Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Louis Paolino and Marie E. Issa, own property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to a site operated as an automobile recycling business. The neighboring property, owned by J.F. Realty, LLC and operated by LKQ Route 16 Used Auto Parts, Inc., was found to be contaminated. The Department of Environmental Management (DEM) required remediation, leading the defendants, Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., to design a stormwater remediation system. Plaintiffs alleged that this system discharged contaminated water onto their property and encroached on it.In prior litigation, the plaintiffs sued the Ferreira defendants in state court for trespass due to contamination. The case was removed to federal court, where federal claims were dismissed, and state claims were remanded. A jury found encroachment but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, which was partially granted. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the encroachment, deeming it de minimis, but ordered a new trial on other issues. In a subsequent trial, the jury found no continuing trespass. Plaintiffs also pursued a Clean Water Act claim in federal court, which was dismissed after a bench trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the issues in the current case were precluded by collateral estoppel. The court found that the issue of contamination had been litigated and decided in prior state and federal actions, and the encroachment was previously determined to be de minimis. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating these issues. View "Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Custer applied for a permit from the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) to discharge treated wastewater into French Creek as part of an upgrade to its wastewater treatment facility. Preserve French Creek, Inc. (Preserve), a group of local citizens, opposed this discharge. Two years after the permit was issued, a Custer County ordinance was passed by citizen initiative, declaring the discharge of treated water into French Creek a nuisance. Preserve demanded the City cease construction based on the new ordinance, but the City did not comply. Preserve then sought mandamus relief to enforce the ordinance, which the circuit court denied.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Custer County found that the ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically SDCL 21-10-2, which states that actions done under the express authority of a statute cannot be deemed a nuisance. The court concluded that the City’s actions, authorized by the DANR permit, could not be considered a nuisance. The court also rejected Preserve’s estoppel argument, stating that the City and County had no duty to enforce an ordinance that conflicted with state law.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was preempted by state law because it attempted to declare a nuisance something that state law expressly authorized. The court also found that the City and County were not estopped from asserting the ordinance’s invalidity, as their actions in placing the ordinance on the ballot and canvassing the vote were statutorily required and did not constitute an inconsistent position. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was properly denied. View "Preserve French Creek V. Custer County" on Justia Law

A severe thunderstorm caused significant damage to Norwood Hospital, owned by Medical Properties Trust, Inc. (MPT) and leased to Steward Health Care System LLC (Steward). The storm led to extensive flooding in the hospital's basements and rainwater accumulation on the rooftop courtyard and parapet roofs, which then seeped into the building, causing further damage. MPT and Steward sought coverage from their insurers, Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (AGLIC), respectively. Both policies had high overall coverage limits but lower sublimits for flood damage. The insurers argued that all the damage was due to "Flood" as defined in the policies, which included "surface waters," and thus subject to the lower sublimits.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted partial summary judgment to the insurers, interpreting "surface waters" to include rainwater accumulated on the roofs. The court allowed an interlocutory appeal, recognizing the substantial ground for difference of opinion on this legal issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then certified the question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, asking whether rainwater accumulating on a building's rooftop courtyard or parapet roof constitutes "surface waters" under Massachusetts law.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the term "surface waters" is ambiguous in this context. The court noted the lack of a clear definition in the policies and the divided case law on the issue. Given this ambiguity, the court ruled in favor of the insureds, determining that rainwater accumulating on the rooftop courtyard and parapet roofs does not unambiguously constitute "surface waters" under the policies. Therefore, the damage from such water infiltration is not subject to the flood sublimits. View "Zurich American Insurance Company v. Medical Properties Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a Surface Use Agreement (SUA) between Mikkelson Land, LLLP, and Continental Resources, Inc. The disagreement centers on whether the SUA authorized Continental to install water pipelines on Mikkelson's property. Mikkelson claimed that the SUA did not permit such installations and filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, trespass, and seeking injunctive relief. Continental argued that the SUA explicitly allowed for the installation of water pipelines and moved forward with the project, compensating Mikkelson as per the SUA terms.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of Continental. The court found that the SUA was unambiguous and explicitly authorized Continental to install water pipelines. The court also noted that the SUA included provisions for compensation related to the installation of such pipelines. Additionally, the court considered an addendum to the SUA, which expanded Continental's rights and further supported the installation of the pipelines. The district court concluded that Continental's actions were within the scope of the SUA and dismissed Mikkelson's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the SUA's language was clear and unambiguous, granting Continental the right to install water pipelines. The court emphasized that the SUA specifically contemplated future installations of water pipelines and provided a payment structure for them. The court also found that the addendum to the SUA expanded Continental's rights, allowing for necessary operations, including the installation of water pipelines. Consequently, the appellate court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Continental, rejecting Mikkelson's arguments. View "Mikkelson Land, LLLP v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Mesquite Power, LLC owns the Mesquite Power Plant, which operates under a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) guaranteeing specific electrical capacity to buyers in exchange for fixed payments. For the 2019 tax year, the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) valued the plant at $196,870,000 using a cost-based approach as mandated by A.R.S. § 42-14156. Mesquite challenged this valuation in tax court, arguing that it exceeded the market value of the property, which they claimed was $105,000,000 based on the income approach, excluding income from the PPA.The Arizona Tax Court ruled partially in favor of Mesquite, determining that the PPA was a non-taxable, intangible asset and should not be included in the property valuation. However, the court allowed for the possibility that cash flows from the PPA could be considered in the valuation. At trial, Mesquite's expert valued the property at $105,000,000 using the income approach without the PPA, while ADOR's expert valued it at $432,000,000, including the PPA income. The tax court sided with Mesquite, setting the value at $105,000,000. ADOR appealed.The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the tax court's decision, holding that the PPA must be considered in the property valuation as it enhances the value of the plant. The court emphasized that any competent appraisal must reflect the property's current usage, which includes the PPA.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that income from the PPA may be considered under the income approach if it is relevant to the property's income derivable as a power plant. The court also clarified that A.R.S. § 42-11054(C)(1) does not mandate the consideration of the PPA under the "current usage" requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing both parties to offer new valuations consistent with this opinion. The Court of Appeals' opinion was vacated. View "MESQUITE v. ADOR" on Justia Law

AGK Sierra De Montserrat, L.P. (AGK) entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) with Comerica Bank (Comerica) for the purchase of lots in a residential subdivision. The PSA included an indemnity provision requiring Comerica to indemnify AGK against claims arising from Comerica's position as the declarant. After the sale, Westwood Montserrat, Ltd. (Westwood) initiated several lawsuits against AGK, claiming declarant rights. Comerica refused to indemnify AGK, leading AGK to sue Comerica for breach of the indemnity provision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that Comerica breached the indemnity agreement and awarded AGK attorney fees incurred in the underlying lawsuits with Westwood. Additionally, the district court, relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in DeWitt v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., awarded AGK attorney fees for the present breach of contract suit against Comerica. Comerica appealed the award of attorney fees for the present litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's award of attorney fees for the present litigation. The Ninth Circuit held that DeWitt was only binding in the absence of subsequent indications from California courts that the interpretation was incorrect. Since DeWitt, California appellate courts have uniformly indicated that first-party attorney fees are not recoverable under an indemnity provision unless explicitly stated. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the attorney fees were otherwise recoverable under the PSA's attorney fees provision. The court emphasized that indemnity provisions generally cover third-party claims, not first-party litigation costs, unless specific language indicates otherwise. View "AGK SIERRA DE MONTSERRAT, L.P. V. COMERICA BANK" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was electrocuted while carrying a long-handled aluminum tool at a construction site. The tool either touched or came close to a high-voltage power line owned by the defendant utility company. The plaintiff sustained severe injuries, including amputations and a traumatic brain injury. He filed a lawsuit against the general contractor and the utility company, alleging negligence and premises liability.The Wayne Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary disposition. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the general contractor was not liable under the common work area doctrine and that the utility company did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition. The court found genuine issues of material fact regarding three of the four elements of the common work area doctrine for the general contractor. Specifically, there were factual disputes about the height of the power lines and whether the general contractor took reasonable steps to guard against the danger. The court also found that multiple subcontractors were exposed to the risk, satisfying the requirement of a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers in a common work area.Regarding the utility company, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether the power lines were properly maintained and whether the injury was foreseeable. The court concluded that the utility company had a duty to ensure the safety of the power lines, given the pre-injury communications and the known dangers of high-reaching conductive tools.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "El-Jamaly V Kirco Manix Construction Llc" on Justia Law

A developer proposed constructing a 12-unit residential condominium in downtown Lafayette, California, on a parcel mostly occupied by a vacant, dilapidated convalescent hospital. The City of Lafayette determined the project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, classifying it as infill development. Nahid Nassiri, who owns an adjacent office building, challenged this decision, arguing the site had value as habitat for rare species and that the project would significantly affect air quality.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted Nassiri's petition, finding insufficient evidence to support the City's determination that the site had no value as habitat for rare species. However, the court rejected Nassiri's other claims regarding general plan consistency, air quality effects, and mitigation measures. The developer and the City filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the project site, as defined by recent case law, did not include the area with potential habitat. The trial court granted the motion, leading to the denial of Nassiri's petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the City's determination that the project site had no value as habitat for rare species, specifically the oak titmouse and Nuttall’s woodpecker. The court also upheld the City's finding that the project would not significantly affect air quality, dismissing Nassiri's reliance on a health risk assessment that did not accurately reflect the project's construction characteristics. Lastly, the court declined to address the "unusual circumstances" exception to the CEQA exemption, as Nassiri did not properly raise this issue in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed. View "Nassiri v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

Brett Del Valle was sued by Alum Rock Riverside, LLC in California for breach of contract, resulting in a judgment against him for over $4 million. Alum Rock domesticated this judgment in Utah and recorded it with the Weber County Recorder’s Office. At the time of recording, the property in question was held by a revocable trust established by Brett and his wife, but the trust sold the property to the Mulligans before Alum Rock applied for a writ of execution to seize and sell the property.The Third District Court upheld the writ of execution despite the Mulligans' objections. They argued that Alum Rock failed to create a valid judgment lien because it did not record the judgment in the registry of judgments, that the writ was not available since the trust held the title when the judgment was domesticated, and that the court lacked jurisdiction as the property was in a different judicial district. The district court rejected these arguments, holding that recording the judgment with the county recorder was sufficient to create a lien, the writ was valid because Brett retained ownership indicia over the property, and the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that since July 1, 2002, a judgment lien is created by recording the judgment with the county recorder, not by filing it in the registry of judgments. The court also determined that Brett owned the property for purposes of the lien because he retained control over the trust. Finally, the court found no relevant limitation on the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ, even though the property was located in a different judicial district. View "Mulligan v. Alum Rock Riverside" on Justia Law

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law