Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Amy Hadley’s home in South Bend, Indiana, was significantly damaged when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant in pursuit of a murder suspect they believed was inside her residence. The officers, acting on information that the suspect had accessed his Facebook account from Hadley’s IP address, obtained a warrant and forcefully entered the home, causing extensive property damage, including the use of tear gas and destruction of personal items. Hadley, who had no connection to the suspect, was denied compensation by both the City of South Bend and St. Joseph County for the $16,000 in damages.After her request for compensation was denied, Hadley filed suit in Indiana state court, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, specifically invoking the Takings Clause. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly Johnson v. Manitowoc County, foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint, finding that the Takings Clause did not entitle her to compensation for property damage resulting from the execution of a lawful search warrant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, under its precedent in Johnson v. Manitowoc County, the Fifth Amendment does not require the government to compensate property owners for damage caused by law enforcement executing a valid search warrant. The court declined to overrule Johnson and found that Hadley’s arguments did not warrant revisiting the established rule. View "Hadley v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the validity of Measure C, a citizens’ initiative placed on the ballot by the City of San Diego for the March 2020 election. Measure C proposed an increase in the city’s transient occupancy tax, with revenues earmarked for homelessness programs, street repairs, and convention center improvements. The measure also authorized the City to issue bonds repaid from the new tax revenues. Measure C received 65.24 percent of the vote, and the city council subsequently passed resolutions declaring the measure approved and authorizing the issuance of related bonds.After the election, Alliance San Diego and other plaintiffs filed actions challenging the City’s resolution declaring Measure C had passed, arguing it was invalid. The City responded with a validation complaint seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of Measure C and the related bond resolutions. California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN) and other opponents answered, contending that Measure C required a two-thirds vote and was not a bona fide citizens’ initiative. The Superior Court of San Diego County initially granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that a two-thirds vote was required, and entered judgment against the City. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative.On remand, the trial court conducted a bench trial and rejected CTAN’s arguments, finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the case was ripe, the special fund doctrine exempted the bonds from the two-thirds vote requirement, and Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative requiring only a simple majority vote. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Measure C and the related bond resolutions were valid, and that the trial court properly excluded certain hearsay evidence. View "Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network" on Justia Law

A group of fourteen taxpayers, all out-of-state owners, operators, or lessees of multifamily housing developments in the City of Tuscaloosa, challenged a city ordinance that amended the business-license fee structure. The ordinance, effective April 2022, imposed a 3% business-license fee on rents received from student-oriented housing developments (SOHDs) with more than 200 bedrooms, while other rental properties remained subject to a 1% fee. The SOHD designation is determined by the city’s zoning officer based on a non-exhaustive list of characteristics and factors. The taxpayers alleged that the ordinance unfairly targeted out-of-state owners and was vague in its application.The taxpayers filed suit in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, seeking a declaration that the ordinance was invalid and a refund of taxes paid. They raised claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the dormant Commerce Clause, and argued that the ordinance was essentially a zoning ordinance adopted without following statutory notice requirements. The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding the complaint insufficient to state a claim.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal. The court held that the taxpayers’ claims under the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause (vagueness), and dormant Commerce Clause were sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to dismiss, as the allegations, if proven, could entitle the taxpayers to relief. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim that the ordinance was a zoning ordinance subject to statutory notice requirements, finding the ordinance did not regulate property use in the manner of zoning laws. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campus Crest at Tuscaloosa LLC v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

After the death of Gary Wayne Johnson, who died without a will in 2021, his sister, Zoa Ann Manners, opened his estate and filed a creditor’s claim. Her claim was based on a document titled “Article of Agreement,” which Gary had prepared, signed, and delivered to her in 2002. Zoa Ann argued that this document created a contractual obligation for Gary, and subsequently his estate, to distribute a one-fourth interest in certain real property (specifically, Lots 12 and 13 of Lenzi Farms Subdivision) to her and her sisters, in accordance with their parents’ wills. The document was notarized but never recorded, and its language referenced the parents’ testamentary intentions.The Chancery Court of Marshall County held a hearing on Zoa Ann’s claim. After considering her testimony and the document, the chancery court found that the Article of Agreement was ambiguous, lacked sufficient clarity to convey a present interest in land, and did not meet the requirements of a deed or a contract. The court denied her claim against the estate. Zoa Ann appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision, holding that the Article of Agreement did constitute a valid deed conveying a vested future interest in the property, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Article of Agreement did not create a contractual obligation nor did it operate as a valid deed, as it failed to convey a present interest in the property and was testamentary in nature. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of Marshall County, denying Zoa Ann’s claim. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson v. The Estate of Gary Wayne Johnson" on Justia Law

Ann Tierney Smith owned real property in West Virginia but failed to pay the assessed real estate taxes for 2016. As a result, the Mercer County Sheriff sold a tax lien on the property to Ed Boer. Boer sought a tax deed and provided the West Virginia State Auditor’s Office with a list of individuals to be notified about the right to redeem the property, including Smith. However, Boer did not include Smith’s current mailing address, which was available in county records. Notices sent by mail were returned as undeliverable, and attempts at personal service were unsuccessful, leading to notices being posted at the property and other addresses. After the redemption deadline passed, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., an employee of the State Auditor’s Office, issued a tax deed to Boer. Smith learned of the deed in late 2020.Smith, and later her estate representatives, sued Rollyson and Boer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment to Rollyson, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that while Rollyson could have directed Boer to search county records for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned, the duty to do so was not clearly established at the time. The estate representatives appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that it was not clearly established on April 1, 2019, that Rollyson was required to have Boer search county records anew for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned. The court found that existing precedent did not prescribe a specific follow-up measure and that Rollyson’s actions did not violate clearly established law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Ann deWet v. G. Russell Rollyson, Jr." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

Frank and Shirlynne Apecella purchased property in Hamilton, Montana, in 2020, which historically received irrigation water from the Decker Ditch, originating at Roaring Lion Creek and running through their neighbor Lillian Overman’s property. After moving in, the Apecellas discovered they were not receiving water through the ditch and, upon investigation, learned that Overman’s husband had filled in the ditch and posted a “no trespassing” sign. The Apecellas own a water right in Roaring Lion Creek, and the disputed ditch segment runs from a bifurcation point on Overman’s property to the boundary with the Apecella property. The Apecellas sought a declaratory judgment affirming their ditch easement and alleged Overman interfered with their easement rights.The Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court held a bench trial and found that the Apecellas had established both an implied and a prescriptive easement for the ditch in question, and that Overman had interfered with their easement by filling in the ditch. The court rejected Overman’s defenses of abandonment and reverse adverse possession, finding insufficient evidence that the Apecellas or their predecessors had abandoned the easement or that Overman had extinguished it through adverse use. The court permanently enjoined Overman from further interference and awarded the Apecellas attorney fees as the prevailing party under Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that Overman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either abandonment or reverse adverse possession of the Apecellas’ irrigation ditch easement. The Court also held that the Apecellas were the prevailing party under § 70-17-112(5), MCA, and were entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees. The District Court’s orders were affirmed in all respects. View "Apecella v. Overman" on Justia Law

Several homeowners initiated a lawsuit against an individual, alleging conversion, trespass, outrage, reformation of restrictive covenants, quiet title, and seeking injunctive relief to prevent interference with their use of common areas in a real estate development. The defendant retained counsel and filed a timely answer. However, when the homeowners moved for summary judgment, the defendant’s attorney failed to respond or inform his client about the motion. The district court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, far exceeding the amount requested in the motion.After more than 30 days had passed since judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, arguing that unavoidable casualty or misfortune, fraud, and irregularity had prevented him from defending the action. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to vacate. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the defendant had not properly pled a valid defense and that his attorney’s negligence was imputed to him.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the attorney’s abandonment of the case without the client’s knowledge, combined with a breakdown in office procedures and lack of communication, constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune under Oklahoma law. The court further found that the district court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees without a hearing or proper evidentiary support violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also vacated the appellate attorney fee award previously granted to the homeowners. View "Bjorkman v. Noble" on Justia Law