Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the City of Laramie, Wyoming, sued the University of Wyoming and its Board of Trustees, challenging the drilling and operation of certain water wells. The city argued that the university was in violation of a 1965 deed covenant prohibiting the drilling of one of the wells and was also in violation of a city ordinance. The city also claimed that legislation exempting the university from this city ordinance was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed some of the city's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the university on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the university was protected by sovereign immunity from the city's attempts to enforce the deed covenant. It also held that the state law exempting the university from the city ordinance was constitutional. The court further noted that the law precluded the city from enforcing its ordinance against the university. View "City of Laramie, Wyoming v. University of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed a dispute over a settlement agreement regarding the sale of a house and the subsequent release of construction-related claims. Daniel Perl and Sandra Perl (collectively, "the Perls"), who are the plaintiffs and appellants, entered into discussions with Christopher Grant and other related parties (collectively, "the Grants"), who are the defendants and appellees. The Perls had purchased a home from the Grants and later became dissatisfied with the construction quality. After negotiations, the parties, through text messages, appeared to reach an agreement wherein the Grants would buy back the property for $2.8 million, and the Perls would release all claims related to the house's construction. However, the Perls later objected to several terms in the formal documents prepared by the Grants' attorney and disputed the existence of an enforceable settlement agreement.The lower court, the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted the Grants' motion for summary judgment and denied the Perls' cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The lower court held that there was indeed an enforceable settlement agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the parties' text messages satisfied the statute of frauds and constituted an enforceable settlement agreement. The court pointed out that the text messages contained all the essential elements of a contract, including the parties, the subject matter, a reasonably certain description of the property, the purchase price, and mutual assent. The court also found that the Perls' objections to non-material terms in the formal documents did not invalidate the settlement agreement. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant the Grants' motion for summary judgment and deny the Perls' cross-motion for partial summary judgment. View "Perl v. Grant" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Gracia Bovis, an elder woman, signed documents transferring the title of her house to her daughter, Marina Casey. According to Bovis, Casey had misled her into signing the documents to protect her from rising property taxes. However, the documents transferred the property into Casey's name. Casey argued that the transfer was meant to protect the property from tax reassessment under Proposition 19. Bovis sought an Elder Abuse Restraining Order (EARO) against Casey, alleging financial abuse. The trial court granted the EARO and subsequently declared the deed transferring the property void ab initio (invalid from the outset). Casey appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, affirmed the issuance of the restraining orders, finding sufficient evidence of financial abuse, but reversed the order declaring the deed void. The appellate court concluded that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03 in declaring the deed void. The statute allows for the issuance of restraining orders to protect elders from further abuse, but does not provide the court with the authority to declare a deed void. The court noted that other permanent remedies, such as the return of property, can be pursued through a civil action under other provisions of the Elder Abuse Act. View "Newman v. Casey" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a decision by the District Court granting Camille J. Moulton's motion for summary judgment against J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Moulton's property in Buckfield was subject to a mortgage held by J.P. Morgan. When Moulton stopped making payments on her loan, J.P. Morgan sent her a notice of default and right to cure. However, the notice overstated the amount required to cure the default due to an amount held in suspense by the bank, and was thus deemed deficient by the court.The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the District Court's decision that the notice was deficient and affirmed that portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment that required J.P. Morgan to discharge the mortgage, as there was no basis for the lower court to declare the effect of its judgment without a specific claim for declaratory relief. The court did not disturb the lower court's award of reasonable attorney fees to Moulton for defending against the foreclosure claim. The holding of this case is that a notice of default and right to cure is deficient if it does not clearly inform the borrower of the amount required to cure the default. If a lender has not complied with the prerequisites to acceleration, a court cannot conclude that initiation of a foreclosure action nevertheless accelerates the note balance. When a court enters summary judgment against a lender or dismisses the lender’s foreclosure claim due to a deficient notice, it does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title. View "J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton" on Justia Law

In 2006, Ronald A. Gosset borrowed $275,000 against his property, which he owned as a joint tenant with his daughters, Mellissa and Verity Gosset. Both daughters signed the mortgage but not the underlying note. When Ronald Gosset passed away and the loan was in default, The Bank of New York Mellon, as the current note and mortgage holder, moved for summary judgment and for permission to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property. The defendants argued that they were not in default since they never signed the note and bore no financial obligations to the plaintiff. Moreover, they contended that the claims against their deceased father couldn't be addressed until a representative for his estate was appointed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the plaintiff presented uncontested evidence demonstrating it is the holder of the note and mortgage, and that the note is currently in default. Furthermore, under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgage itself is also in default. The defendants, who are referred to as "Borrowers" in the mortgage, failed to present evidence challenging these assertions. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, ruling that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property securing its promissory note. The court clarified that the judgment does not provide for an award of damages against any defendant, it only authorizes the plaintiff to foreclose its mortgage. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Gosset" on Justia Law

In Mississippi, Samuel and Sandra Evans appealed the trial court's decision not to set aside a foreclosure sale. They executed a deed of trust for real property in 2003, but defaulted on their payments. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale by MC&J Investments, LLC. The Evans alleged that they had an oral agreement with the managing member of MC&J Investments to buy the property at the foreclosure sale and then sell it back to them. The trial court found that the bid price paid by MC&J Investments was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and that no written evidence was provided to support the alleged promise to sell back the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the oral agreement was barred under the statute of frauds and did not fall under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because there was no evidence that the Evans relied on the alleged promise. Additionally, the court found that the price paid at the foreclosure sale didn't shock the conscience of the court and therefore didn't err in not setting aside the foreclosure sale. View "Evans v. MC & J Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The case in question involved a dispute between Epochal Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Divine Orchids, and LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation, over a commercial lease agreement for a property containing dilapidated commercial greenhouses known to contain asbestos and lead paint. Epochal Enterprises claimed that the defendants failed to disclose the presence of these hazardous substances, which resulted in economic damage when the County of San Diego quarantined the leased premises. A jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence, and awarded Epochal Enterprises damages for lost profits and other past economic loss.However, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), based on a limitation of liability clause in the lease agreement that purported to prevent Epochal Enterprises from recovering the economic damages awarded by the jury.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the trial court's judgment. It found that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendants had violated the Health and Safety Code by failing to disclose the existence of asbestos, and that this violation of law rendered the limitation of liability clause invalid under Civil Code section 1668. The court concluded that the limitation of liability clause could not bar Epochal Enterprises from recovering damages for the defendants' statutory violations.The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV on the issue of damages, finding that the jury had a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of lost profits. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In "King County v. Michael J. Abernathy et al.", the Supreme Court of the State of Washington answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case involved a dispute over the ownership of a 3.6 mile section of land along the shore of Lake Sammamish, known as the Corridor. In 1887, prior to Washington becoming a state, a railroad company was granted a "right-of-way" to build a railroad over the Corridor. Since then, the Corridor and surrounding shorelands have been used by various parties including individual property owners, the state, and the county. The certified question asked whether a right-of-way approved by the United States Department of the Interior under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 is a conveyance "patented by the United States" under Article XVII, Section 2 of the Washington State Constitution. If the land was "patented" by the federal government, it would have been owned by the railroad and later King County. If the land was not patented, Washington would have owned it at the time of statehood and later conveyed it to private parties, and the shoreland would currently belong to the homeowners, the Abernathys. The Washington Supreme Court held that the right-of-way was an easement and did not constitute a land conveyance patented by the United States. Therefore, the land belonged to Washington at the time of statehood and is presently owned by the homeowners. View "King County v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around two developers, SAS Associates 1, LLC and Military 1121, LLC, who filed a complaint against the City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, alleging that their equal protection rights were violated when their rezoning applications were denied by the council. The developers owned several parcels of land in Chesapeake and sought to combine them to create a 90-acre development involving housing units, commercial space, and a conservation district. Their plans required rezoning, which was denied by the Council citing community opposition and the ability to develop under existing zoning classifications. The developers filed a complaint alleging that their application was denied even though similar applications from other developers were approved, and the council's reasons for denial were irrational and arbitrary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the developers' claim. The Court of Appeals found that the developers failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus. Furthermore, the court highlighted that zoning decisions are primarily the responsibility of local governments and that the Developers did not provide any valid comparators to support their claim of discriminatory treatment. The court noted the lack of any evidence to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the City Council members and ruled that the Developers' disagreement with the Council's decision does not render the Council's judgment call pretextual. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. View "SAS Associates v. City Council of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

In this case, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the park's policy that required all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, four Latino families, argued that this policy violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because it disproportionately ousted Latinos from the park. The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals found that the district court had misunderstood the federal anti-harboring statute. The court of appeals noted that the statute requires more than simply entering into a lease agreement with an undocumented immigrant to be in violation. Rather, a person must knowingly or recklessly conceal, harbor, or shield undocumented immigrants from detection. The court of appeals concluded that the park's policy of verifying tenants' legal status did not serve the park's stated interest of avoiding liability under the anti-harboring statute. Consequently, the park had not met its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims under the FHA. As such, the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law