Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, property owners and residents of the Statham Lakefront Subdivision in Sumter County, Georgia, sought to require the county to repair roads in their subdivision. The county had not expressly accepted the roads as public roads, but the residents argued that the county had an obligation to maintain the roads because they had been open to the public since their creation. The trial court ruled that the county had no obligation to maintain the roads. The Court of Appeals vacated this decision, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether there was evidence of "recognition of the streets as public streets or acceptance of the dedication by the public."The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Sumter County's petition for certiorari. The court held that a county is not obligated to repair and maintain a road if county authorities have not accepted the land owner’s offer to dedicate the road to public use. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in directing the trial court to consider whether the public accepted the road as a public road. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia found ambiguity in the Court of Appeals's decision and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to clarify whether it was directing the trial court to consider if the county authorities or the general public recognized the roads as public. View "SUMTER COUNTY v. MORRIS" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered an appeal by Colony Insurance Company against First Mercury Insurance Company related to a settlement agreement for an underlying negligence case. Both companies had consecutively insured DL Phillips Construction, Inc. (DL Phillips) under commercial general liability insurance policies. After the settlement, Colony sued First Mercury, arguing that First Mercury needed to reimburse Colony for the full amount of its settlement contribution, as it contended that First Mercury's policies covered all damages at issue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First Mercury, prompting Colony's appeal.In the underlying negligence case, DL Phillips was hired to replace the roof of an outpatient clinic in Texas. Shortly after completion, the roof began leaking, causing damage over several months. The clinic's owner sued DL Phillips for various claims, including breach of contract and negligence. A verdict was entered against DL Phillips for over $3.7 million. Both Colony and First Mercury contributed to a settlement agreement, and then Colony sued First Mercury, arguing it was responsible for all the property damage at issue.The appellate court held that under the plain language of First Mercury's policies and relevant case law, First Mercury was only liable for damages that occurred during its policy period, not all damages resulting from the initial roof defect. The court also found that Colony failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about whether there was an unfair allocation of damages, which would be necessary for Colony's contribution and subrogation claims. As such, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of First Mercury and denied summary judgment for Colony. View "Colony Insurance Company v. First Mercury Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho was required to interpret aspects of Idaho’s mechanic’s lien statutes. Datum Construction, LLC, was the general contractor for a commercial construction project, and subcontracted part of the work to Elmore Welding and Steel, who rented equipment from RE Investment Co., LLC, dba Pro Rentals & Sales. Elmore Welding and Steel failed to pay Pro Rentals for the equipment rental, resulting in Pro Rentals filing a mechanic's lien. Datum then purchased a bond and petitioned the district court to release the lien. Pro Rentals did not oppose this petition and the district court released the lien. Datum argued that Pro Rentals had failed to begin proceedings to enforce its claim of lien within six months. The district court granted Datum’s motion to release the bond. Pro Rentals appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled in favor of Pro Rentals, determining that the district court had erred in applying a six-month statute of limitations from the mechanic’s lien statutes to a bond action. The court held that the bond replaced the lien, and the six-month period to enforce a lien was not applicable once the lien was released. The court determined that the appropriate statute of limitations for an action against the bond was two years under Idaho Code section 5-219. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s decision to release the bond. View "Datum Construction, LLC v. Re Investment Co." on Justia Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court's judgment, which had dismissed the claims of Jacob Ebel, John Ebel, and Ordeen Ebel (collectively, "the Ebels") for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The Ebels had sought enforcement of contracts they claimed were formed when their bids for parcels of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt were accepted. The district court had dismissed the Ebels' claims, asserting that the parties did not satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires contracts for the sale of real property to be in writing. The Supreme Court found that the district court misapplied the law because the statute of frauds was not specifically pled or otherwise raised by the parties. The Supreme Court noted that under Rule 8 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the statute of frauds must be specifically pled as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the case was reversed on the ground that the district court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds when the defense was not properly raised. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law

In Vermont, a dispute arose among the owners of seven lots connected by a private road named Purple Mountain Road over how to allocate maintenance costs for the road. The plaintiffs, who own five of the seven lots, argued that each lot owner should contribute based on the percentage of distance traveled from the public highway along the private road to reach their respective lot. The defendants, who own the remaining two lots, argued that all parcel owners should divide costs equally. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that in the absence of an express agreement governing the maintenance of a private road, all parties deriving common benefit from the road must contribute "rateably," or in a manner that is reasonable and equitable given the benefits each owner receives, to the cost of maintaining the road, as per 19 V.S.A. § 2702. The court reasoned that all the parties have the right to use the entire private road at any time and share equally in the benefits offered by the road, such as enhanced private and commercial access to their properties and the privacy provided by the cul-de-sac. Therefore, all parties must pay an equal fee for the maintenance of the road. View "Rawley v. Heymann" on Justia Law

In February 2020, Shift Services, LLC (Shift) was contracted by Ames Savage Water Solutions, LLC (Ames) to repair a liner inside a water tank operated by Ames. The agreement was for a fixed price of $39,500.00, which included all labor, material, and travel time. When Shift began the work, they found a more significant amount of ice in the tank than initially observed. Shift communicated with Ames about the issue and decided to subcontract a hot oil truck company to melt the ice. Upon completion of the project, Ames paid the contracted amount but refused to pay an additional $31,705.00 bill from Shift related to the ice removal. Shift claimed that the contract was modified to include these additional costs, which Ames had allegedly approved. The district court dismissed Shift's breach of contract claim and terminated the construction lien it had placed on the property, finding that there was a lack of mutual assent to modify the contract.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Shift did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate mutual assent for the modification of the original contract. The court pointed out that Shift had not disclosed to Ames that they intended to add an additional charge for the increased cost associated with the ice removal, nor did they discuss the details of the subcontractor, the equipment to be used, or the estimated number of hours that the removal would take. In conclusion, the court found no error in the district court's finding of a lack of mutual assent to modify the contract, thereby confirming that Ames did not breach the contract. View "Shift Services v. Ames Savage Water Solutions" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, the Sargent County Water Resource District ("District") initiated an eminent domain action to acquire permanent and temporary easements over five properties adjacent to Drain 11 for a drainage project ("Project"). The landowners argued that the project was unlawful because it did not qualify as “maintenance” and exceeded the six-year maximum maintenance levy without the approval of the majority of landowners. The District countered that the landowners’ arguments were foreclosed because they did not appeal the District’s “Resolution of Necessity” and their arguments were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The district court ruled that the landowners’ arguments were not foreclosed and granted condemnation of the property for the Project.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the landowners' arguments were not foreclosed and the district court did not err in reaching this conclusion. The Court ruled that the landowners were not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel from challenging whether the Project was authorized by law in defending against an eminent domain action.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's finding that the Project was a use authorized by law and that no landowner vote was required for the Project. The Court concluded that the Project as currently designed and approved exceeded the statutory maximum maintenance levy and could not proceed without the approval of the majority of landowners as required by state law. The judgment was therefore reversed. View "Sargent Cty. Water Resource District v. Beck" on Justia Law

In Texas, the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, Christina Mitchell Busbee, objected to the sale of a property that was purchased with the District's forfeiture funds and was legally owned by Medina County. The District Attorney argued that the County could not sell the property without her consent and that she was entitled to the sale proceeds. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled that the District Attorney did not have standing to make these claims because the relevant statute, Chapter 59, authorizes only the Attorney General to enforce its terms. The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that the question of whether the District Attorney was authorized to sue under Chapter 59 did not pertain to her constitutional standing to sue, but rather to the merits of her claims. The Court concluded that the District Attorney did have constitutional standing to sue because she had alleged a concrete injury traceable to the County's conduct and redressable by court order. The case was remanded back to the trial court to consider the County's additional jurisdictional challenges. View "BUSBEE v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, TEXAS" on Justia Law

In a dispute involving the foreclosure of a home, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the decisions of the lower court in favor of the purchasers of the foreclosed property and the mortgagee. The original homeowners, the Littlefields, defaulted on their mortgage payments and the property was subsequently foreclosed on by Planet Home Lending, LLC ("Planet"), and then sold to Terry Daniel Smith and Staci Herring Smith. The Littlefields refused to vacate the property, leading the Smiths to initiate an ejectment action against them. The Littlefields responded with counterclaims against the Smiths and Planet, arguing that the foreclosure was void because Planet had failed to comply with the mortgage's notice requirements. The Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the Littlefields' arguments, holding that any alleged noncompliance with the notice requirements would have rendered the foreclosure voidable, not void. The court concluded that because the Littlefields did not challenge the foreclosure before the property was sold to the Smiths, who were considered bona fide purchasers, the foreclosure could not be set aside. The court also noted that the Littlefields failed to challenge other rulings related to their counterclaims against Planet and their forfeiture of redemption rights, leading to these aspects of the lower court's judgment being affirmed as well. View "Littlefield v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case pertains to an appeal by plaintiff William J. Papp, III, against the decision of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denying his request for declaratory relief, a stay of eviction, and relief in the nature of certiorari in relation to a housing dispute. The dispute centered around Papp's objection to the transfer of his case against the defendant landlord from the Superior Court to the Central Division of the Housing Court Department, which he alleged was in violation of G. L. c. 185C, § 20 and deprived him of due process.The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the single justice's decision, affirming that Papp had failed to adequately demonstrate that other remedies were not available to him. The court noted that Papp could have sought interlocutory review of the transfer order from a single justice of the Appeals Court, as per G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par. Additionally, he could have appealed the transfer order as part of an appeal from the final judgment of the Housing Court. Therefore, since Papp could not establish the absence or inadequacy of other remedies, the single justice had not erred or abused her discretion in denying Papp's claims for relief. View "Papp v. Westborough Gardens LLC" on Justia Law