Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After Countrywide Home Loans Servicing filed a complaint in foreclosure against Appellants, the trial court granted default judgment in favor of Countrywide, and the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. Countrywide subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and then refiled its complaint in foreclosure. The trial court granted the order of foreclosure, rejecting Appellants' claim that the action was precluded by res judicata. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that until the order confirming the sheriff's sale is entered, the plaintiff may terminate the case without prejudice by filing a notice of voluntary dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judgment of foreclosure cannot be dissolved by the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal after a trial court has entered judgment on the underlying note. Remanded. View "Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Nichpor" on Justia Law

Defendant in the underlying action was a "mortgage servicer" that engaged in the business of serving residential mortgages of individuals. Plaintiff in the underlying proceeding contended that mortgage servicing is a "consumer transaction" as defined in the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01. Defendant countered that mortgage servicers perform services for financial institutions, not for borrowers, and therefore the transactions are commercial in nature and are not covered by the CSPA. The Supreme Court accepted certification of state-law questions from the federal district court concerning the proper interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01(A) and (C). The Supreme Court held that the CSPA does not apply to the servicing of residential mortgage loans because mortgage servicing is not a consumer transaction under the CSPA, and an entity that services a residential mortgage loan is not a "supplier" that engages "in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions" within the meaning of the CSPA. View "Anderson v. BarclayÂ's Capital Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the 2007 tax-year valuation of six properties owned by Appellant. Appellant filed six valuation complaints regarding the properties. The county board of revision (BOR) retained the auditor's valuation for five parcels and ordered a reduction for one. On appeal, the board of tax appeals (BTA) concluded (1) in the case of the one parcel, the complaint's failure to state an actual dollar amount of value reduction was a jurisdictional defect, and thus the case was remanded to the BOR for dismissal; and (2) with respect to the other five parcels, the evidence offered by Appellant was insufficient to find a value different from that determined by the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly ordered dismissal of Appellant's appeal of the case of the one parcel; and (2) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the BOR's valuation with respect to the other parcels. View "Shinkle v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Community Kollel, an educational institution for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4709.121(A)(2), sought exemptions for three residential apartment buildings based on the claim that the properties were being used in furtherance of its educational purposes. The statute provides that real property belonging to an educational institution is exempt from taxation if it is made available under the direction of the institution for use in furtherance of or incidental to its educational purposes and not with a view to profit. The tax commissioner denied the exemptions, and the board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA applied the wrong legal standard and failed to cite reliable and probative evidence to support its decision. Remanded to the BTA to review the evidence submitted in this case and determine whether the subject property was used in furtherance of the kollel's educational purposes. View "Cincinnati Cmty. Kollel v. Levin" on Justia Law

In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the city school district board of education challenged a decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) that affirmed the county board of revision's (BOR) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2007. The school board argued in part that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property owner's spouse, who was not a lawyer. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA's decision, holding (1) the filing of a valuation complaint by the owner's spouse validly invokes the BOR's jurisdiction; and (2) the record furnished a sufficient basis to support the BTA's finding. View "Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

When a complaint has been filed that contests the county auditor's valuation of a particular parcel, as it was in this case, and when that complaint asks for a value increase or reduction of $17,500 or more, Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(B) requires that the auditor give notice of the complaint within thirty days of the last day for filing valuation complaints. At issue in this appeal was whether that notification is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the board of revision, and if so, whether the thirty-day deadline itself is jurisdictional. The Supreme Court held (1) under section 5715.19(B), the notification itself is jurisdictional, but the thirty-day requirement is not; and (2) thus, the original failure of the auditor in this case to give notice was cured when the notice was later given after remand by the court of common pleas. Because the court of appeals held the contrary, the Court reversed its decision. View "2200 Carnegie, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This was an original action by Relators, property owners, for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. On December 1, 2011, the court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of their taking of the property. Following failed settlement negotiations, the State filed appropriation cases for the property of two of the relators. All of the relators with the exception of the two then filed a motion for an order for Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ. The Supreme Court held that Relators established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ and ordered Respondents to file appropriation cases for Respondents' parcels. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zehringer" on Justia Law

Youngstown Belt Railway Company entered into a purchase agreement with Total Waste Logistics of Girard for the purchase of Mosier Yard, which the railway owned. The sale was never consummated, and later the city of Girard commenced an appropriation action to appropriate a portion of Mosier Yard. The trial court held that the city's appropriation proceedings were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). On remand, the trial court held that it would be inappropriate to consider the railway's potential sale to Total Waste in the preemption analysis but determined that the railway's use of a portion of the appropriated land for storage caused the city's action to be preempted by the ICCTA. The appellate court affirmed, although on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city's proposed eminent-domain action against the undeveloped portion of the railway's property, which did not contain any tracks or rights-of-way and did not have any concrete projected use that would constitute rail transportation by a rail carrier, was not preempted under the ICCTA. View "Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law