Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a property dispute between two neighboring condominium associations, Phoenix East Association, Inc. ("Phoenix East") and Perdido Dunes Tower Condominium Association, Inc., a Master Association ("Perdido Dunes"). The dispute centers on a two-and-a-half-foot-wide strip of land between their properties. Perdido Dunes claimed it had acquired title to the disputed property through adverse possession. Phoenix East disagreed, asserting that Perdido Dunes had only used the property with Phoenix East's permission.The Baldwin Circuit Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Perdido Dunes, granting it a prescriptive easement over the disputed property. Phoenix East appealed this decision, arguing that the Alabama Uniform Condominium Act prohibited the trial court from awarding Perdido Dunes a prescriptive easement on Phoenix East's property. Phoenix East also contended that Perdido Dunes did not adequately prove adverse use or claim of right, which are two elements of a prescriptive easement.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Condominium Act did not categorically bar judicially imposed prescriptive easements. It also found that there was sufficient evidence of a prescriptive easement, as Perdido Dunes had used the premises for a period of twenty years or more, adversely to the owner of the premises, under claim of right, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted, with actual or presumptive knowledge of the owner. Lastly, the court ruled that Perdido Dunes was not required to join every unit owner to the litigation, as the Condominium Act specifically contemplates that condominium associations will represent their individual members in litigation. View "Phoenix East Association, Inc. v. Perdido Dunes Tower Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowner, Mohammad Rafiei, sued his builder, Lennar Homes, alleging personal injuries due to a construction defect. The purchase contract between Rafiei and Lennar contained an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, including issues of formation, validity, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Lennar moved to compel arbitration, but Rafiei argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because the cost of arbitration was prohibitively high. The trial court denied Lennar's motion to compel arbitration.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Rafiei had sufficiently demonstrated that the cost to arbitrate was excessive, making the arbitral forum inadequate to vindicate his rights. The court of appeals concluded that if Rafiei were required to pay more than $6,000, he would be precluded from pursuing his claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the record failed to support a finding that the parties' delegation clause was itself unconscionable due to prohibitive costs to adjudicate the threshold issue in arbitration. The court noted that Rafiei had not provided sufficient evidence to show that he could not afford the cost of arbitrating the arbitrability question. The court also noted that Rafiei had not provided evidence of how the fee schedule would be applied to resolve the unconscionability issue. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lennar Homes Of Texas Inc. v. Rafiei" on Justia Law

A group of citizens and a civic organization, Citizens United To Protect Our Neighborhoods (CUPON), filed a lawsuit against the Village of Chestnut Ridge, New York, alleging that the village violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by enacting a new zoning law related to places of worship in 2019. The plaintiffs claimed that the new law favored religious uses over secular uses, thus violating the constitutional separation of church and state.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where it was dismissed. The district court found that none of the plaintiffs had constitutional standing to pursue the claim. The court determined that the individual plaintiffs lacked municipal-taxpayer, direct-harm, or denial-of-benefits standing, and that CUPON lacked associational or organizational standing.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's decision, affirming that neither the individual plaintiffs nor CUPON had any form of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a measurable appropriation or loss of revenue attributable to the challenged activities, a personal constraint or control under the challenged law, or a denial of benefits. The court also found that CUPON failed to show that it had suffered an injury in fact that was distinct and palpable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. View "Citizens United To Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge" on Justia Law

The case involves Eduardo Castillo, the record owner of a property, and Libert Land Holdings 4 LLC (LLH4), which purchased a tax certificate for the property after Castillo failed to pay delinquent taxes. After the tax deed was issued, Castillo attempted to redeem the property, but the county treasurer refunded his payment because the tax deed had already been issued. Castillo then filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the tax deed was void due to a failure to comply with statutory notice requirements and sought to quiet title to the property in his name.The District Court for Douglas County found in favor of Castillo, declaring the tax deed void due to LLH4's failure to comply with the notice requirements under section 77-1801 et seq. of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. The court also ordered Castillo to pay taxes on the property and interest.LLH4 appealed the decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court, arguing that it had complied with all statutory requirements for notice and proof of notice required for the issuance of a treasurer’s tax deed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that LLH4’s application for the tax deed was deficient and that the deficiencies could not be cured by evidence adduced at trial. The court also noted plain error in the lower court's failure to determine the precise payment due from Castillo and remanded the case to the district court with directions to specify the precise amount of taxes and accrued interest to be paid by Castillo. View "Castillo v. Libert Land Holdings 4" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over approximately one acre of coastal land in Mississippi. The disagreement is between John Aldrich and the State of Mississippi, with the main point of contention being whether the land in question is privately owned by Aldrich or is State-owned tideland. The dispute originated from a map published by the secretary of state in 1994, which marked the boundaries between private property and Public Trust Tidelands. According to the map, the land in question was designated as State-owned tideland. Aldrich disagreed with this designation and challenged the boundary in Harrison County Chancery Court in 1998. The State responded with a counterclaim, asserting that it held fee simple title to the property.After more than two decades of inactivity and extended litigation, the chancellor ruled in favor of Aldrich in 2022, vesting title in him and adjusting the tideland boundary. The chancellor made five consequential findings, all of which the State labeled as error on appeal. The most significant finding was that a 1784 Spanish land grant, which is the root of Aldrich’s title, negated the State’s claim to fee simple title. This finding called into question which lands passed from the federal government to Mississippi upon statehood.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s decision. The court found that the 1784 Spanish land grant was valid and vested title in Aldrich. The court also found that the State failed to meet its burden of proof that the artificial filling of the land was not done pursuant to a constitutional legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose. Therefore, the court concluded that the property belongs to Aldrich. View "State v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Newfound Serenity, LLC, sought to develop a seasonal recreational vehicle park and applied for site plan approval from the Town of Hebron's Planning Board. The Planning Board denied the application, citing seven reasons. Newfound Serenity appealed this decision to both the Housing Appeals Board (HAB) and the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA). The HAB dismissed the appeal as untimely, while the ZBA overturned four of the Planning Board's reasons for denial, upheld one, and stated it lacked authority to address the remaining two. Newfound Serenity then filed a complaint in superior court, seeking review of both the Planning Board and ZBA decisions. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, based on the HAB's initial dismissal.The Superior Court agreed with the Town's argument that Newfound Serenity had effectively bifurcated its initial appeal, with the ZBA reviewing zoning ordinance-related reasons for denial and the HAB reviewing reasons outside the ZBA's jurisdiction. The Town argued that since the HAB dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as untimely, and the plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal, the Planning Board’s decision on those issues became final. Therefore, even if the superior court were to reverse the ZBA’s decision, such a reversal would be moot because the Planning Board’s denial based on the two other reasons would remain effective. The Town also argued that because the plaintiff appealed the Planning Board decision in part to the HAB, the plaintiff waived its right to bring an action in superior court.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that the dismissal of the complaint was inconsistent with the statutes governing appeals from planning board decisions. The court found that the plaintiff's initial appeal to the HAB was not late, but premature, as the ZBA had not yet resolved the issues. The court held that the dismissal of a premature appeal by the HAB while the ZBA appeal was pending did not foreclose the plaintiff from pursuing its complaint in superior court. View "Newfound Serenity, LLC v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Commerce Park Condominium Association (Association) and Little Deer Valley, LLC (declarant), concerning the conversion of convertible land into a new structure, Building C, within the condominium. The declarant had recorded a declaration of condominium in 2005, reserving the right to create and build Building C on convertible land within five years. In 2010, shortly before the five-year deadline, the declarant recorded an amendment to the declaration and a new site plan, asserting that this action converted the convertible land. However, the Association contended that the amendment merely extended the declarant's right to convert for another five years, but did not actually convert the land.The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Association, holding that the Condominium Act required the declarant to physically construct Building C for conversion to occur. The court reasoned that since the declarant did not engage in any substantial construction of Building C before the extended deadline of May 9, 2015, its right to do so expired at that time. The court also concluded that the declarant's attempt to begin construction well after the May 9, 2015 deadline would be contrary to the Condominium Act's purpose to protect buyers and establish reasonable expectations among the parties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that to convert convertible land, the Condominium Act required the declarant to file "appropriate instruments" within the five- to ten-year statutory deadline but did not require the declarant to physically construct Building C. The court also concluded that the declarant properly converted the convertible land when it filed the amended declaration and new site plan in 2010. Therefore, the declarant retained its statutory right to build Building C upon conversion. View "Commerce Park Condo. Ass'n v. Little Deer Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lance and Eva Posner purchased a property with an outstanding loan secured by a deed of trust, which they assumed responsibility for. The deed of trust was later assigned to U.S. Bank. In 2012, U.S. Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against the Posners, alleging that the amount owing under the note had become accelerated. However, U.S. Bank did not pursue the judicial foreclosure and voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit without prejudice in 2013. The Posners remained in default on the loan through 2019.U.S. Bank's dismissal of its judicial foreclosure action led to a dispute in 2022. The Posners filed a state-court action asserting a claim for quiet title, alleging that the 10-year period in NRS 106.240 was triggered in 2012 when U.S. Bank filed its judicial foreclosure action, such that by 2022, the deed of trust had been extinguished as a matter of law. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent U.S. Bank's scheduled nonjudicial foreclosure sale.The district court denied the request for an injunction, finding the Posners' claims had no likelihood of success. The Posners appealed, arguing that the district court erred in relying on NRS 107.550, which only applies to judicial foreclosure actions commenced on or after October 1, 2013.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that instituting judicial foreclosure proceedings does not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. The court concluded that the Posners' quiet title claim had no likelihood of success on the merits because the judicial foreclosure action did not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. Therefore, the lien on the subject property was not discharged as a matter of law in 2022. View "Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In March 2021, Jeffrey A. Winder and Heather Durbin rented a room at a motel. During check-in, the motel manager, Gary McCullough, warned Winder that any illegal activity would result in eviction. The next day, McCullough entered the room for cleaning and discovered a backpack containing what appeared to be methamphetamine. He immediately called 911 and informed the responding officers about his discovery. Upon the officers' arrival, McCullough granted them permission to enter the room, which led to them finding more drugs and a handgun. Winder and Durbin were later arrested when they returned to the motel; another gun and more drugs were found in their vehicle.Before trial, Winder moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the motel room, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be denied. The district court adopted this recommendation, ruling that Winder had been evicted at the time of the search and that the officers had probable cause to search the backpack based on McCullough's account. Winder pleaded guilty conditionally to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court found that Winder was lawfully ejected from the motel room prior to the officers' entry, thus eliminating his expectation of privacy. The court also ruled that the officers' search of the backpack did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it did not exceed the scope of McCullough's private search. Consequently, the use of a drug dog and the subsequent seizure of evidence did not violate Winder's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Winder" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, sued XTO Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and its Director. Whitetail Wave claimed ownership of certain property in McKenzie County, North Dakota, and alleged that XTO Energy had breached their lease agreement by failing to make required royalty payments. Whitetail Wave also claimed that the State's assertion of an interest in the mineral interests associated with the property constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.The District Court of McKenzie County granted summary judgment in favor of the State and XTO Energy. The court concluded that the State owned certain mineral interests within the ordinary high watermark as defined by North Dakota law. The court also found that XTO Energy was within the safe harbor provision provided by North Dakota law and did not breach the parties’ lease agreement when it withheld the royalty payments. The court awarded XTO Energy recovery of its attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim of an unconstitutional taking against the State, as the State's actions were limited to a title dispute. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim against XTO Energy for the non-payment of royalties, as XTO Energy fell within the safe harbor provision of North Dakota law. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in awarding XTO Energy a recovery of its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law