Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mississippi Apartment Association (MAA) and other property owners challenging an ordinance adopted by the Jackson City Council. The ordinance imposed registration and inspection requirements on rental housing units in Jackson. MAA appealed the city council's decision in the Hinds County Circuit Court but did not request a stay of the ordinance's implementation. Subsequently, MAA filed a separate action in the Hinds County Chancery Court seeking injunctions against the ordinance's enforcement, arguing that the planning department's interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance were unlawful.The Hinds County Chancery Court dismissed MAA's claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The chancery court found that the circuit court also had pendent jurisdiction over MAA's equitable claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision and pendent jurisdiction over related claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement. The court emphasized that allowing a separate action in the chancery court could lead to contradictory rulings and confusion. The court also noted that MAA had an adequate remedy at law in the circuit court and could have requested a stay of the ordinance's implementation under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62. View "Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Alebia, Inc. (Alebia) is a Rhode Island corporation that owned a property at 284-286 Atwells Avenue, Providence. In September 2005, Carmela Natale and Walter Potenza, purported owners and shareholders of Alebia, executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Equity One Mortgage Company. The mortgage lacked a legal description of the property, but the loan proceeds were used to pay off prior mortgages and taxes on the property. The note was intended to be secured by the property, but Natale and Potenza signed the mortgage in their individual capacities instead of as corporate representatives of Alebia.In 2011, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), the current holder of the note, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court against Natale and Potenza for breach of contract and against Alebia seeking reformation of the mortgage. Deutsche Bank obtained a judgment against Natale and Potenza in 2017 but could not proceed against the property. In 2021, Deutsche Bank filed a motion to equitably reform the mortgage against Alebia. The Superior Court held remote evidentiary hearings and granted the motion, reforming the mortgage to reflect that Natale and Potenza signed as corporate representatives of Alebia.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony and evidence, including the promissory note. The court found sufficient evidence to support the reformation of the mortgage due to mutual mistake. The court also held that the mortgage could be reformed without reforming the note and that the remote hearings did not violate due process, despite the error in holding them remotely without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Alebia, Inc." on Justia Law

Jewels Helping Hands and Ben Stuckart challenged a proposed initiative by Spokane resident Brian Hansen, which aimed to expand the criminalization of camping within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, and childcare facilities. The initiative was a response to increased crime rates near a homeless encampment called Camp Hope. Spokane had previously adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating public camping, which included provisions to comply with the Ninth Circuit's Martin v. City of Boise decision, barring criminalization of camping when no shelter space was available.The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing but found their claims without merit, allowing the initiative to proceed to the ballot. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initiative was within the scope of the local initiative power, not a zoning ordinance, did not conflict with state law, and was legislative rather than administrative.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that the initiative was impermissibly administrative because it modified the details of Spokane's preexisting comprehensive policy on public camping. The court emphasized that local initiatives must be legislative in nature, creating new policies rather than administering existing ones. The court reversed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the initiative exceeded the scope of the local initiative power. View "Jewels Helping Hands v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Weston and Carrie Twigg, hired Rainier Pacific Development LLC to build a home. After taking possession, they discovered various construction defects, including issues with the garage floor. Rainier Pacific agreed to make repairs, but failed to meet deadlines, leading to arbitration. The parties settled through a "Repair Agreement," but Rainier Pacific's subsequent repairs were also defective, prompting the Twiggs to reinitiate arbitration. The arbitrator found Rainier Pacific's work defective and awarded the Twiggs $150,000 for the garage floor repairs.The Multnomah County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Admiral Insurance Company, Rainier Pacific's insurer, concluding that the damages did not arise from an "accident" as required by the commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The court relied on the precedent set by Oak Crest Construction Co. v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., which held that damages solely from a breach of contract do not qualify as an "accident."The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the damages arose solely from a breach of contract and not from an "accident" as defined by the CGL policy. The court emphasized that the Twiggs had not contended that Rainier Pacific's liability arose from a separate duty of care, i.e., a tort.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that whether an insurance claim seeks recovery for an "accident" does not depend on the plaintiff's pleading decisions but on whether there is a factual basis for imposing tort liability. The court found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Rainier Pacific's defective work constituted an "accident" under the CGL policy. Therefore, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2020, Cody Sturzenbecher and his mother, Judy Sturzenbecher, entered into a series of transactions with Sioux County Ranch, LLC (Sioux County) related to the purchase of their family farm from a trust. Judy bought the farm using a loan from Sioux County, then sold the property to Sioux County, which leased it to Cody. The lease included an option for Cody to purchase the property. Cody defaulted on the lease, leading Sioux County to terminate the lease and list the property for sale.The Sturzenbechers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Judy’s conveyance of the farm to Sioux County created an equitable mortgage rather than an absolute sale. The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Turner County, South Dakota, granted the Sturzenbechers’ request for a preliminary injunction and denied Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Sioux County appealed both decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court concluded that the arrangement between the Sturzenbechers and Sioux County was intended as a financing agreement rather than an absolute sale. The court found that the agreements between the parties were unambiguous but unenforceable as an absolute sale due to public policy favoring a mortgagor’s right of redemption. The court held that the Sturzenbechers were likely to succeed on their equitable mortgage claim and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court also affirmed the denial of Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the Sturzenbechers had pled sufficient facts to support their claim. View "Sturzenbecher v. Sioux County Ranch" on Justia Law

The defendant, Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP (CHA), agreed to design a new athletic field for the plaintiff, Trustees of Boston University (university). The contract included an express indemnification provision, which required CHA to indemnify the university for any expenses resulting from CHA's negligent design. A defect in CHA's design caused the university to incur expenses to fix the field. The university demanded indemnification from CHA, which CHA refused. More than six years after the field opened, the university sued CHA for breach of the indemnification provision.The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of CHA, relying on the tort statute of repose, which bars tort actions for damages arising from design defects in real property improvements six years after the improvement's opening. The judge concluded that the university's claim was barred by this statute. The university appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the tort statute of repose does not apply to the university's contract claim for indemnification. The court emphasized that the claim was based on an express contractual provision, not a tort duty imposed by law. The court distinguished between claims for breach of an implied warranty, which are barred by the statute of repose, and claims for breach of an express warranty or indemnification provision, which are not. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP" on Justia Law

The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a vacant lot. Renee Dominguez holds a recorded deed to the lot, but Magdalena Rios De Dominguez claims the deed is a forgery and asserts ownership through a previously recorded deed. The primary issue is the applicability of A.R.S. § 12-524, which sets a five-year statute of limitations for quiet title actions against a party with a recorded deed who has paid property taxes for the preceding five years.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Renee, ruling that even if the deed was forged, the five-year statute of limitations barred Magdalena's claim, thus conferring full title to Renee. The court also ruled that quieting title for Renee barred Magdalena’s claim for damages under A.R.S. § 33-420. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that a "recorded deed" under § 12-524 includes any deed that is facially valid, even if it is forged. Since Renee's deed was facially valid and she met the other requirements of § 12-524, the five-year statute of limitations applied. However, the court also held that Magdalena had sufficiently preserved her arguments for equitable tolling and the discovery rule, which, if successful, could make her complaint timely under § 12-524. The court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case for consideration of these arguments.The Supreme Court affirmed the remainder of the Court of Appeals' opinion and denied both parties' requests for attorney fees, allowing them to re-urge their requests before the appropriate court after the remand. View "DOMINGUEZ v DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law