Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Thomas Ghelf, Tricia Hansen, Constance and Thomas Klein, Maureen Sommerfeld, and Mississippi Sports and Recreation, Inc. (MSR), own abutting properties in the Town of Wheatland, Vernon County, Wisconsin. They alleged that the Town, its officials, Vernon County, the County Treasurer, and unknown agents and employees engaged in a harassment campaign against them. This included coordinated complaints about their businesses, unlawful arrests, failures to respond to emergency services, excessive property tax assessments, a foreclosure action, and the designation of a private driveway as a public road.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the plaintiffs' tax assessment and road claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the foreclosure claims, and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity barred the tax assessment and foreclosure claims. It also found that the plaintiffs' claims related to events before September 15, 2016, were time-barred by the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tax assessment and foreclosure claims, agreeing that the Tax Injunction Act and comity principles deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The appellate court also upheld the dismissal of claims related to events before September 15, 2016, as time-barred. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' road claims, finding that these claims were not barred by claim or issue preclusion. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the road claims, and the court held that Town Chairman Jayne Ballwahn should not be dismissed from the suit at this stage. View "Ghelf v Town of Wheatland" on Justia Law

From 2009 to 2015, Clarence Roland engaged in a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders and title insurance companies by using aliases, fake businesses, and fraudulent documents. He promised homeowners facing foreclosure that he could help them eliminate their mortgages. Instead, he transferred property ownership to his shell entities, created fake mortgages, and sold the properties to unsuspecting buyers. Roland used fraudulent notary stamps and signatures to make these transactions appear legitimate.A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Roland of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 derived from unlawful activity. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, ordered to pay restitution of over $3 million, forfeit nearly $2 million, and assessed a $1,000 special assessment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Roland's appeal, where he raised several issues. He argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his and his co-conspirator’s prior convictions, limiting his good-faith defense, and denying his request for expert-witness funding. He also claimed that his conduct was not criminal and highlighted a clerical error regarding the special assessment.The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's evidentiary rulings, determining that the admission of prior convictions was not plain error and that the limitations on Roland's good-faith defense were either appropriate or harmless. The court also upheld the denial of expert-witness funding, noting Roland's failure to make a formal request. The court agreed with Roland on the clerical error and modified the judgment to remove the $1,000 special assessment. In all other respects, Roland's conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

Austin Properties, LLC, submitted an application to the Shawnee City Council to build a multi-unit residential complex. The city council denied the application, leading Austin Properties to petition the district court to reverse the denial. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Austin Properties then appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the City had followed the necessary procedures under the Shawnee Municipal Code (SMC) § 17.92.030. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, but based its reasoning on K.S.A. 12-757, a Kansas statute that dictates similar procedures for zoning amendments. Both courts found that the City had complied with the required procedures.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and determined that both the SMC and K.S.A. 12-757 were applicable. The Court found that the City failed to comply with K.S.A. 12-757(d) when it did not vote on denial or return the application to the planning commission with an explanation after failing to approve the application with a 3/4 majority vote, as required by K.S.A. 12-757(f) due to a valid protest petition. The Court held that the procedures in K.S.A. 12-757(d) are still applicable even in the face of a valid protest petition under K.S.A. 12-757(f).The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to rule in favor of Austin Properties and return the application to the City for action consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Austin Properties v. City of Shawnee " on Justia Law

Clyde and Nancy Straatmeyer purchased a lot within a subdivision governed by a restrictive covenant. They began constructing a house with a large three-car garage, prompting their neighbors to sue to stop the construction, claiming it violated the covenant. The Straatmeyers counterclaimed, seeking to have the covenant declared void. The circuit court held a bench trial and ultimately declared the covenant null and void.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, found that the restrictive covenant had been routinely violated by numerous property owners within the subdivision without any enforcement action taken since its inception in 1976. The court determined that enforcing the covenant against the Straatmeyers while allowing other violations to persist would be inequitable. The court also found that the covenant's terms, such as the three-car garage limit and the prohibition on business activities, had been violated by several plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declaring the covenant void. The court noted that the widespread, unchallenged violations of the covenant undermined its purpose and that enforcing it selectively would be unjust. The Supreme Court agreed that it would be impractical and harmful to require all properties to comply with the covenant and that voiding the covenant was an appropriate equitable remedy. View "Hood v. Straatmeyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

In 2021, Sharon Ceynar initiated a divorce action against William Ceynar. Following a bench trial, the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, granted the divorce and divided the marital estate. Sharon received $1,218,903.90 in net assets, while William received $681,827.35. The court ordered the sale of the couple's real estate and mineral interests at public auction, with 55% of the proceeds going to William and 45% to Sharon.William appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its division of the marital estate, particularly given his large inheritance. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that property distribution decisions are not reversed unless clearly erroneous. The court emphasized that the district court's findings are presumed correct and that it does not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility on appeal.The Supreme Court found that the district court had properly considered the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, which include factors such as the duration of the marriage, the parties' ages, health, and financial circumstances. The district court had noted the long-term nature of the marriage and the need for both parties to have income-generating assets for retirement. Although William argued that his inheritance should result in a larger share of the marital estate, the court found that the district court had appropriately considered this factor and had not erred in its division.The Supreme Court also addressed William's contention that the district court erred in ordering the sale of the real property, noting that the court had the authority to do so to achieve an equitable distribution. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the property division was equitable and not clearly erroneous. View "Ceynar v. Ceynar" on Justia Law

DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC and DCA Capitol Hill SNF, LLC (collectively, “DCA”) leased a property from Capitol Hill Group (“CHG”) in Northeast Washington, DC, to operate a long-term acute care hospital and skilled nursing facility. In 2015, DCA began withholding rent payments, claiming dissatisfaction with CHG’s installation of a new HVAC system and generator. CHG sued for breach of contract, and DCA counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and fraud, alleging misrepresentations by CHG.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to CHG on DCA’s fraud counterclaims related to pre-lease representations, citing the lease’s integration clauses. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of CHG on its breach-of-contract claim and DCA’s counterclaims, finding that CHG had fulfilled its obligations regarding the HVAC system and generator work. The court also awarded CHG attorneys’ fees based on a provision in the lease.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court held that DCA’s fraud claims related to pre-lease representations failed as a matter of law because DCA’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable. The court also concluded that CHG had not breached the lease, as the term “new HVAC system” did not include distribution components, and CHG had fulfilled its generator-related obligations by replacing one generator. The court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to CHG, finding no abuse of discretion.The case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award CHG attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal. View "DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Group" on Justia Law

David L. Murphy Properties, LLC and John Schaffer own property adjacent to Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC on Flathead Lake. Painted Rocks constructed a dock after obtaining a permit from Lake County. Murphy Properties claimed the dock violated the Lakeshore Protection Act, interfered with their prescriptive easement, and constituted a nuisance.The Twentieth Judicial District Court dismissed Murphy Properties' Lakeshore Protection Act claim against Lake County and granted summary judgment in favor of Painted Rocks on all claims. The court found that the dock did not interfere with navigation or lawful recreation under the Act, as Murphy Properties could still access the cove with smaller watercraft. The court also ruled that Murphy Properties could not establish a prescriptive easement because their use of the cove was not exclusive, given the public's right to use the waters. Additionally, the court dismissed the nuisance claim, as it was contingent on the alleged violation of the Lakeshore Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's rulings. The court held that the Lakeshore Protection Act does not mandate denial of a permit if a project impacts navigation or recreation, but rather favors issuance if it does not. The court agreed that Murphy Properties' use of the cove was not exclusive and thus could not support a prescriptive easement. The court also upheld the dismissal of the nuisance claim, as it was based on the failed Lakeshore Protection Act claim. The judgment in favor of Lake County and Painted Rocks was affirmed. View "David L. Murphy Properties, LLC v. Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of Montana filed a lawsuit to determine the ownership of riverbeds underlying certain segments of rivers within its borders. The dispute centered on whether the riverbeds were navigable at the time of Montana's statehood in 1889, which would determine whether Montana or the United States held title to the riverbeds. The segments in question included parts of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers.The United States District Court for the District of Montana held a 10-day bench trial and found that only one segment, the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment of the Missouri River, was navigable in fact at the time of statehood. The court quieted title to the United States for the riverbeds underlying four other segments, including the Big Belt Mountains Segment and the Big Falls to Belt Creek Segment of the Missouri River, the Eddy Segment of the Clark Fork River, and the Headwaters/West Yellowstone Basin Segment of the Madison River. The court's decision was based on the "navigability in fact" test, which requires that navigability be determined on a segment-by-segment basis, considering the physical characteristics of the river at the time of statehood.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the navigability in fact test as clarified in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012). The court rejected Montana's argument that evidence of actual use alone establishes navigability and upheld the district court's findings that the four segments were not navigable. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the cross-appeal by Talen Montana, LLC and Northwestern Corporation, which argued that the district court should not have considered the navigability of the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. The court found that the district court's review was consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in PPL.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine damages for the Sun River to Black Eagle Falls Segment. View "State v. Talen Montana, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002 and 2009, the town of Pembroke recorded tax liens against property owned jointly by Brian E. Priest and his wife, Lisa C. Priest. The Priests paid the delinquent taxes, and the town discharged the liens through "municipal quitclaim deeds." After Brian died intestate, a dispute arose among his heirs regarding whether the tax liens had severed the joint tenancy, thus terminating Lisa's right of survivorship.The Penobscot County Probate Court denied Lisa's petition to reform the municipal quitclaim deeds to reflect that the property remained in joint tenancy. The court found no evidence of the transferor's intention at the time the deeds were drafted and dismissed the petition. The court did not address Lisa's alternative request for a declaration that the property was not an asset of the estate.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the joint tenancy was not severed because the town never foreclosed on either tax lien mortgage. The court held that the municipal quitclaim deeds served only to discharge the liens and did not affect the joint tenancy. Consequently, Lisa's right of survivorship remained intact. The judgment of the Probate Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Estate of Priest" on Justia Law