Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cameron and Mary Susan Arnegard appealed a trial court judgment relating to a conditional use permit (CUP) obtained from Arnegard Township in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The Arnegards argued the district court erred in granting the Township's motion in limine to exclude a buy-sell agreement; denying their motion to amend their complaint on a due process claim; granting summary judgment dismissing their breach of contract, actual fraud and equitable estoppel claims; dismissing their negligence and deceit claims by directed verdict; and determining no party prevailed in the action. The Arnegards also argued the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion to amend their complaint at trial. The Township cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Arnegards' due process claim. Zoning ordinances and amendments are valid if a township follows the statutory procedures. A conditional use permit does not by itself create a contract between a township and a landowner. A township has no duty to disclose validly enacted zoning ordinances or amendments beyond the notice and filing procedures provided by statute. A claim of constitutional due process violation first requires a protected property interest created by an independent source of law. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court regarding dismissal of the Arnegards' breach of contract, actual fraud and equitable estoppel claims. The Court affirmed the judgment regarding directed verdicts in favor of the Township on the negligence and deceit claims. However, the Court reversed the judgment regarding the Arnegards' due process claim and the award of nominal damages, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arnegard v. Arnegard Township" on Justia Law

Leon Pfingsten appealed a district court order granting Owego Township's motion to dismiss an appeal. In 2015, several Owego Township residents petitioned for alteration of what was known as Bagoon Road. In April 2015 the Township sued Pfingsten to have that portion of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property declared a public road by prescriptive easement, to prevent Pfingsten from claiming any adverse interest in the road and to have damages awarded for Pfingsten's intentional injury to the road. The Township also sought access to Pfingsten's property for surveying. Pfingsten counterclaimed for trespass. The district court entered a stipulated order providing that the Township had the right to survey Pfingsten's land before December 31, 2016 and, upon completion of the survey, the Township would proceed with a taking action. The district court stayed the action until December 31, 2016. On September 26, 2016, the Township acted on the March 2015 petition and adopted and filed with the Township Clerk an order to alter highway and a statement of damages. The order to alter highway changed the location of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property; the statement of damages valued Pfingsten's two acres at $9,000. Pfingsten did not appeal the Township's award of damages. On December 3, 2016 the Township adopted a confirmation of order to alter highway and confirmation of statement of damages. On December 22, 2016 Pfingsten received a $9,000 check from the Township. He appealed to the district court on January 19, 2017. The Township moved to dismiss the appeal. The district court ruled that Pfingsten's appeal was untimely under N.D.C.C. sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01 and granted the Township's motion to dismiss the appeal. Pfingsten argued on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court the district court erred by concluding his appeal was untimely. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed: a township's determination or award of damages must be appealed within thirty days of filing under N.D.C.C. Sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01. View "Owego Township v. Pfingsten" on Justia Law

Steve Forster, Daniel Krebs, and Debra Krebs (collectively "Forster/Krebs") appealed the dismissal of their claims against B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc., and JB's Welding. Forster/Krebs argued the district court erred in construing language in a lease agreement with B&B Hot Oil as a waiver of their claims against B&B Hot Oil for damages to their building and property and to preclude a subrogation claim by their insurer, Acuity, against B&B Hot Oil. Forster/Krebs also argued the district court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing their claims against JB's Welding for concerted action and a joint venture. B&B Hot Oil leased one-half of a building owned by Forster/Krebs and used the leased property to store two hot oil trucks. An explosion in January 2010, destroyed the building and its contents and damaged surrounding property. The alleged cause of the explosion was a propane leak from one of the hot oil trucks, which has been referred to by the parties as a "knock off" truck built through "reverse engineering" by B&B Hot Oil with assistance from JB's Welding. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded a stipulation to dismiss Forster/Krebs' other remaining claims against JB's Welding without prejudice did not make the judgment final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "James Vault & Precast Co. v. B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Winnie Development, LLLP appealed a district court judgment holding it had no interest in a parcel of land in the City of Horace. This litigation arose after Winnie sought access over Parcel 1 to reach an adjacent 1.6-acre piece of land ("Parcel 2"). Parcel 2 was not in the Orth-Golberg Second Addition. It sat between the Sheyenne River and several other privately owned lots in the subdivision. Parcel 2 could be accessed only via Parcel 1, crossing the Sheyenne River or crossing privately owned property in the subdivision. Winnie brought this action to quiet title in Winnie to both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, to declare an easement by necessity in Winnie's favor over Parcel 1, or to reform the plat and declare Parcel 1 dedicated to the public subject to access rights not inconsistent with the plat's "City Dike Access." Some defendants owning land in the vicinity of Parcel 1 made no answer to Winnie's complaint. One defendant answered but did not otherwise litigate the issues. The district court ultimately entered judgment barring these defendants from further claiming any interest in Parcel 1. Stephanie and Benjamin Hendricks owned the property immediately south of Parcel 1. The Hendricks counterclaimed against Winnie, arguing they owned all or part of Parcel 1 and Winnie was trespassing on their property by using Parcel 1 to access Parcel 2. The district court rejected both of the Hendricks's counterclaims. None of the parties contested Winnie's claim to Parcel 2, and the district court quieted title in Winnie to that property. The City of Horace also answered and counterclaimed, alleging it had an interest in Parcel 1 to access City dikes. The district court subsequently granted the City's motion for summary judgment, holding the City has a right to use Parcel 1 to access the City's dikes regardless of ultimate disposition of the property. The court found the designation of Parcel 1 as "City Dike Access" divested Mary Lou Orth of any title, and thus the quitclaim deed Winnie obtained from her in 2014 conveyed no interest. The district court also found Winnie failed to meet its burden of proof establishing an easement by necessity, and found Winnie incorrectly claimed an easement over the land of a third party. Winnie argued it had a legal interest allowing access to its property adjacent to the disputed parcel. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court for entry of judgment, providing that Winnie held fee title to the disputed parcel subject to the City's access rights. View "Winnie Development, LLLP, v. Reveling" on Justia Law

James and Carol Miller appealed the quieting of title to certain real property in favor of Julie Sauter. The Millers argued the district court erred in finding Sauter acquired ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession, finding the boundary of the property was established by acquiescence, finding the Millers breached their contract and trespassed on Julie Sauter's property, and awarding Julie Sauter attorney's fees. Prior to taking ownership in 2013, the Miller property was owned by Kurt and Katina Heinrich. In 2012, Julie Sauter and the Heinrichs entered into a grazing lease for a two-year period expiring in 2014. However, before the lease expired, the Heinrichs sold their property to the Millers and no longer had use for the Sauter property. The Millers did not have the property surveyed prior to the purchase. Julie Sauter allowed the Heinrichs to sublease the land to the Millers for the 2013 grazing year. For the 2014 grazing season, Julie Sauter and the Millers entered into a new lease. In 2013, the Millers wanted to drill a water well on their property which required the land to be surveyed. The survey revealed the Original fence did not follow the actual boundary line of the two properties. The Millers tore down the Original fence, constructed a new fence on the surveyed boundary line, and drilled a water well on the disputed property. The right to ownership of land and passage of title, as a consequence of adverse possession or acquiescence, occur when the statutory period for possession has been satisfied. The continuous possession requirement for adverse possession and acquiescence is not disturbed by a nonacquiescent action that brings rise to the quiet title action. The Millers argued the district court erred because there was no proof of acquiescence by themselves or their predecessors in interest, the statutory period for possession was disturbed, and acquiescence was inapplicable because the Original fence was nothing more than a barrier. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on acquiescence, breach of contract, trespass, and attorney's fees. Because the Court affirmed on the issue of acquiescence, it did not reach the issue of adverse possession. View "Sauter v. Miller" on Justia Law

Dickinson Elks Building, LLC, appealed a judgment awarding Rick and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction ("RJ Snider"), $198,255.08 for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims. In 2011, RJ Snider contracted with Granville Brinkman to furnish materials and labor for construction work on real property owned by Dickinson Elks. RJ Snider's principal place of business was located in Washington. In 2012, RJ Snider applied for a contractor license from the North Dakota Secretary of State, and the license was issued on in February 2012. RJ Snider provided services and materials for Dickinson Elks' property from December 26, 2011, to November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks paid RJ Snider for all of the services and materials it provided between December 26, 2011, and February 1, 2012. RJ Snider billed Dickinson Elks $174,642.10 for the services and materials it provided from March 15, 2012, until November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks did not pay any of this amount. In January 2013, RJ Snider recorded a construction lien against Dickinson Elks' property. In May 2014, Dickinson Elks served RJ Snider with a demand to start a lawsuit to enforce the lien and record a lis pendens within 30 days of the demand. RJ Snider sued Dickinson Elks in June 2014, seeking foreclosure of the construction lien and a money judgment. RJ Snider recorded a notice of lis pendens on July 28, 2014. Dickinson Elks moved for summary judgment, arguing RJ Snider's complaint should be dismissed under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02 because RJ Snider was not a licensed contractor when it started work on the property. Dickinson Elks also argued RJ Snider did not have a valid construction lien, because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the demand to enforce the lien. The district court partially granted the motion and entered a judgment forfeiting RJ Snider's construction lien because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving Dickinson Elks' demand to enforce the lien as required under N.D.C.C. 35-27-25. The court concluded RJ Snider's claims were not precluded under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02. RJ Snider amended its complaint, claiming it was entitled to a money judgment against Dickinson Elks under the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded RJ Snider was not precluded from maintaining its claims; however, the Court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any of the damages awarded were for services and materials provided before RJ Snider was licensed. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law

Artec Homes, LLC ("Artec") appealed an amended judgment granting foreclosure in favor of Andrew Martin ("Martin"), and dismissing Artec's claims against Martin and Greyson Financial Services, Inc. ("Greyson"). This case was the fourth lawsuit relating to an unfinished real estate development referred to as Magic Meadows in Minot, North Dakota. Highpoint Properties, LLC ("Highpoint") originally owned 127 residential lots in the Magic Meadows development. In September 2011, Artec purchased an interest in twenty of the lots from Highpoint for $400,000. Highpoint continued to own the remaining 107 lots after the sale of the twenty lots to Artec. In April 2013, while the first lawsuit between Artec and Highpoint was pending, Highpoint conveyed its interest in the remaining 107 lots to Marquee Pacific, LLC ("Marquee"). In June 2013, Greyson loaned $400,000 to Marquee in exchange for a mortgage against the remaining 107 lots. Greyson subsequently assigned the mortgage to Martin in November 2014. In December 2013, Artec began the third lawsuit against Highpoint and Marquee after it discovered Highpoint transferred the remaining 107 lots to Marquee. Artec alleged that Highpoint's conveyance of the remaining 107 lots to Marquee was fraudulent. Highpoint and Marquee did not defend the lawsuit, and Highpoint's conveyance to Marquee was set aside. Greyson and Martin were not parties to the third lawsuit. Following that lawsuit, Artec owned all 127 lots subject to the mortgage on 107 lots originally held by Greyson and assigned to Martin. The latest lawsuit was initiated by Martin against Marquee and Artec seeking to foreclose the mortgage on the 107 lots. Artec counterclaimed against Martin and subsequently brought a third-party complaint against Greyson, alleging they did not receive the mortgage from Marquee in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value, rendering the mortgage unenforceable. Martin and Greyson moved to dismiss Artec's counterclaim and third-party complaint, and Martin moved for summary judgment on the foreclosure claim. The district court concluded that because Greyson obtained its mortgage from Marquee before Artec sued to set aside the conveyance from Highpoint to Marquee in the third lawsuit, Greyson should have been made a party to that action. The court held Artec improperly split its cause of action because it did not join Martin and Greyson in the fraudulent transfer action. The court granted Martin's motion for summary judgment on the foreclosure claim after determining that dismissal of Artec's claims against Martin and Greyson eliminated Artec's only defense to the foreclosure claim. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded:because Greyson and Martin were not parties to the fraudulent transfer action nor in privity with Highpoint or Marquee, the res judicata prohibition against splitting a cause of action did not apply, and the district court erred in dismissing Artec's claims. View "Martin v. Marquee Pacific, LLC" on Justia Law

Craig Benson ("Benson") appealed a district court's judgment defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 and awarding Feland Brothers Properties ("the Felands") the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. In 1951, Ruby Benson, Benson's grandmother, acquired a 600 by 450 foot tract to the west of Whiskey Bay on Lake Metigoshe. This tract of land was subdivided into several lots. The Felands owned Outlot 10, Craig and Brenda Benson ("the Bensons") owned Outlot 53, and Danny and Gwen Aftem ("the Aftems") owned Outlot 11. Outlot 53 was the result of a survey completed in 2010. The northern portion of Outlot 53 was largely ignored by the record owners, Richard Benson and then Craig Benson. Chris Romfo, a neighbor, testified that he rented Outlot 53 from Richard Benson for about nine years and understood that it was only for the southern part of Outlot 53. Romfo testified that Richard Benson never mentioned owning the northern part of Outlot 53. Although Craig Benson testified that he and his family regularly stayed at the lake for many years, he was vague as to the use of the northern part. He testified that he didn't build anything on the northern lot, except for a small bridge across the creek, apparently connecting the north and south portions of the lot. This bridge was later removed. After the 2010 survey was completed, he placed "no trespass" signs on the northern lot and cut trees down. He also began warning others not to use the property. The previous owners of Outlot 10 made a number of improvements to the northern portion of Outlot 53. The Bensons sued the Felands and Aftems to quiet title in all of Outlot 53. The Felands and Aftems counterclaimed, arguing that they own the northern portion of Outlot 53 and title should be quieted in their favor. Alternatively, the Felands and Aftems argued that they acquired the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court defined the southeastern boundary of Outlot 11 as the corner of L-8 and L-9 on Outlot 53's plat, awarded the Felands the northern portion of Outlot 53 on the basis of adverse possession, and quieted title to the southern portion of Outlot 53 in favor of the Bensons. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not clearly err in defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 or in concluding the Felands adversely possessed the northern portion of Outlot 53. View "Benson v. Feland Brothers Properties" on Justia Law

Michele Brandt, as Trustee of the Michele L. Brandt Revocable Trust, appealed an order dismissing her appeal of the City of Fargo's resolution of necessity. Karen Wieland appealed a judgment dismissing her appeal to the district court from the City's resolution of necessity. In December 2016, the Fargo City Commission passed a resolution of necessity for property owned by Brandt related to construction of a flood protection project. Days later in a separate proceeding, the City passed a similar resolution of necessity for property owned by Wieland. Each resolution authorized the City to proceed with all legal means to obtain the property, including eminent domain. In each case the City filed a record on appeal in the district court and moved the court to dismiss the appeal. In Brandt's appeal, the City moved alternatively to consolidate Brandt's appeal with an eminent domain proceeding that the City also commenced in December 2016. In both appeals, Brandt and Wieland moved the district court to strike all materials from the record that had not specifically been placed in front of the city commission during the respective December 2016 meetings. After a February 22, 2017 hearing in Brandt's appeal, the district court entered an order granting the City's motion to dismiss and holding a resolution of necessity as a predicate to eminent domain is not subject to appellate review by the court. The court also held the City had not acted in bad faith, with a gross abuse of discretion, or fraudulently in passing the resolution of necessity. The order denied Brandt's motion to strike, concluding further consideration of the motion was moot. After a March 21, 2017 hearing in Wieland's appeal before a different judge, the district court entered an order and judgment dismissing Wieland's appeal. The court explained that the decision to go forward with an eminent domain proceeding is the City's political or legislative decision which the court could not review by appeal from issuance of the resolution. The City commenced an eminent domain proceeding for the Wieland property in April 2017. Because of similar dispositions, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed both appeals in this decision and affirmed, concluding the court in each case did not err in dismissing the appeals because no statutory basis authorized an appeal to the district court from the City's resolutions of necessity. View "Brandt v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Robert and Teryl Gannaway filed a complaint in 2015 against Nadir Torres, Terra Nova Developments, LLC ("Terra Nova"), William and Karen Schneider, and any other encumbrancers of their property. The Gannaways sought to quiet title to the property after it was fraudulently conveyed, and the Schneiders secured a mortgage on the property. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment quieting title in the Gannaways and determining the Schneiders were not good-faith purchasers for value without notice. View "Gannaway v. Torres" on Justia Law