Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Greenspan family bought a home in Long Beach, California, for $900,000 in 2014. The land was valued at $540,000 and the improvements (the home itself) at $360,000. Two years later, the Greenspans demolished the original residence, except for the garage, and built a new home on the property. The County of Los Angeles then reappraised the property, reducing the value of the improvements to $40,000 and increasing the value of the land to $860,000. The County then added the appraised value of the new construction to the newly allocated land and improvement values. The Greenspans contested this reappraisal, arguing that the County's reallocation of their base-year land and improvement value was contrary to law. The trial court found in favor of the County, and the Greenspans appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The court found that the County's automatic reallocation of the base-year value for the entire structure removed, leaving only a "credit" for the remaining garage, was contrary to Revenue and Taxation Code sections 51 and 75.10, which require that a property owner receive a reduction in previously assessed base values for portions of any property removed. The court held that the County's automatic reappraisal policy, based on the assumption that a property owner bought the property for the land value alone if substantial renovation occurred within two years, was inconsistent with Proposition 13 and statutory valuation standards. The court remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment vacating the decision of the Board and remanding the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Greenspan v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the 1950s and 1960s, landowners in southwest San Bernardino County, California, transferred 19 parcels of land to various individuals by grant deed, reserving a partial interest in all minerals beneath the surface. The current owners of the surface estate are mining companies that wish to extract sand and gravel from the combined 196-acre tract through open-pit excavation. Mineral rights holders, descendants of the original grantors, claim a one-half interest in the mining proceeds. The question in this appeal was whether “minerals” in the original reservations include rights to mine sand and gravel. Concluding they do, the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the mineral rights holders, and the mining companies appealed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the plain language of the deed was ambiguous as to the term "minerals," and therefore turned to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The court found that sand and gravel had been mined in the region for decades before the grant deeds, and that these substances possess commercial value. Although open-pit mining will affect the usability of the surface estate, the surface estate retains a 50 percent interest in the extracted minerals. The court concluded that the deeds' ambiguity as to whether sand and gravel were included in the mineral reservation was resolved by California Civil Code section 1069, which requires that deed reservations be construed in favor of the grantor. Thus, the court held that under these deeds, the term "minerals" included sand and gravel. View "Vulcan Lands, Inc. v. Currier" on Justia Law

In Washington, a couple, the Lewises, moved into a rental property owned by another couple, the Ridgways. After the Lewises moved out, a dispute arose over the return of their security deposit. The Ridgways claimed the Lewises caused damage to the property and deducted repair costs from the deposit. The Lewises disputed these charges, and the case was sent to arbitration. During arbitration, the Lewises were awarded the full amount of their security deposit, but the Ridgways were given attorney fees under the small claims statute. The Lewises attempted to appeal the arbitration award and a pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. However, the Lewises did not personally sign their request for a trial de novo, a requirement under court rules and the arbitration statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that the Lewises' request for a trial de novo was ineffective because they did not personally sign the request, as required by the court rule and the arbitration statute. The court also held that, absent a valid request for a trial de novo, the Lewises could not appeal the pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. The court further stated that the question of who should be considered the prevailing party for the purpose of any attorney fee award needed further consideration, and remanded the case back to the lower court for determination of attorney fees. View "Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction between appellants Donnell and Marilyn Bauer and appellees Jesse Lee and Mary A. Beamon. The Bauers sold Lot 24A to the Beamons, failing to disclose certain defects and issues related to the property. After the sale, the Beamons discovered a mold issue in the residence and soil instability on an adjacent lot, Lot 18, which the Bauers had also owned. The Beamons attempted to remediate these issues, incurring significant costs. They ultimately sought to rescind the contract, alleging fraud and deceit by the Bauers.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's denial of the Beamons’ rescission claim, finding that the Beamons had waived their right to rescission by taking possession of the property, engaging in mold eradication, and attempting to remediate the soil conditions on the hillside. These actions were found to be inconsistent with an intent to rescind.However, the court reversed the lower court's award of damages to the Beamons for breach of contract. The court found that the Beamons had not alleged breach of contract in their complaint, and thus could not recover damages on that basis. Furthermore, the court found that the Bauers' constitutional right to a jury trial had been violated, as the Beamons’ claim for rescission, an equitable remedy, had been tried without a jury, and the Bauers were not given a jury trial on the legal claim for damages. View "BAUER V. BEAMON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri issued an opinion involving a dispute between Tyler Technologies, Inc., and several individual and corporate property owners. The property owners had filed a class-action petition alleging that Tyler Technologies negligently carried out its contractual obligations to assist Jackson County with the 2023 real property assessment. The property owners claimed that Tyler Technologies' failures resulted in some class members not receiving timely notice of increased assessments and others having their property assessments increase by more than 15 percent without a physical inspection.Tyler Technologies filed a motion to dismiss the allegations, arguing that the property owners failed to allege facts showing that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, prompting Tyler Technologies to file a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the Supreme Court of Missouri issued as a preliminary writ.After a review, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the property owners did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The court noted that the duties the property owners described were statutory obligations of the county assessor, not private, third-party contractors like Tyler Technologies. The court also invoked the rule of privity, which generally states that a party to a contract does not owe a duty to a plaintiff who was not a party to the contract. In the court's view, disregarding this rule would expose Tyler Technologies to excessive and unlimited liability and potentially discourage contractors from entering into service contracts due to the fear of obligations and liabilities they would not voluntarily assume.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Tyler Technologies was entitled to dismissal of the disputed counts of the property owners' petition. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, barring further action from the circuit court other than dismissing the contested counts with prejudice. View "State ex rel. Tyler Technologies, Inc. v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In Missouri, Jackson County and its public officials sought a writ of mandamus to overturn a circuit court's order which had denied their motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by Jackson County property owners. The property owners alleged that the County had unlawfully increased assessed property values by failing to provide timely notice of increases and not conducting physical inspections for properties with increases of over 15%. The County argued that the property owners should have exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit.The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with the County's argument, stating that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an aggrieved party to seek available administrative remedies before courts will act. The court found that the County's failure to provide timely notice did not prevent the property owners from pursuing administrative remedies. At the time they filed the lawsuit, they could have exercised their appellate rights to the County's Board of Equalization or the State Tax Commission, but they chose not to. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that because the property owners failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit, the action must be dismissed, making permanent its preliminary writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Jackson County, Missouri v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In the State of Idaho, Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC ("Yellowstone") owned a rental property in the City of Rigby that was extensively damaged after BorTek Utilities and Construction, LLC bored through a lateral sewer line connected to the rental property. The City of Rigby had failed to mark the service lateral sewer pipe connected to the rental property prior to the excavation. Yellowstone sued the City of Rigby for both negligence per se and common law negligence for failing to mark the service lateral. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Rigby, determining that Yellowstone did not have standing under the Idaho Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, and even if it did, it failed to prove the City breached any duty owed to it.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Rigby. The court found that while the Act does not explicitly provide a private right of action for "end users" like Yellowstone, it does impose a duty on the City to mark underground sewer lines in a public right-of-way, which it did not do. The court also held that whether the City breached this duty by failing to maintain records of the location of service laterals, failing to adequately mark service laterals, or failing to take other precautions to protect customers’ service laterals within the public right of way are questions of fact for a jury to decide. Thus, the court concluded that the City of Rigby owed Yellowstone a duty to act as a reasonable manager of its property under the circumstances. View "Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC v. City of Rigby" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to decide whether rainwater that accumulated on a parapet roof one or more stories above the ground is considered "surface waters" under Massachusetts law for the purposes of the insurance policies in question. This determination was crucial for deciding whether the insureds, Medical Properties Trust, Inc. (MPT) and Steward Health Care System LLC (Steward), were subject to coverage limitations on "Flood" damage in the policies issued by Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (AGLIC).The interpretation of "surface waters" posed a novel issue of Massachusetts law that had not been previously addressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). The court decided to certify the issue to the SJC as the existing case law did not provide a clear answer and the resolution may require policy judgments on applying Massachusetts law to this key insurance coverage issue.The case arose from a situation where Norwood Hospital Facility, a building owned by MPT and leased to Steward, suffered significant damage after severe thunderstorms. Rainwater accumulated on the hospital's roof and a second-floor courtyard, eventually seeping into the hospital's upper floors. Both Zurich and AGLIC, in their initial evaluations, determined that water damage in the hospital's basement was caused by "Flood," and would be subject to the policies' respective coverage limits. However, the insurers later characterized all the water damage, including that from the roof, as "surface water" and subject to the "Flood" coverage limits.The court concluded that whether rainwater pooled on a parapet roof constitutes "surface waters" in the policies' "Flood" definition is determinative of this interlocutory appeal. Therefore, the court certified the issue to the SJC for its consideration. View "Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Medical Properties Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the plaintiffs, Mohammad Amoorpour and Maryam Amnifar, trustees of the Amoorpour Family Trust, sought to quiet title to a piece of property against Brenda J. Kirkham, a neighboring landowner who counterclaimed, alleging adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court awarded title to the plaintiffs and denied their requests for money damages and a writ of assistance.Kirkham appealed the decision, asserting that she had proven adverse possession of the property. The plaintiffs counter-appealed, challenging the denial of their requests for financial compensation and a writ of assistance.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's decision to quiet title to the plaintiffs, noting that Kirkham had failed to prove the necessary elements to claim adverse possession. Specifically, Kirkham had not continuously, exclusively, openly, notoriously, and hostilely possessed the land for the required 15 years. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for money damages, stating that a quiet title action does not inherently provide for a monetary award of damages.However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for a writ of assistance. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the property and the power to issue a writ of assistance after determining and settling the parties' title to the property. The case was remanded back to the district court with instructions to proceed in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "AMOORPOUR v. KIRKHAM" on Justia Law