Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use.As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law

Linda Lee owned a motel in Pascagoula, Mississippi, which had deteriorated significantly and was being used improperly, attracting vagrants and drug users. The city council ordered the demolition of the motel after a hearing, citing it as a menace to public health and safety. Lee did not attend the hearing, but her son did. The city council decided the motel was beyond repair and ordered its demolition.Lee appealed the city council's decision to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing that the city failed to provide substantial evidence and did not comply with statutory notice provisions. The Circuit Court affirmed the city's decision. Lee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the city’s notice was insufficient and reversed and remanded the case for further determination.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the appeal was moot because the motel had already been demolished by a new owner, as admitted by Lee in her appellate filings. Additionally, Lee lacked standing to pursue the appeal because she had transferred the property to her son on the day of the city council meeting and no longer had any interest in it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed Lee's appeal. View "Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

Angela Knight and her two children lived in a rental unit managed by the King County Housing Authority. In January 2023, the Housing Authority served a three-day notice to vacate due to alleged nuisance and criminal conduct, including unauthorized guests, excessive garbage, and activities leading to police reports involving shootings and stolen property. Despite previous warnings and a transfer to another unit, the issues persisted. When the Knights did not vacate, the Housing Authority filed for an unlawful detainer.A commissioner of the King County Superior Court ruled that the property fell under the CARES Act's 30-day notice requirement for evictions, as the Knights were given only three days' notice. Consequently, the unlawful detainer petition was denied, and the eviction action was dismissed without prejudice. The Housing Authority appealed this decision.The Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, held that the 30-day notice requirement under the CARES Act applies only to evictions for nonpayment of rent, disagreeing with Division Two's broader interpretation in a similar case. Andre Knight sought discretionary review from the Washington Supreme Court to resolve this conflict.The Washington Supreme Court held that § 9058(c) of the CARES Act requires a 30-day notice only for evictions due to nonpayment of rent. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that the CARES Act's notice provision does not extend to all types of evictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hous. Auth. v. Knight" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the partition of a family-owned oceanside property in West Maui. The property, originally owned by Elizabeth Cockett Robinson, was conveyed to her children and grandchildren. After Elizabeth's passing, the property was held in undivided interests by her five children and their descendants. The property includes four residential structures, three of which are occupied by some family members, while others do not reside there. The families have attempted to subdivide or sell the property for decades without success.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit initially ordered a partition in kind by subdividing the property into three lots, later amending it to two lots due to regulatory challenges. Eventually, the court ordered the property to be partitioned as a four-unit Condominium Property Regime (CPR), despite objections from some family members who argued that such a partition was not lawful under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 668.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case, focusing on whether a circuit court can order a partition by CPR under HRS Chapter 668. The court held that partition by CPR is not a lawful form of partition in kind pursuant to HRS Chapter 668. The court emphasized that the purpose of partition is to sever co-ownership ties, which a CPR does not accomplish as it creates new contractual obligations and entanglements among the owners.The Supreme Court vacated the Circuit Court's April 18, 2023 Final Judgment and related orders, remanding the case to the Circuit Court to undo the CPR, partition the property by sale, and hold further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Robinson v. Zarko" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Hari and Saranya Nagireddy, live next to a property owned by Willow Haven on 106th Street, LLC, which is being developed to house up to ten residents with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. After Willow Haven obtained a building permit from Carmel, the Nagireddys sued, seeking a declaration that the proposed use would be a public nuisance as it would violate Carmel’s unified development ordinance (UDO). They also obtained a preliminary injunction against further construction.The Hamilton Superior Court denied Willow Haven’s motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the Nagireddys did not need to exhaust administrative remedies before the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and were likely to succeed on their claim. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, with a majority holding that the Nagireddys were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and were likely to succeed on their nuisance claim. A dissenting judge argued that the UDO was ambiguous and should be interpreted to permit Willow Haven’s land use.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the preliminary injunction was improper. The court found that the Nagireddys did not prove they were likely to win their public-nuisance claim, as they did not show that Willow Haven’s proposed land use violated the UDO at this preliminary stage. The court noted that the UDO incorporates state and federal law, which may protect Willow Haven’s land use. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willow Haven on 106th St, LLC v. Nagireddy" on Justia Law

Eight Black homeowners in New York City sued a lending institution and affiliated entities, alleging that the lender violated federal, state, and city antidiscrimination laws. They claimed the lender made mortgage refinancing loans with high default interest rates to Black and Latino individuals in poor neighborhoods who had no income, no assets, and low credit scores but high equity in their homes, and then foreclosed on the loans when the individuals defaulted. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a final judgment awarding four homeowners $722,044 in compensatory damages and four others nominal damages.The lender appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: by finding the homeowners' claims timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling and the discovery rule of accrual, in its instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination, and in holding that a release-of-claims provision in a loan modification agreement signed by two homeowners was unenforceable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the homeowners' claims were timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court also found no error in the district court's instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination. Finally, the court agreed that the release-of-claims provision in the loan modification agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system through eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructure Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action, and Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment for Liberty, awarding attorney’s fees. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty only needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the public necessity elements were not met, and that the administrative record (AR) was irrelevant. The trial court allowed Liberty to present any evidence it deemed relevant, including post-RON evidence, and found in favor of Liberty.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by not using the gross abuse of discretion standard. The trial court also erred by not admitting the AR, failing to start its analysis with the RON’s findings, and improperly allowing Liberty to rely solely on post-RON evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the rebuttable presumption in favor of TAV’s findings should have been the starting point for the trial court’s analysis.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the trial court to determine whether to permit TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct standards. The judgment and attorney’s fees award were reversed, and TAV was allowed to recover its costs on appeal. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

Rod Dorale built his house with a setback of seven feet three inches from the neighboring property line, violating the McCook County ordinance requiring a nine-foot setback. Greg and Patricia DeCramer, who own the adjacent property, appealed the McCook County Board of Adjustment's decision to grant Dorale a variance for the reduced setback. The DeCramers argued that the Board exceeded its authority by violating the governing statute and county ordinance.The circuit court denied the DeCramers' petition for a writ of certiorari, concluding that the Board had complied with the requirements for granting a variance under SDCL 11-2-53(2). The court noted that the Board determined the variance would not be offensive to the public and that undue hardship existed because Dorale would have to move the house. The court emphasized the limited nature of its review, stating it could not question the Board's decision or examine the facts leading to the variance request.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Board acted illegally and in excess of its authority by granting a variance that did not comply with SDCL 11-2-53(2) or the county ordinance. The Court noted that the Board did not find any special conditions or extraordinary circumstances that justified the variance. The Board's finding that there was "nothing extraordinary in this residential district" precluded it from granting the variance under the terms of the ordinance. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for the entry of an order vacating the variance granted by the Board. View "Decramer v. Dorale" on Justia Law