Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Ronnie Nelson owned a surface estate in Burke County who sought to use the mineral lapse statutes to obtain the mineral rights associated with the surface estate. Nelson published a notice of lapse of mineral interest against McAlester Fuel Company ("McAlester") for three consecutive weeks. Nelson filed an action to quiet title on 108 mineral acres in Burke County, a notice of no personal claim, and a sheriff's return in district court. Before filing his action to quiet title, Nelson also mailed a notice of claim and attempted to personally serve McAlester. The address to which Nelson mailed notice of claim appeared on a mineral deed dated March 6, 1958. McAlester filed no statement of claim within 60 days after Nelson published the notice of lapse. Nelson's complaint alleged he had substantially complied with the statutory procedure for claiming abandoned minerals. Nelson moved for entry of default judgment, and based upon what was provided to the district court and the fact McAlester did not file a statement of claim, the district court found McAlester had failed to use the mineral interests. The district court entered a default judgment on February 3, 2009. In 2015, McAlester filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. The district court concluded the judgment against McAlester was void and entered an order vacating the judgment quieting title. In its order to vacate, the district court determined Nelson failed to comply with the notice requirements of the statutory procedure for claiming abandoned minerals. McAlester moved to dismiss Nelson's action to quiet title for failure to state a claim and judgment on the pleadings. Nelson opposed the motion. Ultimately, the district court granted McAlester's motion to dismiss Nelson's quiet title action. On appeal, Nelson argued the district court erred because it concluded the abandoned mineral statute "requires a surface owner to conduct a reasonable inquiry to find a mineral owner's current address, even when an address appears of record." The Supreme Court found that this was not the basis for the district court's decision: the district court stated Nelson's mailing was not "reasonably certain" to reach McAlester. However, the district court then stated, "[a]llowing a claimant to pick any address from the record would encourage the claimant to always mail notice to the oldest address in the record in hopes that the address is stale, and that the notice would therefore not reach the intended target." The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Nelson failed to comply with the statutory notice procedure, and affirmed its judgment. View "Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Company" on Justia Law

James Broten, individually, and as personal representative of the estate of Olaf Broten, appealed a second amended judgment denying him restitution for payments he made to his parents during their lifetimes. In 1979, Broten and his parents Helen and Olaf Broten executed a contract for deed to purchase approximately 480 acres of farmland. Broten agreed to purchase the farmland for $200,000 plus six percent annual interest through 2006. After his father's death in 1998, Broten, as personal representative of the estate, conveyed the farmland to himself with his mother receiving a life estate. After Broten's mother died in 2010, his sisters, as personal co-representatives of the estate, sued Broten alleging he breached his fiduciary duties by transferring the farmland to himself after his father's death. At trial in 2013, Broten testified that under an oral modification to the contract, he agreed to pay his parents' living expenses for the rest of their lives in addition to the $12,000 annual interest payment in exchange for the farmland. After trial the district court found the parties mutually agreed to abandon the terms of the written contract for deed. The court also found Broten did not prove the oral modification to the contract and breached his fiduciary duties to his father's estate by transferring the farmland to himself. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment finding a breach of fiduciary duty and award of damages, but remanded to the district court to decide whether Broten was entitled to compensation for improvements he made to the farmland or for payments he made to his parents or on their behalf. The district court entered a second amended judgment reducing the amount Broten owed by $20,000 for improvements he made to the property. The court did not award Broten restitution for the payments he made to his parents or on their behalf. The court concluded Broten benefited from the relationship with his parents and failed to prove his parents were unjustly enriched by the payments he made to them or on their behalf. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment finding Broten breached his fiduciary duty, and to pay plaintiffs $103,054 as compensation for his use of the land from June 16, 2010, through December 31, 2013, including interest. The Court also affirmed the judgment holding the reduction of the land value by $20,000 for improvements to the land. The Court reversed the judgment holding Broten was not entitled to any restitution, and remanded for entry of judgment requiring Broten to pay to plaintiffs $1,197,000 for the value of the land as of December 31, 2013, reduced by $191,789.40 for restitution and $20,000 for improvements. View "Broten v. Broten" on Justia Law

Justin Beckstrand and James Beckstrand, through his surviving spouse, Cynthia, appealed a judgment awarding $164,202.40 in 2015 farm rental payments to Julie Beckstrand, the personal representative of John Beckstrand's estate. The Supreme Court found that because the district court's findings were inadequate to explain the basis for its equitable decision to award the farm rental payments to Julie Beckstrand, it reversed and remanded for the court to explain the rationale for its decision. View "Beckstrand v. Beckstrand" on Justia Law

Kevin and Lynn Klein appealed a judgment dismissing their claims and quieting title to certain real property in Gregory Sletto. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in granting summary judgment because the Kleins failed to present any evidence supporting their claims about the existence of a valid contract. View "Klein v. Sletto" on Justia Law

XTO Energy, Inc., appealed and Darwin and Jean Krenz cross-appealed a judgment awarding the Krenzes $800,000 for a pipeline trespass and ordering the parties to abide by certain documents for their future relationship after the district court construed a pipeline easement to authorize one pipeline on the Krenzes' land and found XTO's unauthorized construction and operation of a second pipeline on the Krenzes' land and use of their private road was a trespass. After review of this matter, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded an April 2007 pipeline easement was ambiguous and the court erred in construing the easement as a matter of law. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision construing the pipeline easement and awarding the Krenzes $800,000 for the pipeline trespass and the court's decision requiring the parties to abide by their unexecuted negotiations involving their future relationship. View "Krenz v. XTO Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Rick Snider and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction ("Snider"), appealed the grant of summary judgment, forfeiting a construction lien against the property that formerly housed the Dickinson Elks Lodge later owned by private investors, the Dickinson Elks Building, LLC ("DEB"), and prohibiting Snider from recording additional liens against the property without performing additional work. The North Dakota Supreme Court was not convinced that perfecting a lien amounted to creating a lien, as argued by the Sniders. As such, the Court concluded that when a Court declares a lien is deemed forfeited or satisfied, the right to the lien for the construction services or materials provided is deemed forfeited, not just the document recording the lien and establishing its priority. The district court correctly interpreted N.D.C.C. 35-27-25 in concluding the statute barred Snider from recording another construction lien against DEB's property for the same work. The district court also correctly concluded Snider forfeited its construction lien created and attached as a matter of law under N.D.C.C. sections 35-27-02 and 35-27-03 when it failed to comply with DEB's demand to enforce the lien. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law

La Verne Koenig appealed after a jury found no fault in his personal injury lawsuit against Kenneth Schuh and Jason Schuh. Koenig was injured on a farm owned by Patricia Schuh. Koenig bought hay bales located on the Schuh farm. While tightening a strap securing the hay bales to a trailer, Koenig fell resulting in injury. Koenig sued Kenneth, Jason, Patricia and Mary Schuh alleging their fault in strapping the bales to the trailer. Koenig specifically alleged Jason was negligent in assisting him strapping a bale to the trailer and was acting under the direction of Kenneth and Mary Schuh. He alleged Patricia was liable because she owned the land and had a business relationship with the other Schuh defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to Patricia and Mary Schuh before trial. A jury found no fault on the part of Kenneth and Jason Schuh. Koenig argued on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Patricia and Mary; (2) the lack of a trial transcript denied him a fair and full review on appeal; and (3) he did not receive a fair and full jury trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Koenig v. Schuh" on Justia Law

Cory Rice appealed a district court's judgment quieting title to real property in Joyce Neether. Rice was Neether's grandson. Neether and her late husband, Alvin Neether, raised Rice at their farm. Alvin was diagnosed with ALS in 2009. Sometime before July 29, 2009, Joyce contacted an attorney to draft a bill of sale for the purchase of personal property and two warranty deeds conveying real property to Rice, reserving a life estate in that property for the Neethers. The attorney met with the Neethers to sign the warranty deeds. At that time, Alvin was terminally ill and, while he was physically unable to sign his own name, the district court found he was mentally competent to transfer property. Joyce had authority through a Power of Attorney to manage Alvin’s real and personal property. Rice was not present when Joyce signed the deeds. The attorney told the Neethers he would record the deeds the following day, July 30, 2009. Before the deeds were recorded, Joyce instructed the attorney not to record the deeds. Joyce never contacted the attorney to either record the deeds or deliver them to Rice. Rice testified that, some time after July 29, 2009, he came to believe he owned the property at issue based on alleged conversations he had with both Alvin and the attorney. Rice claimed the attorney had represented him on other matters prior to 2009. Rice testified that, in 2012, Rice learned a developer planned on building a grocery and liquor store on the property he believed the Neethers had conveyed to him. Rice brought an action in district court to quiet title. The Supreme Court found that Rice failed to establish the deeds were delivered and N.D.C.C. 47-09-06 created a rebuttable presumption that a deed has been delivered at its date only after delivery has been separately established. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Rice v. Neether" on Justia Law

Lyndon Fredericks appealed, and Bole Resources, LLC, and others cross-appealed a judgment declaring the district court: had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, reforming a quit claim mineral deed, quieting title in the mineral interests in Paul Fredericks, and ordering Lyndon Fredericks to pay the Bole defendants damages plus interest and their attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court concluded, after review, the district court correctly ruled it had subject-matter jurisdiction, its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed. View "Fredericks v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

Linda Ketterling was married to Larry Ketterling. They were the co-owners of L & L Rentals, and each owned a fifty percent membership interest in the company. Larry died on July 31, 2014. An application for the informal probate of Larry's will was filed and a personal representative was appointed. In November 2015, the personal representative petitioned for approval of the final accounting, settlement, and distribution of the estate, including distribution of Larry's interest in L & L Rentals to his children. Linda objected to the petition, arguing Larry's interest in the company was not available for distribution because she intended to purchase the interest under the terms of the L & L Rentals operating agreement. In 2016, a bank petitioned for allowance of its claim against the estate for payment of debts, including a loan to L & L Rentals. Linda filed a claim against the estate for amounts she may be required to pay creditors on loans to Larry. Linda then objected to the petition for approval of an amended final accounting and distribution, arguing L & L Rentals was not an estate asset. Linda filed a notice of appeal, stating she was appealing the earlier order. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not ruled on Linda's claim: the petition for approval of the amended final accounting and distribution, or the objection. There were also remaining issues with creditors and the transfer of the ownership interest in L & L Rentals could have been interrelated to these issues. The Supreme Court held that the district court's order was not appealable without Rule 54(b) certification, if it was providently granted. Linda did not request Rule 54(b) certification, and therefore this was not a final, appealable order. Concluding it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed. View "Estate of Ketterling" on Justia Law