Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, who owned real property in Southfield, Michigan, became delinquent on their property taxes between 2012 and 2014. Oakland County foreclosed on their properties under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA). The plaintiffs had the opportunity to redeem their properties by paying the delinquent taxes, but they failed to do so. Consequently, the properties were foreclosed, and the city of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal to purchase the properties for the minimum bid, which included the unpaid taxes and associated fees. The properties were then conveyed to the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (SNRI).The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging violations of their constitutional rights, including the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, citing lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, and res judicata. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. However, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.On remand, the trial court again granted summary disposition to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Rafaeli applied retroactively and that the plaintiffs had valid takings claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a taking occurs when a governmental unit retains property without offering it for public sale and the value of the property exceeds the amount owed in taxes and fees. The Court also held that MCL 211.78m, as amended, applies prospectively, while MCL 211.78t applies retroactively but does not govern this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative" on Justia Law

Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson Island, Maryland, sought to build an assisted living facility for elderly people with disabilities. The Gibson Island Corporation, a homeowners association, opposed the project, citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting business use of homes without approval. Lussi requested an exemption as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Maryland law, but the Corporation imposed four conditions, which Lussi found unreasonable. Negotiations failed, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the Corporation, finding that Lussi could not show the requested accommodation was necessary for providing equal housing opportunities. The court also dismissed Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims, concluding there was no evidence of adverse actions or discriminatory intent by the Corporation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the necessity element by focusing on the removal of the Corporation's conditions rather than the requested exemption itself. The appellate court held that the exemption was necessary to provide equal housing opportunities for disabled individuals on Gibson Island. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Corporation's conditions, which should be resolved by a jury.Additionally, the appellate court determined that Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims presented jury questions. The court noted evidence suggesting the Corporation's stated reasons for opposing the project might be pretextual and that community hostility towards disabled residents could imply discriminatory intent.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp." on Justia Law

Brian and Susan Fernaays own a house on lot 31 in Brewers Creek Subdivision, Isle of Wight County, Virginia. A 20-foot drainage easement, shared with lot 32, contains an underground stormwater drainage pipe that has deteriorated over time, causing significant erosion. The Fernaayses estimate the repair cost at $150,000 and sued Isle of Wight County, claiming the County owns the easement and is responsible for maintaining the pipe. They argued that the County's failure to maintain the pipe resulted in an unconstitutional taking of their property under both the Virginia and U.S. Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the subdivision plat and the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions. The court found that the easement was not dedicated to the County, meaning the County had no duty to maintain the drainage pipe. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the Brewers Creek Partnership did not unequivocally dedicate the drainage easement to the County. The court noted that the plat and the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions did not manifest an intent to dedicate the easement or the pipe to the County. The language in the documents suggested that the easements were for the benefit of the lot owners and that the County was only permitted to use them, not obligated to maintain them. Therefore, the County was not responsible for the damage, and the Fernaayses, as property owners, would have to bear the maintenance costs. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Fernaays v. Isle of Wight County" on Justia Law

Copinol Restaurant, Inc. ("Copinol") and 26 North Market LLC ("North Market") entered into a commercial lease agreement for a property in Frederick, Maryland, with a term ending on March 31, 2032. Copinol failed to pay rent on time in May 2023, prompting North Market to terminate the lease and demand that Copinol vacate the premises. When Copinol did not vacate, North Market filed a tenant holding over action in the District Court of Maryland, seeking possession of the property and damages.The District Court of Maryland ruled in favor of North Market, granting it possession of the property. Copinol appealed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which initially ruled in Copinol's favor, stating that the tenant holding over statute did not apply because the lease had not expired. However, after North Market filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the circuit court reversed its decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment, awarding possession to North Market.Copinol then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the tenant holding over statute, RP § 8-402, does not apply where a tenant is in possession of property pursuant to a lease that has not expired by lapse of time. The Court further held that a landlord cannot contractually modify the statutory meaning of the phrase "expiration of a lease" to avail itself of the tenant holding over statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain language. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Copinol. View "Copinol Restaurant v. 26 N. Market" on Justia Law

Thomas Hamann brought a lawsuit against Heart Mountain Irrigation District (HMID) and its manager, Randy Watts, alleging that HMID, through Watts' actions, damaged his property and caused him bodily injury. Hamann sought damages based on claims of inverse condemnation and violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of HMID and Watts, dismissing Hamann’s lawsuit entirely. Hamann appealed only the dismissal of his inverse condemnation claim against HMID.The district court found that HMID had not taken any official action to authorize Watts to enter Hamann’s property beyond the limited scope of work on the Riolo bowl, which Hamann had consented to. The court held that without such authorization, Hamann’s inverse condemnation claim could not survive summary judgment. Hamann argued that there was a material issue of fact regarding whether Watts was acting under the scope, authority, and direction of HMID’s board.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the extent of Watts’ authority and whether his actions were authorized by HMID. The court noted that HMID’s bylaws allowed for delegation of responsibilities to its manager and other agents, and there was evidence suggesting that Watts had general discretion as HMID’s manager. Additionally, there was conflicting testimony about whether Watts had specific authorization to access Hamann’s property beyond the Riolo bowl.The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to HMID, as there were unresolved factual issues regarding the authorization of Watts’ actions and the extent of damage to Hamann’s property due to activities on adjoining land. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hamann v. Heart Mountain Irrigation District" on Justia Law

Anthony Mitchell was driving his Ferrari in Dana Point when he ran over large rocks that had rolled onto the road from an adjacent slope, causing damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Mitchell and his passenger, Scott Sieverts, sued multiple parties, including Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust, for negligence and premises liability, alleging that the defendants failed to maintain their properties to prevent rocks from becoming hazards.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson, concluding that she met her initial burden of showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or whether the defendants negligently maintained their slopes. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Hutchinson met her initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), by showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to show a triable issue of material fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' expert's opinion was speculative and lacked foundation, and there was no admissible evidence tying the rocks to Hutchinson’s property or proving negligence. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson was affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the South Dakota Department of Corrections' (DOC) decision to purchase state-owned agricultural land in Lincoln County for a new men's state prison, authorized by House Bill 1017 (HB 1017). The plaintiffs, a group of private individuals and a non-profit corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Dakota, the DOC, and the DOC Secretary, arguing that the State must comply with local zoning regulations, which do not permit a prison in an agricultural district without a conditional use permit or rezoning.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The court found that only two plaintiffs had standing based on alleged property value decreases. However, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity and preemption, determining that the DOC's actions were discretionary and that state law preempted local zoning regulations.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable claim of right to enforce the local zoning ordinance against the State. The court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and that the plaintiffs failed to identify any statutory or other legal authority granting them a private right to enforce the zoning ordinance. Consequently, the case was deemed non-justiciable, and the court did not address the merits of the sovereign immunity and preemption claims. View "Jensen v. Dept Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Residents of South Seaside Park filed a petition to deannex their community from Berkeley Township and annex it to the Borough of Seaside Park. South Seaside Park is geographically isolated from the mainland section of Berkeley Township, requiring residents to drive 13-16 miles through seven other municipalities to reach the mainland. The community has limited municipal facilities and relies more on Seaside Park for services. The petitioners argued that deannexation would benefit them economically and socially, while not significantly harming Berkeley Township.The Township Council referred the petition to the Planning Board, which conducted 38 hearings over four years. The Planning Board's professional planner, who was supposed to be impartial, instead assisted the Township in opposing the deannexation. Additionally, some Planning Board members made public comments against the petition. The Planning Board ultimately recommended denying the petition, and the Township Council followed this recommendation.Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Council's decision. The trial court found that the Planning Board's process was biased and that the Township's denial of the petition was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court also found that the denial was detrimental to the economic and social well-being of South Seaside Park residents and that deannexation would not significantly harm Berkeley Township. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Planning Board failed to conduct an impartial review and that plaintiffs met their burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. The Court affirmed the trial court's order for deannexation, allowing South Seaside Park to seek annexation by Seaside Park. View "Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township" on Justia Law

Valderra Land Holdings, LLC owns real property encumbered by a performance trust deed held for the benefit of Jenco, LC and others. After Valderra defaulted on its obligations, Jenco sought judicial foreclosure. Valderra counterclaimed, asserting a right to cure its default and requested the court to determine the amount owed. The district court set the payoff amount and directed Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property upon Valderra’s tender of funds.Valderra tendered the payoff amount, but Jenco did not instruct the trustee to release the trust deed. Instead, Jenco appealed the judgment and moved for a stay of the obligation to reconvey the property under rule 62(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the stay over Valderra’s objection, which argued that the order was injunctive and should be governed by rule 62(c), not 62(b).The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the case and agreed with Valderra that the district court erred in granting the stay under rule 62(b). The court held that rule 62(b) applies only to stays of orders or judgments to pay money, not injunctive orders, which are governed by rule 62(c). The court found that the order requiring Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property was injunctive in nature. Consequently, the district court should have considered the motion under rule 62(c), which requires the court to determine whether the conditions for the security of the rights of the adverse party are just.The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the district court’s decision to grant the stay under rule 62(b) and vacated the order rejecting Valderra’s rule 62(i) objection. The court also denied Valderra’s request for appellate attorney fees, as Valderra was not awarded fees in the lower court. View "Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings" on Justia Law

A couple contracted to buy a lakefront home with the intention of demolishing it and building a new one. They later discovered a publicly recorded sewer line running through the property, which was not listed on the seller's disclosure form. Believing the sewer line would interfere with their construction plans, they attempted to back out of the deal, leading to litigation.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller, finding that the sewer easement was publicly recorded and that the buyers had constructive notice of its existence. The court also found no evidence that the sewer line materially and adversely impacted the use or value of the property, concluding that it was not a defect requiring disclosure.The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the sewer line materially and adversely affected the buyers' intended use of the property and whether the seller completed the disclosure form in good faith.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court's judgment, reinstating the trial court's decision. The court held that the sewer line did not constitute a material defect that the seller was required to disclose on the Residential Property Disclosure Form. The court reasoned that the term "defect" implies an inadequacy or flaw, and a working sewer line in an inconvenient location does not meet this definition. Additionally, the court noted that the disclosure form requires disclosure of conditions that could inhibit an ordinary buyer's use of the property, not a specific buyer's intended use. Therefore, the seller had no duty to disclose the sewer line, and the buyers' claim of fraudulent concealment failed. View "Ashmus v. Coughlin" on Justia Law