Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

La Verne Koenig appealed after a jury found no fault in his personal injury lawsuit against Kenneth Schuh and Jason Schuh. Koenig was injured on a farm owned by Patricia Schuh. Koenig bought hay bales located on the Schuh farm. While tightening a strap securing the hay bales to a trailer, Koenig fell resulting in injury. Koenig sued Kenneth, Jason, Patricia and Mary Schuh alleging their fault in strapping the bales to the trailer. Koenig specifically alleged Jason was negligent in assisting him strapping a bale to the trailer and was acting under the direction of Kenneth and Mary Schuh. He alleged Patricia was liable because she owned the land and had a business relationship with the other Schuh defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to Patricia and Mary Schuh before trial. A jury found no fault on the part of Kenneth and Jason Schuh. Koenig argued on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Patricia and Mary; (2) the lack of a trial transcript denied him a fair and full review on appeal; and (3) he did not receive a fair and full jury trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Koenig v. Schuh" on Justia Law

Cory Rice appealed a district court's judgment quieting title to real property in Joyce Neether. Rice was Neether's grandson. Neether and her late husband, Alvin Neether, raised Rice at their farm. Alvin was diagnosed with ALS in 2009. Sometime before July 29, 2009, Joyce contacted an attorney to draft a bill of sale for the purchase of personal property and two warranty deeds conveying real property to Rice, reserving a life estate in that property for the Neethers. The attorney met with the Neethers to sign the warranty deeds. At that time, Alvin was terminally ill and, while he was physically unable to sign his own name, the district court found he was mentally competent to transfer property. Joyce had authority through a Power of Attorney to manage Alvin’s real and personal property. Rice was not present when Joyce signed the deeds. The attorney told the Neethers he would record the deeds the following day, July 30, 2009. Before the deeds were recorded, Joyce instructed the attorney not to record the deeds. Joyce never contacted the attorney to either record the deeds or deliver them to Rice. Rice testified that, some time after July 29, 2009, he came to believe he owned the property at issue based on alleged conversations he had with both Alvin and the attorney. Rice claimed the attorney had represented him on other matters prior to 2009. Rice testified that, in 2012, Rice learned a developer planned on building a grocery and liquor store on the property he believed the Neethers had conveyed to him. Rice brought an action in district court to quiet title. The Supreme Court found that Rice failed to establish the deeds were delivered and N.D.C.C. 47-09-06 created a rebuttable presumption that a deed has been delivered at its date only after delivery has been separately established. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Rice v. Neether" on Justia Law

Lyndon Fredericks appealed, and Bole Resources, LLC, and others cross-appealed a judgment declaring the district court: had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, reforming a quit claim mineral deed, quieting title in the mineral interests in Paul Fredericks, and ordering Lyndon Fredericks to pay the Bole defendants damages plus interest and their attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court concluded, after review, the district court correctly ruled it had subject-matter jurisdiction, its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed. View "Fredericks v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

Linda Ketterling was married to Larry Ketterling. They were the co-owners of L & L Rentals, and each owned a fifty percent membership interest in the company. Larry died on July 31, 2014. An application for the informal probate of Larry's will was filed and a personal representative was appointed. In November 2015, the personal representative petitioned for approval of the final accounting, settlement, and distribution of the estate, including distribution of Larry's interest in L & L Rentals to his children. Linda objected to the petition, arguing Larry's interest in the company was not available for distribution because she intended to purchase the interest under the terms of the L & L Rentals operating agreement. In 2016, a bank petitioned for allowance of its claim against the estate for payment of debts, including a loan to L & L Rentals. Linda filed a claim against the estate for amounts she may be required to pay creditors on loans to Larry. Linda then objected to the petition for approval of an amended final accounting and distribution, arguing L & L Rentals was not an estate asset. Linda filed a notice of appeal, stating she was appealing the earlier order. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not ruled on Linda's claim: the petition for approval of the amended final accounting and distribution, or the objection. There were also remaining issues with creditors and the transfer of the ownership interest in L & L Rentals could have been interrelated to these issues. The Supreme Court held that the district court's order was not appealable without Rule 54(b) certification, if it was providently granted. Linda did not request Rule 54(b) certification, and therefore this was not a final, appealable order. Concluding it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed. View "Estate of Ketterling" on Justia Law

In August 2014, the First Western Bank and Trust (Bank) applied for two variances from City of Minot zoning regulations for off-street parking after incorrectly calculating the size of an addition to its bank building. The Bank's application sought to reduce the required number of off-street parking spaces for its building from 131 to 110 and to reduce the required width of each parking space from 10 to 9 feet. After notice to the Bank's neighbors, the Minot Planning Commission met to consider the application, and several neighbors appeared to oppose the application. The Planning Commission approved the application, finding the existence of an exceptional topographical hardship and the variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without impairing the general purpose and intent of Minot's comprehensive zoning plan. The Planning Commission affirmed its earlier decision approving the application. The City Council later affirmed the Planning Commission's decision. Sixteen Minot residents living near the Bank appealed a judgment dismissing their appeal of the City Council’s decision to grant the Bank's application for zoning variances. The residents argued the district court erred in ruling they lacked standing under N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 to appeal the City Council's decision granting the variances. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 as grounds for its standing decision. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded the residents were not aggrieved applicants authorized to appeal a variance decision under N.D.C.C. 40-47-11. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing their appeal. View "Schmidt v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Brian Welken appealed after a jury returned a verdict in favor of Eugene Taszarek, Marlys Taszarek, Trina Schilling, Steven Taszarek, and Michael Taszarek ("Taszareks") and against Lakeview Excavating, Inc., ("Lakeview") and Welken. Lakeview was a corporation primarily involved in flood control projects, and Welken was Lakeview's president and sole shareholder. In the spring of 2012, German Township in Dickey County solicited bids for road construction projects to repair and raise the grade of a road near the Taszareks' property. Lakeview, acting through Welken, successfully bid and was selected as the contractor for the road projects. Lakeview obtained most of its field rock for the project from area farmers and ranchers with rock piles on their properties. Lakeview arranged with landowners to harvest rocks from their fields and reclaim the ground so it could again be farmed, and landowners allowed Lakeview to remove rock piles. Herb Buerkley owned land adjacent to land owned by the Taszareks, and Buerkley permitted Lakeview to enter his family's property to harvest field rock. While harvesting the rock piles from Buerkley's land, Lakeview's employees crossed into the Taszareks' land and harvested field rock. The Taszareks brought an action against both Lakeview and Welken, asserting claims of intentional trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment arising from Lakeview's work on the German Township road-raising project. The district court held a jury trial on the Taszareks' trespass and conversion claims against Lakeview and Welken. During trial, the Taszareks' attorney asked the court to instruct the jury on the theory that Lakeview was the "alter ego" of Welken and that Welken should therefore be personally liable for any judgment. Over the objection of Welken's attorney, the court gave an instruction regarding the alter ego doctrine. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Welken failed to preserve whether the district court misapplied the law by allowing the jury to resolve whether Lakeview was the alter ego of Welken. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of law in inadequately instructing the jury regarding the alter ego doctrine. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Taszarek v. Welken" on Justia Law

Joan and Shane Tangedal appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim against the Lake Region District Health Unit and denying their motion to amend their complaint to add a Lake Region employee, Allen McKay, as a defendant to their lawsuit. In September 2014, the Tangedals sued William and Mavis Mertens, Lake Region, and the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners for damages resulting from the January 2014 collapse of a septic tank on land the Tangedals had purchased from the Mertens in 2009. The Tangedals alleged the Mertens failed to disclose that in 2000 they built an addition to the residence on the land on top of the septic system in violation of applicable state and county regulations. The Tangedals also alleged that, as part of the purchase and as required under North Dakota law and Ramsey County regulations, McKay, the Environmental Health Supervisor for Lake Region, inspected the septic system and negligently certified it as "expected to function satisfactorily and . . . not likely to create an insanitary condition." Lake Region and the Ramsey County Board answered, denying liability and alleging governmental immunity in the performance of a public duty. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Lake Region and McKay had immunity for their alleged acts under N.D.C.C. section 32-12.1-03(3). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Tangedals' motion to amend their complaint and did not err in granting summary judgment dismissal of their claim against Lake Region. View "Tangedal v. Mertens" on Justia Law

Sandra Horob, Steven Poeckes, Steve Shae, Mike Shae and Paul Shae, the successors to the interests of John and Bernice Shae ("Horob plaintiffs"), appealed the grant of summary judgment deciding ownership of an oil and gas lease in favor of the successors to the interest of the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate (collectively "defendants") and declaring the lease did not terminate and remained in effect. The Horob plaintiffs argued the Shae lease expired under the cessation of production clause because production from the well on the interest at-issue ceased, and additional drilling or reworking operations were not commenced within 60 days of the cessation. The district court concluded the lease did not expire because the cessation of production clause was not triggered. The court alternatively concluded the lease did not expire because: (1) it remained in effect under the terms of a communitization agreement with the United States; and (2) the Horob plaintiffs ratified the lease by accepting royalty payments after the lapses in production. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Shae lease's cessation of production clause was triggered, however, the lease remained in effect under the terms of the communitization agreement. View "Horob v. Zavanna, LLC" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, several landowners appealed district court orders granting the Cass County Joint Water Resource District (District) permission to enter their respective properties. The Landowners argued that the district courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cases because: (1) the District failed to serve a summons and complaint; (2) that soil borings and other tests were outside the scope of permitted examinations; and (3) they were entitled to a jury trial to determine just compensation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district courts' orders. View "2015 Application for Permit to Enter Land" on Justia Law

Dickinson Elks Building, LLC, appealed after the district court forfeited a construction lien filed by Rick and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction, and awarded the Dickinson Elks attorney's fees. In December 2011, Snider contracted with Beaver Brinkman to perform work on real property owned by the Dickinson Elks. Snider recorded a construction lien in January 2013 against the property after it did not get paid for all of its work. In May 2014, the Dickinson Elks served Snider with a demand to start a lawsuit to enforce the lien and record a lis pendens within 30 days of the demand. Snider sued the Dickinson Elks in June 2014, seeking foreclosure of the construction lien and a money judgment. Snider recorded a notice of lis pendens in July 2014. The Dickinson Elks moved for summary judgment, arguing Snider's complaint should have been dismissed because Snider was not a licensed contractor when it started the work on the property. The Dickinson Elks also argued Snider did not have a valid construction lien, because Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the demand to enforce the lien. The district court granted the motion in part and entered a judgment forfeiting Snider's construction lien because Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the Dickinson Elks' demand to enforce the lien. After review, the Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law