Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church) submitted a site plan and an application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to the City of Cody Planning, Zoning, and Adjustment Board (Board) for the construction of a temple. The Board approved the site plan and CUP application at a meeting on June 15, 2023. Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods (POCN), an association of local landowners, opposed the construction and filed petitions for review in the district court challenging the Board's approvals.The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over POCN’s petitions because they were untimely. The court found that the Board had approved the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting, and any subsequent actions by the Board to reconsider or modify those approvals were unauthorized. POCN's petitions for review were filed more than 30 days after the June 15, 2023 meeting, making them untimely.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that the Board's approval of the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting constituted final agency action, as it concluded the proceedings regarding the Church’s site plan and CUP application. The Court found that the Board did not have the authority to reconsider or modify its approvals at subsequent meetings. Therefore, POCN's petitions for review, filed in August 2023, were untimely, and the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider them. View "Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods v. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

White Knight Development, LLC entered into a contract in 2015 to purchase land from Dick and Julie Simmons for $400,000. The contract included a "buy-back" provision allowing White Knight to require the Simmonses to repurchase the property if certain restrictions were extended. When the restrictions were extended in October 2016, White Knight invoked the buy-back provision, but the Simmonses refused to repurchase the property. White Knight sued for breach of contract and sought specific performance and damages related to the delay in performance.The trial court found that the Simmonses breached the contract and awarded White Knight specific performance, ordering the Simmonses to repurchase the property for $400,000. Additionally, the court awarded White Knight $308,136.14 in damages for various costs incurred due to the delay in performance. These costs included property taxes, loan interest, and other expenses related to the property and White Knight's business operations.The Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas modified the judgment by deleting the $308,136.14 monetary award but otherwise affirmed the trial court's decision. The court acknowledged that monetary compensation could be awarded alongside specific performance in narrow circumstances but found no express statement by the trial court that the monetary award was equitable in nature.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while specific performance usually precludes a monetary award, there are narrow circumstances where both can be awarded. The court concluded that the trial court's findings supported an equitable monetary award to account for the delay in performance. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case for further review of the monetary award consistent with the principles announced. View "WHITE KNIGHT DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. SIMMONS" on Justia Law

A landowner recorded a plat dividing its property into seventy-three tracts, each between one and two acres. A restriction in the recorded deeds stated that no more than two residences could be built on any five-acre tract. Neighbors sued to enforce this restriction, arguing it limited development to no more than two residences per five acres.The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the neighbors, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development to two residences per five-acre tract. The court dismissed the landowner's defenses and counterclaims, except for changed conditions, and issued a temporary injunction. The jury found no changed conditions, and the court permanently enjoined the landowner from building more than two residences per five-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development and rejecting the landowner's defenses.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the restriction did not prevent the landowner from building one residence on each sub-five-acre tract. The court concluded that the restriction limited density, not tract size, and did not expressly address tracts smaller than five acres. The court reversed the judgment awarding the neighbors declaratory and injunctive relief and remanded for a new trial on the landowner's changed-conditions counterclaim, finding the jury was improperly instructed to consider only post-purchase changes. The court also held that nonparty adjoining landowners and the State were not necessary parties to the suit. View "EIS DEVELOPMENT II, LLC v. BUENA VISTA AREA ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeanette Runey, filed a lawsuit against her neighbor, Wayne S. Faring, over a boundary dispute involving a shared driveway between their properties. The plaintiff owns property at 930 East Wallum Lake Road, while the defendant owns property at 860-900 East Wallum Lake Road. In 2019, the defendant initiated an action to determine ownership of the driveway, claiming easement by prescription, necessity, implication, and/or estoppel. The plaintiff counterclaimed for declaratory relief. In 2021, a Superior Court justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that she had title to the disputed land, and the defendant did not. Neither party appealed this decision.The plaintiff then sought a preliminary injunction to remove the defendant’s personal property from the disputed land. The defendant opposed, claiming adverse possession. A different Superior Court justice denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal after it had been docketed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the proper method to seek review of the denial of a preliminary injunction is through a petition for writ of certiorari, not a direct appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.The Supreme Court also expressed concern over the motion justice’s disregard for the unappealed April 7, 2022 judgment, emphasizing the importance of res judicata, which bars the relitigation of issues that were or could have been tried in an earlier action. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Runey v. Faring" on Justia Law

Tom Smith Masonry (Smith Masonry) and WIPI Group USA, Inc. (WIPI) entered into a contract for Smith Masonry to construct a fence on WIPI’s property. After completing most of the work, Smith Masonry requested final payment, which WIPI withheld due to a dispute over the installation of a gate operator. Smith Masonry filed a mechanic’s lien and subsequently a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien, seeking the unpaid balance. WIPI counterclaimed for breach of contract and other issues, seeking damages for alleged faulty workmanship.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, denied relief to both parties, finding that Smith Masonry’s work was defective and that WIPI’s damages were not established with exactitude. Smith Masonry appealed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Smith Masonry for the full amount of the lien and to reconsider Smith Masonry’s request for attorney fees.On remand, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Smith Masonry on the lien but denied the request for attorney fees. Smith Masonry appealed again. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the circuit court violated the law of the case doctrine by revisiting issues already settled in the first appeal and by speculating on what might have occurred had the trial resumed. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on irrelevant factors and an overly narrow interpretation of the statute governing attorney fees in mechanic’s lien cases.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney fees consistent with its opinion. The court also awarded Smith Masonry $30,000 for appellate attorney fees. View "Smith Masonry v. Wipi Group Inc." on Justia Law

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

In this case, a construction financer, Mortgages Ltd. (ML), collapsed, leading to numerous mechanics' liens on unfinished projects. ML had loaned $165 million to Tempe Land Company (TLC) for a condominium project, securing the loan with a deed of trust and purchasing a title insurance policy from Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. Contractors began recording mechanics' liens against the property, and ML entered involuntary bankruptcy. The Loan LLCs, created to hold ML's assets, foreclosed on the property but did not extinguish the liens. Universal and VRCP provided loans to ML Manager and the Loan LLCs, securing their loans with deeds of trust and obtaining title insurance policies from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.The trial court granted summary judgment to Commonwealth on CMLC's breach of contract claim, finding that the loans were fully repaid, thus precluding coverage under the policy. The case proceeded to trial on CMLC's bad faith claim, where the jury awarded $5 million in damages. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for CMLC, and affirmed the denial of Commonwealth's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that Commonwealth could contest coverage based on policy provisions limiting liability to the unpaid indebtedness. The court found that the loans were fully repaid, thus no covered loss occurred. The court also held that the diminution in lien value did not constitute actual pecuniary damage to support a bad faith claim. Additionally, the court ruled that the collateral source rule did not preclude evidence of loan repayments. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Commonwealth on the breach of contract claim, and remanded to enter summary judgment for Commonwealth on the bad faith claim. View "CENTERPOINT v COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

The case involves an ancillary proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Jesse Dunn filed a third-party petition claiming ownership of a parcel of land in West Jordan, Utah, which the government sought to forfeit in Justin Peck’s criminal case. Peck was convicted of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. The government alleged Peck held an ownership interest in the land. The district court agreed with Dunn and blocked the forfeiture, leading to the government's appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially found the land forfeitable based on Peck’s plea agreement. However, during the ancillary proceeding, the district court determined that Dunn had a superior interest in the property. Dunn had purchased the land with untainted funds and later paid off a loan using funds authorized by Peck. The court found that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s at all relevant times under Utah law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s and the government’s under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). The court noted that the government had only sought to forfeit the land and had not pursued other potentially forfeitable property or substitute property. The court also emphasized that the government did not challenge the district court’s findings under Utah law, which governed the determination of property interests in federal forfeiture proceedings. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly vacated the preliminary forfeiture order and granted Dunn’s third-party petition. View "United States v. Peck" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law