Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Nova Group/Tutor-Saliba (“NTS”) was awarded a construction contract by the United States Department of the Navy to build a new aircraft carrier maintenance pier at a naval base. The contract required NTS to demolish an old pier, design and build a replacement pier, and construct a new structure known as the Mole Quaywall, which would be designed by the government. During construction, NTS encountered unexpected subsurface soil conditions that complicated and increased the cost of the project. NTS sought additional compensation from the government alleging differing site conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims which had denied NTS's claim for additional compensation. The Court of Federal Claims found that NTS had not established a Type I differing site condition because the contract documents disclosed that NTS would encounter unpredictable subsurface conditions and possible obstructions. It also found that NTS had failed to prove a Type II differing site condition, as it had not demonstrated that any of the potential causes for hard driving were unknown or unusual in the region or materially different from comparable work. The Court of Appeals agreed with these findings and also ruled that the parol evidence rule had not been violated as NTS claimed. The Court of Appeals found that the parol evidence rule does not prevent a party from presenting evidence that a recital of fact in an integrated agreement may be untrue, and the challenged evidence was not introduced to modify any term of the contract. Therefore, the appeal by NTS was denied and the decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "NOVA GROUP/TUTOR-SALIBA v. US " on Justia Law

In this case before the Indiana Supreme Court, Thomas DeCola, the appellant, filed a suit to quiet title after purchasing property owned by Norfolk Southern Corporation, the appellee, at a tax sale. The property had fallen into tax delinquency. DeCola sought judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Norfolk had not received proper notice of the tax sale, the petition for tax deed, or its right of redemption. The trial court converted DeCola's motion into one for summary judgment because it considered evidence outside the pleadings. In its detailed order, the trial court denied DeCola's summary judgment motion, finding the tax deed void due to lack of sufficient notice to Norfolk.DeCola appealed the denial of summary judgment, claiming it was a final order. However, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court's order denying summary judgment was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims as to all parties. The Court stated that the order did not meet any of the five definitions of a "final judgment" as laid out in Rule 2(H) of the appellate rules. Therefore, the Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "DeCola v. Norfolk Southern Corporation, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland (ABY) sued the Town of Clarkstown, George Hoehmann, CUPON Inc., and Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods of Greater Nanuet Inc. ABY, a religious educational institution, planned to purchase property in Clarkstown, New York, to establish an Orthodox Jewish school. It alleged that the Defendants manipulated an ostensibly neutral building permit application and zoning appeals process to block this construction. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that ABY's religious discrimination and civil rights claims were not ripe as it had not received a final decision from the town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and that the lost-contract injury underpinning ABY’s tortious interference claim was not traceable to the Town Defendants.In this appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court. The Second Circuit found that the ZBA's refusal to adjudicate ABY's appeal of its permit application constituted a final decision for ripeness purposes. The court also determined that ABY had plausibly alleged a causal connection between the Town Defendants’ actions and the injuries resulting from ABY's lost contract with Grace Church. Therefore, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstoawn" on Justia Law

The case revolved around a disagreement over a parking agreement related to a property owned by Midtown Ventures, LLC ("Midtown"). In 1999, restaurant owners Thomas and Teresa Capone ("the Capones") agreed with the Idaho Youth Ranch to allow the Capones’ customers to park in the Idaho Youth Ranch’s adjoining lot. In 2008, a group of nonprofit organizations, including the Capones and the Idaho Youth Ranch, signed an agreement to relocate the parking area to accommodate a proposed workforce housing project. However, the 2008 Agreement was not finalized, and the project was eventually abandoned. In 2018, Midtown purchased the Idaho Youth Ranch property and attempted to enforce the 2008 Agreement to relocate the parking area, but was unsuccessful. Midtown then sued the Capones for breach of contract and specific performance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Capones, concluding that Midtown lacked standing to challenge the 2008 Agreement and that the agreement was unenforceable. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the 2008 Agreement was merely an "agreement to agree" and not an enforceable contract. The court also held that Midtown had standing to bring the suit as a property owner, but failed to show that the 2008 Agreement was a valid or enforceable contract. It also found that Midtown waived its challenge to the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its argument that the district court erred in denying the equitable remedy of promissory estoppel. The Court concluded that the Capones are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed a lower court's judgment regarding the denial of a preliminary plat for a proposed development within the geographical limits of the City of Montgomery. The plaintiffs, T Investments, LLC, and FHM Company, LLLP, contested the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment that refused their petition for a writ of mandamus directing the City of Montgomery Planning Commission to conditionally approve their preliminary plat. The Supreme Court found that the City of Montgomery Planning Commission's decision to deny approval on the basis of "safety reasons" was insufficiently specific and did not comply with the requirement that valid and sufficiently clear grounds for the denial of a subdivision plat be recorded. The court held that the failure to meet this requirement resulted in the automatic approval of the preliminary plat and ordered the lower court to grant the petition for the writ of mandamus. View "T Investments, LLC v. City of Montgomery Planning Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to determine whether a landowner could delegate its duty to protect invitees on its premises from known or obvious dangers to an independent contractor. The case arose from the death of Jeffry Eylander, an employee of an independent contractor, Commercial Industrial Roofing Inc. (CIR), who fell through a skylight while cleaning the roof of a warehouse owned by Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund and Prologis Management LLC (collectively, Prologis). Eylander's daughter, as personal representative of his estate, sued Prologis for wrongful death, alleging that Prologis had breached its duty of reasonable care to protect Eylander from harm.The Court held that Prologis had reasonably delegated its duty of reasonable care to protect invitees from known or obvious dangers to CIR. The Court found that Prologis had fulfilled its duty by selecting a professional and experienced contractor, CIR, and by requiring CIR to follow all applicable laws, be solely responsible for the health and safety of its employees, and create and post a site-specific safety plan before starting work. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Prologis. View "Eylander v. Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by a landlord, Carline Vilbon, against her tenant, Judy Vargas, in an eviction action. The landlord had sought possession of the rental property and reasonable use and occupancy damages from the termination date through the date Vargas vacated the property. The Superior Court granted Vilbon possession but dismissed her claim for use and occupancy as well as for money damages. Vilbon appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the order of the Superior Court. The court found that without a transcript of the proceedings, it could not determine whether the trial justice had abused his discretion in either dismissing Vilbon’s claims or denying her motion to vacate the consent order. The court held that the burden of furnishing the court with the necessary records to enable it to pass on the alleged error lay with the party alleging the error. As such, the court concluded that Vilbon's failure to provide an adequate transcript was fatal to her claims. View "Vilbon v. Vargas" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Judicial Court, the Attorney General of Massachusetts initiated a civil action in the Superior Court alleging housing discrimination by the defendant, Mark Davidson, on behalf of two complainants. The defendant transferred the case to the Housing Court, after which the Attorney General unsuccessfully sought to have the matter transferred back to the Superior Court, arguing that the Housing Court lacked jurisdiction over a discrimination claim in this procedural posture. The complainants had initially filed an administrative complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, alleging that the defendant had terminated their lease upon learning that one of the complainants was pregnant, allegedly to avoid having to comply with the lead containment or abatement statute. The defendant chose to have the matter heard in court rather than by the commission.The Supreme Judicial Court held that, based on the language of G. L. c. 151B, § 5, the Superior Court is the proper court for actions such as this one, and that the Housing Court lacks jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the language of § 5 unambiguously indicates that the Superior Court is the proper court for such actions. The court also noted that the Legislature's use of the word "shall" suggests a command to commence the action in the Superior Court, and not elsewhere, and the phrase "commence and maintain" is a clear directive that such actions brought by the Attorney General, once initiated, are to remain in the Superior Court. Therefore, the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court was affirmed, and the stay of any proceedings in the Superior Court was vacated. The case must be returned to the Superior Court. View "Commonwealth v. Davidson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska was asked to determine whether the question of a deceased worker's status as an employee or independent contractor under the Alaska Worker's Compensation Act should be determined by a jury or a judge. The lawsuit was initiated by the estate of Nicholson Tinker, a worker who was killed in a construction accident while working for Mark Welty, doing business as North Country Services. Welty had no workers' compensation coverage at the time of the accident. Tinker's estate argued that he was an employee and that under the Act, Welty was presumed negligent because he had no compensation coverage. Welty argued that Tinker was an independent contractor, hence the Act did not apply.The superior court decided that the question of employee status was an issue for the jury to decide. The estate appealed this decision, arguing that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Benson v. City of Nenana determined that a judge, not a jury, should decide the issue of a worker's status under the Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the estate, holding that the superior court must determine whether Tinker was an employee or independent contractor under the Act as a preliminary issue before trial. The Court reasoned that the applicability of the Act is a legal determination with factual underpinnings that the court should decide as a preliminary matter. The Court also noted that determining the employee status promptly is significant due to its potential impact on basic issues such as the type of action a party can bring or the burden of proof for negligence. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s order that the jury decides the issue of employee status and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leona Seal, Personal Representative of the Estate of Nicholson J. Tinker v. Mark C. Welty D/B/A North Country Services" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the petitioner, Eric McDonald, an employee of a subcontractor, suffered injuries during the renovation of a high school. He sued Architects Alaska, Inc. and BBFM Engineers, Inc., alleging that they negligently failed to exercise reasonable care in the design, supervision, implementation, and specifications of the demolition of the renovation project. Before trial, the parties’ attorneys discussed the possibility of a settlement, and the defendants moved to enforce a “walk-away” settlement they claimed had been reached through email correspondence. McDonald, unrepresented at this point, did not file a substantive response to the defendants’ motion. The superior court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the case.About a year later, McDonald moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he had never given his attorney authority to settle the case. A different superior court judge granted the motion, finding that factual issues precluded summary judgment on whether a settlement agreement existed, that the earlier dismissal was erroneous as a law matter, and that extraordinary circumstances otherwise entitled McDonald to Rule 60(b) relief. The defendants petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the ruling on the ground that McDonald’s Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within a reasonable time. View "BBFM Engineers, Inc. v. McDonald" on Justia Law