Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Bradley R. Huebner ("Quality Auto Body") appealed a trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment awarding immediate possession of leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Working Capital #1, LLC. Although an order for judgment is not appealable, "an attempted appeal from an order for judgment will be treated as an appeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment, if one exists." The Supreme Court treated this case as an appeal, and affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Working Capital immediate possession of the leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements.

Dakota Resource Council ("the Council") appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Stark County Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") decision approving a zoning change for certain land from agricultural to industrial and authorized nine conditional uses for the property. The Board and Great Northern Project Development ("Great Northern") cross-appealed. Great Northern planned to construct and operate a coal gasification facility on a tract of land in Stark County. Great Northern's planned 8,100 acre complex would include a coal gasification plant, chemical fertilizer plant, electrical power plant, coal mine, solid waste landfill, and facilities for manufacture and storage of hazardous, explosive, and odorous products. Great Northern submitted an application to the Stark County Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to change the zoning of the land from agricultural to industrial and to allow nine conditional uses of the land. The Commission scheduled a hearing on the application and sent notice of the hearing by certified mail to all persons who owned land within 200 feet of the boundaries of the proposed rezoned tract. Following the hearing, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board approve the application, conditioned upon Great Northern obtaining all necessary local, state, and federal permits or approvals. The Board subsequently approved the application to rezone the property from agricultural to industrial and approved the requested conditional uses. The Council, Neighbors United, and several individuals who owned land near the rezoned tract appealed the Board's decision to the district court. The district court initially determined that the Council, Neighbors United, and the individual landowners had standing to challenge the Board's decision, but the district court affirmed on the merits the Board's decision to rezone the property and allow the conditional uses. In their cross-appeal, the Board and Great Northern contended the Council lacked standing to appeal the Board's decision to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Council had standing to appeal the Board's decision and the Board did not misinterpret or misapply its zoning ordinance.

Respondents-Appellants Darlene Hankison, Michael Flick, Steven Flick, David Flick, landowners in Wells County, and Weckerly F.L.P., a landowner in Sheridan County, appealed a Wells County district court judgment and a Sheridan County district court order that denied their motions to dismiss and granted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.'s petitions to enter their property to conduct testing and surveys. The Wells County district court held that for purposes of a petition to enter land for surveying and testing, Minnkota only needed to show it was in charge of a public use or it was in the category of persons entitled to seek eminent domain. The court determined Minnkota was in charge of a public use and also was entitled to seek eminent domain. The Sheridan County court held, under N.D.C.C. § 10-15-52, a foreign cooperative is entitled to all rights, exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same purposes under the laws of this state when it is issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state. Minnkota was issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, and it is organized to provide power to its members. Because North Dakota electric cooperatives have authority to use eminent domain, the court determined Minnkota also has the power to use eminent domain. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district courts did not err in concluding that Minnkota was entitled to seek the power of eminent domain under North Dakota law.

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Tibert, Melvin Tibert, Sue Tibert, and William Tibert appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their declaratory judgment action against Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. Mark, Melvin, and William Tibert are brothers, and Sue Tibert is Mark's wife. The Tiberts were involved in a lengthy dispute with Minto Grain, LLC, and its owners William and Katherine Slominski. Mark and Sue Tibert and Melvin Tibert owned homes on property adjacent to a grain elevator owned and operated by Minto Grain. Minto Grain intended to expand its facility, and acquired a portion of BNSF Railway's right-of-way on a roadway abutting and providing access to the Tiberts' properties. The Tiberts had various homeowner's policies and umbrella policies, which included personal injury liability endorsements, with Nodak. In 2004, Minto Grain brought an action against the Tiberts, alleging civil conspiracy, wrongful interference with business, tortious interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, and abuse of process. The Tiberts delivered the complaint to Nodak. Nodak denied it had a duty to indemnify or defend the Tiberts under the policies. The Tiberts brought this declaratory judgment action against Nodak, seeking indemnification and recovery of their costs of defending the underlying action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to indemnify the Tiberts for the damages paid to Minto Grain, but did err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to defend the Tiberts in the underlying action. The Court considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and found them to be either unnecessary to its decision or without merit.

The Dakota Resource Council (DRC) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) order. DRC argued: (1) the PSC's decision was not in accordance with the law; and, (2) the PSC's conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. In 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate "no mow" areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife. McLean County, NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC then held a public hearing. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk's permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “[w]hen considered together, the PSC's findings of fact do not indicate its decision to grant the revision was based on the desire to facilitate the land transfer agreement rather than on consideration of the higher and better use of the land. ... The PSC's conclusions and order affirming its decision granting the revision to recreational use were supported by its findings of fact.”

Petitioner Fred M. Hector, Jr. appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Fargo Board of City Commissioners' decision to approve special assessments against his property. In his appeal to the district court, Petitioner alleged at least 34 errors existed in the proceedings for the special assessments. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued the total amount assessed for an improvement project was improperly calculated and should have been based on the City's true costs for the project, the method used to determine the amount assessed against his property was improper, the Assessment Commission failed to comply with certain statutory requirements and the City Commission failed to properly review the Assessment Commission's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner was given an opportunity to appear and speak at an October, 2009 City Commission hearing. He also submitted written objections to the City Commission. The City Commission heard Petitioner’s objections and they questioned the City's attorney, the Special Assessment Coordinator, and the City Auditor. The Court concluded the City Commission complied with the statutory requirements for review of the assessments by the Special Assessment Commission. Furthermore, the Court considered all the other arguments Petitioner raised, and concluded they were without merit.

Appellants Angeline Maki and other relatives of Richard Arndt (collectively "Maki defendants") appealed a judgment that declared that Appellee Richard Arndt and others (collectively "Arndt plaintiffs") were the owners of mineral interests underlying the Arndt family farm, and the Arndt plaintiffs cross-appealed part of the judgment that denied their claim against the Maki defendants for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the Maki defendants' counterclaim for reformation of a 1973 contract for deed and a 1984 personal representative's deed and correctly quieted title to the minerals in the Arndt plaintiffs. The Court further concluded, however, that genuine issues of material fact existed on the claim for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals.

Appellants Cendak Development Corporation and Fort Rice Bar & Grill, Inc. (Cendak), appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard and Mary Bendish, which cancelled the Bendishes' contract for deed with James Castillo and held Cendak had no right to redeem the property under a lease purchase agreement. This issue in this case centered on the cancellation of a contract for deed. In 2003, Bendishes owned land in Fort Rice where they operated a business called the "Outpost." In March 2003, the Bendishes entered into a contract for deed to sell the property to Castillo for $40,400. Castillo made a down payment of $7,500 and was to make monthly payments of $620.86 on the contract for deed, with an annual interest rate of five percent. Castillo made regular payments on the contract for deed through January 1, 2005. In 2006, Richard Bendish, Castillo, and Ivan Gange, on behalf of Cendak, executed a "Lease Purchase Agreement," which included handwritten notations initialed by each of the parties. The agreement was not filed with the Morton County Register of Deeds. Castillo and then Gange operated the Fort Rice Bar & Grill on the premises. After January 2005, Bendishes received sporadic payments from Castillo and then Gange. In 2010, the Bendished sued Castillo alleging default under the terms of the contract for deed. Cendak answered the suit, alleging that Castillo had assigned the contract to Cendak, the Bendishes accepted the assignment and accepted payments from Cendak pursuant to the contract. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred when it failed to give Cendak a period of redemption in the action to cancel the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Based upon the language of the Lease Purchase Agreement and the equities of the situation, we cannot say that the district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or that its decision was not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Cendak a redemption period."

Respondents-Appellants Brian Wicklund and Deborah Williams, the surviving children of Maurice Wicklund, appealed an order that granted a petition by Maurice Wicklund's surviving spouse, Petitioner-Appellee Betty Wicklund, for an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from Maurice Wicklund's estate. The surviving children claimed their father intended to transfer North Dakota mineral interests to them under a will and Trust agreement, and they argued the district court erred in failing to address issues relating to their father's intent and erred in granting the surviving spouse an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from his estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's decision effectuated Maurice Wicklund's intent from the plain language of his will and the Trust, but the court's findings were inadequate to explain the bases for granting Betty Wicklund an elective share, administration costs, and personal representative fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.