Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Kyle Dew and Mossy Woods & Waters LLC were sued by Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District and Mossy Brake Hunting Club, who claimed exclusive ownership of a portion of Mossy Lake located on sixteenth section land in Leflore County, Mississippi. The School District leases this section of the lake to the hunting club for recreational purposes and alleged that Dew trespassed on its property while on Mossy Lake. Dew countered that Mossy Lake is a public waterbody, and as a littoral landowner, he had the right to use the lake. He also argued that the public waters trust should take precedence over the sixteenth section trust.The Leflore County Chancery Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and declaratory judgment. After a hearing and site visit, the chancery court found that the sixteenth section trust was superior to the public waters trust, quieted title to the relevant portion of Mossy Lake in favor of the School District and the hunting club, and enjoined Dew from using that section of the lake. The court also found Dew had not established adverse possession or a prescriptive right and rejected his claims for injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mossy Lake, being navigable and an oxbow lake, is part of the public waters trust and never accrued to the sixteenth section land. The Court found that the School District does not have the right to exclude citizens who legally access the waters of Mossy Lake. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the judgment of the Leflore County Chancery Court on all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dew v. Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District" on Justia Law

Elliott Land Developments LLC sought to rezone approximately 31.8 acres of property owned by Michael and Winona Aguzin in Jackson County, Mississippi, from agricultural (A-1) to single-family residential (R-1) in order to develop a subdivision. The Jackson County Planning Commission held a hearing, where both supporters and opponents presented evidence and arguments. Elliott Land relied on a Land Use Report showing recent development, improved infrastructure, and a purported public need for more housing. Several residents opposed the rezoning, citing concerns about drainage, traffic, and a desire to maintain the rural character of the area. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning.An adjacent property owner, Marisa Lamey, appealed the Planning Commission’s recommendation to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors. Elliott Land challenged the sufficiency and timeliness of Lamey’s notice of appeal, but the Board chose to hear the appeal. After a hearing with testimony from multiple residents, the Board of Supervisors voted four-to-one to deny the rezoning application, finding insufficient evidence of a change in the character of the neighborhood or a public need for rezoning. Elliott Land appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the appeal was not properly before the Board. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the appeal was properly before the Board of Supervisors, that the question of whether Elliott Land met its burden was fairly debatable based on substantial evidence from both sides, and that the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Elliott Land Developments, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

A group of nonprofit associations representing non-residential property owners in New Castle County, Delaware, challenged a temporary state law enacted in response to a recent county-wide property reassessment. The reassessment, ordered by the Delaware Court of Chancery in a prior case, updated decades-old property valuations to reflect current fair market values, resulting in significant tax increases for many residential homeowners and shifting the overall tax burden toward residential properties. In reaction to public outcry, the Delaware General Assembly passed House Bill 242 (HB242), which authorized school districts in New Castle County to implement a one-year split-rate property tax system for the 2025-2026 tax year, imposing higher rates on non-residential properties and lower rates on residential ones.After the reassessment, school boards set new tax rates and issued tax warrants, and the County mailed revised tax bills. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against the State, county officials, and school boards, arguing that HB242 and its implementation were unconstitutional and violated state law on several grounds, including the Uniformity Clause of the Delaware Constitution, statutory requirements for tax referenda, fair market value assessment, due process, and HB242’s own revenue neutrality provision.The Court of Chancery reviewed the plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory claims. It held that HB242’s temporary split-rate system did not violate the Uniformity Clause, as reasonable classification between residential and non-residential properties is permitted. The court found that HB242 did not constitute a retroactive personal income tax, nor did it violate due process, given the availability of post-deprivation remedies for property reclassification. Statutory claims regarding referenda, fair market value, and revenue neutrality were also rejected, as HB242’s specific provisions and timing superseded general statutory requirements. Judgment was entered for the defendants on all counts. View "Newark Property Association v. State" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the ownership of a Goldendoodle named Tucker, acquired by two individuals while they were in a romantic relationship. After their separation in May 2022, one party lost contact with Tucker and initiated legal proceedings to regain possession of the dog. Both parties claim a strong emotional bond with Tucker and present evidence regarding their respective abilities to care for him, including testimony from a veterinary behaviorist about Tucker’s anxiety and attachment.The initial legal action was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court, which ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding her to be Tucker’s rightful owner. The respondent appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where a de novo trial was held. The Court of Common Pleas determined that Tucker was jointly owned by both parties, denying the petitioner’s request for replevin. The petitioner then appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the finding of joint ownership. The parties are now estopped from relitigating the issue of joint ownership.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case to determine the appropriate procedure for partitioning a jointly owned companion animal. The court held that, under Delaware law, partition is the remedy for co-owners wishing to sever their interests in personal property, including pets. The court established a presumption that a value-maximizing auction is the default procedure for partitioning a companion animal, but allowed for the possibility of deviation if the equities require it, such as to prevent harm to the animal. In this case, finding no evidence that either party would harm Tucker and that both are suitable owners, the court ordered partition by private auction, appointing a trustee to oversee the process. View "Callahan v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a Delaware law, House Bill 242 (HB242), which permits New Castle County school districts to set different property tax rates for residential and non-residential properties for the 2025-2026 school year. This legislation was enacted after a county-wide property reassessment revealed a significant shift in the tax base, resulting in higher taxes for residential properties. In response to public concern, HB242 allowed school districts to implement a split-rate system, reducing residential rates and increasing non-residential rates, with the stipulation that non-residential rates could not exceed twice the residential rate and that total projected revenue could not surpass the amount projected under the original tax warrant. Subsequent corrections to property classifications led to a net increase in projected tax revenue.The plaintiffs, four property-related associations, challenged HB242 in the Court of Chancery, arguing that it violated the Uniformity Clause of the Delaware Constitution and a “revenue neutrality” requirement in the statute. The Court of Chancery rejected these claims, finding that the General Assembly has the authority to create reasonable property classifications for tax purposes and that the statute’s use of “projected” rather than “actual” revenue allowed for adjustments due to classification corrections.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the constitutionality of HB242 and the statutory interpretation issues de novo. The Court held that the Uniformity Clause does not prohibit reasonable legislative classifications of property for taxation, provided tax rates are uniform within each class. The Court also determined that HB242’s revenue limitation applies to projected, not actual, revenue, and that corrections to property classifications do not violate the statute. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery. View "Newark Property Association v. State" on Justia Law

New South Media Group, LLC, along with other plaintiffs, sought to construct four types of signs—flags, artwork, political messages, and event notices—on private property in Rainbow City, Alabama. The city denied their permit applications, determining that the proposed signs were billboards, which are prohibited under Section 214 of the city’s sign ordinance. The plaintiffs believed their signs qualified for exemptions under Section 213, but the city’s definition of “billboard” encompassed their proposed signs. After receiving the denial, New South requested variances, which were also denied by the city’s zoning board.Following these denials, New South appealed in state court and brought federal and state constitutional challenges, which were dismissed in state court and then refiled in federal court. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, New South alleged that several city sign regulations violated the First Amendment and the Alabama Constitution by imposing content-based restrictions, lacking time limits for permit decisions, and granting unbridled discretion to city officials. The district court granted summary judgment to Rainbow City, finding that New South lacked standing because the injury—the denial of the applications—was caused by the unchallenged billboard prohibition, not the provisions New South contested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that New South lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the non-billboard regulations because the injury was not traceable to those provisions and a favorable decision would not redress the harm caused by the billboard prohibition. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Rainbow City and dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "New South Media Group, LLC v. City of Rainbow City" on Justia Law

A Maryland real estate investment trust with over 12,000 shareholders entered into an advisory agreement with UMTH General Services, L.P. and its affiliates to manage the trust’s investments and operations. The agreement stated that the advisor was in a fiduciary relationship with the trust and its shareholders, but individual shareholders were not parties to the agreement. After allegations of mismanagement and improper advancement of legal fees surfaced, a shareholder, Nexpoint Diversified Real Estate Trust, sued derivatively in Maryland. The Maryland court dismissed the claims for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Nexpoint then transferred its shares to a subsidiary, which, along with Nexpoint, sued the advisors directly in Texas, alleging corporate waste and mismanagement, and claimed the advisory agreement created a duty to individual shareholders.In the 191st District Court of Dallas County, the advisors filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a verified plea in abatement, and special exceptions, arguing that the claims were derivative and belonged to the trust, so the shareholders lacked standing and capacity to sue directly. The trial court denied these motions. The advisors sought mandamus relief from the Fifth Court of Appeals, which was denied, and then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while the shareholders alleged a financial injury sufficient for constitutional standing, they lacked the capacity to sue individually because the advisory agreement did not create a duty to individual shareholders, nor did it confer third-party beneficiary status. The agreement benefited shareholders collectively through the trust, not individually. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its order and dismiss the case with prejudice, holding that shareholders must pursue such claims derivatively and in the proper forum as specified by the trust’s governing documents. View "IN RE UMTH GENERAL SERVICES, L.P." on Justia Law

Bedford Recycling, Inc. applied to the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for a conditional use permit to operate a scrap metal collection and sorting facility on property zoned for mineral extraction. The county’s zoning ordinance did not specifically allow scrap metal recycling, so Bedford sought approval under the category of “Central Garbage/Rubbish Collection Facility.” The BZA granted the permit after a public hearing in which Bedford acknowledged the facility would not handle solid waste, a typical requirement for the permit. Subsequently, Republic Services, a neighboring property owner, filed for judicial review, arguing that Bedford’s facility did not meet the ordinance’s requirements. While preparing written findings to support its decision, the BZA’s attorney concluded that granting the permit was a legal error, as Bedford’s proposed use did not fit the permit’s definition.After several meetings and changes in BZA membership, the Board voted to revoke Bedford’s permit, finding that the facility was essentially a scrap yard, which was not a permitted use in the zoning district. Bedford then sought judicial review in the Monroe Circuit Court, which found that the BZA lacked statutory authority to revoke the permit based on a change in reasoning or alleged legal error, and reinstated the permit. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BZA could correct its own legal error and revoke the permit.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that administrative bodies like the BZA have only the powers expressly granted by statute and possess no inherent or common law authority to reconsider or revoke final decisions absent explicit legislative authorization. The Court disapproved prior appellate decisions that recognized an “error of law” exception. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the BZA’s revocation and reinstated Bedford’s conditional use permit. View "Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bedford Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law