Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves William Phillip Jackson, who owes unpaid federal taxes to the United States. Following a jury trial and post-trial proceedings, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri entered a judgment against Jackson for $2,396,800.47 and ordered the foreclosure and sale of four properties owned by Jackson and his wife. Jackson filed multiple motions to amend or vacate the sale, which were denied, and his appeals to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals were unsuccessful. Jackson then filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief, but the United States proceeded with evictions and seized personal property before being notified of the bankruptcy filing.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri heard Jackson's motion for contempt and turnover of property and the United States' motion to lift the automatic stay nunc pro tunc. The bankruptcy court denied Jackson's motion and granted the United States' motion, annulling the automatic stay retroactively to the date of Jackson's bankruptcy filing. Jackson appealed this decision but did not seek a stay of the order pending appeal. While the appeal was pending, the United States sold the properties at auction, and the district court confirmed the sales and approved the disbursement of proceeds.The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was constitutionally moot. The court held that since the properties had been sold and Jackson did not obtain a stay pending appeal, there was no effective relief that could be granted. Consequently, the appeal of the bankruptcy court's order annulling the stay and denying Jackson's motion for contempt and turnover was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

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A property owner sought to subdivide a 161.6-acre property in Westminster, Vermont, to create two residential lots with frontage on Old Codding Road, a private road discontinued in 1893. The Westminster Development Review Board (DRB) granted the subdivision permit, finding that the applicant had made a "threshold showing" of the right to use Old Codding Road. Neighbors appealed, arguing that the applicant did not have a legal right-of-way over the road.The Environmental Division affirmed the DRB's decision, concluding that the applicant had made the necessary threshold showing of a right to use the road based on historical use by the applicant's predecessors and other neighbors without deeded rights-of-way. The court declined to fully evaluate whether the road was formally laid out before its discontinuance, citing a lack of jurisdiction to determine private property rights.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Environmental Division erred in requiring only a threshold showing and in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of an easement or right-of-way. The Supreme Court held that the Environmental Division has jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant has a permanent easement or right-of-way, as required by the Vermont Planning and Development Act and the Westminster Zoning Bylaws. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the permit applicant to establish the necessary easement or right-of-way.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division's decision and remanded the case for a determination of whether the applicant has an easement or right-of-way over Old Codding Road. The Environmental Division must now fully evaluate the evidence regarding the road's layout and the applicant's claimed right-of-way. View "In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2012, two individuals, Moore and Lloyd, obtained a $185,000 judgment against Mikul and Sanders. They applied for a writ of execution to auction two properties owned by Mikul and Sanders, and they were the highest bidders for one parcel at $130,000. Mikul, who resided on the property, contested the sale, claiming ownership and arguing that the sale price was unconscionably low. The Shelby Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of Moore and Lloyd, granting them possession of the property. Mikul's subsequent appeals and motions to intervene were denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision without an opinion.Moore and Lloyd then filed an action in the Shelby Circuit Court seeking immediate possession of the property. The court granted their motion but stayed the execution of the judgment. Over the years, Moore and Lloyd filed multiple motions to dissolve the stay and sought writs of execution, but the court repeatedly denied their requests. In 2022, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that Moore and Lloyd had not argued that the stay was "immoderate" in the lower court and suggested they seek dissolution of the stay in the original action.Moore and Lloyd filed a motion to dissolve the stay in 2022, arguing it was immoderate. The Shelby Circuit Court, however, did not dissolve the stay and instead set the matter for a trial. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the stay, which had been in place for six years, was indefinite and without continued justification, making it immoderate and beyond the court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dissolve the stay and a writ of prohibition to vacate the orders setting the case for trial, limiting the court to issuing orders necessary to wind up the litigation. View "Ex parte Moore" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Monadnock Rod and Gun Club, reoriented its outdoor shooting range from an east-west to a south-north direction without obtaining site plan approval from the Town of Peterborough. This reorientation encroached on a neighboring property. Subsequently, the Town amended its zoning ordinance to require shooting ranges to be enclosed, indoor facilities. The primary issues are whether the Club’s shooting range was a lawful nonconforming use when the Town amended its zoning ordinance and whether state law prohibits the enforcement of the amended ordinance.The Superior Court found that the Club had trespassed onto the neighboring property and awarded damages to the property owners. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Town for zoning ordinance violations related to the south-north range. The Club applied for site plan review for an expanded east-west range, but the Town’s code enforcement officer determined that neither the east-west nor the south-north ranges were grandfathered as nonconforming uses. The Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) affirmed this decision and denied the Club’s application for a special exception. The planning board subsequently denied the Club’s site plan application. The Superior Court affirmed these decisions and denied the Club’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Club’s south-north range was not a lawful nonconforming use because it was constructed without site plan approval. Therefore, it could not qualify as a lawful nonconforming use when the zoning ordinance was amended. The court also upheld the ZBA’s denial of the special exception application, concluding that the ZBA correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant a special exception for an illegal nonconforming use. Additionally, the court found that the Town’s zoning ordinance was not preempted by state law and that the Club’s constitutional arguments were not preserved for review. View "Monadnock Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Peterborough" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Howard Malloy obtained a judgment against James Behrens related to their partnership, requiring Behrens to transfer his interest in the partnership and pay $341,890.26 plus interest. Behrens's homestead, subject to a 2006 mortgage, was sold at an execution sale. Behrens appealed the sale confirmation, and in a prior decision, the court reversed and remanded due to procedural errors. Upon remand, the district court issued new executions, leading to a levy on Behrens's homestead. The property was appraised and sold at auction to Malloy for $759,004.65. The court applied a $100,000 homestead exemption, deducted sale costs, allocated $118,866.27 to the mortgage, and applied the remaining proceeds to the judgment.The District Court of Morton County initially confirmed the sale, but Behrens appealed, arguing errors in the sheriff's compliance with execution laws, the application of the homestead exemption, and the allocation of sale proceeds. The court found the sheriff complied with the law requiring personal property to be used before real property. However, it erred by applying a $100,000 homestead exemption instead of the $150,000 exemption effective at the time of the sale and by allocating proceeds to the mortgage rather than the judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that the sheriff complied with execution requirements but reversed the application of the outdated homestead exemption and the allocation of sale proceeds to the mortgage. The court held that the $150,000 homestead exemption should apply and that sale proceeds should satisfy the judgment before addressing the mortgage. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Malloy v. Behrens" on Justia Law

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Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

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A nonprofit organization challenged the County of Los Angeles's approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. The project included a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map. The organization alleged that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to adequately analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts and by not providing proper procedural notices. They also claimed violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and local zoning laws.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the developer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the organization's claims were barred by the 90-day limitations period under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA. The court ruled that the organization failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map, which was required for any action challenging a subdivision decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 of the SMA did not bar the organization's CEQA claims to the extent they alleged procedural violations and failures to analyze and disclose environmental impacts, as these claims were unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that the CEQA claims challenging the adequacy of mitigation measures imposed as conditions of the project's approval were barred by the SMA's 90-day limitations period. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the CEQA cause of action and grant it concerning the SMA and zoning law violations. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

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A company, A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI), leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans had initially acquired the property, which was undeveloped at the time, for a freeway project. ADI used the property commercially as a staging area for equipment and machinery. In 2021, Caltrans deemed the property "excess real property" as it was no longer needed for the freeway project. ADI sought to purchase the property under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which requires Caltrans to offer to sell excess commercial property to the current occupant. Caltrans denied the application, arguing the property was not commercial when acquired.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County agreed with Caltrans, interpreting the statute to mean that the property had to be commercial at the time of acquisition. The court denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate to compel Caltrans to offer the property for sale.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history indicated that the property only needed to be commercial at the time it was deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court concluded that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer the property for sale to ADI at fair market value. The court held that Caltrans must comply with its ministerial duty under section 118.1 to sell the excess commercial property to the current occupant. ADI was awarded its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

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Roger K. Moreau sought to operate an automotive repair shop on his lot in the Town of Parsonsfield, which is accessed via Reed Lane, a private road. The lot, created from a larger parcel, lacks frontage on a public road. Reed Lane, dating back to 1991, is a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way with a fifteen-foot-wide gravel road. Moreau had been operating the repair shop without a permit since 2015-2018. Nelligan, who owns adjacent property, opposed the business.The Town of Parsonsfield Planning Board initially denied Moreau's application for a site plan review permit but later approved it after Moreau acquired additional property. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) vacated this approval, stating the lot remained nonconforming. Moreau submitted a third application, which the Planning Board approved, but the ZBA again vacated the decision, citing the insufficient width of Reed Lane for commercial use. Moreau appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the ZBA's decision, finding the Planning Board's approval valid.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the commercial road standards in the Town’s Land Use and Development Ordinance required a sixty-foot-wide right-of-way for a business, which Reed Lane did not meet. The court concluded that Moreau's commercial use of the lot was not grandfathered and must comply with current ordinance standards. Consequently, the court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of Nelligan and the Town of Parsonsfield, affirming the ZBA's decision. View "Moreau v. Town of Parsonsfield" on Justia Law

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The case involves Havana Docks Corporation, which held a 99-year usufructuary concession at the Port of Havana, Cuba. This concession, granted in 1905, allowed Havana Docks to build and operate piers at the port. The Cuban Government expropriated this concession in 1960, and Havana Docks has not received compensation for this expropriation. The concession was set to expire in 2004. Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified its loss at $9.179 million.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of Havana Docks, awarding over $100 million in judgments against four cruise lines—Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises—for trafficking in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court found that the cruise lines had engaged in trafficking by docking their ships at the terminal, using the property to embark and disembark passengers, and using it as a starting and ending point for shore excursions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Havana Docks' limited property interest had expired in 2004, and therefore, the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reversed the judgments against the cruise lines for the 2016-2019 period. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Havana Docks' claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking from 1996 to 2001. View "Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law