Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

John Miller and J.D. Miller Farming Association (collectively "Miller") appealed an order that affirmed the Walsh County Water Resource District's decision requiring Miller to remove unpermitted dikes from his property located in Forest River Township. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Miller failed to establish that the District acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, that there was not substantial evidence to support its decision, or that the District was estopped from requiring removal of the dikes. View "Miller v. Walsh County Water Resource District" on Justia Law

D&P Terminal, Inc., and Potter Enterprises appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the decision of the Board of City Commissioners of Fargo in approving special assessments against their property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Fargo Special Assessment Commission did not use an inappropriate method to calculate the benefits to property included in the improvement district. View "D&P Terminal v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Timothy and Elizabeth Lamb appealed a summary judgment cancelling their contract for deed with EVI Columbus, LLC ("EVI") and awarding EVI its costs incurred in cancelling the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Lambs' motion to amend their answer to include counterclaims against EVI and refusing to construe the Lambs' affirmative defenses as counterclaims; the trial court properly granted EVI's motion for summary judgment awarding a $150 personal judgment against the Lambs to EVI for its costs and disbursements; and the Court denied EVI's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to the appeal. View "EVI Columbus, LLC v. Lamb" on Justia Law

Quality Auto Body, Inc. and Bradley R. Huebner ("Quality Auto Body") appealed a trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment awarding immediate possession of leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Working Capital #1, LLC. Although an order for judgment is not appealable, "an attempted appeal from an order for judgment will be treated as an appeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment, if one exists." The Supreme Court treated this case as an appeal, and affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Working Capital immediate possession of the leased premises, a money judgment for past due rent and late fees, and a money judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements.

Dakota Resource Council ("the Council") appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Stark County Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") decision approving a zoning change for certain land from agricultural to industrial and authorized nine conditional uses for the property. The Board and Great Northern Project Development ("Great Northern") cross-appealed. Great Northern planned to construct and operate a coal gasification facility on a tract of land in Stark County. Great Northern's planned 8,100 acre complex would include a coal gasification plant, chemical fertilizer plant, electrical power plant, coal mine, solid waste landfill, and facilities for manufacture and storage of hazardous, explosive, and odorous products. Great Northern submitted an application to the Stark County Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to change the zoning of the land from agricultural to industrial and to allow nine conditional uses of the land. The Commission scheduled a hearing on the application and sent notice of the hearing by certified mail to all persons who owned land within 200 feet of the boundaries of the proposed rezoned tract. Following the hearing, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board approve the application, conditioned upon Great Northern obtaining all necessary local, state, and federal permits or approvals. The Board subsequently approved the application to rezone the property from agricultural to industrial and approved the requested conditional uses. The Council, Neighbors United, and several individuals who owned land near the rezoned tract appealed the Board's decision to the district court. The district court initially determined that the Council, Neighbors United, and the individual landowners had standing to challenge the Board's decision, but the district court affirmed on the merits the Board's decision to rezone the property and allow the conditional uses. In their cross-appeal, the Board and Great Northern contended the Council lacked standing to appeal the Board's decision to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Council had standing to appeal the Board's decision and the Board did not misinterpret or misapply its zoning ordinance.

Respondents-Appellants Darlene Hankison, Michael Flick, Steven Flick, David Flick, landowners in Wells County, and Weckerly F.L.P., a landowner in Sheridan County, appealed a Wells County district court judgment and a Sheridan County district court order that denied their motions to dismiss and granted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.'s petitions to enter their property to conduct testing and surveys. The Wells County district court held that for purposes of a petition to enter land for surveying and testing, Minnkota only needed to show it was in charge of a public use or it was in the category of persons entitled to seek eminent domain. The court determined Minnkota was in charge of a public use and also was entitled to seek eminent domain. The Sheridan County court held, under N.D.C.C. § 10-15-52, a foreign cooperative is entitled to all rights, exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same purposes under the laws of this state when it is issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state. Minnkota was issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, and it is organized to provide power to its members. Because North Dakota electric cooperatives have authority to use eminent domain, the court determined Minnkota also has the power to use eminent domain. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district courts did not err in concluding that Minnkota was entitled to seek the power of eminent domain under North Dakota law.

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Tibert, Melvin Tibert, Sue Tibert, and William Tibert appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their declaratory judgment action against Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. Mark, Melvin, and William Tibert are brothers, and Sue Tibert is Mark's wife. The Tiberts were involved in a lengthy dispute with Minto Grain, LLC, and its owners William and Katherine Slominski. Mark and Sue Tibert and Melvin Tibert owned homes on property adjacent to a grain elevator owned and operated by Minto Grain. Minto Grain intended to expand its facility, and acquired a portion of BNSF Railway's right-of-way on a roadway abutting and providing access to the Tiberts' properties. The Tiberts had various homeowner's policies and umbrella policies, which included personal injury liability endorsements, with Nodak. In 2004, Minto Grain brought an action against the Tiberts, alleging civil conspiracy, wrongful interference with business, tortious interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, and abuse of process. The Tiberts delivered the complaint to Nodak. Nodak denied it had a duty to indemnify or defend the Tiberts under the policies. The Tiberts brought this declaratory judgment action against Nodak, seeking indemnification and recovery of their costs of defending the underlying action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to indemnify the Tiberts for the damages paid to Minto Grain, but did err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to defend the Tiberts in the underlying action. The Court considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and found them to be either unnecessary to its decision or without merit.

The Dakota Resource Council (DRC) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) order. DRC argued: (1) the PSC's decision was not in accordance with the law; and, (2) the PSC's conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. In 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate "no mow" areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife. McLean County, NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC then held a public hearing. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk's permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “[w]hen considered together, the PSC's findings of fact do not indicate its decision to grant the revision was based on the desire to facilitate the land transfer agreement rather than on consideration of the higher and better use of the land. ... The PSC's conclusions and order affirming its decision granting the revision to recreational use were supported by its findings of fact.”