Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Valderra Land Holdings, LLC owns real property encumbered by a performance trust deed held for the benefit of Jenco, LC and others. After Valderra defaulted on its obligations, Jenco sought judicial foreclosure. Valderra counterclaimed, asserting a right to cure its default and requested the court to determine the amount owed. The district court set the payoff amount and directed Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property upon Valderra’s tender of funds.Valderra tendered the payoff amount, but Jenco did not instruct the trustee to release the trust deed. Instead, Jenco appealed the judgment and moved for a stay of the obligation to reconvey the property under rule 62(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the stay over Valderra’s objection, which argued that the order was injunctive and should be governed by rule 62(c), not 62(b).The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the case and agreed with Valderra that the district court erred in granting the stay under rule 62(b). The court held that rule 62(b) applies only to stays of orders or judgments to pay money, not injunctive orders, which are governed by rule 62(c). The court found that the order requiring Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property was injunctive in nature. Consequently, the district court should have considered the motion under rule 62(c), which requires the court to determine whether the conditions for the security of the rights of the adverse party are just.The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the district court’s decision to grant the stay under rule 62(b) and vacated the order rejecting Valderra’s rule 62(i) objection. The court also denied Valderra’s request for appellate attorney fees, as Valderra was not awarded fees in the lower court. View "Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings" on Justia Law

A couple contracted to buy a lakefront home with the intention of demolishing it and building a new one. They later discovered a publicly recorded sewer line running through the property, which was not listed on the seller's disclosure form. Believing the sewer line would interfere with their construction plans, they attempted to back out of the deal, leading to litigation.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller, finding that the sewer easement was publicly recorded and that the buyers had constructive notice of its existence. The court also found no evidence that the sewer line materially and adversely impacted the use or value of the property, concluding that it was not a defect requiring disclosure.The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the sewer line materially and adversely affected the buyers' intended use of the property and whether the seller completed the disclosure form in good faith.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court's judgment, reinstating the trial court's decision. The court held that the sewer line did not constitute a material defect that the seller was required to disclose on the Residential Property Disclosure Form. The court reasoned that the term "defect" implies an inadequacy or flaw, and a working sewer line in an inconvenient location does not meet this definition. Additionally, the court noted that the disclosure form requires disclosure of conditions that could inhibit an ordinary buyer's use of the property, not a specific buyer's intended use. Therefore, the seller had no duty to disclose the sewer line, and the buyers' claim of fraudulent concealment failed. View "Ashmus v. Coughlin" on Justia Law

Steven Corry Stephenson, as trustee of the Steven Corry Stephenson Trust, owns Lot 11, and Lone Peak Preserve, LLC owns Lot 13, both near Big Sky, Montana. The properties were created by the same certificate of survey (COS 1754) and have a road (Skywood Road) with a 60-foot easement depicted. A 1993 affidavit of dedication granted this easement for ingress, egress, and utilities for all owners within COS 1754. In 2004, Phillip Smith conveyed Lot 13 to Lone Peak with a 30-foot easement for access and utilities across Lot 11. In 2010, Smith conveyed Lot 11 to Stephenson, referencing prior conveyances and easements. In 2013, Stephenson executed an access and utility easement agreement, incorporating the 30-foot easement described in the Smith-Lone Peak Deed.In December 2021, Stephenson sued Lone Peak for trespass and declaratory judgment, alleging that Lone Peak's utilities and proposed driveway were outside the easement area. Lone Peak counterclaimed for interference with easements, trespass, and declaratory judgment. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Between 2022 and 2023, Stephenson placed landscape boulders, a log, and a speed bump near Lone Peak's access, leading Lone Peak to file for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in July 2023.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, granted Lone Peak's request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the 30-foot easement and cul-de-sac easement were valid and that Stephenson's actions unreasonably interfered with these easements. The court ordered Stephenson to remove the obstructions and refrain from further interference.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's order, finding no manifest abuse of discretion. The court held that Lone Peak demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of equities tipped in its favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. View "Stephenson v. Lone Peak" on Justia Law

Sidney and Julian Helvik, who have lived on their family ranch since 1947, sold a portion of their ranch to Wesley and Karen Tuscano in 2018. In 2020, the Helviks agreed to sell the remainder of the ranch to the Tuscanos under an agreement that included a promissory note and provisions for the Tuscanos to assist the elderly Helviks with end-of-life issues. The Helviks signed a quitclaim deed, but the Tuscanos later had them sign a gift deed, which transferred the ranch without consideration. The Tuscanos never made any payments under the agreement and used the gift deed to obtain a mortgage on the ranch.The Helviks filed a complaint in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweet Grass County, seeking to void the agreement and the gift deed, alleging undue influence and fraud. The Tuscanos counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Jacqueline Conner, alleging tortious interference and abuse of process. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Conner on the tortious interference claim and excluded evidence of an Adult Protective Services investigation and an oral agreement to transfer land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to rescind the agreement based on its equitable powers, noting the unique fiduciary duty in grantor-support agreements. The court found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of the APS investigation and the oral agreement. The court also held that the Tuscanos waived their argument regarding jury instructions on undue influence by not objecting at trial. The summary judgment in favor of Conner was upheld due to the lack of evidence of damages. The court declined to award attorney fees to Conner under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The District Court's orders and judgments were affirmed. View "Helvik v. Tuscano" on Justia Law

In 1999, Rosemary Colver executed the Colver Land Trust agreement, naming her five children as beneficiaries and appointing Bruce and Karin as co-trustees. Rosemary and her husband, Richard, retained life estates in any real property held by the Land Trust. The Land Trust sold and purchased properties over the years, with the final property being the Sanders County Property, purchased by Rosemary and Richard in 2010. Richard quitclaimed his interest to Rosemary in 2012, and Rosemary's will devised the Sanders County Property in trust for Richard and their daughter, Gretchen, allowing them to reside there until their deaths.After Rosemary's death in 2017, Bruce and Gretchen were appointed co-personal representatives of her estate. The final accounting identified the Sanders County Property as an estate asset. In 2023, Gretchen filed a petition to correct the distribution of the Sanders County Property, claiming a life estate per the will. Bruce and the Land Trust filed a cross-motion, asserting the property belonged to the Land Trust, alleging it was purchased with Land Trust funds.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, sitting in probate, denied Bruce and the Land Trust's motion for summary judgment and granted Gretchen's motion, ruling that the Land Trust did not equitably own the Sanders County Property and that Gretchen had a valid life estate per the will.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Land Trust's claim of equitable ownership, as such claims are equitable in nature and fall outside the probate court's limited jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the probate court's decision regarding the Land Trust's claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. However, it affirmed the probate court's ruling that Gretchen had a valid life estate in the Sanders County Property as per the will. View "In re R.E. Colver" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation and application of Idaho Code section 63-602G, which governs the homestead property tax exemption. In 2020, the Idaho Legislature amended the statute to remove the April 15 application deadline and added that the exemption "shall be effective upon the date of the application." The Idaho State Tax Commission issued guidance stating that the exemption should not be prorated based on the application date, which was supported by an Attorney General Opinion. However, Latah and Lincoln Counties disagreed and prorated the exemption based on the application date.The Counties petitioned for judicial review in their respective district courts, which were consolidated. The district court ruled in favor of the Counties, determining that the Tax Commission exceeded its authority and that the statute was ambiguous, allowing for proration based on legislative intent. The Tax Commission appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 63-602G requires the retroactive application of the homestead exemption to January 1 of the tax year during which the application was submitted, regardless of the application submission date. The Court found that the statute was unambiguous and that the exemption applies to the entire tax year, not prorated based on the application date.The Court also determined that the Tax Commission did not exceed its statutory authority when it issued the May 2022 Order directing the Counties to apply the full homestead exemption. The Court concluded that the Tax Commission's order was within its constitutional and statutory powers to ensure uniformity and compliance with property tax laws.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's order, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for entry of an order affirming the Tax Commission’s May 2022 Order. View "Latah County v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Daniel B. Struebing and Amanda L. Lyons, appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Jeremy J. Fournier and Jennifer M. Fournier, in a case involving claims of trespass and adverse possession. The plaintiffs argued that a "seizure" by the United States government of their property interrupted the statutory period for the defendants' adverse possession claim. They also contended that the hearing justice improperly acted as a factfinder and overlooked a federal court's determination regarding the forfeiture of the property.The Superior Court initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment due to concerns about federal jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings. However, after the federal court clarified that it did not retain jurisdiction over the property dispute, the Superior Court granted the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment. The court found that the defendants had satisfied the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, having maintained and used the disputed area exclusively for over ten years.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the federal government's actions did not constitute a seizure that interrupted the adverse possession period. The court also agreed that the defendants had established their adverse possession claim by clear and convincing evidence, noting their continuous and exclusive use of the property since 2008. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claims of trespass and slander of title were rendered moot. View "New Phase Realty, LLC v. Fournier" on Justia Law

In this case, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, engaged in a 2009 comprehensive rezoning process known as a sectional map amendment for subregions 5 and 6. Several property owners, including Christmas Farm and MCQ Auto Servicenter, were affected by this rezoning. Christmas Farm sought a more intensive zoning classification but failed to file the required ethics affidavit. MCQ’s property was downzoned, but MCQ successfully petitioned for a revisory petition, resulting in the restoration of its original zoning classification.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed the zoning decisions multiple times, resulting in several remands to the District Council. The courts found that the District Council failed to comply with procedural requirements, including the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The most recent remand occurred in 2019, where the District Council adopted sectional map amendments without holding a public hearing or notifying the affected property owners.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether a 2021 countywide rezoning constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners' assertions of error from the 2019 proceeding. The Court also examined whether the District Council erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether it complied with the Appellate Court’s prior remand order.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2021 countywide rezoning was not a comprehensive rezoning or a substantive change in the law that rendered the property owners' assertions moot. The rezoning was a technical mapping exercise intended to align zoning classifications with the new zoning ordinance. The Court also held that the District Council failed to comply with state and local laws requiring notice and a public hearing and did not follow the Appellate Court’s remand instructions. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "County Council of Prince George's County. v. Robin Dale Land LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, purchased property at 5 Bowser Court in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), acquired adjacent property at 51 Kingston Avenue. A dispute arose when NRI's representative, John Gullison, conducted renovations and removed part of the plaintiffs' cobblestone landing, claiming it encroached on NRI's property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over the disputed land based on the doctrine of acquiescence, adverse possession, and an easement by prescription.The Superior Court awarded title to the plaintiffs for the disputed land, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired the land through the doctrine of acquiescence. The court also granted title to other abutters of Bowser Court, even though they had not requested such relief. NRI appealed, arguing that the trial justice misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence and erred in awarding title to other abutters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice erred in granting relief to the other abutters who had not requested it. The court also determined that the doctrine of acquiescence was not applicable because the disputed boundary was not solely on the parties' adjoining lots but also bordered Bowser Court. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription over the five-foot strip of land, as they had used the walkway openly, continuously, and hostilely for the statutory period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in part, recognizing the plaintiffs' easement by prescription, and vacated the part of the judgment granting relief to the other abutters. View "Urbonas v. Gullison" on Justia Law

Bighorn Construction, LLC (Bighorn) and JED Spectrum, Inc. (JED) filed mechanic’s liens against property owned by Keith Stoakes, seeking to foreclose on the liens. Stoakes denied the validity of the liens and counterclaimed for slander of title against both companies, and for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud against JED. After a bench trial, the circuit court denied Bighorn’s and JED’s claims for lien foreclosure and ruled in favor of Stoakes on his slander of title claims, awarding him $252,225.27 in damages and $33,394.20 in attorney fees. The court denied relief on the remaining claims.The circuit court found that Bighorn had no reasonable grounds to file the lien after receiving a check for full payment, and that JED’s lien was untimely and insufficiently itemized. The court also found that Stoakes reasonably relied on JED’s promise of a shared well system, awarding him damages for promissory estoppel. However, the court later reversed its decision on the promissory estoppel claim and reduced the attorney fee award accordingly.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. It reversed the circuit court’s ruling on the slander of title claims, finding insufficient evidence to prove that Jerry, acting on behalf of Bighorn and JED, knew or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the liens. The court affirmed the denial of Stoakes’s promissory estoppel claim, concluding that Stoakes did not suffer substantial economic detriment. The court also affirmed the attorney fee award of $33,394.20 to Stoakes, as it was within the court’s discretion under SDCL 44-9-42. View "Jed Spectrum, Inc. v. Stoakes" on Justia Law