Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a borrower who executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2007, defaulted on the loan in 2009, and faced a foreclosure action that same year by the lender's predecessor. The 2009 foreclosure action included an explicit acceleration of the loan, but the lender’s standing was disputed due to the timing of the assignment of the note and mortgage. The foreclosure case lingered for over a decade, during which the mortgage and note changed hands and were eventually assigned to the current lender. In 2022, the foreclosure action was voluntarily discontinued without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the borrower brought a quiet title action, contending that the six-year statute of limitations had expired, making further foreclosure unenforceable. The lender then initiated a new foreclosure action, which was also pending.In the Supreme Court of New York County, the lender argued that the loan was never validly accelerated due to lack of standing in the original case. The borrower sought summary judgment, asserting that under the recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), the limitations period had expired. While the motions were pending, FAPA took effect. The Supreme Court found that FAPA applied retroactively, estopped the lender from challenging the validity of the 2009 acceleration, and granted judgment for the borrower, cancelling the mortgage. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that FAPA’s relevant provisions (sections 4, 7, and 8) apply retroactively to pending actions and do not violate the federal Due Process or Contract Clauses. The Court found that FAPA validly estops the lender from disputing the prior acceleration and that the limitations period had expired, supporting quiet title relief for the borrower. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Van Dyke v U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn." on Justia Law

In this case, the dispute centered on a Brooklyn property subject to both senior and junior mortgages. After the original borrower defaulted on the senior mortgage, a loan servicer (Central Mortgage Company) commenced a foreclosure action in 2007 but later discontinued it without prejudice in 2017. Subsequently, Article 13 LLC acquired the junior mortgage and, in 2020, filed a quiet title action in federal court seeking to have the senior mortgage canceled as time-barred under New York’s statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether the servicer actually held the note at the time it commenced the 2007 foreclosure, denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the New York Legislature enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which clarified the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosures and addressed abusive litigation practices. Article 13 LLC moved for reconsideration, arguing the new law applied retroactively. The district court agreed, concluding that FAPA retroactively applied and precluded the senior mortgage holder from contesting the validity of the prior foreclosure acceleration, and further held that this retroactive effect did not violate due process rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the retroactive application of FAPA and its consistency with the New York Constitution’s due process protections. The New York Court of Appeals held that FAPA applies to all foreclosure actions in which a final judgment of foreclosure and sale had not been enforced before its effective date, including those pending at the time of enactment. The court further held that FAPA’s retroactive application does not violate substantive or procedural due process under the New York Constitution. View "Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank" on Justia Law

In this case, the Jewetts obtained a mortgage loan in 1999, which was later assigned to U.S. Bank. The Jewetts stopped making payments before March 2016. U.S. Bank sent a notice of right to cure in July 2018 and initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Jewetts in September 2018, also naming Unifund as a party due to its judgment lien on the property.The District Court (Newport, Larson, J.) conducted a bench trial and dismissed U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action without prejudice, finding that U.S. Bank’s notice of default and right to cure did not comply with statutory requirements under 14 M.R.S. § 6111. The court’s order barred U.S. Bank from recovering attorney fees, costs, and certain charges in any future action, but did not expressly bar claims for unaccelerated amounts due under the note. Unifund then moved to alter or amend the judgment, seeking a judgment in favor of the Jewetts to preclude future claims for unaccelerated amounts, but the court denied the motion.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo. It held that when a foreclosure action is dismissed due to a defective notice of default and right to cure, the dismissal is not on the merits, but claim preclusion applies to any amounts that could have been litigated in the action. The court concluded that the District Court was within its authority to dismiss the case without prejudice and was not required to enter a judgment for the Jewetts or explicitly bar future claims for unaccelerated amounts. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Jewett" on Justia Law

Tenants of two units in a multi-family residential building filed rent escrow complaints in the District Court of Maryland in Prince George’s County, alleging hazardous conditions such as infestations, water damage, and fire risks. The property lacked a valid rental license due to housing code violations. The tenants sought repairs and a return of rent paid during the unlicensed period, arguing that, under Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Edward J. Maher, P.C., they owed no rent while the property was unlicensed and should not have to pay rent into escrow.The District Court ordered the tenants to pay rent into escrow starting September 2023, and dismissed their complaints when they declined to do so. The tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. By the time of the appeal, one tenant had vacated, and the landlord had obtained the necessary license and disclaimed any intent to collect rent from the unlicensed period. The circuit court heard the appeal de novo and dismissed it as moot, noting that the landlord was not seeking rent for the unlicensed period.On further review, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that no live controversy remained. The tenants no longer had possession of the units, and the landlord had renounced claims for rent during the unlicensed period. The court rejected arguments that collateral consequences or exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, finding no judgments of possession or damages had been entered and recent legislative changes had altered the statutory framework. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Wilson v. Tanglewood Venture" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization based in Queens purchased a 73-acre parcel in the Town of Callicoon, Sullivan County, in 2018. Although the organization originally intended to use the property as a retreat center, testimony established that its actual use involved farming vegetables on about one cleared acre for charitable distribution to low-income residents in Queens. Occasional overnight stays involved religious activities, but there was no evidence of regular organized religious services or use as a retreat center. The Town Supervisor, who lived nearby and farmed part of the property without a formal agreement, confirmed the farming use but did not observe overnight retreats.After the Town Assessor denied a religious use tax exemption for the property for the 2021 tax year, the organization filed a grievance complaint, which was denied by the Town’s Board of Assessment Review. The organization then initiated an RPTL article 7 proceeding in Supreme Court, challenging the denial. A similar process occurred for the 2022 tax year, and both proceedings were joined. Supreme Court held a nonjury trial, found all witnesses credible, credited the organization’s testimony about actual use, and granted the petitions for both tax years, concluding the property was exempt. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with one Justice dissenting.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the lower courts applied the correct legal standards: the burden to prove entitlement to exemption rests with the party seeking it, while the burden to prove a zoning violation rests with the municipality. The Court of Appeals found record support for Supreme Court’s factual findings and concluded that the Town failed to prove a zoning violation sufficient to defeat the exemption for both years. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v Assessor, Town of Callicoon" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are entities that own and operate a four-story building in Kemah, Texas. The building houses a bar, residential rental units, and a food truck. The dispute began when, in July 2021, the city issued a zero-occupancy notice for the building after an inspection found multiple safety hazards, prohibiting anyone except the owner and repair contractors from entering. Plaintiffs allege this deprived them of almost all economic use of the property. Separately, the city took enforcement action against the food truck, culminating in its removal from the property in October 2021. Plaintiffs challenged the food truck towing in state court, but ultimately dropped their appeal. They then sued the city in federal court, raising federal and state takings, due process, and equal protection claims regarding both the zero-occupancy notice and the food truck towing, and sought declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the city’s motion to dismiss. The court found the claims related to the zero-occupancy notice were not ripe because plaintiffs had not pursued available administrative appeals to the city council, as allegedly required by city ordinances. The court dismissed the food truck claims on the merits, and dismissed the request for declaratory relief because no substantive claims remained.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the zero-occupancy notice claims as unripe. The appellate court determined that the city’s issuance of the zero-occupancy notice constituted a sufficiently final decision for purposes of ripeness and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reversed the dismissal of the zero-occupancy notice claims and remanded those claims, including the related request for declaratory relief, for further proceedings. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had waived their food truck claims by failing to adequately brief them on appeal and affirmed their dismissal. View "T&W Holding v. City of Kemah, Texas" on Justia Law

The case concerns three heirs of Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a Jewish German art collector persecuted by the Nazi regime, who seek to recover Vincent van Gogh’s painting “Sunflowers.” Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was forced to liquidate his art collection in the 1930s due to Nazi policies. The painting was sold through a Parisian dealer, later purchased at auction in London in 1987 by Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which subsequently became Sompo Japan Insurance. The painting was exhibited briefly in Chicago and Amsterdam in 2001–2002 before returning to Japan, where it remains on display.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Sompo Holdings and its affiliates, seeking the painting’s return or compensation, alleging various state and federal claims. The district court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims because the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act) does not create a federal cause of action, and the plaintiffs had not shown a conflict between state law and federal policy to justify federal common law claims. For the state law claims, the district court held (following a Pennsylvania district court’s reasoning in Holtzman) that the HEAR Act’s extension of limitations periods could confer federal question jurisdiction, but ultimately dismissed these claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, finding insufficient connection to Illinois.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the federal claims failed for lack of a federal cause of action or basis for federal common law. As for the state law claims, the Seventh Circuit declined to address subject matter jurisdiction and instead affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding the defendants’ contacts with Illinois were unrelated to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a further amended complaint. View "Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The City sought to condemn two portions of property owned by Johnson Properties, located at the intersection of Arrowhead Parkway and Six Mile Road in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, as part of a road realignment project. The property housed the Alibi Bar & Grill, and the City's action resulted in the loss of direct access from Arrowhead Parkway to the business. The City initially offered $32,454 for the property interests, later increasing its offer to $250,000. Johnson Properties rejected these offers, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial solely on the issue of just compensation, with Johnson Properties’ appraiser valuing the loss at $405,000 and the City’s appraiser at $51,711.After a three-day trial in the Second Judicial Circuit Court, the jury awarded Johnson Properties $382,600, which was more than 20% above the City’s final offer. Johnson Properties subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to SDCL 21-35-23, submitting evidence of a contingent fee agreement and customary regional practices in eminent domain litigation. The City did not contest the statutory entitlement to fees, the hours worked, or the hourly rate, but argued that the lodestar calculation of $61,740 was sufficient and objected to any enhancement based on the contingency arrangement.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding $139,724.60 in attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly began with the lodestar method and then applied the Kelley factors, including the specialized nature of eminent domain law, customary contingent fee practices, and the substantial results obtained. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the circuit court’s award of $139,724.60 in attorney fees. View "City Of Sioux Falls v. Johnson Properties" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children experienced significant changes in their financial and professional circumstances during their marriage. The husband started several businesses, including an insurance agency and other ventures with local investors. In early 2023, he faced serious legal and regulatory issues, including a large default judgment and revocation of his insurance and gaming licenses, followed by criminal indictments. Amid these developments, the wife discovered evidence of his extramarital affair and initiated divorce proceedings, seeking an equitable division of marital property and debts. During the divorce, the husband retained counsel and used marital funds to commence a lawsuit against his former business partners to recover money he had invested in their shared businesses.The divorce case was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota. Both parties disputed the classification and valuation of assets, notably the pending lawsuit. The husband argued that the lawsuit should be treated as his separate property due to an alleged pretrial agreement. The wife disputed the existence of such an agreement and asserted that the lawsuit was a marital asset. The circuit court found no binding agreement on the lawsuit’s classification, treated the pending lawsuit as marital property, valued it at $350,000 based on the invested retainer and a percentage of the claimed amount, and assigned it to the husband.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the pending lawsuit as marital property subject to equitable division. The Supreme Court found that the valuation of the lawsuit was not clearly erroneous, as it reasonably reflected the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decisions regarding classification and valuation, and granted the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who were instrumental in the campaign to incorporate the City of Erda sought to prevent approximately 8,000 acres from being annexed out of Erda and into Grantsville City. The controversy arose after an entity, Six Mile Ranch, initiated and amended an annexation petition to move land from Erda’s boundaries into Grantsville, during and after Erda’s incorporation process. The Grantsville City Recorder determined that the annexation petition met statutory requirements and certified it, which was followed by Grantsville approving the annexation by ordinance and entering a development agreement for the property. The sponsors challenged the annexation, alleging it violated both statutory requirements and constitutional provisions, and sought to invalidate the annexation ordinance and prevent the Lieutenant Governor from certifying it.In the Third District Court, Tooele County, the sponsors filed a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the sponsors lacked statutory, traditional, and alternative standing to challenge the annexation, and denied related motions.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the dismissal but on alternative grounds. The court held that the sponsors, lacking statutory standing, had no other remedy for their statutory claims but failed to demonstrate that rule 65B(d)(2)(B) or the judiciary’s constitutional writ authority permitted relief where a public official had performed their statutory duty, albeit allegedly incorrectly. Regarding the constitutional claims, the court found that a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available through declaratory judgment actions, as clarified by recent appellate decisions. Therefore, the sponsors could not obtain extraordinary relief under rule 65B for either set of claims, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Erda Community Association v. Baugh" on Justia Law