Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over the sale of real property. Patricia Ann Scott, the seller, previously sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging mishandling of the sale. Schnelle's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict were denied, and the jury found in her favor. Subsequently, Schnelle filed a malicious prosecution claim against Scott and her attorneys, arguing they lacked probable cause and conspired against her. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the prior denials as evidence of probable cause.The district court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the previous denials were factors to consider but did not conclusively establish probable cause. The court found Schnelle's allegations sufficient to support her claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the denials did not create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if such denials should create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. The court concluded that while the denials are factors in the probable cause analysis, they do not create a rebuttable presumption. The court emphasized the need for a careful, case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line rule. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the denials of summary judgment and directed verdict motions do not establish probable cause as a matter of law. View "Cantafio v. Schnelle" on Justia Law

Steve Kovachevich, a homebuyer, was required to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) when he took out a mortgage with a down payment of less than 20%. After a year, he requested his mortgage servicer, LoanCare, to cancel his PMI. LoanCare initially denied the request, stating he had not paid down enough of his mortgage to qualify for cancellation under the Homeowners Protection Act (HPA). However, LoanCare agreed to voluntarily cancel the PMI upon meeting certain conditions, which Kovachevich fulfilled. Subsequently, he sought a refund of the prepaid PMI premiums from the mortgage insurer, National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (NMIC), but was denied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Kovachevich’s claim under the HPA, ruling that he was not entitled to a refund of unearned premiums under § 4902(f) because his PMI was canceled voluntarily and not under the statutory benchmarks of the HPA. The court also dismissed his state-law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion, stating it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kovachevich’s HPA claim, agreeing that § 4902(f) only mandates refunds for PMI canceled under the statutory benchmarks, not for voluntary cancellations. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded them to the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Kovachevich v. National Mortgage Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

In 1997, William Brokaw Price’s parents entered into a contract with Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc. (CST) for surface-level mining on their property. The contract allowed CST to extract sand, gravel, and topsoil in exchange for royalty payments. As the contract neared its end in 2010, Bill Price, Brokaw’s father, communicated with CST about future plans for the property but passed away shortly after. Years later, Brokaw discovered that the property had not been reclaimed as required by the contract, leading to a dispute over CST’s reclamation obligations and alleged trespassing.The Prices sued CST for breach of contract, and CST counterclaimed for breach based on the Prices’ trespass accusations. The first trial ended in a mistrial, and the second trial resulted in a verdict for CST. The district court denied the Prices’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and rejected CST’s request for attorney’s fees under the contract’s fee-shifting provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the contract did not set a firm deadline for reclamation and allowed for a jury to resolve factual disputes about the instructions given by Bill Price. The jury had a sufficient basis for its verdict in favor of CST. Additionally, the court held that CST was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the contract’s fee-shifting provision only applied to parties enforcing the contract’s terms, and CST’s successful defense did not trigger that provision. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "Price v Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

This case involves a property on Maui in which Wade Brady owned a 50% interest. Beverly and James Spence obtained a default judgment against Wade and Katherine Brady in 2010, which they recorded as a lien against Wade Brady’s interest in the property. After the Bradys failed to satisfy their debt, the Spences obtained a writ of execution to sell the property. The sale was advertised by publication, and Wade Brady’s interest was sold to the Spences. At the time of the sale, Peter J. Winn and Westminster Realty, Inc. (the Winn parties) also had a recorded junior judgment lien on the property but did not receive personal notice of the sale.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit confirmed the sale, stating it was free of all junior liens. The Winn parties later sought to execute their judgment on the property, but the circuit court denied their motion, stating they were not entitled to personal notice. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s order, holding that the Winn parties had a constitutionally protected property interest and were entitled to personal notice of the sale.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. The court held that a recorded judgment lien under HRS § 636-3 creates a constitutionally protected property interest. The court further held that due process requires personal notice to junior judgment lienholders when the executing party knows or should know of their interest. However, the court decided that this ruling would apply prospectively only, due to the potential impact on prior and pending execution sales and the substantial prejudice to the intervenors. The court reversed the ICA’s decision to reinstate the Winn parties’ lien on the property. View "Winn v. Brady" on Justia Law

Applicants sought an Act 250 permit to construct a farm store on Route 5 in Hartland, Vermont. The proposed project includes a 9000 square-foot, two-story building with a deli, bakery, eating area, and parking lot. The store will sell products primarily from the applicants' nearby farm, Sunnymede Farm. The project site is a vacant lot near the Interstate 91 interchange, with significant traffic and no existing sidewalks.The District 3 Environmental Commission approved the project and issued the permit. The Hartland Planning Commission (HPC) appealed to the Environmental Division, arguing the project did not meet Act 250 Criteria 9(L) and 10. The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the applicants, finding the project satisfied both criteria. The HPC then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the project made efficient use of land, energy, roads, utilities, and other supporting infrastructure, as required by Criterion 9(L). Although the project met the definition of strip development, the court found it would not contribute to a pattern of strip development due to its agricultural nature and specific conditions limiting its use. The court also determined that the project conformed with the local town plan under Criterion 10, despite the HPC's argument to the contrary. The court affirmed the Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment to the applicants. View "In re SM Farms Shop, LLC Permit Appeal" on Justia Law

A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church) submitted a site plan and an application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to the City of Cody Planning, Zoning, and Adjustment Board (Board) for the construction of a temple. The Board approved the site plan and CUP application at a meeting on June 15, 2023. Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods (POCN), an association of local landowners, opposed the construction and filed petitions for review in the district court challenging the Board's approvals.The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over POCN’s petitions because they were untimely. The court found that the Board had approved the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting, and any subsequent actions by the Board to reconsider or modify those approvals were unauthorized. POCN's petitions for review were filed more than 30 days after the June 15, 2023 meeting, making them untimely.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that the Board's approval of the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting constituted final agency action, as it concluded the proceedings regarding the Church’s site plan and CUP application. The Court found that the Board did not have the authority to reconsider or modify its approvals at subsequent meetings. Therefore, POCN's petitions for review, filed in August 2023, were untimely, and the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider them. View "Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods v. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

White Knight Development, LLC entered into a contract in 2015 to purchase land from Dick and Julie Simmons for $400,000. The contract included a "buy-back" provision allowing White Knight to require the Simmonses to repurchase the property if certain restrictions were extended. When the restrictions were extended in October 2016, White Knight invoked the buy-back provision, but the Simmonses refused to repurchase the property. White Knight sued for breach of contract and sought specific performance and damages related to the delay in performance.The trial court found that the Simmonses breached the contract and awarded White Knight specific performance, ordering the Simmonses to repurchase the property for $400,000. Additionally, the court awarded White Knight $308,136.14 in damages for various costs incurred due to the delay in performance. These costs included property taxes, loan interest, and other expenses related to the property and White Knight's business operations.The Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas modified the judgment by deleting the $308,136.14 monetary award but otherwise affirmed the trial court's decision. The court acknowledged that monetary compensation could be awarded alongside specific performance in narrow circumstances but found no express statement by the trial court that the monetary award was equitable in nature.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while specific performance usually precludes a monetary award, there are narrow circumstances where both can be awarded. The court concluded that the trial court's findings supported an equitable monetary award to account for the delay in performance. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case for further review of the monetary award consistent with the principles announced. View "WHITE KNIGHT DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. SIMMONS" on Justia Law

A landowner recorded a plat dividing its property into seventy-three tracts, each between one and two acres. A restriction in the recorded deeds stated that no more than two residences could be built on any five-acre tract. Neighbors sued to enforce this restriction, arguing it limited development to no more than two residences per five acres.The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the neighbors, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development to two residences per five-acre tract. The court dismissed the landowner's defenses and counterclaims, except for changed conditions, and issued a temporary injunction. The jury found no changed conditions, and the court permanently enjoined the landowner from building more than two residences per five-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development and rejecting the landowner's defenses.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the restriction did not prevent the landowner from building one residence on each sub-five-acre tract. The court concluded that the restriction limited density, not tract size, and did not expressly address tracts smaller than five acres. The court reversed the judgment awarding the neighbors declaratory and injunctive relief and remanded for a new trial on the landowner's changed-conditions counterclaim, finding the jury was improperly instructed to consider only post-purchase changes. The court also held that nonparty adjoining landowners and the State were not necessary parties to the suit. View "EIS DEVELOPMENT II, LLC v. BUENA VISTA AREA ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law