Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In Arizona, condominium unit owners Jie Cao and Haining Xia challenged the forced sale of their unit by their condominium association (the “Association”) following the dissolution of the condominium. The Association, which had been given power to sell under the Arizona Condominium Act, sold the unit to PFP Dorsey Investments, a company that had previously acquired the majority of units in the condominium.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the Arizona Condominium Act, which authorized the sale, did not violate the eminent domain provision of the Arizona Constitution. The court stated that the Act was incorporated into the condominium declaration, to which the owners had agreed. However, the court also held that in these circumstances, the Act required the sale of all property, rather than individual units as occurred in this case.The court noted that the Association's power to sell derived from the condominium declaration that all unit owners had signed. Thus, the Act didn't effect a taking of the owners' property. As such, the forced sale of the owners’ unit alone rather than as part of a sale of all common elements and units of the condominium was impermissible under the Act.The court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also granted the owners reasonable attorney fees for amounts expended to enforce the Declaration, excluding those attributable to the unsuccessful eminent domain claims. View "CAO v PFP DORSEY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a landlord, in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, a tenant. The plaintiff had suffered serious burns in an explosion caused by a gas leak in the rental property. He claimed that the landlord had been negligent, violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breached the implied warranty of habitability.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that he had notified the landlord of the issues with the flooring or the heating system, or that the landlord had any actual knowledge of these issues. Consequently, the landlord's duty under the RRAA had not yet arisen. Therefore, the landlord could not be held liable for negligence, violation of the RRAA, or breach of the implied warranty of habitability.The Court further clarified that the RRAA does not completely abrogate the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) in relation to repairs and dangerous conditions on leased residential premises. The RRAA only imposes a duty on the landlord to make repairs after receiving notice or acquiring actual knowledge of the need for them. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on all of the plaintiff's claims, reinstated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the matter. View "Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled in a case concerning a dispute over the amount of ad valorem taxes owed by Indorama Ventures Xylenes & PTA, LLC for the personal property at a petrochemical plant that it owns in Morgan County.The Morgan County Revenue Commissioner assessed Indorama's personal-property value at nearly 1.5 times the amount that Indorama had paid for the plant, which Indorama challenged before the Morgan County Board of Equalization. After the Board affirmed the Commissioner's assessments, Indorama appealed the decisions to the Morgan Circuit Court. The circuit court ruled in favor of Indorama, determining that the fair market value of the property was roughly $150 million less than the Board's appraisal.The Board then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing that the circuit court's valuation was contrary to the evidence and violated Alabama law. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, stating that under Alabama law, the circuit court was entitled to consider "all the evidence," and was not restricted to any particular method of valuation.Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Alabama also affirmed the circuit court's application of the corporate rate to the prejudgment interest on Indorama's overpayment, determining that this was correct under Alabama law. View "Morgan County Board of Equalization v. Indorama Ventures Xylenes & PTA, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Charles Crowder bought a property owned by Delores Blevins at a tax sale. After the purchase, Crowder took possession of the property and made improvements. Subsequently, Blevins sought to redeem the property following the statutory procedures. The Jefferson Probate Court granted Blevins's redemption petition and entered a judgment in her favor. Crowder then filed a postjudgment motion to set aside that judgment and a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the judgment, both of which the probate court denied.In his appeal, Crowder contested the process of service arguing that he had not been properly served with Blevins's redemption petition. He claimed that the signature on the return receipt was not his and that he had moved out of the address where the service was delivered before Blevins filed the redemption petition. However, Crowder both received and sent correspondences to and from the contested address after he claimed to have moved. Moreover, he did not deny that the signature on the return receipt was his at any point during the proceedings in the probate court.The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the probate court's judgment. It found that Crowder failed to file a timely appeal concerning the probate court's judgment on the merits. Additionally, the court concluded that the probate court's judgment was valid and properly denied Crowder's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Crowder v. Blevins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court in favor of the City of Des Moines, in a case brought by Lime Lounge, LLC. Lime Lounge, a bar, challenged a city ordinance requiring it to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate. After receiving noise complaints, the City revoked Lime Lounge's CUP, which was upheld in a prior appeal. Lime Lounge then challenged the ordinance arguing it was preempted by Iowa Code, violated equal protection and spot zoning prohibitions. The trial court dismissed Lime Lounge's claims and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the city's ordinance was not preempted by state law. Rather, it was a proper exercise of the city's zoning authority and did not create a separate local alcohol license. The Court also rejected Lime Lounge's equal protection claim, holding that the city had a legitimate purpose in imposing a CUP on specific businesses selling alcohol. Finally, the Court dismissed the claim of illegal spot zoning, as Lime Lounge failed to prove that the city had engaged in such activity. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of Lime Lounge's challenge to the ordinance. View "Lime Lounge, Inc. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in favor of government attorneys Michael Spindler-Krage and Thomas Canan. The plaintiff, Michael Davitt, had brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Spindler-Krage and Canan, alleging they violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they advised police that Davitt could be removed from his hotel room without eviction proceedings.During the COVID-19 pandemic, Olmsted County, Minnesota, arranged temporary, non-communal housing for elderly and vulnerable homeless individuals. Davitt, who was 69 years old and homeless, was moved into a Super 8 hotel room. When the county stopped paying for his room, Davitt refused to leave, citing a Minnesota governor's executive order temporarily prohibiting evictions. Spindler-Krage and Canan, after reviewing the relevant state law, the executive order, and the Agreement for Hotel Guests, advised the police that Davitt was a hotel guest, not a tenant protected by the executive order.In granting Spindler-Krage and Canan summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court found that no case law, statute, or other legal authority clearly established that Davitt was a tenant with a constitutionally protected right to his hotel room. The court also found that the advice provided to the police was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that Spindler-Krage and Canan did not violate Davitt’s clearly established rights and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. View "Davitt v. Krage" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Teton County Assessor and Aspen S, LLC along with the Kelvin and Nancy Stirn Trusts. The landowners in Teton County contested the reclassification of their property from "agricultural" to "non-agricultural" by the Teton County Assessor. The Teton County Board of Equalization held a contested case hearing and found that the County Assessor's removal of the agricultural classification was incorrect. The County Assessor then appealed this decision to the State Board of Equalization.The State Board of Equalization consolidated the cases and sided with the County Assessor, stating that the County Board of Equalization had rejected the Assessor's determination without sufficient explanation. However, the State Board also assessed all the evidence independently and found that the taxpayers had not met their burden of proof. The landowners then sought judicial review of the agency's action in the district court, a portion of whose decision was adverse to the Teton County Assessor who now seeks further judicial review in the Supreme Court of Wyoming.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed and remanded the case, finding that the County Board of Equalization's decision lacked necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). This lack of necessary findings and conclusions rendered the record insufficient for judicial review, causing the County Board of Equalization to act arbitrarily and capriciously. The case was remanded to the district court, with instructions to remand to the State Board of Equalization, which was instructed to remand to the Teton County Board of Equalization for findings and conclusions as required by WAPA. View "Teton County Assessor v. Aspen S, Llc" on Justia Law

The case pertains to a dispute between the Department of Finance of the City of New York and Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Associates, Inc. over the revocation of a real property tax exemption. The property in question was owned by Samuel and Bertha Schulman Institute for Nursing and Rehabilitation Fund, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, and was leased to Brookdale Dialysis, a for-profit corporation. The Department of Finance retroactively revoked the property's tax-exempt status in 2013, citing the fact that the property had been leased to a for-profit entity.The Supreme Court initially annulled the Department's determination, arguing that it failed to consider whether Brookdale Dialysis' services were reasonably incidental to the exemption purpose. The Department of Finance reassessed the property for the 2014-2015 tax year and again revoked the exemption after finding that the income from the lease exceeded the expenses for the property. The decision to revoke the exemption was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division.However, the Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that the property was not exempt under New York Real Property Tax Law § 420-a. The court noted that the law mandatorily exempts from taxation any real property owned by certain not-for-profit entities and used exclusively for beneficial purposes without financial gain. The law does not apply to property leased by a for-profit corporation. Therefore, the court concluded that the property in this case was not exempt under this law, and the Department of Finance's decision to revoke the exemption was justified. View "Matter of Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Assoc., Inc. v Department of Fin. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Tax Equity Now NY LLC (TENNY), challenged the property-tax system of New York City, arguing that it imposes substantially unequal tax bills on similarly valued properties that bear little relationship to the properties' fair market value. TENNY further alleged that multi-million-dollar properties are taxed at similar or lower rates than less valuable properties and that real property in majority-people-of-color districts are overassessed and subjected to higher taxes compared to properties in majority-white districts. The plaintiff sought relief against City and State defendants for alleged constitutional and statutory violations caused by the City's tax scheme.The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that although TENNY's complaint failed to state claims against the State defendants, the complaint sufficiently alleges causes of action against the City defendants under section 305 (2) of Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) and the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) on the basis that the system is unfair, inequitable and has a discriminatory disparate impact on certain protected classes of New York City property owners. The court therefore modified the Appellate Division's order with respect to these causes of action. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the remaining causes of action against the City and all claims against the State for failure to state a claim. View "Tax Equity Now NY LLC v City of New York" on Justia Law