Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiffs following the court's grant of summary judgment on counts one (declaratory judgment) and three (anticipatory repudiation) of the complaint, holding that the grants of specific performance and attorneys' fees were improper.After a real estate action soured, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging eight counts. On summary judgment, the hearing justice granted a declaratory judgment for Plaintiffs, entered summary judgment for them on their anticipatory repudiation claim, ordered specific performance, and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the hearing justice's grant of specific performance was premature; and (2) Plaintiff raised justiciable issues of fact that impelled this Court to reverse the award of attorneys' fees. View "Bennett v. Steliga" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Defendant-appellee Carmela Hill (Hill) pursued counterclaims against U.S. Bank and its mortgage servicer Nationstar following bank's dismissal of its foreclosure action against Hill. A jury returned a verdict against bank on borrower's wrongful foreclosure claim and a verdict against the mortgage servicer on multiple claims including violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The trial court awarded attorney's fees and costs to Hill. The Bank and mortgage servicer appealed and Hill counter-appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals dismissed in part borrower's appeal and found neither the OCPA or the FDCPA was applicable. It reversed the attorney's fee award and reduced the amount of awarded costs. In addition, it reversed the wrongful foreclosure judgment against bank and affirmed the remainder of the judgment which concerned breach of contract and tort claims against the mortgage servicer. The Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed that portion of Hill's appeal seeking review of the trial court's Category II punitive damages ruling; reversed Hill's wrongful foreclosure judgment against U.S. Bank; reversed the OCPA portion of the judgment against Nationstar; affirmed the FDCPA portion of the judgment against Nationstar, including the $1,000.00 award under the FDCPA; reversed the award of attorney's fees and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine a reasonable attorney's fee consistent with the Court's opinion; and reversed $1,223.39 of the costs awarded to Hill. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed. View "U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. Hill" on Justia Law

Fillmore County Park in Genoa Charter Township, Michigan, includes a 15-station “Leopold the Lion Reading Trail” with large signs, telling the story. On a wooded 40-acre property a few miles away, Catholic Healthcare created a prayer trail with 14 “Stations of the Cross.” None of the improvements were visible from outside the property. The Township treated the prayer trail as a church building, for which a “special land use” permit was required. At considerable expense, Catholic Healthcare submitted two unsuccessful applications. The Township demanded the removal of the Stations of the Cross, plus a stone altar and mural.Catholic Healthcare sought a preliminary injunction to restore the Stations of the Cross, altar, and mural. The district court twice denied that request, holding that its free-exercise and statutory claims are unripe. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In land-use cases, claims are ripe when the government has adopted a “definitive position” as to “how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.” Here, the Township has uniformly insisted that Catholic Healthcare obtain a special land-use permit and has twice refused to grant a permit. Those events have “inflicted an actual, concrete injury” because the Township has actually forced them to remove the religious displays. Catholic Healthcare is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. View "Catholic Healthcare International Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township, Michigan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the tax court sustaining a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) to TBL Licensing LLC for the 2011 tax year, holding that the Tax Commissioner properly determined that TBL's transfer of its intangible property was followed by a disposition of that property, requiring TBL to pay the tax due in a lump sum.In 2011, TBL transferred the intangible property at issue, which was worth approximately $1.5 billion, to an affiliated foreign corporation. TBL argued that the tax attributable to the transfer, which occurred in the context of a corporate reorganization involving an exchange as described in section 26 U.S.C. 361, could be paid on an annual basis by one of TBL's affiliates. The IRS disagreed and assessed a deficiency based on its position that TBL was required to pay tax on the entire gain and to do so in its 2011 tax return. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was nothing in 26 U.S.C. 367(d) that would absolve TBL of its responsibility under the disposition-payment rule. View "TBL Licensing LLC v. Werfel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion to enforce a provision in the parties’ final divorce order that gave her the option to purchase jointly owned real property from defendant. The property at issue was a five-acre parcel of land with buildings on the Connecticut River where the parties lived and operated a marina business during their marriage. In the final divorce order, the court gave each party the option to buy out the other’s share of the property. If plaintiff chose not to exercise the purchase option and defendant wished to do so instead, he had to notify plaintiff and send her a check. If neither party wished to purchase the property and business, it was to be sold through a realtor and the proceeds would be split between the parties. In January 2022, plaintiff moved to enforce her option to purchase the marina property. Plaintiff asserted that an April 2020 court order had given her thirty days to notify defendant of her intent to purchase. She argued that the order was stayed by her motion to alter or amend the judgment and subsequent notice of further proceedings, and did not become final until the trial court issued a November 2021 decision. According to plaintiff, she had thirty days from that date to exercise the option and did so by sending a letter with a $25,000 check to defendant on November 30, 2021. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion and filed his own motion to enforce the sale of the property to him. Defendant asserted that after plaintiff indicated in her motion to alter or amend that she did not want to purchase the property, he had notified her of his intent to purchase it on June 1, 2020, and mailed her a $25,000 check. At that time, plaintiff responded by offering to sell the property for a much higher price but did not express any interest in purchasing it herself. After the court issued its decision on remand, defendant sent plaintiff a check for the remaining $217,500 along with a quitclaim deed for her to complete. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s first appeal did not stay or alter the deadlines for exercising the purchase option, which expired in June 2020. The family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff’s purchase option had expired and that defendant effectively exercised his option to purchase the property instead. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thurber v. Thurber" on Justia Law

Plaintiff NexPoint holds $7.5 million in subordinated notes issued by Acis CLO-2015-6 Ltd. (the “Issuer”), as part of a CLO. The Issuer acquired the CLO collateral and conveyed it to a trust under an indenture between the Issuer and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee (the “Indenture”). Defendant-appellee Acis Capital Management, L.P. (“Acis”) was engaged as the CLO’s portfolio manager pursuant to a Portfolio Management Agreement between the Issuer and Acis (the “PMA”). NexPoint claims that Acis, Terry, and Brigade (together, the “Advisers”) maximized their own profits at the expense of the CLO in violation of fiduciary duties imposed by Section 206 of the IAA. The district court concluded that NexPoint failed to state a claim under Section 215(b). NexPoint appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in limiting Section 215(b)’s application to contracts that require illegal performance, as opposed to lawful contracts performed in an unlawful manner.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that under Section 215(b), a contract’s performance involves the violation of the IAA only if performing a contractual duty requires conduct prohibited by the IAA. No such unlawful conduct is required by the contracts NexPoint seeks to rescind. The court further explained that the text and structure of the IAA, interpreted with the benefit of TAMA, Oxford, and other precedent, make clear that a contract’s performance “involves” the violation of the IAA only if performing a contractual duty requires a party to engage in conduct prohibited by the IAA. NexPoint does not seek rescission of any contract requiring a party to engage in conduct prohibited by the IAA. View "NexPoint Diversified Real Est. Tr. v. Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor" on Justia Law

Freed fell behind approximately $1,100 on his property taxes. Thomas, Gratiot County’s treasurer, foreclosed on Freed’s property and sold it at a public auction for $42,000. The County retained the entire proceeds. Freed sued the County and Thomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an unconstitutional excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.Following a remand, the district court granted Freed summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim, rejecting Freed’s argument that he was entitled to the fair market value of his property, minus his debt, and holding that Freed was owed just compensation in the amount of the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, plus interest from the date of the foreclosure sale. Freed was owed about $40,900 plus interest, $56,800 less than he was seeking. The court also held that Freed’s claims against Thomas were barred by qualified immunity and denied Freed’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a public sale, a debtor is entitled to any surplus proceeds from the sale, which represent the value of the equitable title extinguished. Thomas did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of her alleged misconduct. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Airbnb, Inc. and Airbnb Payments, Inc. (collectively Airbnb) is an online marketplace that connects owners of short-term rentals (STRs) with renters seeking accommodations for 30 days or less. Among Airbnb’s many rental listings are properties within California’s coastal zone. The Coastal Protection Alliance (CPA) brought an action against Airbnb for violations of the Coastal Act, alleging that STRs in the coastal zone are “developments” that require a coastal development permit (CDP) and that Airbnb was directly and vicariously liable for allowing STR owners to list and rent unpermitted STRs on its website. CPA appealed from a judgment following an order granting Airbnb’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that t STRs are not per se developments under the Coastal Act. The court explained that a development does not occur merely because a residence is used as an STR. Whether using a residence as an STR is a “change in the density or intensity of the use of land,” and thus, a development under the Coastal Act depends on the permissible scope of the residence’s existing use. Here, CPA’s sweeping interpretation of development to include every STR would circumvent the specifically tailored zoning ordinances in the LCPs throughout the coastal zone. Interpreting the Coastal Act in this way is neither reasonable nor consistent with the Act’s acknowledged reliance on “local government and local land use planning procedures and enforcement” in carrying out the Act’s goals. View "Coastal Protection Alliance v. Airbnb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the summary judgment entered by the Business and Consumer Docket in an action brought by Defendant's neighbors issuing a declaratory judgment and injunction based on the court's determination that Defendant's short-term rentals had violated a deed restriction that limits the use and occupancy of certain property and the structures on it, holding that remand was required.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the lower court's declaration that Defendant's short-term rentals of his oceanfront property had violated a deed restriction that limited the use and occupancy of the property and the structures upon it, holding that there was no error in the summary judgment as to these issues; but (2) vacated the court's injunction against further violations, holding that the injunction lacked specificity on what did and did not comply with the deed restriction in question. View "Morgan v. Townsend" on Justia Law