Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
Morales v. Weatherford U.S.
On December 29, 2015, Timothy Morales, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal while walking along a roadway within the Weatherford distribution facility in Williston, North Dakota. Morales alleged that Weatherford U.S., L.P. was negligent in maintaining the premises, specifically citing inadequate lighting, lack of road signs, and absence of sidewalks. Morales filed a lawsuit in 2019 against Weatherford, Junewal, and Junewal’s employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc., asserting claims of negligence and premises liability.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Weatherford, concluding that Weatherford did not owe Morales a duty of care. The court dismissed all claims against Weatherford and the other defendants. Morales appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the danger posed by vehicles on the roadway was open and obvious, and therefore, Weatherford owed no duty of care to Morales. The court noted that Morales was aware of the dangers of walking on the roadway and that the conditions were such that a reasonable person would have recognized the risks. The court also rejected Morales's argument that Weatherford should have anticipated the harm despite the obvious danger, concluding that the distraction exception did not apply as Morales's distraction was self-created. The judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice was affirmed. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S." on Justia Law
ND Energy Services, LLC v. Lime Rock Resources III-A
ND Energy Services, LLC, entered into a temporary layflat easement agreement with Kathleen Stroh, granting it the exclusive right to transfer freshwater via aboveground layflat hoses on Stroh's property. Lime Rock Resources III-A, L.P., and Herman Energy Services, LLC, subsequently placed layflat hoses on the same property to transport water for fracking operations. ND Energy sued Lime Rock for tortious interference with contract and willful trespass, seeking a permanent injunction.The District Court of Dunn County granted summary judgment in favor of Lime Rock, dismissing ND Energy's claims. The court found that the oil and gas leases, which Lime Rock had acquired, provided Lime Rock the right to use the property for oil and gas production, including the installation of layflat hoses. The court also concluded that ND Energy had notice of Lime Rock's rights due to a recorded memorandum of a surface use agreement and that Lime Rock's actions were justified.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the leases granted Lime Rock the right to use layflat hoses on the property, as this use was necessary for oil and gas production. The court also determined that ND Energy was not a good-faith purchaser of the layflat easement because it had constructive notice of the surface use agreement through the recorded memorandum. Consequently, ND Energy's claims for tortious interference and a permanent injunction were dismissed, as Lime Rock's actions were justified under the leases. View "ND Energy Services, LLC v. Lime Rock Resources III-A" on Justia Law
Nordquist v. Alonge
Benjamin Nordquist appealed a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. The case involves a dispute over the recording of a quitclaim deed for a portion of land in Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision, Stutsman County, North Dakota. Diane and Duane Witzig originally owned the land, which was platted into three lots in 2014. Diane Witzig later conveyed these lots to Gannon Van Gilder and Levi Hintz. In 2022, Diane Witzig provided a quitclaim deed to Nordquist for a portion of the subdivision depicted as 6th Street SW on the plat map. Nordquist attempted to record this deed, but the Stutsman County Recorder refused, citing discrepancies in the property description and forwarded it to the Auditor.The District Court of Stutsman County denied Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description and thus required a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. The court also noted that the Auditor had discretion to request the land be replatted due to the irregularities in the property description and previous conveyances.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower court that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description, necessitating a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court improperly determined that the 2018 and 2021 deeds conveyed the north 60 feet of Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision. The Supreme Court held that property ownership should be determined in a separate proceeding involving all relevant parties. The court affirmed the denial of Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Nordquist had not demonstrated a clear legal right to compel the Auditor to issue the certificate of transfer. View "Nordquist v. Alonge" on Justia Law
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc.
The Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (Commission), a bi-state entity created by an interstate compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, sought to replace the I-95 Scudder Falls Bridge. The Commission decided to use a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) for the project, which required contractors to hire at least 75% of their workforce from specified local unions. George Harms Construction Company, Inc. (Harms), which had a collective bargaining agreement with a different union, challenged the PLA, arguing it was unlawful because it excluded their union.The trial court denied Harms' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed Harms' counterclaims, ruling that New Jersey’s competitive bidding laws did not apply to the Commission. However, it also dismissed the Commission’s complaint, stating the lawsuit was not properly authorized by the Commission as a whole. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Commission’s complaint but reversed the dismissal of certain counterclaims, concluding that the Commission lacked authority to use a PLA because New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not have complementary or parallel laws on PLAs.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Court found that the Commission’s broad powers under the Compact include the authority to use PLAs, even though the Compact does not explicitly mention them. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division erred in looking beyond the Compact to state laws that do not mention the Commission. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law
City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition
The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law
Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC
In this case, the original plaintiff, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property in Nashville but did not register the deed. Years later, the seller defaulted on a loan, and a creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold. The plaintiffs argued that Mr. Eads had adversely possessed the property during the intervening years, while the defendant, the subsequent purchaser, contended that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse.The Davidson County Chancery Court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse due to the permissive nature of his relationship with the original owner, Mr. Whiteaker. The court noted that Mr. Whiteaker had acquiesced in Mr. Eads’s use of the property and that the deed, installment note, and other facts indicated a non-adverse relationship. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Mr. Eads had acquired title to the property by common-law adverse possession, as his possession was not with the permission of anyone.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the chancery court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that adversity, for purposes of adverse possession, requires a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Since Mr. Eads had obtained legal title through a valid deed, albeit unregistered, there was no conflict of title or controversy regarding possession between him and Mr. Whiteaker. Therefore, Mr. Eads did not satisfy the requirements for statutory or common-law adverse possession. The court concluded that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse to Mr. Whiteaker, and any adversity to other parties did not last long enough to meet the statutory periods required for adverse possession. View "Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law, Tennessee Supreme Court
Frisk v. Thomas
Robert Frisk owns property at 1196 Swan Hill Drive, Bigfork, Montana, and John and Lori Thomas own the neighboring property at 1194 Swan Hill Drive. The properties share a common driveway and a water well located on Frisk’s property. Disputes arose over the width of the easement for the driveway and access to the water well, leading Frisk to file a lawsuit seeking a declaration of an easement and an injunction against Thomas. Thomas counterclaimed for breach of contract regarding the water well agreement and trespass due to Frisk’s fence and house encroaching on their property.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court granted Frisk a prescriptive easement over 15 feet of the existing roadway and an equitable easement for the encroaching portion of Thomas’s property. The court dismissed Thomas’s breach of contract claims but affirmed his right to access the water well, imposing additional restrictions on this access due to the parties' animosity. Thomas appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that Montana law does not recognize the creation of an equitable easement. The court held that Frisk must remove his fence and gate from Thomas’s property but allowed the house to remain due to its de minimis encroachment. The court affirmed the additional restrictions on the water well agreement, finding them reasonable and consistent with the agreement’s terms. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Frisk v. Thomas" on Justia Law
Bradley Livestock v. Fraser
The case involves a water rights dispute on Indian Creek in Madison County, Montana. William Fraser claimed a senior stock use water right in Indian Creek, which Bradley Livestock, LC contested. Fraser's claim is based on historical use dating back to the late 1800s when his predecessor, William Tiernan, acquired ranchland and water rights in the Ruby Valley. The dispute arose when Fraser sought enforcement of his water right, and the Water Commissioner refused, leading Fraser to file a complaint.The Fifth Judicial District Court certified Fraser’s complaint to the Montana Water Court to resolve the water distribution controversy. The Water Court issued an order decreeing Fraser’s stock use claim as senior to Bradley’s irrigation rights in Indian Creek. Bradley appealed, arguing that the Water Court misinterpreted a 1905 District Court decree and that Fraser’s chain of title was broken, thus invalidating his claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Water Court’s decision, holding that Fraser has a valid stock use right with an April 20, 1866 priority date. The court found that the chain of title supporting Fraser’s claim was unbroken and that the Water Court correctly interpreted the historical evidence. The court also upheld the Water Court’s interpretation of the 1905 decree, which limited Fraser’s right to make a call on junior appropriators after July 15 unless he could show that curtailment would result in water reaching his property in beneficial amounts. The court concluded that this limitation only applies to appropriators addressed in the 1905 decree. View "Bradley Livestock v. Fraser" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Montana Supreme Court, Real Estate & Property Law
Schafer v. Kent County
In the first case, Kent County foreclosed on the homes of Matthew Schafer and Harry and Lilly Hucklebury for unpaid taxes. The properties were sold at auction in 2017, and the county retained the surplus proceeds beyond the owed taxes. Following the Michigan Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales is an unconstitutional taking, the Schafer plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking those proceeds. The Kent Circuit Court denied the county's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rafaeli applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the second case, the state of Michigan, acting as the foreclosing governmental unit (FGU) for Shiawassee County, foreclosed on property owned by Lynette Hathon and Amy Jo Denkins in 2018. The state retained the surplus proceeds from the sale. The Hathon plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Court of Claims, which certified the class and denied the state's motion for summary disposition. After Rafaeli, the plaintiffs moved for summary disposition, and the state moved to revoke class certification. The Court of Claims granted the state's motion to revoke class certification but later recertified an amended class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' decisions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final as of July 17, 2020. The court also ruled that MCL 211.78t, which provides a procedure for processing claims under Rafaeli, applies retroactively, while the new two-year limitations period in MCL 211.78l applies prospectively. Claims that arose before December 22, 2020, but expired between that date and the court's decision must be allowed to proceed if filed within a reasonable time. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in Schafer and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Hathon, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming class recertification and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for reconsideration. View "Schafer v. Kent County" on Justia Law
San Pablo Ave Golden Gate Improvement Assn v. City Council Oakland
In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied for a zoning clearance from the City of Oakland to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The facility, measuring approximately 14,000 square feet, was classified as "Light Manufacturing" under the Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) because it involved food production exceeding 10,000 square feet. The City’s Planning Department issued the zoning clearance and a subsequent building permit for renovations. In April 2021, local neighborhood associations learned of the project and requested the City reconsider the zoning classification, arguing it was essentially a fast-food restaurant, which was not permitted in the zone. The Planning Department denied the request, maintaining the classification was correct.The neighborhood associations filed a formal complaint requesting a revocation review process, which the Planning Department also denied, stating the classification was consistent with similar uses and that there was no substantial evidence of a nuisance. An independent hearing officer affirmed this decision, noting that the Enforcement Regulations under chapter 17.152 were not intended to revisit zoning determinations. The hearing officer also found the classification as "Light Manufacturing" to be supported by sufficient evidence. The associations then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Alameda County Superior Court, which was denied. The court held that chapter 17.152 did not provide a legal basis to challenge the prior zoning determination.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 of the OMC does not authorize challenges to zoning determinations, which are governed by chapter 17.132. The court found that the neighborhood associations' appeal was time-barred under the specific procedures outlined in chapter 17.132, which requires appeals to be filed within ten days of the Planning Department's decision. The court concluded that the Enforcement Regulations could not be used to challenge the initial zoning classification. View "San Pablo Ave Golden Gate Improvement Assn v. City Council Oakland" on Justia Law