Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Deborah Reichman appealed a judgment that granted Plaintiff-Appellee McKenzie County a prescriptive easement for a road that crosses her land in McKenzie County and dismissed her counterclaim for inverse condemnation. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting a prescriptive easement for the road because the court failed to correctly calculate the 20-year period for a prescriptive easement backward from when McKenzie County began the lawsuit in 2006. She argued the County did not clearly and convincingly establish adverse use during that period because the adjacent landowners, including her predecessors in interest, blocked the road for their ranching operations and any public use of the road was not continuous and uninterrupted. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err and affirmed its decisions on the issues Defendant raised on appeal.

JB Mineral Services, LLC (JB), appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring an oil and gas lease terminated and awarding statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees to Dahn P. Beaudoin and J. Willard Beaudoin, as trustees of the William Beaudoin Irrevocable Mineral Trust (Beaudoins). JB sought to lease the Beaudoins' oil and gas interests, and sent a lease, a supplemental agreement and a document it alleged was a "120-say sight draft" for $165,000. Later, JB sent a revised lease and a 25-day sight draft to Beaudoins, reflecting JB's claim that Beaudoins owned 3.68 fewer mineral acres than covered in the original lease. The revised lease would also have extended the term of the lease approximately six months longer than a July 2009 lease. Beaudoins never executed or agreed to the revised lease and did not present the second sight draft for payment. Beaudoins claim that the "termination date" under the supplemental agreement was January 12, 2010, which was 120 business days after they signed the lease and supplemental agreement in July, 2009. JB's position was that it had until January 20, 2010, to pay a supplemental bonus payment by funding the July 2009 sight draft. Beaudoins' counsel responded by faxed letter dated January 20, 2010, reiterating that the lease had already terminated and was invalid. JB never authorized payment of the July 2009 sight draft, but recorded the original July 2009 lease on January 20, 2010. Beaudoins sued JB to have the lease declared invalid and for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Beaudoins, finding the district court did not err in concluding JB failed to timely pay or tender the sum required to continue the 2009 lease and that the lease automatically terminated by its express terms.

In 1979, Plaintiffs-Appellees James and Betty Van Berkom executed a contract for deed for the purchase of certain real estate from Arlo and Garoldine Van Berkom, James Van Berkom's uncle and aunt. The contract for deed contained a mineral reservation clause. In 1995, after the completion of payments under the contract for deed, Garoldine executed a warranty deed conveying the real estate to Plaintiffs. The warranty deed did not contain a mineral reservation clause. Garoldine died in 2002, and she willed an option to purchase any part of her farmland and mineral rights she owned to Defendant Mark Barenthsen who exercised the option and purchased (specific to this appeal) the mineral rights in question. A discrepancy in title was brought to the parties' attention in 2008 when both parties sought to simultaneously lease the disputed mineral acres. Plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to the mineral rights they claimed under the 1995 warranty deed. Defendants responded, alleging the warranty deed suffered from a mutual mistake and seeking to reform the warranty deed to conform to the 1979 contract for deed. They argued the warranty deed suffered from a mutual mistake and Arlo and Garoldine actually intended to except the mineral rights from the warranty deed. The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, and Defendants appealed. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it found Defendants failed to establish a mutual mistake and were not entitled to reformation of the warranty deed. Finding Defendants failed to establish the alleged error affected their substantial rights and prejudiced the outcome of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs John and Lori Finstad appealed a district court judgment which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., n/k/a Southeast Water Users District, and its board members (collectively, "Water District"), and dismissed their complaint. The Finstads owned 80 acres of land in Ransom County, and leased the adjacent 240 acres from Willis and Doris Olson. In 1997, the Finstads and Olsons granted options to purchase their land to the Water District. The options contained a provision which allowed the Finstads and Olsons to lease back the property for a five-year period, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal for the next five years. The options also stated that the land could only be used for pasture and hayland purposes if it were leased back, and no feedlots, fertilizer use, or chemical use would be permitted on the land. The options provided that any violation of the use restrictions would result in the immediate termination of the lease and the right of first refusal. In 2001, the Water District exercised its options to purchase the 320 acres. The district court found that the Finstads exercised the right to lease their former property back from the Water District, and also exercised the right to lease back the Olsons' former property, which the Olsons had assigned to the Finstads. In early 2006, the Finstads brought suit against the Water District and its board members. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction because the Finstads had filed for bankruptcy. The Water District moved for summary judgment which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations to the Finstads' contract claims, and genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Patricia Saltsman appealed a district court summary judgment and dismissal of her case against Ed Hasche. Saltsman argued the district court erroneously decided Hasche did not owe a duty toward Saltsman as a lawful entrant on Hasche's land. Saltsman also argued the district court made improper findings of fact to support the summary judgment in favor of Hasche. Saltsman rode her bicycle on a sidewalk next to an apartment building and parking lot owned by Hasche. Hasche had constructed a chain-link fence with vertical "privacy slats" parallel to the sidewalk in order to provide more privacy for the tenants who parked their vehicles in the parking lot next to the apartment building. Lisa Sharp, traveling in a vehicle, exited the building's parking lot. Saltsman collided with Sharp's vehicle and sustained injuries. Saltsman sued Sharp and Hasche to recover for her personal injuries. Saltsman and Sharp settled, and the case against Sharp was dismissed. On the issue of whether he owed a duty toward Saltsman, Hasche argued Saltsman was not on his property when she was injured, she was not directly injured by his property, his fence was lawful, and no special relationship existed between Hasche and Saltsman that would create a duty. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Saltsman's claims, stating a landowner does not owe a duty to protect a passerby on a sidewalk adjacent to the landowner's property from the acts of an independent negligent driver. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Hasche, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

K & L Homes appealed a district court judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of Neal Leno and Susan Leno ("the Lenos"). On appeal, K & L Homes argued: (1) the district court erred by deciding K & L Homes had not sufficiently raised the defense of fault by the Lenos in its answer; (2) the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, the court erred by denying K & L Homes' request for inspection and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during a jury viewing; and (3) the court erred by ruling K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties as a matter of law. The Lenos purchased a newly-constructed house from K & L Homes. The Lenos alleged they noticed cracks, unevenness, and shifting due to improper construction not long after purchasing the house from K & L Homes. Initially, the Lenos claimed K & L Homes was negligent, breached the parties' contract, and breached implied warranties. The Lenos claimed the parties' contract implied warranties that the house would be built according to the applicable codes, that it would fit its purpose as a residence, and that it would be constructed according to engineering standards and in a workmanlike condition. K & L Homes requested the jury be instructed on comparative fault, but the district court denied the proposed comparative fault instruction. The district court decided K & L Homes had not adequately pled fault, and comparative fault did not apply to Lenos' cause of action. The district court also found, as a matter of law, that K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties in a Homeowners' Guide given to the Lenos at the closing on the house. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings made by the district court and affirmed its decisions as to all issues raised on appeal.

Defendant Linus Poitra appealed a default judgment entered by the district court regarding a lease between Plaintiff Darrel Gustafson as lessee and Leon and Linus Poitra as lessors. Linus Poitra argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the Poitras were members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and the land subject to the lease is Indian-owned fee land located within the boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Linus Poitra argued the default judgment infringed upon tribal sovereignty because of cases pending in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment finding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lease.

In 1953, Standard Oil Company owned a refinery in Mandan, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company owned land between the refinery and the Heart River. Northern Pacific executed a written permit granting Standard Oil permission to construct a pipeline along Northern Pacificâs right-of-way from the refinery to the river. The permit provided that Standard Oil could not transfer or assign the permit without Northern Pacificâs permission. In 1998, Northern Pacificâs successor-in-interest sold the portion of land that contained Standard Oilâs pipeline. In 2001, Standard Oilâs successor-in-interest, sold the refinery. In 2004, Tesoro, the new owner of the refinery, filed a âNotice of Permitâ along with the 1953 permit, with the Recorderâs Office. Later that year, the property was sold to Riverwood Commercial Park. Disputes arose between Riverwood and Tesoro over Riverwoodâs planned development of the property. The dispute bounced between the district and Supreme Court for various theories of recovery. Riverwoodâs theories centered on the characterization of the 1953 âpermitâ: all of Riverwoodâs claims would fail as a matter of law if the 1953 permit was not a license but an easement. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1953 permit was indeed an easement, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tesoro and Standard Oil.

Duane Peterson, Mid Am Group, LLC, and Mid Am Group Realty (collectively âMid Amâ), Village Homes at Harwood Groves, LLC (Village Homes), and First International Bank and Trust (First International) all had a stake in the insurance proceeds from a 2007 hail storm that damaged their respective properties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Village Homesâ Homeownersâ Association that represented ten property owners of the Village Homes community impacted by the storm. Mid Am developed and built the insured properties, but Mid Am had only sold ten of fifty units. When the hail storm hit, Mid Am submitted a proof of loss with its insurance company for the residences it still owned. First American was in the process of foreclosing on those unsold Mid Am properties. The insurance check was sent to Mid Am, but First American sued to get possession of the proceeds, and the individual owners were permitted to intervene. The court took control of the proceeds, and held that neither Mid Am nor First International were entitled to them. The court ruled that Mid Am, as fiduciary to the ten owners, should distribute the proceeds among them. Mid Am appealed, arguing that the ownersâ association did not have standing to intervene in the suit for the proceeds. The Supreme Court concluded that the ownersâ association had standing to intervene, and that it was not an error of the trial court to allow the owners to make their claim for the proceeds. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant David Locken appealed a grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to determine who owned a tract of land in Dickey County. In 1973, Mr. Locken purchased the tract. He put money down and promised to make yearly payments until the balance due was satisfied. The final payment listed on the contract for deed was scheduled for March, 1998. In 1974, Mr. Locken assigned his interest in the contract for the deed to his parents. Through a series of conveyances in the 1980s, the tract was gifted to all of Mr. Lockenâs siblings by quitclaim deed, excluding Mr. Locken. The siblingsâ interests would reconvey to a family trust by quitclaim deed in 2002. Mr. Lockenâs mother died in 2001, and his father died in 2006. Both parents devised âall right, title and interestâ in land they owned to Mr. Locken. The family trust sold its real estate holdings to a third party, who reconveyed the land to his own trust. Mr. Locken brought suit to reclaim his interest in the tract, and named everyone in the chain of these conveyances as defendants. The district court dismissed Mr. Lockenâs action, holding that his claim was time barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Mr. Lockenâs interest in the land ended with the final payment in March, 1998. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Lockenâs claim as time barred by the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.