Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Leona Kuhn was charged in Napoleon Municipal Court with improper disposal of refuse in violation of Napoleon city ordinance 10.0310. After her house had been severely damaged by fire, Kuhn disposed of debris from the house in the Napoleon city dump. The municipal court found Kuhn guilty of improper disposal, and she appealed to the district court. After a March 2014 trial, the district court found her guilty of the infraction for improper disposal. The court entered a criminal judgment imposing a $500 fine, but the court also purported to defer imposition of sentence and have Kuhn remove or relocate rubbish "to the City's satisfaction." In April 2014 Kuhn moved the district court for a restitution hearing, which was held in May 2014. After the hearing the court declined to modify the criminal judgment and entered an order denying her request for a written restitution order, stating no restitution had been ordered. Kuhn appealed. In 2015, the district court held a hearing on remand. The court decided to defer imposition of the $500 fine for the infraction and to order restitution rather than restoration of the property. The court initially scheduled a restitution hearing for October 5, 2015, without objection, but ultimately held the restitution hearing on October 21, 2015. After the hearing, the court entered an order deferring imposition of a $500 fine for six months and requiring Kuhn pay restitution in the amount of $10,686.98. Kuhn argued the district court's order deferring imposition of sentence and imposing payment of restitution of $10,686.98 should be set aside. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Napoleon v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

In September 2014, the City of Larimore served the Sandahls with a notice of a public nuisance and order to repair or demolish buildings on three parcels of their property. Lonny and Lilian Sandahl appealed the denial of their request to submit additional evidence and affirming the City's finding that a building on their property was dangerous and unsafe and ordering demolition of the building. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Sandahls' self-represented notice of appeal to the district court was not timely under N.D.C.C. 28-34-01 and "Zajac v. Traill Cty. Water Res. Dist.," (2016 ND 134), vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to the district court to dismiss the appeal. View "Sandahl v. City Council of the City of Larimore" on Justia Law

Constellation Development, LLC, appealed dismissal of its claims against Western Trust Company and its trustee, Gary Hoffman (collectively "Western"), for breach of contract and equitable and promissory estoppel, and against Dabbert Custom Homes, LLC, for tortious interference with a business contract. In 2013, Constellation agreed in writing to purchase about 24 acres of land in Cass County from Western, with the remaining balance to be paid on October 14, 2013. A check was tendered with the agreement, but was returned for insufficient funds. When Constellation tendered a cashier's check to cover the earlier check, Western refused it. In it s suit against Wester, Constellation claimed there had been an oral extension of the purchase agreement. The Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding there was no breach of any agreement Western had with Constellation, it affirmed dismissal of Constellation's claims. View "Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co." on Justia Law

Roland Riemers twice sued Heidee Hill, her husband, Jason Hill, and her three children, Hannah Hill, Ashley Roesler, and Hailey Marie Hill, for unpaid rent, late fees, property damage, and punitive damages arising out of a lease agreement signed by Heidee Hill for a house in Emerado. Only Heidee Hill signed the lease agreement, but Heidee and Jason Hill were both identified as applicants on the agreement and the three children were listed as "others who will be sharing the house." The Hill family moved to dismiss Riemers' complaint for failure to state a claim and sought attorney fees. They asserted the property was uninhabitable and had been condemned by the Grand Forks Public Health Department in July 2013. They also counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging Riemers' claims for unpaid rent and property damage were "so outrageous and ridiculous" to rise to the level of abuse of process. They claimed that despite the property being condemned in July 2013, Riemers sued them for structural damage to the house that was clearly Riemers' responsibility and Riemers had an ulterior motive to harass and embarrass them with a lawsuit void of any factual or legal basis. Riemers appealed the judgment awarding him $8,245.87 from Heidee Hill for unpaid rent and property damage and ordering him to pay Ashley Roesler $10,164 for abuse of process. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the liability issue of the abuse-of-process claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed the summary judgment on that claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Riemers v. Hill" on Justia Law

In June 2014, the Traill County Water Resource District initially approved Patricia Bertsch's application to install subsurface drain tile on her land, conditioned on her obtaining flowage easements from affected landowners, including appellant Ray Zajac. At a regularly scheduled meeting on July 7, 2015, the Resource District amended its original approval of Bertsch's application to eliminate the requirement that she obtain an easement from Zajac. Zajac did not dispute the agenda for the Resource District's regularly scheduled July 7, 2015 meeting was filed with the Traill County Auditor before the meeting and stated the "Jon Bertsch-Zajac Easement Issue" would be addressed at 7:30. The parties did not dispute that a separate notice of hearing was not mailed to or otherwise served upon Zajac before the meeting. After amending approval of Bertsch's application, the Resource District sent Zajac a July 14, 2015 letter notifying him of the July 7, 2015 decision. On August 10, 2015, Zajac filed a notice of appeal from the Resource District's amended decision with the district court. The district court dismissed Zajac's appeal, concluding it was not timely under N.D.C.C. 28-34-01. Finding no error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Zajac v. Traill County Water Resource District" on Justia Law

Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

26th Street Hospitality, LLP appealed a district court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration; order lifting a stay in the proceedings, confirming the arbitration award, and awarding post-judgment interest; and final judgment. The Partnership argued the district court erred in ordering arbitration because the court was required to determine the validity of the contract before arbitration could be ordered and not all of the claims and parties were subject to arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "26th Street Hospitality v. Real Builders" on Justia Law

The Next Step, an unincorporated association, and Jamie Redmon, an individual, both claimed title to residential real property in Minot. Both parties claimed ownership through different quitclaim deeds they alleged were executed by the prior owner of the property. Redmon alleged the quitclaim deed to The Next Step was forged. Holly Gates, a co-founder of The Next Step, asserted it was not. The Next Step moved for summary judgment, and Redmon filed a response. The district court did not immediately rule on the motion; it instructed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the issue of whether unincorporated associations were capable of holding title to real property in North Dakota. After the parties provided their supplemental briefs, the court entered an order dismissing the case. The court held unincorporated associations are incapable of holding title to real property in North Dakota. The Next Step appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that indeed, unincorporated associations were incapable of holding title to real property. View "The Next Step v. Redmon" on Justia Law

In 2007, Leroy and Norma Seaton entered into an oil and gas lease with Gadeco, LLC covering Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 18 in Township 154 North, Range 98 West, Williams County, North Dakota. The lease had a primary term of five years. The lease contained a "continuing operations clause," which enabled Gadeco to extend the primary term of the lease if "not more than ninety . . . days . . . elapse between the completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of a subsequent well." The lease also contained a Pugh clause (the terms of which were not at issue here). In 2012, the Seatons entered into an oil and gas top lease with Valentina Exploration, LLC, covering Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Township 154 North, Range 98 West, Williams County, North Dakota, sections already under contract by Gadeco's lease. A Gadeco land manager mailed a letter to the Seatons, tendering a shut-in royalty payment. The Seatons did not immediately contact Gadeco in response to the land manager's letter, but later had their attorney mail a certified letter to Gadeco demanding that it "sign and file a formal Release of Oil and Gas lease as to the Seaton lease acres in Sections 6 and 7, . . . pursuant to [N.D.C.C. § 47-16-36]." The letter alleged the lease had expired as to Sections 6 and 7 based on the terms of the lease, stating: "[d]ue to the "unless" lease term provisions contained in the 2007 Gadeco, L.L.C. lease and the letter of March 5, 2012, the lease rights held by Gadeco, L.L.C. under the May 4, 2007 Seaton lease have expired as to the acreage in Section 6 and 7 terminated as of May 4, 2012." 2013, Valentina Exploration recorded and assigned its top lease to Valentina Williston, its wholly-owned subsidiary, to litigate the dispute. The Seatons entered into a litigation agreement with Valentina Williston in which the Seatons agreed to Valentina Williston acting "as the agent and Lessee of Seaton," in the impending litigation. Valentina Williston sued for declaratory judgment and to quiet title. Valentina Williston moved for partial summary judgment arguing the lease had terminated, as a matter of law, due to the effect of the land manager's letter. Gadeco filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asking the district court to dismiss Valentina Williston's claims and conclude the lease continued in full force and effect beyond the primary term due to continuing drilling operations. The district court granted Gadeco's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Valentina Williston's claims with prejudice. Valentina Williston appealed. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC" on Justia Law

David Gray appealed from an order denying his demand for a change of judge and from a judgment dismissing his claims and awarding costs and attorney's fees to Terry Berg. Gray and Berg are adjacent property owners. Berg wounded a deer on his property. The deer ran onto Gray's property. Berg followed the deer onto Gray's property, but he did not find the deer. Berg, along with his son and an acquaintance, reentered the property the following day, but they again did not find the deer. In a subsequent conversation with Gray, Gray informed Berg he was not welcome on the property. About a month later, Gray posted his property. Gray refused Berg's subsequent requests to access the property for purposes of finding the deer. Berg contacted the North Dakota Department of Game and Fish for assistance in entering Gray's property to locate the deer. On December 23, 2013, a game warden accompanied Berg to Gray's property. At trial, the game warden testified that prior to going to the property, she contacted Gray, who agreed Berg and the game warden could come onto his property. However, once at the property, Gray informed a sheriff's deputy, who had been called to the property, he wanted Berg and the game warden removed for trespassing. The district court found, as a matter of fact, Gray consented to their search for the deer after the sheriff's deputy informed Gray that Berg and the game warden wanted to search his property to recover the deer. Berg and the game warden again did not locate the deer. Gray sued Berg for Berg's December 23, 2013 entry to his property. After a bench trial, the district court concluded Berg lawfully entered Gray's property to recover the deer, which was legally shot on his own land. The court concluded Berg acted reasonably and caused no damage while on the property. The court also concluded Gray's claims were frivolous because, in the court's opinion, the law was clear Berg had the right to go onto Gray's property to recover the deer and there was no good faith basis on which Gray could have expected to prevail. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment dismissing Gray's action and ordering Gray to pay Berg's costs and attorney's fees. Gray appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order and the judgment. Berg's request for attorney's fees for defending against this appeal was denied. View "Gray v. Berg" on Justia Law