Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund and its employees for damages caused by an allegedly defamatory article published under a pseudonym. The claims were dismissed in Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trust then sued in Texas state court. The defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. The trial court granted both motions.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court lacked authority to grant the TCPA motion after it was overruled by operation of law and that the defendants failed to conclusively establish that collateral estoppel barred the claims. The appellate court determined that the Colorado court's findings on personal jurisdiction did not preclude the Texas claims and that the addition of new defendants in Texas further demonstrated that the issues were not identical.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed with the appellate court that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on their collateral estoppel defense. However, it found that the appellate court erred in holding that the order granting the TCPA motion was void. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the trial court's error in granting the TCPA motion outside the statutory deadline was harmless because it occurred within the time frame in which the defendants could have appealed the denial by operation of law. The case was remanded to the appellate court to address the TCPA motion on its merits. View "FIRST SABREPOINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. v. FARMLAND PARTNERS INC." on Justia Law

Gianni and Jennifer Pignetti owned two noncontiguous parcels of land in Philadelphia, used for storing vehicles and equipment for Mr. Pignetti's electrical business. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) condemned part of one parcel and all of the other for an Interstate 95 improvement project. The Pignettis sought just compensation, arguing the parcels should be valued together as one under the Eminent Domain Code, which allows for such valuation if noncontiguous tracts in substantially identical ownership are used together for a unified purpose.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County agreed with the Pignettis, finding that the parcels were used together for a unified purpose and had substantially identical ownership. PennDOT appealed, and the Commonwealth Court reversed, ruling that the Pignettis did not prove the parcels were used together for a unified purpose. The Commonwealth Court applied a stricter standard from the case Morris v. Commonwealth, requiring that the parcels be so inseparably connected that the loss of one would necessarily and permanently injure the other.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code does not require the stricter standard from Morris. Instead, it requires only that the parcels be used together for a unified purpose. The Court found that the Pignettis' use of the parcels for storing business equipment and vehicles met this requirement. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address whether the parcels had substantially identical ownership, an issue not resolved by the Commonwealth Court. View "Pignetti v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

Diamond Quality, Inc., an industrial inspection and sorting company, had been working with subsidiaries of Dana Incorporated, including Dana Light Axle Products, LLC (Dana Fort Wayne). In 2019, Dana Fort Wayne stopped using Diamond's services. In 2020, Dana Fort Wayne twice refused Diamond entry onto its premises to sort defective parts, despite requests from other Dana subsidiaries in Mexico.Diamond sued Dana Fort Wayne in Allen County state court, alleging tortious interference with its business relationships and contracts with the Dana subsidiaries in Mexico. Dana Fort Wayne removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, where it denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment, arguing that barring Diamond from its premises was not tortious.The district court sought guidance from the Indiana Supreme Court on whether a corporate subsidiary can tortiously interfere with the contracts and business relationships of another subsidiary of the same parent company. The Indiana Supreme Court reframed the question to whether a property owner acts without justification, for purposes of a claim for tortious interference, when barring a plaintiff from accessing the property.The Indiana Supreme Court held that a property owner is always justified in excluding another from its premises absent a contractual or statutory duty. This right to exclude is fundamental to property law and cannot support a claim for tortious interference under Indiana law. The court did not need to choose between the second and third restatements of torts for this decision. The answer to the reframed certified question was "no." View "Diamond Quality, Inc. v. Dana Light Axle Products, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming, Board of Land Commissioners (State Board), granted Temporary Use Permits (TUPs) to permittees for the use of state land in Teton County. The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (County Board) issued abatement notices to the permittees, asserting violations of county land use regulations. The State Board sought a declaration that it and its permittees were not subject to these regulations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Board, and the County Board appealed.The district court found that the State Board and its permittees were not subject to Teton County's land use and development regulations. The County Board argued that Wyoming statutes required compliance with local zoning laws for state lands under long-term leases and TUPs. The State Board countered that sovereign immunity protected it from such regulations and that the statutes did not apply to TUPs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP are not subject to county land use and development regulations. The court reasoned that while Wyoming statutes require compliance with local zoning laws for long-term leases of state lands, they do not impose the same requirement for TUPs. The court emphasized that the legislature's omission of TUPs from the statutory requirement for compliance with local zoning laws was intentional. Therefore, the County Board lacked the authority to enforce its land use regulations against the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP. View "Teton County Board of County Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

HIVE Construction, Inc. served as the general contractor for the construction of Masterpiece Kitchen, a restaurant. The contract required HIVE to follow specific architectural plans, including installing two layers of drywall on a wall separating the kitchen and dining area. Instead, HIVE installed one layer of drywall and one layer of combustible plywood without approval. A fire started within the wall, causing significant damage and forcing the restaurant to close. Mid-Century Insurance Company, as the property insurer and subrogee of Masterpiece Kitchen, paid for the damages and then sued HIVE for negligence, alleging willful and wanton conduct.The district court initially allowed Mid-Century to amend its complaint to include a breach of contract claim but later reversed this decision, requiring Mid-Century to proceed with the negligence claim. At trial, the jury found HIVE's conduct to be willful and wanton, awarding damages to Mid-Century. HIVE appealed, arguing that the economic loss rule barred the negligence claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the district court's decision and instructing a verdict in HIVE's favor.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the economic loss rule does not provide an exception for willful and wanton conduct. The court held that the rule barred Mid-Century's negligence claim because the duty HIVE allegedly breached was not independent of its contractual obligations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals, upholding the application of the economic loss rule to bar the negligence claim. View "Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE Construction" on Justia Law

The City of Tea passed a resolution imposing a special assessment on properties abutting a road construction project, including property owned by KJD, LLC. The City found that the improvement conferred special benefits on the abutting properties beyond those experienced by the public. KJD objected to the assessment, arguing it was unconstitutional as the project did not confer a special benefit on its property. The circuit court held that KJD did not rebut the presumption that the City’s assessment was valid and did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the City’s findings were incorrect, thus denying KJD’s objection.KJD appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. The Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, noting that the City’s findings in its resolution are presumed correct and that KJD had the burden to rebut this presumption with substantial, credible evidence. The Court found that KJD failed to present such evidence. The City’s findings included that the project would improve aesthetics, safety, and access to the properties, which are considered special benefits. The Court also noted that the City’s method of calculating the assessment based on the cost of the project was constitutionally permissible.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that KJD did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the City’s special assessment was unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the City’s findings were supported by the record and that the special assessment did not exceed the value of the benefits conferred on KJD’s property. View "KJD, LLC v. City Of Tea" on Justia Law

Wehr Constructors, Inc. (Wehr) entered into a contract with St. Claire Medical Center (St. Claire) to build an addition to the hospital. Wehr's performance was allegedly deficient, leading to significant construction defects. St. Claire terminated the contract and sought damages from Wehr's performance-bond carrier, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (Travelers Surety). Travelers Surety then involved Wehr in the litigation. Wehr sought defense coverage from its insurers: Phoenix Insurance Company (Phoenix), St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company (St. Paul), and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers Property).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled that none of Wehr’s insurers had a duty to defend Wehr in the lawsuit initiated by St. Claire. The court held that Phoenix’s duty to defend was not triggered because St. Claire did not assert claims directly against Wehr. It also found that St. Paul had no duty to defend because Wehr did not specifically agree to perform as a construction manager, a requirement under the St. Paul policy. Although Wehr did not seek summary judgment against Travelers Property, the court noted that Travelers Property also had no duty to defend for the same reasons as Phoenix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding St. Paul, agreeing that Wehr did not specifically agree to serve as a construction manager. However, it reversed the decision regarding Phoenix, holding that Phoenix had a duty to defend Wehr because the damages alleged by St. Claire potentially fell within the policy coverage, and Wehr was a party to the suit. The court vacated the decision regarding Travelers Property and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Travelers Property had a duty to defend, given the ambiguity in the district court’s ruling and the stipulation by the parties. View "Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Wehr Constructors, Inc." on Justia Law

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mississippi Apartment Association (MAA) and other property owners challenging an ordinance adopted by the Jackson City Council. The ordinance imposed registration and inspection requirements on rental housing units in Jackson. MAA appealed the city council's decision in the Hinds County Circuit Court but did not request a stay of the ordinance's implementation. Subsequently, MAA filed a separate action in the Hinds County Chancery Court seeking injunctions against the ordinance's enforcement, arguing that the planning department's interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance were unlawful.The Hinds County Chancery Court dismissed MAA's claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The chancery court found that the circuit court also had pendent jurisdiction over MAA's equitable claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision and pendent jurisdiction over related claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement. The court emphasized that allowing a separate action in the chancery court could lead to contradictory rulings and confusion. The court also noted that MAA had an adequate remedy at law in the circuit court and could have requested a stay of the ordinance's implementation under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62. View "Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law