Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, plaintiffs Mark Quillen and Dawn Quillen entered into a Purchase and Sales Agreement (P & S Agreement) with defendant Clint Cox to purchase a property for a total sale price of $632,000, which included a $31,000 deposit. An issue arose when the parties' chosen escrow agent, Beycome Brokerage Realty, refused to accept the deposit, leading to an amendment in the agreement that allowed the plaintiffs to submit the deposit to a different brokerage firm, Trusthill. This amendment led to a dispute with the defendant claiming the plaintiffs failed to meet the deposit requirement, thereby breaching the contract.The trial justice in the Superior Court found that the defendant had prevented the plaintiffs from effectuating delivery of the deposit, thereby eliminating the condition precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. Despite the defendant's claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs had met all their obligations under the contract. The court ordered specific performance, directing the defendant to transfer the property to the plaintiffs. The defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and damages were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the trial justice correctly determined that the plaintiffs timely and properly delivered the deposit in accordance with the amended agreement. The court also agreed with the trial justice's finding that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial justice failed to apply the clear and convincing standard in her factual findings, noting that the defendant failed to raise this issue in the lower court. The court also dismissed the defendant's contention that he was entitled to the deposit as damages, as the court found no evidence of breach on the part of the plaintiffs. View "Quillen v. Cox" on Justia Law

In the State of Wyoming, the Supreme Court examined a dispute between Tony R. Testolin, Tim Karlberg, and Thirty-One Bar Ranch Company about the use of an access easement. The defendants (Testolin and Karlberg) owned an easement that passed over a portion of Thirty-One Bar's property. Thirty-One Bar challenged the validity of the easement and its use. While the district court affirmed the validity of the easement, it restricted how the defendants could use it. The court ruled that the defendants could not use the easement to allow a commercial hunting outfitter access to their property, which the defendants appealed.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the lower court's decision. It ruled that the easement's language did not restrict the defendants from using it to allow a hunting outfitter access to their property. The court also ruled that Thirty-One Bar did not meet its burden of proving that such use of the easement materially increased the burden on their property. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring this use of the easement as impermissible. The court emphasized that an easement may be used for any reasonable use of the dominant estate, provided that use does not materially increase the burden on the servient estate. View "Testolinv. Thirty-One Bar Ranch Company" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the tragic drowning of a 14-year-old boy at a dam on Buffalo Creek in Erie County. The victim's mother brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against the Joint Board of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation District (the Joint Board), alleging that they owned the dam and were responsible for its maintenance and safety. The dam was initially constructed as part of a federal project under the Flood Control Act of 1944, after which the Joint Board was created as the local "sponsor" of the project. Two agreements between the Joint Board and the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 1959 and 1984 stipulated that the Joint Board had ongoing duties to inspect and maintain the dams. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the singular question of whether the Joint Board owned the dams at the time of the accident. Both the plaintiff and the Joint Board moved for directed verdicts. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, concluding that the Joint Board owned the dams. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and granted the Joint Board's motion for a directed verdict, ruling that the dams were fixtures that ran with the land and could not have been owned by the Joint Board since the NRCS did not own the underlying land. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both lower courts, stating that neither the plaintiff nor the Joint Board should have been granted a directed verdict as the evidence was not conclusive enough to establish ownership of the dams as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals ordered that the case be remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, and affirmed the dismissal of claims against other parties, including the Districts, County, and Town. View "Suzanne P. v Joint Bd. of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) had the authority under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g. to initiate administrative proceedings to curtail the withdrawal of water from any well during any period where water to fill a water right in said well was not available. The proceedings stemmed from a district court decision involving the adjudication of water rights in the Wood River Valley during an unprecedented drought in 2021. The Director of the IDWR initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether water was available to fill junior groundwater rights in the aquifer beneath the Bellevue Triangle. After a six-day hearing, the Director issued a Final Order that found water was unavailable to fill the junior rights because pumping from the aquifer was affecting the use of senior surface water rights. The South Valley Ground Water District and Galena Ground Water District challenged the Director's authority to initiate proceedings under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g., arguing that the Director did not comply with the prior appropriation doctrine because the Director had not formally designated an area of common groundwater supply, or determined "material injury" had been sustained by senior surface water rights holders. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the Director had the authority to initiate administrative proceedings under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g. and that the Director did not violate the prior appropriation doctrine. It held that the Director had the discretion to limit or prohibit the withdrawal of groundwater from any well during any period when water was not available to fill a water right in said well, and was not required to establish an area of common groundwater supply before he is allowed to curtail groundwater pumping. The Court also held that the Director's decision to reject the proposed mitigation plan without a hearing was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "South Valley Ground Water v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled on a case involving a commercial real estate transaction in Puerto Rico that failed to close. The sellers of the property, located in Valle Arriba Heights, had entered into agreements to sell their respective parcels to KRB Universal Investments, LLC, which later assigned its rights under the agreements to CPC Carolina PR, LLC ("CPC"). The conditions of the sale included the cancellation of restrictive covenants that limited the use of the property to residential purposes. CPC intended to lease the properties to Puerto Rico CVS Pharmacy, LLC ("CVS") for commercial use. However, CVS refused to proceed with the lease due to restrictive covenants and issues with the title insurance policy. The sellers sued CPC and CVS for negligence, alleging that they had been induced into an impossible contract and that CVS's actions had contributed to vandalism on the properties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CPC and CVS. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the sellers' claims were time-barred and that they failed to establish the necessary elements of their negligence claims. View "Hamdallah v. CPC Carolina PR, LLC" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a property dispute in Ketchum, Idaho, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's judgment, in part, and vacated and remanded the case, in part, for further proceedings. The dispute arose when Trustees Glen Miller and Cynthia Anderson attempted to build a home on a lot they purchased in the Rocking Ranch No. 3 subdivision. The Rocking Ranch No. 3 Property Owners’ Association denied their application to construct the home and asserted several counterclaims to recover unpaid homeowners association (HOA) assessments. The district court granted summary judgment to the Association on Miller and Anderson’s claims and dismissed the Association’s counterclaims. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Association’s counterclaims, concluding that the Association failed to establish its breach of contract counterclaim because it had not established two elements of the prima facie case: breach of the contract and damages resulting from the breach. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho also vacated and remanded the district court's award of attorney fees to the Association for further proceedings, finding that the Association was not entitled to recover attorney fees for the counterclaims on which it did not prevail. View "Miller v. Rocking Ranch No. 3" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In this case, Richard Mullen and Cheryl Mullen petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer their case to the Walker Circuit Court. The case at hand arises from a dispute between the Mullens and Karl Leo and Fay Leo, who purchased a parcel of property from the Mullens in Walker County. The Leos alleged that the Mullens, unlicensed homebuilders, sold them a residence with multiple latent defects and refused to remedy these defects. The Leos filed a suit against the Mullens in the Jefferson Circuit Court, where the Mullens resided, claiming breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, and fraudulent suppression.The Mullens sought dismissal or transfer of the case to Walker County, arguing that as the property in question was located there, it was the appropriate venue. The Jefferson Circuit Court, however, denied their motion. The Mullens then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing that Walker County was the proper venue due to the location of the property and the Leos' request for equitable relief in their complaint.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the Mullens' petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court found that the property sold by the Mullens to the Leos in Walker County was the "subject matter" of the action within the meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B). Therefore, the Court directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the Mullens' motion to transfer the action and to transfer the case to the Walker Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Mullen" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal by John William Riley against a judgment by the Autauga Circuit Court, Alabama. The judgment declared that Kenneth R. Boles had an easement by prescription across a road on Riley's property. Riley's property is a 25-acre parcel located in Autauga County, and the road in dispute leads back to the property owned by Boles. Boles sought to establish that he and his predecessors in title had used the road adversely to Riley for more than 20 years, a requirement for establishing a prescriptive easement under Alabama law.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's order denying Riley's motion to dismiss the case, on the grounds that the dispute between the parties constituted a justiciable controversy. However, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's declaration in favor of Boles. The court found that Boles had not established a prescriptive easement across Riley's property.Boles had relied on the use of the road by a friend and hunting partner, Edmondson, to establish a continuous 20-year period of adverse use. However, Edmondson was not a predecessor in title to Boles and had no title to any relevant real-property interest that he could have transferred to Boles. Thus, the court ruled that the relationship between Edmondson and Boles did not satisfy the legal requirement for "tacking" the periods of use to establish a prescriptive easement. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's declaration that Boles had established a prescriptive easement across Riley's property. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Riley v. Boles" on Justia Law