Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, lakefront property owners and others, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) and the State, seeking declarations that owners of property abutting Lake Erie hold title to the land between the high-water mark and the actual legal boundary of their properties as defined in their deeds or a writ of mandamus to compel ODNR to compel the State to compensate them for its alleged taking of the property. The trial court subsequently consolidated the action of other Plaintiffs claiming ownership of their land to the low-water mark of Lake Erie. The trial court concluded that the public-trust territory of Lake Erie was a moveable boundary consistent with the water's edge. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holdings regarding the boundary of the public trust. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the territory of Lake Erie is held in public trust and extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes; and (2) the boundary of the public trust does not change from moment to moment, and artificial fill cannot alter the boundary. Remanded.

The Liberty Township board of trustees approved a zoning amendment that rezoned three parcels of township land. Subsequently, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition seeking to submit the board's action approving the rezoning of the property to the electors of the township. Relators, the owner of the property at issue, the developer of the property, and the developer company's president, submitted a protest to the county board of elections against the referendum petition. The board certified the referendum petition and placed the rezoning issue on the general-election ballot and rejected Relators' protest grounds. Relators then filed this action for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus to compel the board to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion by denying Relators' protest, certifying the referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the electorate because the petitioners did not timely file their referendum petition pursuant to statute.

Insured submitted a claim to Insurer after his house was damaged by a storm. Insured returned the payment tendered to him by Insurer, deeming the amount insufficient to cover the damage to his home. Almost two years after the house was damaged, Insured filed suit against Insurer. Insurer argued the lawsuit was barred by a clause in the insurance contract that stated that any action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage. The trial court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the policy language was ambiguous and that Insurer, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Insurer could enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its contract because (1) the policy language was not ambiguous, and (2) Insurer did not waive its right to enforce the clause.

Insured submitted a claim to Insurer after his house was damaged by a storm. Insured returned the payment tendered to him by Insurer, deeming the amount insufficient to cover the damage to his home. Almost two years after the house was damaged, Insured filed suit against Insurer. Insurer argued the lawsuit was barred by a clause in the insurance contract that stated that any action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage. The trial court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the policy language was ambiguous and that Insurer, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Insurer could enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its contract because (1) the policy language was not ambiguous, and (2) Insurer did not waive its right to enforce the clause.

Gayle Sperry, her son, and her daughter-in-law owned and operated a winery at Sperry's residence. The property was in a residentially zoned district. A zoning inspector filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent injunction seeking to enjoin the Sperrys' use of the property as a retail business and restaurant in a residentially zoned district. The trial court granted summary judgment to the zoning inspector, finding that the winery was not exempt from township zoning. The Sperrys appealed, contending that under Ohio Rev. Code 519.21(A) their winery was exempt from township zoning regulations because they also engaged in viticulture on the property within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that exemption from township zoning under the statute does not require for its application that viticulture be the primary use of property engaged in the vinting and selling of wine. Remanded.

This case involved a determination of the value of real property owned by Huntington National Bank. The County Board of Revision (BOR) determined the true value of the property to be $2,000,000, thereby reducing the value from the $2,650,000 originally assigned by the auditor. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Plain Local Schools Board of Education appealed, arguing that the BOR and BTA erred by (1) determining the value of real property based in part on factual material set forth in a written appraisal report when the appraiser who prepared the report did not testify, and (2) considering evidence contained in an appraisal report that offered an opinion of value as of a date other than the tax-lien date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the school board did not object below to the alleged violation of appraisal-practice standards, the school board's claim that the violation made proferred evidence inadmissible was waived; and (2) the appraisal did furnish evidence relevant to determining the value as of the tax-lien date, even though the report itself used that data to arrive at an opinion of value for a different date.

Property owner Riser Foods Company appealed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in which the BTA determined the true value of Riser's real estate to be $450,000 for tax year 2005 rather than $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the County Board of Revision (BOR). The BTA's determination of value was predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease. The ground lease was entered into in 1998, and ownership was transferred in 2005. The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm's-length sale price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of 2005 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale was either not recent or not at arm's length; (2) Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale; and (3) Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market elements was significant.

This case came before the Supreme Court twice. The property owner challenged the Board of Tax Appeals' (BTA) use of a propertyâs sale price as an indicator of its value, arguing that it was an unreliable way to value property. The BTA rejected that challenge and adopted use of the sale price. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale was "recent" which was one of the criteria that must be satisfied before a sale price may be used to value a property for tax purposes. The BTA responded by relying solely on the temporal proximity of the sale to the tax-lien dates. Because proximity was not the only factor affecting recency, and because the property owner made a persuasive argument, the Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision and remanded the case for a proper determination of "recency" based on the entire record. BTA then issued its decision on remand. The BTA again adopted the sale price as the value of a property based on a conclusion that "recency" had not be rebutted. The property owner appealed again to the Supreme Court, arguing that the BTA disregarded the Supreme Court's earlier holding. The Supreme Court reviewed the BTA's findings of fact and found that its decision was "reasonable and lawful," and that it "fulfilled the instruction of the Court." The Court affirmed the decision of the BTA.

The state tax auditor assigned a $3.6 million value to an 80-room hotel for the tax year 2005. The owner, KDM and Associates, LLC (KDM) challenged the valuation with the Board of Revision in March 2006. KDM sought to reduce the valuation to $2.4 million, the original purchase price of the hotel. The Hilliard City Schools Board cross complained, and sought to maintain the assessorâs original valuation. The Supreme Court affirmed the original $3.6 million valuation, finding that accounting discrepancies did not entitle KDM to the reduced assessed-value in the hotel.