Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cedar Hills Investment Co., L.L.C. leased part of the ground under the Battlefield Mall in Springfield, Missouri, to Battlefield Mall LLC. Cedar Hills suspected that Battlefield was improperly deducting certain costs from revenue-sharing payments owed under the lease. Cedar Hills sued Battlefield, and the district court found that Battlefield had improperly deducted capital expenditures and some administrative costs from shared revenue. The court approved the deduction of security costs and other administrative costs but held that Battlefield failed to state charges to subtenants for deducted costs separately as required by the lease. Cedar Hills was awarded approximately $3.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Cedar Hills on several points, including the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the court also found that Battlefield's deduction of security costs was permissible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings regarding the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the appellate court found that the district court misidentified which administrative costs were deductible and miscalculated Cedar Hills's damages. The Eighth Circuit held that Battlefield's deduction of capital expenditures breached the lease, and the failure to separately state charges also breached the lease. The court affirmed the district court's finding that security costs were common area maintenance costs. The case was remanded for further proceedings to correctly identify deductible administrative costs and recalculate damages. The appellate court granted the parties' joint motion to supplement the record. View "Cedar Hills Investment Co. v. Battlefield Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Michael Etchegoinberry, Erik Clausen, Barlow Family Farms, L.P., and Christopher Todd Allen, own land in the Westlands Water District, part of the San Luis Unit in California. They alleged that the United States failed to provide necessary drainage for their irrigated lands, leading to a rise in the water table and accumulation of saline groundwater, which they claimed resulted in a taking of their property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims initially denied the government's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the plaintiffs that their claim was timely under the stabilization doctrine. This doctrine postpones the accrual of a takings claim until the damage has stabilized and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable. The case was then stayed for nearly seven years for settlement attempts. In 2023, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue and dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the stabilization doctrine did not apply and the claim was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the stabilization doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs' claim was based on the regular and known lack of drainage over many years, not an irregular or intermittent physical process. Even if the doctrine applied, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim accrued before the critical date of September 2, 2005, as they were aware of the permanent nature of the damage to their land well before that date. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ETCHEGOINBERRY v. US " on Justia Law

A motorcyclist, Bradley Charles St. John, died after colliding with a 300-pound pig on a rural road and subsequently being struck by another vehicle. The pig had escaped from a nearby property owned by Gary and Judy Schaeffler, who had leased it to Judy’s brother and sister-in-law, Michael and Suzanne Mountjoy. The Mountjoys were responsible for maintaining the property, including the fences, under an oral lease agreement. The Schaefflers visited the property occasionally but did not reside there.St. John’s widow sued the Schaefflers and the Mountjoys for negligence, claiming they failed to properly secure the livestock. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers, ruling they owed no duty of care to St. John as out-of-possession landlords without actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a landlord owes a duty of care if they have actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the right to enter the property to remedy it, or if they have reason to believe a dangerous condition exists at the start or renewal of a lease and fail to conduct a reasonable inspection. The court found that the Schaefflers did not have actual knowledge of the unsecured livestock and had no reason to know the fences were inadequate. Therefore, they had no duty to inspect or secure the property. The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers. View "Estate of St. John v. Schaeffler" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law

Island Girl Outfitters, LLC (IGO) operated a store called Hippie Gurlz at Eastern Shore Centre, an outdoor shopping mall owned by Allied Development of Alabama, LLC. IGO signed a five-year lease in late 2020 but closed the store after the first year due to slow sales. Allied Development filed a complaint in Baldwin Circuit Court seeking rent and other damages under the lease. The trial court entered a $94,350 judgment in favor of Allied Development against IGO and its owner, Anthony S. Carver, who had personally guaranteed the lease.The Baldwin Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Allied Development, finding no genuine issues of material fact regarding IGO's liability for breaching the lease. The court then held a hearing to determine damages, ultimately awarding Allied Development $94,350. IGO and Carver appealed, arguing that Allied Development failed to market and maintain the mall adequately and that they should not be liable for future rent since the storefront was relet shortly after they vacated.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo regarding the liability determination and under the ore tenus rule for the damages award. The court found that IGO and Carver failed to show that Allied Development had a contractual duty to market and maintain the mall in a specific manner. Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment on liability was affirmed. Regarding damages, the absence of a transcript from the damages hearing meant the court had to presume the trial court's findings were correct. Consequently, the $94,350 judgment was affirmed. View "Island Girl Outfitters, LLC v. Allied Development of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law

Kilvert, a Rhode Island company, acquired a commercial property and claimed that SBC Tower, a Delaware company, breached their lease agreement by failing to pay fifty percent of the payments received from subleases. Kilvert filed a Commercial Property Eviction Complaint in Rhode Island district court, seeking eviction and damages. SBC Tower removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilvert moved to remand, arguing that Rhode Island law grants exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes to state district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island agreed with Kilvert and granted the motion to remand, holding that Rhode Island law mandates that the state district court is the proper court for this action, making removal improper. SBC Tower appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the Rhode Island statute in question, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2), allocates jurisdiction among state courts and does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where diversity jurisdiction is present. The court held that the statute does not preclude removal to federal court and that the federal court has the authority to hear the case. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Leslie J. Knoles (Decedent) and Ruth Catello co-owned a property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. After Decedent's death in 2020, the property's title became disputed. Decedent's four siblings and Catello were involved in probate proceedings regarding the property and other estate assets. Concurrently, the siblings filed a civil action in 2022 to partition the property. The trial court identified the property owners as Catello and Decedent’s estate and ordered a partition by sale. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing to sue for partition because ownership of the property was still undetermined in probate court.The Superior Court of San Diego County entered an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale, identifying the property owners and ordering the sale proceeds to be distributed accordingly. Catello did not challenge the siblings' standing during the trial court proceedings. The siblings filed a cross-claim for partition by sale, asserting that the 2020 quitclaim deed was valid and that they would inherit Decedent's interest in the property. The trial court ruled in favor of the siblings, leading to Catello's appeal.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring the partition claim because the probate court had not yet determined the ownership of the property. The court emphasized that clear title is required to bring a partition action, and the ongoing probate proceedings meant that the siblings' ownership interest was not confirmed. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the uncertainty of ownership precluded the siblings from establishing the necessary standing for their partition claim. View "Amundson v. Catello" on Justia Law

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, owner of an apartment building in Manhattan, filed an application with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) in 2019 to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements. The petitioner claimed that the registrations erroneously stated that unit 1B was temporarily exempt from rent stabilization due to owner/employee occupancy, while it should have been permanently exempt due to a high rent vacancy in 2002. The petitioner sought to withdraw the erroneous registrations and submit new ones removing unit 1B from the total of rent-stabilized units.The Rent Administrator denied the application, stating that registration amendments could only correct ministerial issues, not substantive changes like recalculating rental history or removing an apartment from rent-stabilized status. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR upheld this decision, agreeing that the requested amendments went beyond the scope of an amendment application proceeding. The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul DHCR's determination.The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, reasoning that DHCR rationally determined the requested correction was substantive rather than ministerial. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, noting that DHCR's interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) as precluding the requested amendments was rational and reasonable.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and held that DHCR's interpretation of the RSC, which limits amendments to ministerial issues, was entitled to substantial deference. The court found that DHCR's decision to deny the petitioner's application was rational, as it aimed to protect tenants from fraud, preserve agency resources, and ensure rent stabilization disputes were litigated in the proper forum. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law