Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Fred M. Hector, Jr. appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Fargo Board of City Commissioners' decision to approve special assessments against his property. In his appeal to the district court, Petitioner alleged at least 34 errors existed in the proceedings for the special assessments. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued the total amount assessed for an improvement project was improperly calculated and should have been based on the City's true costs for the project, the method used to determine the amount assessed against his property was improper, the Assessment Commission failed to comply with certain statutory requirements and the City Commission failed to properly review the Assessment Commission's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner was given an opportunity to appear and speak at an October, 2009 City Commission hearing. He also submitted written objections to the City Commission. The City Commission heard Petitioner’s objections and they questioned the City's attorney, the Special Assessment Coordinator, and the City Auditor. The Court concluded the City Commission complied with the statutory requirements for review of the assessments by the Special Assessment Commission. Furthermore, the Court considered all the other arguments Petitioner raised, and concluded they were without merit.

Appellants Angeline Maki and other relatives of Richard Arndt (collectively "Maki defendants") appealed a judgment that declared that Appellee Richard Arndt and others (collectively "Arndt plaintiffs") were the owners of mineral interests underlying the Arndt family farm, and the Arndt plaintiffs cross-appealed part of the judgment that denied their claim against the Maki defendants for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the Maki defendants' counterclaim for reformation of a 1973 contract for deed and a 1984 personal representative's deed and correctly quieted title to the minerals in the Arndt plaintiffs. The Court further concluded, however, that genuine issues of material fact existed on the claim for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals.

Appellants Cendak Development Corporation and Fort Rice Bar & Grill, Inc. (Cendak), appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard and Mary Bendish, which cancelled the Bendishes' contract for deed with James Castillo and held Cendak had no right to redeem the property under a lease purchase agreement. This issue in this case centered on the cancellation of a contract for deed. In 2003, Bendishes owned land in Fort Rice where they operated a business called the "Outpost." In March 2003, the Bendishes entered into a contract for deed to sell the property to Castillo for $40,400. Castillo made a down payment of $7,500 and was to make monthly payments of $620.86 on the contract for deed, with an annual interest rate of five percent. Castillo made regular payments on the contract for deed through January 1, 2005. In 2006, Richard Bendish, Castillo, and Ivan Gange, on behalf of Cendak, executed a "Lease Purchase Agreement," which included handwritten notations initialed by each of the parties. The agreement was not filed with the Morton County Register of Deeds. Castillo and then Gange operated the Fort Rice Bar & Grill on the premises. After January 2005, Bendishes received sporadic payments from Castillo and then Gange. In 2010, the Bendished sued Castillo alleging default under the terms of the contract for deed. Cendak answered the suit, alleging that Castillo had assigned the contract to Cendak, the Bendishes accepted the assignment and accepted payments from Cendak pursuant to the contract. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred when it failed to give Cendak a period of redemption in the action to cancel the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Based upon the language of the Lease Purchase Agreement and the equities of the situation, we cannot say that the district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or that its decision was not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Cendak a redemption period."

Respondents-Appellants Brian Wicklund and Deborah Williams, the surviving children of Maurice Wicklund, appealed an order that granted a petition by Maurice Wicklund's surviving spouse, Petitioner-Appellee Betty Wicklund, for an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from Maurice Wicklund's estate. The surviving children claimed their father intended to transfer North Dakota mineral interests to them under a will and Trust agreement, and they argued the district court erred in failing to address issues relating to their father's intent and erred in granting the surviving spouse an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from his estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's decision effectuated Maurice Wicklund's intent from the plain language of his will and the Trust, but the court's findings were inadequate to explain the bases for granting Betty Wicklund an elective share, administration costs, and personal representative fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellant Deborah Reichman appealed a judgment that granted Plaintiff-Appellee McKenzie County a prescriptive easement for a road that crosses her land in McKenzie County and dismissed her counterclaim for inverse condemnation. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting a prescriptive easement for the road because the court failed to correctly calculate the 20-year period for a prescriptive easement backward from when McKenzie County began the lawsuit in 2006. She argued the County did not clearly and convincingly establish adverse use during that period because the adjacent landowners, including her predecessors in interest, blocked the road for their ranching operations and any public use of the road was not continuous and uninterrupted. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err and affirmed its decisions on the issues Defendant raised on appeal.

JB Mineral Services, LLC (JB), appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring an oil and gas lease terminated and awarding statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees to Dahn P. Beaudoin and J. Willard Beaudoin, as trustees of the William Beaudoin Irrevocable Mineral Trust (Beaudoins). JB sought to lease the Beaudoins' oil and gas interests, and sent a lease, a supplemental agreement and a document it alleged was a "120-say sight draft" for $165,000. Later, JB sent a revised lease and a 25-day sight draft to Beaudoins, reflecting JB's claim that Beaudoins owned 3.68 fewer mineral acres than covered in the original lease. The revised lease would also have extended the term of the lease approximately six months longer than a July 2009 lease. Beaudoins never executed or agreed to the revised lease and did not present the second sight draft for payment. Beaudoins claim that the "termination date" under the supplemental agreement was January 12, 2010, which was 120 business days after they signed the lease and supplemental agreement in July, 2009. JB's position was that it had until January 20, 2010, to pay a supplemental bonus payment by funding the July 2009 sight draft. Beaudoins' counsel responded by faxed letter dated January 20, 2010, reiterating that the lease had already terminated and was invalid. JB never authorized payment of the July 2009 sight draft, but recorded the original July 2009 lease on January 20, 2010. Beaudoins sued JB to have the lease declared invalid and for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Beaudoins, finding the district court did not err in concluding JB failed to timely pay or tender the sum required to continue the 2009 lease and that the lease automatically terminated by its express terms.

In 1979, Plaintiffs-Appellees James and Betty Van Berkom executed a contract for deed for the purchase of certain real estate from Arlo and Garoldine Van Berkom, James Van Berkom's uncle and aunt. The contract for deed contained a mineral reservation clause. In 1995, after the completion of payments under the contract for deed, Garoldine executed a warranty deed conveying the real estate to Plaintiffs. The warranty deed did not contain a mineral reservation clause. Garoldine died in 2002, and she willed an option to purchase any part of her farmland and mineral rights she owned to Defendant Mark Barenthsen who exercised the option and purchased (specific to this appeal) the mineral rights in question. A discrepancy in title was brought to the parties' attention in 2008 when both parties sought to simultaneously lease the disputed mineral acres. Plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to the mineral rights they claimed under the 1995 warranty deed. Defendants responded, alleging the warranty deed suffered from a mutual mistake and seeking to reform the warranty deed to conform to the 1979 contract for deed. They argued the warranty deed suffered from a mutual mistake and Arlo and Garoldine actually intended to except the mineral rights from the warranty deed. The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, and Defendants appealed. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it found Defendants failed to establish a mutual mistake and were not entitled to reformation of the warranty deed. Finding Defendants failed to establish the alleged error affected their substantial rights and prejudiced the outcome of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs John and Lori Finstad appealed a district court judgment which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., n/k/a Southeast Water Users District, and its board members (collectively, "Water District"), and dismissed their complaint. The Finstads owned 80 acres of land in Ransom County, and leased the adjacent 240 acres from Willis and Doris Olson. In 1997, the Finstads and Olsons granted options to purchase their land to the Water District. The options contained a provision which allowed the Finstads and Olsons to lease back the property for a five-year period, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal for the next five years. The options also stated that the land could only be used for pasture and hayland purposes if it were leased back, and no feedlots, fertilizer use, or chemical use would be permitted on the land. The options provided that any violation of the use restrictions would result in the immediate termination of the lease and the right of first refusal. In 2001, the Water District exercised its options to purchase the 320 acres. The district court found that the Finstads exercised the right to lease their former property back from the Water District, and also exercised the right to lease back the Olsons' former property, which the Olsons had assigned to the Finstads. In early 2006, the Finstads brought suit against the Water District and its board members. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction because the Finstads had filed for bankruptcy. The Water District moved for summary judgment which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations to the Finstads' contract claims, and genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Patricia Saltsman appealed a district court summary judgment and dismissal of her case against Ed Hasche. Saltsman argued the district court erroneously decided Hasche did not owe a duty toward Saltsman as a lawful entrant on Hasche's land. Saltsman also argued the district court made improper findings of fact to support the summary judgment in favor of Hasche. Saltsman rode her bicycle on a sidewalk next to an apartment building and parking lot owned by Hasche. Hasche had constructed a chain-link fence with vertical "privacy slats" parallel to the sidewalk in order to provide more privacy for the tenants who parked their vehicles in the parking lot next to the apartment building. Lisa Sharp, traveling in a vehicle, exited the building's parking lot. Saltsman collided with Sharp's vehicle and sustained injuries. Saltsman sued Sharp and Hasche to recover for her personal injuries. Saltsman and Sharp settled, and the case against Sharp was dismissed. On the issue of whether he owed a duty toward Saltsman, Hasche argued Saltsman was not on his property when she was injured, she was not directly injured by his property, his fence was lawful, and no special relationship existed between Hasche and Saltsman that would create a duty. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Saltsman's claims, stating a landowner does not owe a duty to protect a passerby on a sidewalk adjacent to the landowner's property from the acts of an independent negligent driver. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Hasche, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

K & L Homes appealed a district court judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of Neal Leno and Susan Leno ("the Lenos"). On appeal, K & L Homes argued: (1) the district court erred by deciding K & L Homes had not sufficiently raised the defense of fault by the Lenos in its answer; (2) the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, the court erred by denying K & L Homes' request for inspection and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during a jury viewing; and (3) the court erred by ruling K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties as a matter of law. The Lenos purchased a newly-constructed house from K & L Homes. The Lenos alleged they noticed cracks, unevenness, and shifting due to improper construction not long after purchasing the house from K & L Homes. Initially, the Lenos claimed K & L Homes was negligent, breached the parties' contract, and breached implied warranties. The Lenos claimed the parties' contract implied warranties that the house would be built according to the applicable codes, that it would fit its purpose as a residence, and that it would be constructed according to engineering standards and in a workmanlike condition. K & L Homes requested the jury be instructed on comparative fault, but the district court denied the proposed comparative fault instruction. The district court decided K & L Homes had not adequately pled fault, and comparative fault did not apply to Lenos' cause of action. The district court also found, as a matter of law, that K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties in a Homeowners' Guide given to the Lenos at the closing on the house. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings made by the district court and affirmed its decisions as to all issues raised on appeal.