Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between two companies, one a contractor and the other a developer, over a construction project in Maui. The disagreement was submitted to binding arbitration, resulting in an award in favor of the developer. The developer sought to confirm the award in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, but the contractor challenged the award, alleging the arbitrator was evidently partial due to undisclosed relationships. The circuit court initially confirmed the award, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the partiality claim. After the hearing, the circuit court found evident partiality, denied confirmation, vacated the award, and ordered a rehearing before a new arbitrator.Following this, the contractor moved for taxation of costs incurred on appeal, which the circuit court granted. The developer sought to appeal the costs order, but the circuit court denied an interlocutory appeal. A new arbitration was held, again resulting in an award for the developer, which was confirmed in a new special proceeding with a final judgment entered. The developer then appealed the earlier costs order from the first special proceeding.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal as untimely, reasoning that the circuit court’s order vacating the first arbitration award and ordering a rehearing was an appealable final order under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 658A-28(a)(3), making the subsequent costs order also immediately appealable.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is not an appealable order under HRS § 658A-28(a). The court clarified that such orders lack finality, regardless of whether the rehearing is full or partial, and reaffirmed the majority rule previously adopted in State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. County of Kauai. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s dismissal and remanded the case for entry of a final judgment, so the merits of the appeal could be addressed. View "Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. v. LPIHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

Eileen Adams and her husband lost their New Jersey home to foreclosure after a series of events involving the transfer and assignment of their mortgage. The mortgage, originally held by AmTrust Bank, was assigned to EverBank after AmTrust’s failure, and then to Nationstar Mortgage. Adams defaulted on the mortgage, leading EverBank to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Although Adams answered the foreclosure complaint, she did not oppose summary judgment, which was granted in favor of EverBank. Subsequent assignments and litigation ensued, but Adams and her husband ultimately lost their appeals in the New Jersey courts, including a denial of review by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.After exhausting state-court remedies, Adams and her husband filed multiple bankruptcy petitions in an effort to prevent the foreclosure sale. In the most recent Chapter 13 case, Nationstar moved for relief from the automatic stay to proceed with the sale. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey granted Nationstar’s motion. Adams appealed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reasoning that Adams was seeking to overturn a state-court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that, while the District Court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Adams’s claims were nonetheless precluded under New Jersey law. The Third Circuit clarified that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine and does not bar jurisdiction in this context; instead, principles of claim preclusion apply because Adams’s arguments had already been litigated and decided in state court. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order insofar as it upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to lift the automatic stay. View "In re: Adams" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the owners and operators of a tourist attraction, Bear World, and the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) over the closure of an intersection on Highway 20 in Madison County, Idaho. Bear Crest Limited LLC owns parcels of land leased to Yellowstone Bear World Inc., and Michael Ferguson is associated with both entities. In 1973, the original landowners (the Gideons) conveyed land to ITD’s predecessor for highway expansion, reserving “Access to the County Road Connection.” In 2016, as part of a highway upgrade to controlled-access status, ITD closed the intersection nearest Bear World, requiring visitors to use a more circuitous route, increasing travel distance by about five miles.After the intersection closure, the plaintiffs sued ITD for breach of contract and inverse condemnation, arguing that the closure violated the reserved access right in the Gideon deed and constituted a taking of property without just compensation. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment to ITD, finding that the deed did not guarantee access to Highway 20, only to a county road, and that the closure did not amount to a compensable taking since alternative access remained.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed in part, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded. The Court held that Bear Crest Limited had standing and that the Gideon deed unambiguously reserved access to the specific Highway 20 connection, not merely to a county road. The Court found that ITD’s closure of the intersection breached the deed and substantially impaired Bear Crest’s access rights, constituting a taking under Idaho law. The Court directed entry of partial summary judgment for Bear Crest on both claims, reserving damages and other issues for further proceedings. View "Bear Crest Limited LLC v. State of idaho" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law

In 1919, a company filed an application in the Hawaiʻi Land Court to register fee simple title to several parcels of land in Lāhainā, Maui, asserting ownership by deed or adverse possession. The land included three main lots, with Lot 3 later subdivided; the dispute here centers on Lot 3A. The last known owner of Lot 3A died in 1877, leaving numerous heirs. Over the next century, the case was marked by long periods of inactivity, incomplete service on heirs, and defaults entered against many descendants. Some descendants appeared at various times to contest the company’s claims. In 2009, a successor company was substituted as applicant. In 2019 and 2020, the Land Court awarded the successor company title to Lots 1 and 2 based on paper title, and a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession, with the remaining interest allocated to appearing heirs.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the Land Court’s decisions. It held that the descendants who appeared lacked standing to defend the interests of their defaulted cotenants against the adverse possession claim and did not address other alleged errors.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case. It held that cotenants have standing to defend the interests of all cotenants against a claim of adverse possession. The court further held that the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A should have been dismissed for laches, given the unreasonable 100-year delay and resulting prejudice to the heirs, including the loss of witnesses and evidence. The court vacated the lower courts’ decisions regarding Lot 3A, affirmed the award of Lots 1 and 2, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the application as to Lot 3A. View "In re Application of Pioneer Mill Company, Limited." on Justia Law

Arron and Arthur Benedetti, along with the Estate of Willie Benedetti, challenged a provision in Marin County’s amended local coastal program (LCP) that allows owners of certain farmland to build additional residential units only if they record a restrictive covenant. This covenant requires the owner of the new units to be actively and directly engaged in agriculture, either through direct involvement in commercial agriculture or by leasing the property to a commercial agricultural producer. The Benedettis, who inherited farmland and sought to build a second residence, argued that this provision was facially unconstitutional, claiming it violated the nexus and proportionality requirements established in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, and infringed upon their substantive due process rights by compelling them to work in a specific occupation.The Marin County Superior Court initially ruled that the Benedettis could not bring a facial takings challenge under Nollan/Dolan and, applying rational basis review, denied their petition and complaint based on their due process theory. The trial court sustained a demurrer to one cause of action and denied relief on the others, leading to the Benedettis’ appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Benedettis could raise a facial Nollan/Dolan claim. However, the court found that the restrictive covenant requirement had a sufficient nexus and rough proportionality to the county’s interest in preserving agricultural land and did not violate substantive due process. The court applied rational basis review and determined the provision was reasonably related to a legitimate legislative goal. The judgment of the Marin County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Benedetti v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a property in Alameda that had previously been used by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard as housing for military personnel and their families. The property, containing about 150 residential units, was vacant and in disrepair for over a decade before the developer acquired it in 2018. The developer extensively renovated the units and related infrastructure, spending significant sums, and obtained a new certificate of occupancy from the City in 2020. The developer then began renting the units to the general public.After the renovations, a dispute arose regarding whether the renovated units were subject to the City of Alameda’s Rent Control Ordinance. The City’s Rent Program Director determined that the units were not exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, reasoning that the property had been used for residential purposes prior to the issuance of the new certificate of occupancy. An administrative hearing officer upheld this determination. The developer challenged this decision in the Superior Court of Alameda County, which ruled in favor of the developer, finding that the exemption applied and that the renovated property qualified as new residential housing stock.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that under the Costa-Hawkins Act, as interpreted by prior decisions such as NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley and Burien, LLC v. Wiley, the exemption from local rent control for properties with a certificate of occupancy issued after February 1, 1995, does not apply if the property had prior residential use. The court concluded that the extensive renovations and the period of vacancy did not transform the property into new housing for purposes of the exemption. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CP VI Admirals Cove, LLC v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law

An elderly plaintiff with significant disabilities inherited her home and, facing a tax sale due to unpaid property taxes, responded to a flyer offering help. She met with the defendant, who had her sign documents that transferred ownership of her home to him, allegedly under the pretense of providing a loan. The documents did not provide for any payment to the plaintiff, only that the defendant would pay the back taxes. The plaintiff later attempted to cancel the transaction, believing it had been voided when the defendant returned her documents and she received no loan. Several years later, the defendant served her with an eviction notice, prompting her to file suit alleging fraud, undue influence, financial elder abuse, and other claims, seeking cancellation of the transfer and damages.The case was heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The defendant, representing himself, filed an answer and a cross-complaint, asserting that he had purchased the property and that the plaintiff had lived rent-free for years. The litigation was marked by extensive discovery disputes, with the plaintiff filing nine motions to compel and for sanctions due to the defendant’s repeated failures to provide timely and adequate discovery responses, appear for depositions, and pay court-ordered sanctions. The court issued incremental sanctions, including monetary and issue sanctions, before ultimately imposing terminating sanctions by striking the defendant’s answer and cross-complaint, leading to a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions after the defendant’s persistent and willful noncompliance with discovery orders. The court also found that the plaintiff’s complaint provided sufficient notice of damages, and that the award of damages and attorney fees was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in all respects. View "Atlas v. Davidyan" on Justia Law

The owners of a lot in the Silver Cay II subdivision on Dauphin Island began constructing a house through their contracting company after obtaining a building permit from the Town of Dauphin Island. However, they did not secure a separate permit from the Dauphin Island Property Owners Association (DIPOA), as required by restrictive covenants applicable to their property. The DIPOA issued a stop-work order, alleging that the construction violated covenants both by lacking DIPOA approval and by extending the house beyond a 90-foot setback from the road. The owners continued some work to avoid material loss and later sought a variance from the DIPOA, obtaining consents from immediate neighbors, but the DIPOA board denied the variance.The DIPOA filed suit in the Mobile Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt construction and require removal of the portions of the house violating the setback. The owners counterclaimed, seeking to compel the DIPOA to enforce the same covenants against a neighbor, but did not name the neighbor as a party. After a bench trial, the Mobile Circuit Court found the owners in violation, granted a permanent injunction requiring removal of the offending portions of the house, denied the counterclaim, and declined to award attorney fees to either party.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held that, although the owners had breached unambiguous restrictive covenants, the harm to them from enforcing the injunction was considerably disproportionate to any benefit to the DIPOA. The Court concluded that the trial court’s failure to apply the relative-hardship test was manifestly unjust. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the owners, and dismissed the DIPOA’s cross-appeal regarding attorney fees as moot. View "Englund v. Dauphin Island Property Owners Association" on Justia Law

A dispute arose when a private company constructed and operated a large LED billboard on property owned by a state agency, the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce (MDAC), within the City of Jackson. The billboard was built pursuant to a licensing agreement between MDAC and the company, Busby Outdoor, LLC, and was located on the State Fairgrounds. The City of Jackson, joined by other plaintiffs, claimed that the billboard violated the City’s sign and zoning ordinances because it was erected without a permit or variance and sought to enjoin its operation, also alleging it constituted a public nuisance.The Hinds County Chancery Court reviewed the matter after the City, The Lamar Company, LLC, and a former mayor filed suit. The court required MDAC to be added as a necessary party. After considering motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the chancery court found that the City had standing but dismissed the other plaintiffs for lack of standing. The court held that MDAC and Busby were required to comply with the City’s sign ordinance, though it found the zoning ordinance did not apply due to a specific exemption for state institutions. The court further determined the billboard was a public nuisance because of its violation of the sign ordinance and issued an injunction halting its operation until compliance.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that, absent a specific statutory provision subjecting the state or its agencies to municipal ordinances, the City could not enforce its sign ordinance against the state on state-owned property. The Court found that the relevant statutes did not expressly or by necessary implication grant the City such authority over MDAC’s property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery court’s judgment, vacated the injunction, and rendered judgment in favor of MDAC and Busby, dismissing the City’s complaint with prejudice. View "Busby Outdoor LLC v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law