Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

King County Ordinance 19030 altered zoning and business licensing regulations for wineries, breweries, and distilleries (WBDs) in agricultural and rural areas. The ordinance aimed to support economic development but faced challenges regarding compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA) and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). The ordinance allowed for expanded WBD operations and introduced new licensing requirements, but it also raised concerns about environmental impacts and the preservation of agricultural land.The Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board found that the County failed to comply with SEPA and the GMA, invalidating parts of the ordinance. The Board's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board's ruling. Friends of Sammamish Valley and Futurewise sought further review, arguing that the County did not adequately address environmental impacts and agricultural land preservation. The County contended that the ordinance was a "nonproject action" not requiring environmental review under SEPA and presumed valid under the GMA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Board's order. The Court held that the County's SEPA checklist was insufficient, failing to address the full range of probable environmental impacts. The Court emphasized that the GMA requires the conservation of agricultural land and that the ordinance's changes could significantly impact the environment. The Court concluded that the County must conduct a comprehensive environmental review to comply with SEPA and the GMA. View "King County v. Friends of Sammamish Valley" on Justia Law

In 1999, Marcus and Eunice Hollow Horn purchased a mobile home on a lot in Eagle Butte, South Dakota, and began paying rent to Oliver Leblanc, who claimed ownership. Later, Phyllis Miller claimed ownership and sold the lot to Eunice, providing a quit claim deed. Years later, Edward Hoffman, representing his deceased mother Theresa Hoffman's estate, claimed Theresa owned the lot and filed a quiet title action against the Hollow Horns. The Hollow Horns counterclaimed, asserting ownership by adverse possession.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Dewey County, South Dakota, denied Edward's claims and quieted title in favor of the Hollow Horns based on adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15 and SDCL 15-3-1. Edward appealed, challenging the court's findings on good faith and the admission of certain out-of-court statements.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision in part. The court held that Eunice had satisfied the elements of adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15, including good faith possession and payment of taxes for ten years. The court found no clear error in the circuit court's findings and concluded that Edward failed to rebut the presumption of Eunice's good faith. The court also determined that any error in admitting out-of-court statements was harmless and did not affect the outcome.However, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment on the alternative claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1, as it was rendered moot by the ruling on SDCL 15-3-15. The case was remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the alternative claim. View "Hoffman V. Hollow Horn" on Justia Law

The City of Shelby operates a municipal water system in Toole County, Montana, supplying water to several service areas. In 2017, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) approved changes allowing Shelby to temporarily service these areas. In 2019, Shelby applied to expand its service area and increase groundwater production. DNRC issued preliminary approvals for these applications in 2020, which the Town of Kevin objected to, leading to a hearing examiner's review.The hearing examiner denied Kevin's motion for summary judgment and later approved Shelby's applications, concluding that Shelby met the statutory criteria based on service agreements with communities in its service area. Kevin then petitioned the Montana Water Court for judicial review, arguing that DNRC misinterpreted the law and that Shelby's applications did not meet statutory requirements. The Water Court denied Kevin's petition, affirming DNRC's decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether DNRC erred in approving Shelby's permit and change of use applications. The court found that DNRC's interpretation of the law, which allowed service agreements to satisfy the statutory requirement for written consent, was reasonable. However, the court noted that the record lacked evidence of a service agreement with Galata, one of the proposed new service areas. Consequently, the court affirmed DNRC's decision in part but reversed it regarding the inclusion of Galata.The court remanded the case to DNRC to determine whether all required service agreements exist and to issue an order consistent with this opinion. The main holding was that DNRC's interpretation of the statutory criteria was correct, except for the missing service agreement with Galata. View "Town of Kevin v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the Whitehorse Estates Minor Subdivision filed a complaint against their neighbors, Joseph and Amanda Kleinhans, alleging that the Kleinhans violated the subdivision’s restrictive covenants by converting their garage into an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) and renting it out as an Airbnb. The covenants in question required properties to be used only for single-family dwellings and prohibited the operation of commercial businesses.The District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, Carbon County, granted summary judgment in favor of the Kleinhans. The court interpreted the single-family dwelling covenant as a structural restriction, not a use restriction, meaning it only limited the type and number of buildings but did not restrict the use of the property to single families. The court also found the commercial business covenant to be ambiguous and concluded it did not prohibit short-term rentals like Airbnb. Consequently, the court awarded the Kleinhans their Bill of Costs amounting to $4,594.35.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the term "commercial business" was not ambiguous and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes activities conducted for profit. Therefore, the Kleinhans' operation of an Airbnb constituted a commercial business, violating the subdivision’s covenants. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of the Bill of Costs to the Kleinhans and remanded the case to the District Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the neighbors. View "Myers v. Kleinhans" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lisa Wilson's late husband, Mason, purchased a home in Coventry, Rhode Island, financing it with a $150,000 mortgage. Both Mason and Lisa signed the mortgage agreement, but only Mason signed the promissory note. The mortgage agreement included covenants requiring the "Borrowers" to defend the title, pay property taxes, and discharge any superior liens. In 2007, Deutsche Bank acquired the mortgage and note. Mason defaulted on the mortgage payments, and the Wilsons failed to pay property taxes, leading to a tax sale in 2014. Birdsong Associates bought the property and later obtained a court decree extinguishing Deutsche Bank's mortgage lien. Birdsong then sold the property to Coventry IV-14, RIGP, which eventually sold it to Dunkin Engineering Solutions, LLC, a company formed by Mason's parents. After Mason's parents' deaths, Lisa became the sole owner of Dunkin.Deutsche Bank sued Lisa, Mason, and Dunkin in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging breach of the mortgage covenants and seeking equitable relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Lisa and Dunkin, finding that the mortgage agreement had been extinguished by the 2016 court decree and that Deutsche Bank had no remaining contractual rights. The court also rejected Deutsche Bank's equitable claims, concluding that there was no evidence of a scheme to benefit Lisa and Mason and that no benefit had accrued to Dunkin or Lisa from Deutsche Bank's payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the mortgage agreement did not unambiguously bind Lisa to the covenants, and thus, Deutsche Bank could not enforce those covenants against her. The court also found that Deutsche Bank failed to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship necessary for its equitable claims and that Deutsche Bank's payments did not unjustly enrich Dunkin or Lisa. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Melissa Evans was involved in a fatal car accident with Darrell D. Blaylock, resulting in the deaths of both Evans and George D. Blaylock, a passenger in Blaylock's car. Joshua Evans, Melissa's son, initiated probate proceedings and was named the personal representative of her estate. Joshua later sought a court order to declare Melissa's house as qualifying for the homestead exemption. The probate court denied this request, leading Joshua to file an interlocutory appeal.The District Court of Rogers County admitted Melissa's will to probate, named Joshua as the personal representative, and identified the heirs. Deborah Matlock, representing George Blaylock's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Melissa's estate and a creditor demand for inventory. Joshua's motion to declare the house as a homestead was denied after he failed to appear at the hearing. The probate court ruled that the property did not qualify for the homestead exemption as Melissa left no surviving spouse or minor children.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the property did not qualify for either a constitutional or probate homestead exemption. The court clarified that the homestead exemption under Oklahoma law is limited to a surviving spouse and minor children, and does not extend to adult children or grandchildren. Consequently, Joshua Evans and his children were not entitled to the homestead exemption, and the property was available to satisfy the debts of Melissa Evans' estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a property owner in Fairfield, Connecticut, sought approval from the town's zoning commission to build a forty-unit affordable housing development. The application included a request for a text amendment to the zoning regulations and approval of a site plan and certificate of zoning compliance. The proposed building exceeded the height limits of the residence A zone district, where the property is located, which typically allows only single-family dwellings with a maximum height of thirty-two feet.The zoning commission denied the text amendment request, citing inconsistency with the town's plan of conservation and development, among other reasons. However, it conditionally approved the site plan and certificate of zoning compliance, provided the building height was reduced to three stories and forty feet. The commission justified the height restriction by stating that the proposed building's visibility from a nearby historic district would harm the district's integrity, which it deemed a substantial public interest.The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which consolidated the case with an appeal from four intervenors who opposed the development. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the commission had improperly failed to apply the standards of Connecticut's affordable housing statute (§ 8-30g) to the text amendment request. The court also concluded that the commission did not meet its burden of proving that the height restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest that outweighed the need for affordable housing.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the height restriction, agreeing that the commission failed to demonstrate that the restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest in historic preservation that outweighed the need for affordable housing. However, the Supreme Court partially reversed the trial court's decision on the text amendment, ruling that § 8-30g applied only to the plaintiff's property and not to the entire residence A zone district. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the text amendment limited to the plaintiff's property. View "131 Beach Road, LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

A nonprofit association of homeowners in Woodbridge appealed a decision by the Connecticut Siting Council, which approved a telecommunications company's application to construct a cell phone tower in the town. The plaintiff intervened in the administrative proceeding, arguing that the proposed tower would unreasonably impact nearby scenic resources and vistas. During the hearings, the council stated that property values were not among the statutory criteria to be considered. The telecommunications company presented evidence that the tower would improve cell coverage, while the plaintiff's consultant argued that alternative locations would provide better coverage with less impact on residential neighborhoods.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable. The court noted that the council had considered evidence from residents about the tower's impact on property values and had sufficiently considered alternative locations but found the approved site to be the most appropriate.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff had standing to raise the claim about property values. However, the court concluded that a facility's impact on property values is not an enumerated or unenumerated significant adverse effect that the council must consider under the statute. The court also found that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including extensive testimony and documentary evidence about the coverage provided by the proposed and alternative locations. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the council's approval of the tower. View "Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

Robert Turner, a property owner in Suwannee County, Florida, claimed that his homestead property was sold at an impermissibly low amount under Florida law, which deprived him of any surplus after back taxes and costs were deducted. Turner had a homestead exemption on his property, which was automatically renewed until 2015. After failing to pay property taxes, a tax certificate was issued, and a tax deed sale was conducted in 2015. Turner alleged that the sale was unlawful because it did not account for the homestead exemption, and he did not receive proper notice of the sale.Turner initially sought relief in state court, challenging the removal of his homestead exemption, but his complaint was dismissed as untimely. He then filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights, including First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment illegal seizure, and due process violations. The federal district court dismissed his complaint, finding that abstention was warranted under the comity doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with state tax administration when state remedies are adequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the relief Turner sought would disrupt Florida's administration of its ad valorem property tax scheme. The court found that Florida provided plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, including the ability to challenge tax deed sales and homestead exemption removals in state court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the comity doctrine. View "Turner v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In May 2017, the City of Alameda leased residential property to Shelby Sheehan. Sheehan stopped paying rent in December 2020 and did not pay for over 17 months. On April 5, 2022, the City served Sheehan with a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate, specifying payment to be made to "City of Alameda c/o River Rock Real Estate Group." Sheehan neither paid nor vacated, prompting the City to file an unlawful detainer action.Sheehan moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice was defective because it did not name a natural person as the payee and was ambiguous about the payment method. The trial court agreed, finding the notice invalid for not identifying a natural person and for being ambiguous about acceptable payment methods. Consequently, the court dismissed the action, and the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court disagreed with the trial court's narrow interpretation of "person" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2), holding that "person" includes corporations as well as natural persons. However, the court found the notice defective because it did not provide the correct and complete name of the corporation to whom rent should be paid, creating ambiguity and confusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Sheehan, concluding that the notice did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. The court did not address the trial court's finding of ambiguity based on payment method due to the notice's other deficiencies. View "City of Alameda v. Sheehan" on Justia Law