Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Linus Poitra appealed a default judgment entered by the district court regarding a lease between Plaintiff Darrel Gustafson as lessee and Leon and Linus Poitra as lessors. Linus Poitra argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the Poitras were members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and the land subject to the lease is Indian-owned fee land located within the boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Linus Poitra argued the default judgment infringed upon tribal sovereignty because of cases pending in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment finding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lease.

In 1953, Standard Oil Company owned a refinery in Mandan, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company owned land between the refinery and the Heart River. Northern Pacific executed a written permit granting Standard Oil permission to construct a pipeline along Northern Pacificâs right-of-way from the refinery to the river. The permit provided that Standard Oil could not transfer or assign the permit without Northern Pacificâs permission. In 1998, Northern Pacificâs successor-in-interest sold the portion of land that contained Standard Oilâs pipeline. In 2001, Standard Oilâs successor-in-interest, sold the refinery. In 2004, Tesoro, the new owner of the refinery, filed a âNotice of Permitâ along with the 1953 permit, with the Recorderâs Office. Later that year, the property was sold to Riverwood Commercial Park. Disputes arose between Riverwood and Tesoro over Riverwoodâs planned development of the property. The dispute bounced between the district and Supreme Court for various theories of recovery. Riverwoodâs theories centered on the characterization of the 1953 âpermitâ: all of Riverwoodâs claims would fail as a matter of law if the 1953 permit was not a license but an easement. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1953 permit was indeed an easement, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tesoro and Standard Oil.

Duane Peterson, Mid Am Group, LLC, and Mid Am Group Realty (collectively âMid Amâ), Village Homes at Harwood Groves, LLC (Village Homes), and First International Bank and Trust (First International) all had a stake in the insurance proceeds from a 2007 hail storm that damaged their respective properties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Village Homesâ Homeownersâ Association that represented ten property owners of the Village Homes community impacted by the storm. Mid Am developed and built the insured properties, but Mid Am had only sold ten of fifty units. When the hail storm hit, Mid Am submitted a proof of loss with its insurance company for the residences it still owned. First American was in the process of foreclosing on those unsold Mid Am properties. The insurance check was sent to Mid Am, but First American sued to get possession of the proceeds, and the individual owners were permitted to intervene. The court took control of the proceeds, and held that neither Mid Am nor First International were entitled to them. The court ruled that Mid Am, as fiduciary to the ten owners, should distribute the proceeds among them. Mid Am appealed, arguing that the ownersâ association did not have standing to intervene in the suit for the proceeds. The Supreme Court concluded that the ownersâ association had standing to intervene, and that it was not an error of the trial court to allow the owners to make their claim for the proceeds. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant David Locken appealed a grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to determine who owned a tract of land in Dickey County. In 1973, Mr. Locken purchased the tract. He put money down and promised to make yearly payments until the balance due was satisfied. The final payment listed on the contract for deed was scheduled for March, 1998. In 1974, Mr. Locken assigned his interest in the contract for the deed to his parents. Through a series of conveyances in the 1980s, the tract was gifted to all of Mr. Lockenâs siblings by quitclaim deed, excluding Mr. Locken. The siblingsâ interests would reconvey to a family trust by quitclaim deed in 2002. Mr. Lockenâs mother died in 2001, and his father died in 2006. Both parents devised âall right, title and interestâ in land they owned to Mr. Locken. The family trust sold its real estate holdings to a third party, who reconveyed the land to his own trust. Mr. Locken brought suit to reclaim his interest in the tract, and named everyone in the chain of these conveyances as defendants. The district court dismissed Mr. Lockenâs action, holding that his claim was time barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Mr. Lockenâs interest in the land ended with the final payment in March, 1998. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Lockenâs claim as time barred by the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.