Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved the interplay between a municipality's expedited type-2 annexation of real property located within a township pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 709.023 and the municipality's tax-increment finding (TIF) created pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5709.40 to encourage development of that property. The Supreme Court held that although a township continues to receive tax revenue on property that a municipality annexes through an expedited type-2 process under section 709.023, the municipality may adopt a TIF plan under 5709.40 that temporarily exempts from city and township property taxes a portion of the improvements made to the annexed property to encourage the annexed property's economic development. In so doing, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sugarcreek Twp. v. City of Centerville" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a county sheriff can meet the constitutional obligation of providing notice of a sheriff's sale to a plaintiff by letter directing the plaintiff's attorney to monitor a website for a listing of the date, time, and location of sale. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice by publication to a party with a property interest in a foreclosure proceeding via a sheriff's office website is insufficient to constitute due process when that party's address is known or easily ascertainable. Remanded. View "PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Prater" on Justia Law

LTC Properties, Inc., which owned a congregate care assisted-living facility in Licking County, contested the tax-year 2007 valuation of its property as found by the auditor, as retained by the Licking County Board of Revision, and as affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). On the merits, LTC contended (1) the auditor overvalued its property by predicating his cost-based valuation on the cost schedule for nursing homes and private hospitals rather than on the cost schedule for apartment buildings with twenty to thirty-nine rental units; and (2) the BTA erred by denying LTC's request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA's decision to affirm the County's use of the nursing home / private hospital cost schedule as a starting point in performing a cost valuation of LTC's assisted-living facility was neither unreasonable nor unlawful; and (2) the BTA did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance. View "LTC Props., Inc. v. Licking County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. View "Moore v. Middletown" on Justia Law

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function. View "Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r" on Justia Law

In this real-property-valution case, Owner sought to reverse the twenty percent increase in the value of his residential property that the auditor ordered for tax year 2007 as part of the sexennial reappraisal in that county. Owner did not attend the hearing before the board of revision (BOR). On appeal to the board of tax appeals (BTA), the BTA excluded Owner's testimony and two of his exhibits. It then held that Owner had not sustained his burden to show a value different from that found by the BOR. Owner appealed, arguing that he was not properly notified of the BOR hearing, that all the evidence he presented at the BTA hearing should have been considered by the BTA, and that he was entitled to a reduced valuation for tax year 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA reasonably and lawfully upheld the county's valuation of Owner's property. View "Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a controversy over a phrase in a trust. The language at issue established the calculation of the price of trust property offered for sale to certain trust beneficiaries. One of the trust beneficiaries filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking judicial interpretation of the disputed provision. The trial court concluded that the disputed phrase was unambiguous and that the option price was the fair market value as determined by the appraisal. The court of appeals reversed after reviewing the trust document de novo, finding that the option language was susceptible to more than one interpretation and that the option price was the federal and/or Ohio qualified-use value. At issue on appeal was what standard of review an appellate court should employ in reviewing legal issues in a declaratory-judgment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the de novo standard of review is the proper standard for appellate review of purely legal issues that must be resolved after the trial court has decided that a complaint for declaratory judgment presents a justiciable question. View "Arnott v. Arnott" on Justia Law

In this appeal, a property owner challenged an increase to the 2006 valuation of its property that was ordered by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) at the instigation of the Bedford Board of Education. The BTA reversed the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR), which had retained the auditor's valuation of $3,713,500. The BTA valued the property by using the allocated portion of the March 2006 sale price, which increased the valuation to $4,835,000. The owner appealed, contending that the allocated sale price was not reflective of market value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA erred by ignoring and failing to weigh the significance of testimony regarding the seller's tax motivations in allocating the sale price to the subject property; and (2) because it is the duty of the BTA to weigh the evidence and determine the facts concerning valuation, the case was remanded for proper consideration of the effect of that testimony.

In this action the Cincinnati City School District Board of Education asked the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of a deed restriction it placed on school property that it offered for sale at a public auction. At issue was whether the deed restriction contravened public policy by preventing an unused school building from being used by a public charter school. The trial court concluded that the deed restriction was void as against public policy, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because this case involved a contract between a private party and a political subdivision, there was a compelling reason to apply the principle of the public policy exception to parties' rights to make contracts; and (2) therefore, the inclusion of a deed restriction preventing the use of property for school purposes in the contract for sale of an unused school building was unenforceable as against public policy.

At issue in this case was whether Hamilton Township, a limited-home-rule township, was authorized under Ohio law to impose its system of impact fees upon applicants for zoning certificates for new construction or redevelopment within its unincorporated areas. Appellants, several development companies, brought this action against Appellees, the Township and its trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, alleging that the impact fees were contrary to Ohio law and were unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the impact fees charged by the Township in this case constituted taxes; and (2) since those taxes were not authorized by general law, the Township was unauthorized to impose them pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 504.04(A)(1).