Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

Desean Hattix was convicted of attempted failure to register a firearm after police executed a search warrant at his home and found two unregistered handguns. Following his conviction, the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) sought to evict him from his federally subsidized housing unit, alleging that his possession of an unregistered firearm violated the federal "one-strike" provision in his lease, which prohibits tenants from engaging in criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of the property. The trial court found that Mr. Hattix's unlawful possession of a firearm violated this provision and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him.The magistrate judge found that Mr. Hattix's possession of an unregistered firearm threatened the safety of other residents and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him. An associate judge of the Superior Court upheld this decision, finding that Mr. Hattix's gun possession posed both a per se and an individualized threat to the health and safety of other residents. The reviewing judge noted that the District's registration requirements were designed to ensure firearms were not in the hands of dangerous and untrained individuals, and by ignoring this law, Mr. Hattix placed the public at risk.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that possession of an unregistered firearm does not constitute a per se threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. The court also found that DCHA did not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Hattix's conduct posed an individualized threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. Consequently, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hattix v. District of Columbia Housing Authority" on Justia Law

In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law

The case involves the County of San Diego's adoption of thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to streamline the evaluation of transportation-related environmental effects for land-use development projects. The County adopted two specific thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating fewer than 110 automobile trips per day. Plaintiffs, two environmental groups, challenged these thresholds, arguing they were not supported by substantial evidence and did not comply with CEQA requirements.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, finding that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and that the small project threshold was justified by substantial evidence, as it aligned with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions that infill development would generally result in insignificant vehicle miles traveled (VMT) impacts. The court found that the County failed to provide evidence showing that development in designated infill areas would typically generate VMT below the County average.Similarly, the court found that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support. The County had adopted OPR's recommendation without providing evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would have a less-than-significant transportation impact in San Diego County.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, requiring the County to comply with CEQA by providing substantial evidence to support the adopted thresholds. View "Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law

Ryan Rose, an electrical technician, sued Nissan North America, Inc. after suffering an electric shock while working at Nissan’s plant in Canton, Mississippi. Rose was employed by Automated Power, Inc., an electrical engineering firm hired by Nissan to repair damaged equipment following an electrical fault. Rose was injured while working in the plant’s A-B tiebreaker cubicle, which he believed was de-energized. However, the cubicle was still energized on one side, leading to his injury.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment in favor of Nissan. The court found that Automated Power was an independent contractor and that both Automated Power and Rose knew or should have known about the dangers associated with the work. Under Mississippi law, a premises owner is not liable for injuries to an independent contractor or its employees resulting from known dangers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Automated Power was indeed an independent contractor and that the company and Rose were aware of the potential dangers. The court concluded that Mississippi Code § 11-1-66 shielded Nissan from liability, as the statute exempts premises owners from liability for injuries to independent contractors or their employees resulting from known dangers. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Automated Power’s knowledge of the danger, thus affirming the summary judgment in favor of Nissan. View "Rose v. Nissan North America" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Jay Folse, purchased real property tax liens on two properties in Cabell County, West Virginia, in September 2021. He provided the necessary information to the respondents, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., and Mark A. Hunt, to issue notices to redeem to the previous owners. However, some notices were returned as undeliverable. The respondents requested additional addresses and funds for personal service, which the petitioner did not provide. Instead, he filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County to compel the issuance of tax deeds.The circuit court dismissed the petition, stating that a writ of mandamus was required to compel the issuance of the tax deeds. The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court's decision, relying on the precedent set in Lemley v. Phillips, which required a writ of mandamus for such relief.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the ICA erred in its reliance on Lemley. The court noted that significant statutory changes had occurred since Lemley, providing a statutory remedy for compelling the issuance of notices to redeem and tax deeds. The court held that a writ of mandamus does not lie to compel the deputy commissioner to execute a deed for land purchased at a delinquent tax sale, as the remedy provided by West Virginia Code § 11A-3-60 is exclusive.The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the ICA's decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings to determine whether the petitioner satisfied all necessary requirements for the issuance of the tax deeds. The court emphasized the need for factual and legal determinations to be made by the circuit court in the first instance. View "Folse v. Rollyson" on Justia Law