Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Dylan R. Isham and Billy C. Jack entered into an agreement to exchange Isham’s manufactured home for Jack’s travel trailer, with an option for Jack to purchase a garage attached to the manufactured home for $3,000 by May 11, 2020. Jack declined the option via a message on June 3, 2019, which Isham read but did not respond to. In February 2021, Isham contacted Jack to either receive payment for the garage or remove it, leading to a dispute as Jack had integrated the garage into his home.The District Court for Butler County found in favor of Jack, concluding that Isham had abandoned his rights to the garage by failing to act on them for over 20 months. The court noted that Isham’s lack of communication and actions indicated abandonment, and it would be inequitable to enforce Isham’s right to remove the garage after such a delay. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that Isham had waived his right under the contract and that the district court’s finding of abandonment was not clearly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Jack did not meet the burden of proving abandonment, as mere nonuse and the passage of time are insufficient to establish abandonment without clear and convincing evidence of intent. The court found that Isham’s actions, such as exploring options to move the garage, did not demonstrate an intent to abandon. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings to determine the value of the garage, given its integration into Jack’s home. View "Isham v. Jack" on Justia Law

Lazy D Grazing Association manages a 25,000-acre ranch along the Colorado-Wyoming border, which lacks sufficient surface water for irrigation. In 2020, Lazy D sought a determination from the water court that the groundwater beneath the ranch in the Upper Laramie Aquifer is nontributary, meaning it is not subject to Colorado's prior appropriation system. This designation would allow Lazy D to control the use of the groundwater. The State Engineer determined that the groundwater was nontributary, prompting opposition from various entities, including the Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins, who feared it would harm their water rights.The District Court for Water Division 1 in Greeley found in favor of Lazy D, determining that the groundwater was nontributary. The Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins appealed, arguing that the State Engineer exceeded his authority, the water court improperly presumed the truth of the State Engineer's findings, and that the court relied on sources not in evidence while discrediting expert testimony without justification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the State Engineer was within his rights to determine the facts regarding whether the groundwater is nontributary, but the final determination is a mixed question of fact and law for the water court. Although the water court erred in giving a presumption of truth to the State Engineer's legal conclusion, this error was deemed harmless as the water court independently concluded that the groundwater was nontributary. The court also found that the water court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the Cities and did not rely on information outside the record. The water court's reliance on expert testimony was found to be appropriate, and the decision to allow Lazy D to use the nontributary groundwater was upheld. View "City of Sterling v. Lazy D Grazing Association" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord initiated a summary process action to evict the defendant tenant from an apartment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, who then sought attorney’s fees under a statute that allows consumers to recover such fees when a contract includes a unilateral attorney’s fees provision favoring the commercial party. The lease agreement in question capped the plaintiff’s recoverable attorney’s fees at $750. The trial court awarded the defendant $3500 in attorney’s fees, reasoning that limiting the defendant’s recovery to $750 would not achieve true parity between the parties, as intended by the statute.The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court could only award the defendant up to $750 in attorney’s fees, as specified in the lease agreement. The plaintiff contended that the statute required the court to base the defendant’s award on the same terms governing the plaintiff’s fees, as long as it was practicable to do so.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney’s fees in excess of the contractual cap when it is not practicable to base the award on the contractual terms. The court determined that the term "practicable" means feasible under the circumstances, which are circumstances that achieve equity or fairness. The court emphasized that the equitable purpose of the statute is to rectify the imbalance of power between consumers and commercial parties in contract disputes.The court vacated the trial court’s award of $3500 in attorney’s fees and remanded the case for a new hearing. The trial court was directed to determine whether it was practicable to base the defendant’s award on the lease agreement’s terms and, if not, to award reasonable attorney’s fees consistent with the statute’s equitable purpose. View "Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg" on Justia Law

In 2020, East Fork Funding LLC filed a quiet title action against U.S. Bank, N.A., regarding a mortgage recorded against East Fork’s property. The mortgage had been subject to three foreclosure actions, two of which were voluntarily discontinued by the mortgagee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork, holding that under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), enacted in December 2022, the voluntary discontinuances did not reset the six-year statute of limitations for bringing a foreclosure action. Consequently, the statute of limitations continued to run from the commencement of the first foreclosure action in 2010 and expired six years later, entitling East Fork to quiet title.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork. The court held that FAPA applied retroactively to the voluntary discontinuances, meaning they did not reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations began running with the filing of the 2010 action and expired before East Fork commenced the quiet title action. The court also found that retroactive application of FAPA did not violate the U.S. Constitution and that even under pre-FAPA law, the statute of limitations had expired.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The main issue on appeal is whether FAPA applies retroactively to voluntary discontinuances that occurred before its enactment. The court has certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals, as it is a novel question of state law necessary to resolve the appeal. The Second Circuit seeks clarification on whether Sections 4 and/or 8 of FAPA apply to a unilateral voluntary discontinuance taken prior to the Act’s enactment. The court retains jurisdiction pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "E. Fork Funding LLC v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

The City of Soldotna sought to expand its boundaries by annexing adjacent land and submitted an annexation petition to the Local Boundary Commission (Commission) for legislative review. The Commission, however, decided to convert the petition to a local vote, exercising its authority under a regulation that had not been previously used. Soldotna appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority, the regulation was invalid due to lack of standards and required rulemaking, there was insufficient basis for the decision, and the decision was internally inconsistent.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, upheld the Commission’s decision. The court found that the regulation under which the Commission acted was authorized by the Alaska Constitution and that the Commission’s decision to convert the petition was reasonable. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory grant of authority and had a reasonable basis for converting the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the Commission had the authority under the Alaska Constitution and relevant statutes to adopt the regulation allowing it to convert a legislative review petition to a local action petition. The court found that the regulation provided a standard by requiring the Commission to balance the best interests of the locality and the state. The court also determined that the Commission’s decision had a reasonable basis in the record, considering the public opposition to the annexation and the support for local action from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its discretion and expertise in deciding to proceed by local action. View "City of Soldotna v. State" on Justia Law

A group of landowners challenged the Ohio Tax Commissioner’s decision to set a woodland-clearing-cost rate of $1,000 per acre for the purpose of calculating the current agricultural use valuation (CAUV) of their properties for tax years 2015 through 2020. The landowners argued that the rate was too low and not based on reliable evidence, causing their woodlands to be overvalued and resulting in higher property taxes.The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the Tax Commissioner’s decision, finding that the Commissioner did not abuse her discretion in setting the $1,000 rate. The BTA concluded that the rate was within the Commissioner’s discretion and based on input from the agricultural advisory committee. The BTA also rejected the Tax Commissioner’s argument that some landowners lacked standing to challenge the CAUV entries for certain years.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the Tax Commissioner abused her discretion by adopting the $1,000 rate without reliable evidence or a sound reasoning process. The court noted that the decision was arbitrary and not supported by any fixed rules or standards. The court also found that the Tax Commissioner failed to comply with Ohio Administrative Code 5703-25-33, which requires obtaining information from reliable sources and ensuring that CAUV tables are accurate, reliable, and practical.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the BTA’s decision and remanded the case to the Tax Commissioner with instructions to adopt a woodland-clearing-cost rate that complies with the administrative code. The court emphasized that the Tax Commissioner must base the rate on reliable evidence and follow the prescribed standards. View "Adams v. Harris" on Justia Law

Corey Nelson-White was barred from Rhode Island Row, a mixed-use development in Northeast D.C., which includes two buildings at 2300 and 2350 Washington Place NE. The barring notice directed him to stay off the property and grounds of Rhode Island Row. Officers explained the barring notice to Nelson-White, but did not provide him with a copy. Six days later, Nelson-White was found inside a parking garage attached to one of the Rhode Island Row buildings and was arrested for unlawful entry.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Nelson-White of unlawful entry, finding that he knew or should have known he was barred from the premises, including the parking garage. The trial court based its decision on the barring notice and the officers' instructions, despite Nelson-White's argument that the garage was not clearly marked as part of Rhode Island Row.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the evidence insufficient to sustain Nelson-White's conviction. The court noted that there was no clear indication that the parking garage was part of the barred premises. The court highlighted the lack of signage or other markers that would inform a reasonable person that the garage was part of Rhode Island Row or 2350 Washington Place. The court concluded that a rational fact-finder could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson-White knew or should have known the garage was included in the barring notice.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Nelson-White's conviction for unlawful entry, holding that the evidence did not support the conclusion that he was aware or should have been aware that the parking garage was part of the premises he was barred from entering. View "Nelson-White v. United States" on Justia Law

Karen Richardson obtained a loan in 2008, secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust on her home. After a series of transfers, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC became the holder and servicer of the note. Nationstar appointed members of McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC (MWC) as substitute trustees. In 2015, Nationstar filed for judicial foreclosure, alleging Richardson defaulted on her mortgage. Richardson counterclaimed, challenging Nationstar's standing and alleging violations of lending laws. The Superior Court ruled in favor of Nationstar, and the property was sold in a foreclosure sale.Richardson opposed the ratification of the sale, arguing that Nationstar and MWC provided an incorrect payoff amount, constituting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The Superior Court ratified the sale, concluding that Richardson's right to cure the default had expired before the incorrect payoff amount was provided. Richardson's subsequent appeals were dismissed as moot.Richardson then filed a new suit against Nationstar, MWC, and the trustees, alleging wrongful foreclosure, fraud, and misrepresentation. The Superior Court dismissed her claims against Nationstar and others as barred by res judicata, but held her claims against MWC and the trustees in abeyance. Richardson amended her complaint, and the Superior Court dismissed it again on res judicata grounds, believing she had not disputed privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's dismissal on the issue of privity. The court held that MWC and the trustees had not sufficiently demonstrated privity with Nationstar to invoke res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address the privity issue and any other unresolved claims. View "Richardson v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of property owners and entities challenged the Albany County Board of County Commissioners' amendments to zoning regulations known as the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ). The amendments aimed to protect the Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents in Albany County, including those in the City of Laramie. The property owners argued that the Board's adoption of the amendments was arbitrary, capricious, and exceeded its authority.The District Court of Albany County dismissed the petitions for review, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the amendments were legislative acts and not reviewable under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The property owners and entities appealed, arguing that the Board's actions were reviewable and that the Board lacked the authority to adopt the amendments.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that there is no common law or general statutory exception to judicial review of agency legislative actions. The court held that the characterization of the Board’s action as legislative or adjudicatory dictates the scope and nature of the review. The court concluded that the district court has jurisdiction to review the APOZ amendments and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an analysis in conformance with the opinion. The court emphasized that judicial review of agency legislative actions is limited by the separation of powers doctrine and should focus on whether the actions were contrary to constitutional rights, not in accordance with the law, in excess of statutory authority, or divergent from the agency's own rules. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissions" on Justia Law

Catherine Sullivan, trustee of the Catherine Sullivan Family Trust of 2000, owns residential property adjacent to Megan Gruver's equestrian facility, Silver Bell Ranch, in Blaine County, Idaho. Gruver was issued a conditional use permit (CUP) in 2019 to operate the facility, which Sullivan did not appeal. In 2021, Gruver sought modifications to the CUP to hold three events per year, board additional horses, and hire more staff. Sullivan objected, citing concerns about noise, traffic, and property devaluation, but the Blaine County Board of Commissioners approved the modified CUP with conditions.Sullivan appealed the Board's decision to the district court, arguing that the Board erred in categorizing Silver Bell Ranch as an "Outdoor Recreational Facility" rather than an "Agricultural Business" and that the modifications would prejudice her substantial rights. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Sullivan failed to show how the modifications prejudiced her substantial rights and that her arguments regarding the categorization of the facility were time-barred because she did not appeal the 2019 CUP.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that Sullivan's arguments regarding the categorization of Silver Bell Ranch were time-barred and that she failed to establish prejudice to her substantial rights under Idaho Code section 67-5279(4). The Court also found that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding Sullivan's arguments related to prejudice that were raised for the first time in her reply brief. Blaine County was awarded attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), while Gruver was not entitled to attorney fees as she was not an adverse party to Blaine County. Both Blaine County and Gruver were awarded costs on appeal. View "Sullivan v. Blaine County" on Justia Law