Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the lower court in a case involving AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C., et al. (AWMS) and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). AWMS sought a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to initiate property appropriation proceedings, arguing that the state had effectuated a regulatory taking of AWMS’s property by suspending operations at its saltwater-injection well. The court of appeals initially granted summary judgment in favor of the state, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the court of appeals to weigh the parties' evidence related to AWMS’s total and partial takings claims.On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ, arguing that AWMS did not have a cognizable property interest for purposes of a takings analysis. AWMS appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had failed to comply with its remand order to weigh the parties' evidence and had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting whether AWMS had a cognizable property interest.The Supreme Court ruled that AWMS did possess a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate the saltwater-injection well, a point that had been established in the previous appeal and was thus the law of the case. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case once again, instructing the lower court to weigh the evidence to determine whether a total or partial regulatory taking had occurred. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the Park's policy requiring all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, noncitizen Latino families, argued that this policy disproportionately ousted Latinos from the Park and therefore violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that the anti-harboring statute did not plausibly put the Park at risk for prosecution simply for leasing to families with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the court found that the Park's policy did not serve a valid interest in any realistic way to avoid liability under the anti-harboring statute. Therefore, the Park did not meet its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Given these findings, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the third step to determine whether a less discriminatory alternative was available. As such, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

In Wyoming, Darrell R. Turcato and Robbin D. Wilkins (Appellants) and Jan Frady and Larry Turcato (Petitioners) were beneficiaries of two trusts created by their parents. The Appellants sought to appeal the district court's decision that a warranty deed executed by the Trusts transferring property to them was invalid due to a defective acknowledgment. The property in question was a house, which was held 50% by the JT Trust and 50% by the VT Trust. The mother, Virginia Turcato, decided to transfer the house to the Appellants in recognition of their assistance. However, her signature was notarized outside her presence. After her death, the Petitioners sought a declaration that the transfer was invalid due to the defective acknowledgment. The district court determined that the Petitioners, as beneficiaries of the trusts, had an interest in the property when the deed was executed and therefore declared the warranty deed void against them.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that a defective acknowledgment does not render a warranty deed void ab initio under Wyoming law. It found that when the parties signed the Warranty Deed, title immediately passed to Appellants, and that title was valid against all but certain parties. The Court also held that the Petitioners did not have an interest in the property at the time of the transfer and therefore had no standing to challenge the Warranty Deed. The Court concluded that the Warranty Deed is valid between the Trusts and the Appellants, and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. View "Turcato v. Frady" on Justia Law

In 2020, Loring De Martini agreed to sell a commercial property to Puja Gupta. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration. Subsequently, Gupta filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award and recorded a lis pendens on the property. Gupta obtained a judgment confirming the award, but abandoned the case after De Martini successfully moved to expunge the lis pendens. Gupta then filed a new action seeking to compel De Martini to complete the sale and recorded another lis pendens. De Martini moved to expunge the new lis pendens, arguing that Gupta needed the court's permission to record it under the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.36, as it was recorded by the same claimant and affected the same property. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that section 405.36 only applies to successive lis pendens filed in the same action and Gupta had established a prima facie case regarding the probable validity of a real property claim.De Martini petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three for a writ of mandate. The court granted the petition, concluding that the trial court erred both in its interpretation of section 405.36 and its application of the prima facie standard in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court held that section 405.36 requires a claimant to seek court permission before recording a lis pendens on the same property in a subsequent proceeding if a lis pendens in a prior, related proceeding has been expunged. Additionally, the court determined that the trial court should have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, not a prima facie standard, in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying expungement of the lis pendens and to enter a new order granting the requested expungement and ruling on De Martini's motion for attorney fees. View "Di Martini v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In a dispute between K&S Staffing Solutions, Inc. (K&S) and The Western Surety Company (Western) and VSS International, Inc. (VSSI), the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District upheld the Superior Court of San Joaquin County's decision that K&S was not a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law and that payment bonds issued for the projects in question were subject to the mechanics' lien law’s requirements.K&S, a staffing company, sued VSSI and Western to recover unpaid amounts for services provided on state projects, arguing it was a “laborer” under the mechanics' lien law and thus entitled to assert a claim against payment bonds for the projects. The court disagreed, interpreting the term “laborer” in the law as a person "acting as an employee" performing labor or bestowing necessary services on a work of improvement, and concluded K&S, as an employer, did not qualify.Furthermore, K&S argued that the payment bonds issued for these state projects were not subject to the mechanics' lien law’s requirements because they were not "payment bonds" within the meaning of the law. However, the court disagreed, ruling that the bond requirements of the mechanics' lien law apply to state projects that require a bond under Public Contract Code section 7103 and other public entity projects that require a bond under section 9550. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's attorney fee award to the defendants under section 9564, which mandates attorney fees be awarded to the prevailing party in any action to enforce the liability on a payment bond. View "K & S Staffing Solutions v. The Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the dismissal of Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC's appeal by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction. Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC filed a notice of appeal five days after the deadline and did not file a motion seeking leave to show good cause or a reasonable excuse for the late filing. Despite the Group's claim that it had electronically submitted the notice of appeal on the due date and that the clerk erroneously rejected it, the Court ruled that the Group failed to seek recourse for its untimely filing as required by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court noted that the record did not support the Group's factual assertions and that the Group did not utilize the remedies available to it, making its claim of due process violation baseless. Therefore, the Court held that the appellate court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Group's appeal. The case originated from a two-count complaint for eviction filed by the Group against Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corporation, in which the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. View "Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC v. Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corp." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, the City of Rock Falls filed a petition against Aims Industrial Services, LLC. The petition sought to enforce compliance with a City ordinance requiring the replacement of a private sewage disposal system with a connection to the City’s public sewage disposal system upon the sale or transfer of any property within the City limits. The trial court determined it would be inequitable to grant the City an injunction and denied the City’s petition. The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the trial court erred in considering the equities when deciding whether to grant the injunction, as the City sought enforcement of an ordinance that specifically authorized injunctive relief.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, stating that when a statute or ordinance expressly authorizes injunctive relief, the court has no discretion to refuse to grant the injunctive relief once a violation of the statute or ordinance has been established. The Supreme Court clarified that in such cases, balancing of the equities is not necessary since a violation of the statute or ordinance implies a harm to the public. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to grant the injunction based on its own balancing of the equities was an error. View "City of Rock Falls v. Aims Industrial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In Houston, Texas, a nurse was struck and killed by a driver while crossing the public street next to the hospital where she worked. The nurse's family filed a suit against the hospital, arguing that the hospital had a duty to make the adjacent public road safer due to the layout of its exit and parking lot, which they claimed created a situation in which injury to others was foreseeable. The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the hospital had a limited duty as a premises occupier based on its control over certain parts of the adjacent public right-of-way. However, the court found no evidence that any dangerous condition the hospital controlled in the right-of-way caused the nurse’s harm. The court rejected the lower courts' ruling that there was a case-specific duty for the hospital to make the road safer. The court reversed the judgment of the lower courts, rendering a take-nothing judgment in favor of the hospital. View "HNMC, INC. v. CHAN" on Justia Law

In a case concerning subsidized low-income housing, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, ruled that tenants in such housing developments have standing to sue a property management company under the unfair competition law (UCL) if their tenancies are terminated prematurely due to legally deficient notices. The plaintiffs, who lived in housing managed by FPI Management, Inc., claimed that their tenancies were terminated after FPI provided just three days’ notice, instead of the legally required 30 days’ notice. The trial court granted summary judgment to FPI, deciding that the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury that would confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court, however, held that the plaintiffs were prematurely deprived of property rights and subjected to imminent legal peril due to FPI's legally deficient termination notices. This amounted to an injury sufficient to confer standing under the UCL. The appellate court also noted a distinction between the plaintiffs who lived in housing subsidized by the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME plaintiffs) and those living in housing subsidized by section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (Section 8 plaintiffs). The Section 8 plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their legal entitlement to 30 days’ notice, leading the court to affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of FPI regarding the Section 8 plaintiffs' UCL claim. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for summary adjudication, but reversed the judgment and post-judgment order on costs, rendering the cost order moot. View "Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The case pertains to an appeal by the City of Los Angeles and real parties in interest, TTLC Los Angeles – El Sereno, LLC and The True Life Companies, LLC against a petition filed by Delia Guerrero and Coyotl + Macehualli Citizens (Objectors). The Objectors alleged that the city's approval of a real estate development project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The city and the developers had argued that the petition was untimely, but the trial court granted the Objectors’ petition, directing the city to vacate project approvals and prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) evaluating the project's environmental impacts. On appeal by the city and developers, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Objectors’ petition was untimely, as it was filed more than a year after the city's notice of determination, which triggered the statute of limitations for challenges under the CEQA. The court concluded that the city's initial approval of the project represented its earliest firm commitment to approving the project, and hence constituted project approval under CEQA. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the city and the developers and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Objectors' petition. View "Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law