Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the plaintiffs, Dallen and Rachel Worthington, filed an expedited unlawful detainer action against the defendant, Carlene Crazy Thunder, for failure to pay rent. Crazy Thunder requested a jury trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court ruled that Crazy Thunder had unlawfully detained the Worthingtons’ property and ordered her to vacate the residence. Crazy Thunder appealed to the district court, arguing she had a right to a jury trial under Idaho’s constitution and Idaho Code section 6313. The district court agreed, concluding that section 6-311A conflicted with section 6-313, and that section 6-311A violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. The Worthingtons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Idaho Code section 6-311A does not violate the Idaho Constitution. The court reasoned that an action for unlawful detainer is an equitable claim, and under Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the right to trial by jury only exists for legal claims, not equitable ones. However, the court also ruled that Crazy Thunder was entitled to a jury trial on her legal claims. The court held that in wrongful detainer cases like this one, when issues of fact are presented by the pleadings, those issues must be tried by a jury, unless such a jury is waived. As such, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, though on different grounds. The court further ruled that Crazy Thunder, as the prevailing party on appeal, was entitled to costs, but neither party was entitled to attorney fees. View "Worthington v. Crazy Thunder" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Jere Hinman hired BrightView Landscape Development, Inc., to design and construct a pool at her residence. BrightView subcontracted with Georgia Gunite and Pool Company, Inc., to install plumbing and spray shotcrete for the pool shell. In November 2015, Hinman contacted BrightView after receiving an unusually high water bill and discovered that the pool was leaking water due to a missing part that was not included in Georgia Gunite’s scope of work. BrightView and Georgia Gunite worked together to address the issue in April 2016. In 2018, Hinman sued BrightView for defective construction of the pool, and BrightView filed a third-party complaint against Georgia Gunite, seeking indemnification based on the subcontractor agreement. Georgia Gunite moved for summary judgment, arguing that BrightView's claim was barred by Tennessee's four-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective improvements to real estate.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Gunite. The court held that, although BrightView's indemnification claim against Georgia Gunite was contractual in nature, it fell within the scope of Tennessee's statute of repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property because, at its core, it sought to recover damages arising from such deficient construction. The court rejected BrightView's argument that the statute of repose only applies to tort actions. The court also rejected BrightView's argument that the application of the statute of repose in this case would extinguish its claim before it even accrued, noting that this argument is directed at the nature of a statute of repose. The court further held that the repose statute is not mutually exclusive with statutes of limitation. Thus, BrightView's claim against Georgia Gunite was barred because it was not brought within four years after substantial completion of the pool construction. View "Hinman v. ValleyCrest Landscaping Dev." on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District was asked to determine two key issues. The first issue pertained to whether K&S Staffing Solutions, Inc., a staffing company, could be considered a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law. The second issue was whether the payment bonds issued for two state projects were subject to the mechanics’ lien law’s requirements. The staffing company had been contracted by a subcontractor, Titan DVBE Inc., to fulfill its staffing needs for two road maintenance projects awarded by California’s Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to VSS International, Inc. (VSSI). When Titan failed to pay K&S all the amounts owed for the projects, K&S sued VSSI and the Western Surety Company, which had issued payment bonds for the projects. K&S argued that it was a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law and was therefore entitled to recover against the payment bonds. The trial court disagreed, finding that K&S was not a “laborer” as it failed to show it was the employer of the laborers. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, interpreting the term “laborer” as defined in the mechanics’ lien law to mean “a person who, acting as an employee, performs labor upon, or bestows skill or other necessary services on, a work of improvement.” The court concluded that K&S was not a “laborer” as it was not acting as an employee in any capacity. The court also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the defendants under a provision in the mechanics’ lien law. Although K&S argued that this provision was inapplicable because the payment bonds for the projects were not “payment bonds” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law, the court rejected this argument. The court concluded that the general requirements of the mechanics’ lien law for payment bonds applied both to state projects that required a bond under the Public Contract Code and other “public entity” projects that required a bond under the mechanics’ lien law. View "K & S Staffing Solutions v. The Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City and County of Honolulu, acting through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART), and Victoria Ward, Limited, over the amount of just compensation to be paid for two acres of easements on property previously owned by Victoria Ward. The easements were obtained by HART for the construction of a fixed rail system and a proposed Kaka‘ako Station. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i ruled that the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment on many of the issues in the case. The supreme court ruled that the circuit court had incorrectly used summary judgment to resolve disputed factual issues including whether Victoria Ward was estopped from seeking severance damages, whether Victoria Ward's claims relating to a "lost tower" were too speculative, and whether Victoria Ward was precluded from seeking severance damages for impacts to non-taken properties. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on some issues, but vacated others and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's pause of the accrual of "blight of summons" interest during the pendency of the appeal. View "HART v. Ward " on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores and One Shot, LLC, filed a petition against the City of Wall, South Dakota, City Council, and Planning and Zoning Commission for the City. Love’s, a corporation that operates 24-hour truck stops, entered into an agreement to purchase a 13-acre parcel of land from One Shot, contingent on obtaining the necessary zoning and permitting approvals from the city. After the City Council denied Love's rezoning and building permit applications, Love’s filed a petition for writ of mandamus, writ of certiorari, and request for declaratory relief with the circuit court. The circuit court granted Love's petition in part, declaring that the City’s Zoning Ordinance did not apply to the property and required the City to reconsider Love's application for a building permit. The City Council reconsidered and again denied Love's building permit application. Love’s then filed a motion for order to show cause requesting the circuit court to find the City in contempt of the court’s order and sought issuance of a building permit. The circuit court found the City in contempt and ordered the City to issue Love's a building permit. The City appealed.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court order was clearly erroneous in finding that the City willfully and contumaciously violated the court’s order to reconsider and vote on Love's requested building permit. The Supreme Court also noted that the circuit court’s remedy for its finding of contempt was inconsistent with the purpose of civil contempt and exceeded its authority by imposing a punitive, rather than coercive civil contempt remedy. The court's order to issue a building permit was punitive and denied the City the opportunity to purge itself of contempt and come into compliance with the original court order. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s finding of contempt and the order issuing a building permit to Love's. View "Love’s Travel Stops V. City Of Wall" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by William Russell and Mountain View Investments, LLC, (MVI) against a judgment from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, in favor of 360 Reclaim, LLC. The dispute revolves around a twenty-acre parcel of land in Montana which was purchased by Russell in 2010 and later foreclosed due to defaulted loan payments. 360 Reclaim purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale and then started charging Russell for storage and cleanup of items left on the property. Russell attempted to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, but his payment was rejected as insufficient by 360 Reclaim, which calculated a higher redemption amount that included cleanup costs. The District Court determined that 360 Reclaim was entitled to include cleanup costs as maintenance expenses, rendering Russell's redemption invalid.However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana held that "maintenance expenses," as used in the redemption statute, do not include cleanup costs for the removal of a redemptioner’s personal property. The court found that 360 Reclaim took a calculated risk in purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, knowing its condition and the presence of Russell's personal property. The court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further findings and conclusions consistent with this decision. The lower court was directed to determine what credits, if any, Russell and MVI are entitled to against the redemption price and whether Russell’s offer of redemption was in substantial compliance with the redemption statutes. View "360 Reclaim v. Russell" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant, a homeowner, for defamation after the homeowner posted critical comments about the company online. The homeowner had hired the construction company to repair her home after it was damaged by a fallen tree. Dissatisfied with the work, the homeowner reported the company to the Contractors State License Board and began posting negative reviews of the company on her blog and Yelp. In response to the defamation lawsuit, the homeowner filed a special motion to strike, arguing that her comments were protected by the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the motion, and the homeowner appealed.The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the homeowner's online posts were not covered by the litigation privilege. The court explained that the litigation privilege applies only to communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings that have some connection to the litigation. The homeowner's posts were public criticisms of the construction company, some of which did not even mention the Contractors State License Board. Therefore, the court found that the posts were akin to press releases and lacked the necessary connection to the proceedings before the board. The court also rejected the homeowner's arguments that the construction company failed to plead that her statements were unprivileged, that her statements were true, and that her statements were merely her opinions. View "Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered an appeal by David C. Milton, Kelly O. Milton, and two associated entities, Southeastern Land Group, Inc., and Pinhoti Ridge Retreat, LLC, collectively referred to as "the defendants". The defendants appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Talladega Circuit Court which required them to remove two gates they had erected across a road they claimed as private. The injunction was requested by plaintiffs Anthony D. Haywood and Sammy K. Gallman, who claimed that the public, including themselves, had used the road for many years to access County Road 600-2 and trails in Talladega National Forest. The trial court granted the injunction without requiring the plaintiffs to give security for costs, damages, or attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court erred in not requiring the plaintiffs to give security upon the issuance of the preliminary injunction. The court noted that under Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., the giving of security by the applicant is mandatory unless a valid exception applies. The court found that the trial court's determination that this case was of "great public concern" was not supported by the evidence and therefore did not constitute a valid exception to the security requirement. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Milton v. Haywood" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property. View "WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON" on Justia Law