Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
Upchurch v. O’Brien
Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law
Gomez v. Hurtado
John Gomez, Gilbert Hurtado, and Jesus Hurtado were members of G&H Dairy, LLC, which defaulted on its loans in 2013. To avoid bankruptcy, they negotiated with Wells Fargo and signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to distribute G&H's assets among themselves. Gomez and Jesus Hurtado purchased the personal property assets and assumed portions of G&H’s debt, but they could not agree on the sales price for the real property. Gomez sued the Hurtado brothers and G&H for breach of contract, estoppel, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty, and sought judicial dissolution of G&H. The Hurtados counterclaimed for damages and also sought dissolution.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment for the Hurtados on Gomez’s breach of contract claim, ruling the LOI unenforceable, but denied summary judgment on the other claims. After a bench trial, the court ordered the dissolution and winding up of G&H and dismissed the remaining claims. Gomez appealed.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the LOI was unenforceable as it was an offer contingent on future agreements and lacked definitive terms. The court also found no breach of fiduciary duty by the Hurtados, as the LOI was unenforceable and the parties had not agreed on the real property transfer terms. The court dismissed Gomez’s quasi-estoppel claim, concluding that the Hurtados did not change their legal position since the LOI was not enforceable. The court also upheld the district court’s final accounting and winding up of G&H, finding no error in the characterization of transactions or member allocations. The court awarded attorney fees to the Hurtados, determining that Gomez’s appeal was pursued unreasonably and without legal foundation. View "Gomez v. Hurtado" on Justia Law
Tamarack Village Shopping Center, LP vs. County of Washington
The case involves the valuation of two commercial properties in a Woodbury shopping center for tax purposes. The taxpayer, Tamarack Village Shopping Center, LP, challenged Washington County’s initial assessments of the properties, arguing that the tax court should have used an effective rent calculation to account for tenant improvement allowances and deducted lease-up costs due to an above-market vacancy rate.The tax court heard testimony from the taxpayer’s real property asset manager, the taxpayer’s expert appraiser, and the County’s expert appraiser. The tax court largely accepted the County’s appraiser’s opinions and rejected the taxpayer’s appraiser’s opinions. The tax court’s final value conclusions increased the properties’ assessed market values over the county assessor’s initial valuations. The taxpayer appealed, contending that the tax court erred in its analysis by not using an effective rent calculation and by not deducting lease-up costs.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the tax court did not err in declining to use an effective rent calculation because the taxpayer’s tenant improvement allowances were typical of the market. The court also found that the tax court did not clearly err in declining to deduct lease-up costs from the property’s indicated value to account for its above-market vacancy rate, as the taxpayer failed to show that such a deduction was required. The court affirmed the tax court’s decision, upholding the increased assessed market values of the properties. View "Tamarack Village Shopping Center, LP vs. County of Washington" on Justia Law
Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge
Plaintiffs own a 325-acre property in Tunbridge, Vermont, crossed by two legal trails. The Town of Tunbridge converted these trails from Class 4 roads in 1987. In 2021, the Town's selectboard revised the town plan to potentially expand trail use, including bicycling. Plaintiffs opposed this and claimed exclusive authority over trail maintenance on their property. In 2022, the selectboard adopted a policy allowing private individuals to apply for permission to maintain the trails, prompting plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the Town lacked such authority.The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as unripe, stating there was no justiciable controversy since no one had applied to maintain the trails. The court reiterated its stance from a prior action, emphasizing that discussions and policy adoptions did not constitute a concrete threat to plaintiffs' interests. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the new policy and procedure for trail maintenance created a sufficiently concrete controversy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated a sufficiently concrete threat of physical invasion and interference with their property rights. The Court held that the Town's formal assertion of authority to maintain and repair the trails, coupled with the procedure for private individuals to apply for permission, constituted an actual case or controversy. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action to proceed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law
Gambrell v. United States
In the 1950s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers purchased land from the Meltons and the Paines, using traditional surveying descriptions. A 1962 subdivision plat map indicated a stone (Peter’s Stone) that appeared to mark the boundary, but a 1974 Corps survey found the stone was not at the true centerline. This discrepancy led to a land dispute over a strip of land between the true centerline and the stone.In 1977, the United States filed quiet title actions against the owners of Lot 8 and adjacent landowners. The court consolidated the cases and found that the Meltons and the Corps likely believed the stone marked the true centerline. In 1979, the court awarded a small portion of Lot 8 to the Highfills but did not resolve the boundary for other lots. The judgment was recorded in 1989.In 2019, the Gambrells purchased several lots in the subdivision and, in 2020, were informed by the Corps that the true centerline was marked by the Corps’ monument, not Peter’s Stone. The Gambrells filed a quiet title action in 2021. The United States moved for summary judgment, arguing the 1979 judgment and the 1974 monument provided notice of a potential dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States, citing the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 1979 judgment and the 1974 monument provided constructive notice of the United States’ claim, triggering the statute of limitations. The court also rejected the Gambrells’ collateral estoppel argument, noting that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply against the United States. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations ruling does not resolve the underlying boundary dispute, leaving the parties free to pursue further legal actions. View "Gambrell v. United States" on Justia Law
City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education
The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law
Town of Bel Air v. Bodt
Citizens of a town submitted a document they claimed was a petition for a referendum to reverse a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures but did not mention the ordinance number or request a referendum. The town's Board of Commissioners reviewed the document and determined it did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum. The citizens then refiled the document with a cover page referencing the ordinance and requesting a referendum, but the signature pages remained unchanged.The Circuit Court for Harford County ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid because they did not first verify the signatures and did not act by ordinance or resolution. The court ordered the town to verify the signatures and proceed with the referendum process if the signatures were valid.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined the document did not meet the charter's requirements. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to verify signatures before determining the petition's validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by a verbal motion, which was memorialized in the meeting minutes, and did not need to adopt an ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion, affirming that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law
Heiser v. Dahl
Lynn and Tanya Heiser filed a lawsuit to quiet title to a 0.90-acre tract of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota, which they claimed through adverse possession and acquiescence. The disputed land is adjacent to their property and separated from Nevin and Laura Dahl's property by County Road 34. The Heisers and their predecessors had used the land for various purposes, including building structures, parking equipment, and general maintenance, since the 1960s.The District Court of McKenzie County ruled in favor of the Heisers, finding that they had established title to the disputed land through adverse possession and acquiescence. The court found that the Heisers and their predecessors had used the land continuously and openly for over 20 years, meeting the requirements for adverse possession. The court also concluded that County Road 34 served as a natural boundary, which the parties had mutually recognized as the property line.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court's findings were insufficient to support the conclusion that the Heisers had adversely possessed the entire disputed tract. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had improperly relied on the transfer of property ownership to establish hostile use and had not adequately determined the 20-year period of adverse possession. Additionally, the court found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the entire disputed land was improved or enclosed.The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further findings on the extent of the Heisers' adverse possession. The court also held that the District Court erred in finding that County Road 34 was the boundary line by acquiescence, as there was no mutual recognition of the boundary by both parties. View "Heiser v. Dahl" on Justia Law
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North Dakota Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
Morales v. Weatherford U.S.
On December 29, 2015, Timothy Morales, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal while walking along a roadway within the Weatherford distribution facility in Williston, North Dakota. Morales alleged that Weatherford U.S., L.P. was negligent in maintaining the premises, specifically citing inadequate lighting, lack of road signs, and absence of sidewalks. Morales filed a lawsuit in 2019 against Weatherford, Junewal, and Junewal’s employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc., asserting claims of negligence and premises liability.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Weatherford, concluding that Weatherford did not owe Morales a duty of care. The court dismissed all claims against Weatherford and the other defendants. Morales appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the danger posed by vehicles on the roadway was open and obvious, and therefore, Weatherford owed no duty of care to Morales. The court noted that Morales was aware of the dangers of walking on the roadway and that the conditions were such that a reasonable person would have recognized the risks. The court also rejected Morales's argument that Weatherford should have anticipated the harm despite the obvious danger, concluding that the distraction exception did not apply as Morales's distraction was self-created. The judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice was affirmed. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S." on Justia Law
ND Energy Services, LLC v. Lime Rock Resources III-A
ND Energy Services, LLC, entered into a temporary layflat easement agreement with Kathleen Stroh, granting it the exclusive right to transfer freshwater via aboveground layflat hoses on Stroh's property. Lime Rock Resources III-A, L.P., and Herman Energy Services, LLC, subsequently placed layflat hoses on the same property to transport water for fracking operations. ND Energy sued Lime Rock for tortious interference with contract and willful trespass, seeking a permanent injunction.The District Court of Dunn County granted summary judgment in favor of Lime Rock, dismissing ND Energy's claims. The court found that the oil and gas leases, which Lime Rock had acquired, provided Lime Rock the right to use the property for oil and gas production, including the installation of layflat hoses. The court also concluded that ND Energy had notice of Lime Rock's rights due to a recorded memorandum of a surface use agreement and that Lime Rock's actions were justified.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the leases granted Lime Rock the right to use layflat hoses on the property, as this use was necessary for oil and gas production. The court also determined that ND Energy was not a good-faith purchaser of the layflat easement because it had constructive notice of the surface use agreement through the recorded memorandum. Consequently, ND Energy's claims for tortious interference and a permanent injunction were dismissed, as Lime Rock's actions were justified under the leases. View "ND Energy Services, LLC v. Lime Rock Resources III-A" on Justia Law