Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Jon Norberg appealed a district court judgment allowing his former parents-in-law, Robert and Cheri Knorr, to buy back certain real property under an alleged oral lease. He argued the district court erred in concluding the Knorrs established promissory estoppel and constructive trust. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's findings of promissory estoppel were not clearly erroneous. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District filed a declaratory action regarding the ownership and control of property in Sargent County, including all property located south of the north boundary of Drain 11. The District claimed ownership as the successor in interest to the Sargent County Board of Drain Commissioners, which had obtained its interest in the property by right-of-way deeds signed in 1917 and 1918 and recorded in the Sargent County register of deeds office. The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District (Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal). Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed the judgment determining language of the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the disputed property to the District's predecessor. The Supreme Court reversed after review, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements. View "Sargent County Water Resource District v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Timothy Huether contracted with Nodak Mutual to provide insurance coverage for his house, buildings and structures on his farm. The coverage was under Nodak Mutual's Farm and Ranch Policy. The Farm and Ranch Policy did not provide insurance coverage for grain dryers. Huether added an equipment endorsement insuring his agricultural equipment, which included a grain handler dryer. A fire destroyed the grain handler dryer, fans and parts. Nodak Mutual's agricultural endorsement provided coverage for "direct physical loss or damage caused by perils 1 through 10." Huether's Farm and Ranch Policy listed fire as Peril 1. Damage from fire was a "direct physical loss or damage" and Nodak Mutual paid Huether $278,187.44 for damage to the grain dryer, control room and grain handling equipment. Huether did not contest the coverage or payment for those items, but claimed an additional $82,954.77 in expenses for transporting to and drying his crops at other grain drying facilities. Nodak Mutual denied Huether's claim because the agricultural equipment endorsement covered "direct physical loss or damage" and did not cover loss-of-use. Huether sued Nodak Mutual seeking damages for the denied claim. The district court found Huether's claim was not covered under the policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Nodak Mutual. Huether appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Nodak Mutual because it misinterpreted the terms of the insurance policy. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huether v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

John and Lori Finstad owned 80 acres of a section of land in Ransom County and leased 240 adjacent acres in the same section from Willis and Doris Olson. The Ranson-Sargent Water Users District was considering this tract of land as a potential site to drill water wells. In 1997, the Finstads and the Olsons granted to the District options to purchase the land. The options also allowed the Finstads and the Olsons to lease back the property for five years, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal to lease back the property for an additional five years. The Finstads appealed from a judgment awarding them $53,000.99 in damages and interest in their action against the District for breach of the lease-back provisions of an option agreement between the parties. The District cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the economic duress doctrine relieved the Finstads of their obligations under a subsequent agreement and release they had entered into with the District. Because the agreement and release is valid and enforceable, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc." on Justia Law

Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor were married and lived most of their lives together in Minnesota. Ragna Mesling, a widow and Carolyn Vizenor's mother, owned real estate outside of New England, in Hettinger County. The Stechers were long-time renters of the Mesling farmland. The Vizenors sued Mesling and the Stechers, seeking to avoid a deed executed in 2006, in which Mesling, as Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, transferred certain real estate to the Stechers. The Vizenors alleged the transaction directly resulted from improper conduct by the Stechers. The Estates of Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Clifford and Linda Stecher and orders denying their post-judgment motions. The Stechers cross-appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court concluded Ragna Mesling, as her daughter Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, was authorized under a power of attorney to transfer real estate to the Stechers and sufficient evidence supported the district court's findings the transfer was not the product of undue influence. Because the court did not err in dismissing the action and denying the post-judgment motions, the Court therefore affirmed. View "Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling" on Justia Law

Willard and Christi Pankonin owned real property in Logan County, which was mortgaged with Dakota Heritage Bank. The Bank brought a foreclosure action and a judgment was entered. Before the Pankonins' redemption period expired, Willard Pankonin filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court, his interest in the property was transferred to his bankruptcy estate and Michael Iaccone was appointed bankruptcy trustee. Pankonin and Iaccone (defendants), on behalf of Willard Pankonin's bankruptcy estate, moved for relief from the judgment. Attorney Timothy Lamb represented the defendants. The district court denied the motion for relief and awarded the Bank costs and disbursements without prejudice to any subsequent claim for attorney's fees. Christi Pankonin appealed award of attorney's fees to the Bank. Finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dakota Heritage Bank v. Pankonin" on Justia Law

Defendants Citation Oil & Gas Corp., Petro-Hunt LLC, and other working interest owners appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in Greggory Tank. In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. The parties agreed to extend the primary term of the lease for three more years, ending July 15, 1989. In May 1983, the Tank 3-10 well was spudded in the northwest quarter. The well produced until October 1996. In June 1998, the Tank 3-10R well was spudded and replaced the Tank 3-10 well. The Tank 3-10R well continues to produce oil or gas. In June 1988, the Tank 13-10 well was spudded in the southwest quarter. The well continuously produced oil or gas until October 2008, and intermittently produced oil or gas until January 2012. Tank was the successor in interest to George and Phyllis Tank and was the owner of minerals in the southwest quarter of section 10. In September 2011, Tank sued the defendants, seeking to cancel the oil and gas lease to the extent it covered the southwest quarter. The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Tank's claims. The defendants argued the continued drilling and operation of oil and gas wells on the leased property maintained the lease beyond the primary term and the lease remained in full force and effect. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling the lease had expired and was no longer valid on the southwest quarter. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because there were only issues of law to resolve, including the interpretation of an unambiguous contract and the application of undisputed facts. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Robert Hale, individually and on behalf of the State of North Dakota, and Susan Hale appealed a summary judgment dismissing their public nuisance claim against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales had a house on agricultural land about one mile southeast of a shooting range in Ward County, which was used to train local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. Several other farms and homes are located near the Hales' property and the law enforcement shooting range, and County Road 12 runs adjacent to the west side of that shooting range. In "Gowan v. Ward Cnty. Comm.," (764 N.W.2d 425), the Supreme Court affirmed a Ward County Commission zoning decision denying an application to rezone neighboring land, which is about one-quarter mile downrange from the law enforcement shooting range, from agricultural to residential for construction of a residential subdivision. The Ward County Commission denied Gowan's application, citing safety concerns resulting from the proximity of his land to the law enforcement shooting range. In "Hale v. Ward Cnty.", the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Hales' public nuisance claim. The Court discussed the differences between a private and a public nuisance and explained different evidence was relevant to the Hales' claims for a private and a public nuisance. The Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Hales' private nuisance claim, concluding they failed to present competent evidence supporting their claim the law enforcement shooting range posed a danger to their property. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the Hales' public nuisance claim about use of County Road 12 and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The Court recognized, however, that Ward County and Minot had not argued the Hales failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. 42-01-08, and neither the parties nor the district court had addressed the propriety of the Hales bringing an action to abate the law enforcement shooting range under N.D.C.C. ch. 42-02. On remand, the district court concluded "private citizens can bring an action 'ex rel.', but as a threshold matter, such citizens must first satisfy the special injury showing of N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08 or their public nuisance claim must be dismissed." The court granted Ward County and Minot summary judgment on the remanded claim for public nuisance regarding the Hales' use of County Road 12, concluding as a matter of law they failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a private person to maintain a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08. The court also denied the Hales' request to join additional neighbors as parties to their action. The Hales argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their public nuisance claim, and in denying their joinder request. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

American General Contractors, Inc. ("AGC"), appealed a judgment assessing liability and awarding damages and interest for the cost of delays in the construction of the Williams County Law Enforcement Center in Williston. C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP ("C&C"), the successful bidder for the mechanical prime contract, filed suit when construction the center was delayed approximately two years after "substantial completion" was supposed to have happened. The district court concluded it was appropriate for the County and AGC to share responsibility for providing temporary shelter and heat on the project. The court apportioned 47 percent of the liability for the costs of the delay for the three and one-half months of active interference to the County and 53 percent to AGC, for the four months delay inherent to the industry. The court awarded C&C approximately $73,000 on its claim against the County. After offsetting amounts owed between the parties, the court awarded AGC approximately $424,000 on its claim against the County. The court awarded Davis Masonry approximately $96,000 from AGC for masonry work completed under its subcontract with AGC, and rejected AGC's claimed offsets to that amount. Davis had provided heat, cover and shelter for the project during cold weather and sought $649,000 from the County and AGC for that expense including prompt payment interest. Davis had settled with the County for $530,000, and the court ruled AGC was responsible for 53 percent of the remaining $119,000, or $63,070. AGC argues the district court erred in determining AGC was liable for any of the costs incurred from the delay under its contract with the County. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County" on Justia Law

Defendant Mark Bosworth appeals from an order evicting him from land. In August 2013, Vlad Gasic commenced this action against several defendants, including Bosworth, Blake Bosworth, Catherine Fletcher, Matthew Fletcher, and James Legg, seeking an order requiring the defendants to vacate land in Epping, or requiring the sheriff to evict the defendants from the premises. Gasic's complaint asserted that he was the record title owner of the land, that defendants were unauthorized tenants, that defendants were using the premises in an unauthorized manner and not paying their fair share of utilities and garbage removal, and that Gasic had demanded the defendants vacate the premises immediately, but they refused to do so. Gasic also alleged he had served a notice of intent to evict under state law. The defendants answered the complaint and counterclaimed. After a hearing, the district court entered an "order for eviction" requiring the defendants and all occupants to vacate the premises on or before September 16, 2013. On September 16, 2013, the defendants moved to stay the eviction and requested a hearing, in addition to filing a notice of appeal. The district court entered a "stay of eviction" on September 16, 2013. Only Mark Bosworth filed a brief in this appeal. Bosworth raised multiple issues on appeal, including that Gasic did not own the land and had no legal authority to file this case, that the three-day notice required under state law was deficient, that Gasic never posted nor served by legal process the three-day notice required, and that the defendants have not been afforded due process. The Supreme Court found that neither the district court's order of eviction, nor the court's stay of eviction, provided any specific findings regarding these issues. Moreover, the Court concluded that defendants' appeal of the order for eviction was not an appeal from a final order or judgment, and therefore the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Gasic v. Bosworth" on Justia Law