Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Paul Ehlen appealed a judgment that dismissed his action against John and LynnDee Melvin to enforce a purchase agreement, a judgment for costs, and an amended judgment. The matter stemmed from a property transaction between the parties from early 2011. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding the parties did not mutually consent to the purchase agreement was not clearly erroneous. View "Ehlen v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Richard Herring appealed a district court summary judgment dismissing his action against Lisbon Partners Credit Fund, Ltd. Partnership ("Lisbon Partners") and Five Star Services ("Five Star") for nuisance, negligence, and civil trespass. Herring owned a commercial building in Lisbon. The adjoining property, including an apartment building, was owned by Lisbon Partners and managed by Five Star. Branches from a large tree located on Lisbon Partners' property overhang onto Herring's property and brush against his building. For many years Herring trimmed back the branches and cleaned out the leaves, twigs, and debris that would fall from the encroaching branches and clog his downspouts and gutters. Herring claimed that the encroaching branches caused water and ice dams to build up on his roof, and eventually caused water damage to the roof, walls, and fascia of his building. Herring contended that, after he had the damages repaired, he requested compensation from Lisbon Partners and Five Star but they denied responsibility for the damages. Herring sued Lisbon Partners and Five Star for the cost of the repairs to his building, alleging Lisbon Partners and Five Star had committed civil trespass and negligence and had maintained a nuisance by breaching their duty to maintain and trim the tree so that it did not cause damage to his property. The district court granted Lisbon Partners and Five Star's motion for summary judgment dismissing Herring's claims, concluding Lisbon Partners and Five Star had no duty to trim or maintain the tree and Herring's remedy was limited to self-help. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[a]lthough … we provide a framework for resolution of disputes arising from encroaching trees which authorizes judicial and self-help remedies, we stress that it is preferable for the parties to cooperate and agree on an amicable resolution to such disputes. Under the rule we adopt today, Lisbon Partners and Five Star, as the owners of the encroaching tree, are not liable for any damages caused merely by the tree dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit. Herring alleged damages caused by branches from the offending tree physically scraping against the building. If Herring [could] present evidence establishing damages caused by the intruding branches physically contacting the building, Lisbon Partners and Five Star would be liable for such damages under the 'Hawaii' rule." The case was remanded for a determination of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. View "Herring v. Lisbon Partners" on Justia Law

Wenco, a North Dakota limited partnership, appealed a judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County royalty and mineral interests in EOG Resources, Inc. ("EOG"), and QEP Energy Company ("QEP"), and dismissing Wenco's claims for conversion and unjust enrichment against EOG and QEP. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Wenco's interest bore the entire burden of a prior royalty interest conveyance in the subject property, that EOG and QEP did not waive their rights to claim the prior royalty interest conveyance burdened only Wenco's interest, and consequently, that Wenco had no viable claims against EOG and QEP for conversion and unjust enrichment. View "Wenco v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Joe Waldock appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to 25 percent of the mineral interests under a tract of land in Mountrail County in the successors in interest of the Estate of William C. Edwardson. Waldock argued the district court erred in deciding a 1954 administrator's deed from Edwardson's Estate to Waldock's predecessor in interest, Clark Van Horn, was equivalent to a quitclaim deed and in deciding the rule for interpreting mineral conveyances from "Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Co.," (144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940)), was not applicable to the administrator's deed. ThUpon review, the Supreme Court concluded the legal effect of the plain language of the administrator's deed conveyed 25 percent of the mineral interests to Waldock's predecessor in interest and reserved 25 percent of the mineral interests to Edwardson's Estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corporation" on Justia Law

The successors to the interests of eight siblings of John Q. Nichols ("Goughnour defendants") appealed the grant of summary judgment in a quiet title action by the successors to the interests of John Q. Nichols ("Nichols plaintiffs") to determine ownership of 1/2 of the mineral interests in a parcel of land in Mountrail County. The Goughnour defendants claimed they collectively owned 1/4 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court decided the Goughnour defendants collectively owned 1/9 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 7/18 of the mineral interests. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nichols v. Goughnor" on Justia Law

David and Marjorie George appealed the grant of summary judgment which quieted title to gravel, clay, and scoria in a quarter section of land in McKenzie County in Rosalie Veeder. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment quieting title in Veeder and in denying the Georges' motion to amend their complaint to seek reformation. View "George v. Veeder" on Justia Law

John Miller and J.D. Miller Farming Association (collectively "Miller") appealed an order that affirmed the Walsh County Water Resource District's decision requiring Miller to remove unpermitted dikes from his property located in Forest River Township. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Miller failed to establish that the District acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, that there was not substantial evidence to support its decision, or that the District was estopped from requiring removal of the dikes. View "Miller v. Walsh County Water Resource District" on Justia Law

D&P Terminal, Inc., and Potter Enterprises appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the decision of the Board of City Commissioners of Fargo in approving special assessments against their property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Fargo Special Assessment Commission did not use an inappropriate method to calculate the benefits to property included in the improvement district. View "D&P Terminal v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Timothy and Elizabeth Lamb appealed a summary judgment cancelling their contract for deed with EVI Columbus, LLC ("EVI") and awarding EVI its costs incurred in cancelling the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Lambs' motion to amend their answer to include counterclaims against EVI and refusing to construe the Lambs' affirmative defenses as counterclaims; the trial court properly granted EVI's motion for summary judgment awarding a $150 personal judgment against the Lambs to EVI for its costs and disbursements; and the Court denied EVI's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to the appeal. View "EVI Columbus, LLC v. Lamb" on Justia Law