Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Citizens of a town submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, seeking a referendum on a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures and requested the reversal of the zoning changes. However, it did not reference the specific ordinance or request a referendum vote. The Commissioners determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum.The Circuit Court for Harford County reviewed the case and ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid. The court found that the Commissioners should have submitted the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making any determination on its validity. The court also ruled that the Commissioners' action by verbal motion was insufficient and that they should have acted by ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the charter's requirements for a valid petition for referendum. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to submit the document to the Board of Election Judges for signature verification before making a threshold determination of its validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by verbal motion, as memorialized in the meeting minutes.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

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In 2016, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) acquired the high bid at a foreclosure sale of Anthony Michael Branch's property. Fannie Mae then initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court to gain possession. The court ruled in favor of Fannie Mae, and Branch appealed. During the appeal, Fannie Mae sold the property to Roberto Pina Cardoso. Cardoso intervened in the case and was awarded use and occupancy payments from Branch. The Appeals Court later vacated the Housing Court's judgment for possession, declaring it moot since Fannie Mae no longer had a possessory interest, and required Cardoso to establish his right to possession in a new case.The Housing Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and dismissed Branch's counterclaims. Branch appealed, and during the appeal, Cardoso was allowed to intervene and was joined as a party with Fannie Mae. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment for possession as moot but affirmed the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appeals Court's mootness determination. The court held that Cardoso, having acquired Fannie Mae's interest, maintained a live stake in the adjudication of the judgment for possession. The court affirmed the Housing Court's order allowing Cardoso to intervene and be joined as a party. It also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims. The court concluded that the foreclosure was valid and that Pentagon Federal Credit Union, as the authorized agent of the note holder, had the authority to foreclose. View "Fannie Mae v. Branch" on Justia Law

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The case involves a landlord-tenant eviction action where the defendant, Jo-Ann Albanese, was ordered to vacate her apartment by August 1, 2021, by the plaintiff, Red Gate Motel, Inc. Ms. Albanese did not vacate the property and sent a rent payment for August, which was returned uncashed by Red Gate. Red Gate then filed an eviction complaint in District Court, which ruled in favor of Red Gate, awarding possession and damages. Ms. Albanese appealed to the Superior Court.In the Superior Court, Ms. Albanese filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss the eviction action, arguing that Red Gate accepted her rent payment without proper notice. The trial justice deferred ruling on this motion until all evidence was presented. The trial spanned five days, during which Ms. Albanese attempted to introduce a recording to support her retaliatory defense. On the final day of trial, Ms. Albanese was absent due to a medical emergency, and the trial justice rendered a bench decision in her absence, awarding possession and $6,000 in damages to Red Gate. Ms. Albanese's subsequent motions to vacate the judgment and to reconsider were denied by the trial justice.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice. The court noted that Ms. Albanese failed to provide a complete transcript of the lower court proceedings, which limited the review. The trial justice's findings, including the decision to deny the motion to vacate based on Ms. Albanese's purposeful delay, were upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders of the Superior Court, concluding that Ms. Albanese was given a fair opportunity to present her case and that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. View "Red Gate Motel, Inc. v. Albanese" on Justia Law

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Demona Freeman secured a loan to purchase her home, which was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon) and serviced by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. After falling behind on her mortgage payments, BNY Mellon initiated a foreclosure action. Freeman filed for bankruptcy and eventually cured her mortgage default through bankruptcy payments. Despite this, Ocwen inaccurately reported her loan as delinquent and began rejecting her monthly payments, leading BNY Mellon to file a second foreclosure action, which was later dismissed. Freeman sued Ocwen and BNY Mellon, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed Freeman’s FCRA claim and granted summary judgment on her FDCPA claim, citing lack of standing. Freeman appealed both rulings. She argued that Ocwen failed to conduct a reasonable investigation after being notified by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) of her dispute over the delinquent loan reporting. She also claimed that Ocwen’s erroneous reporting and collection practices caused her various injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCRA claim, finding that Freeman failed to specify which CRA she notified, thus not providing Ocwen fair notice of the claim. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the FDCPA claim, concluding that Freeman lacked standing. The court determined that Freeman did not provide sufficient evidence of concrete injuries, such as monetary harm or intangible injuries closely related to common law analogues like defamation or invasion of privacy. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves a boundary dispute between two siblings, Susan Dzingle and Thomas Krcilek, over their adjoining tracts of real property in Valley County, Nebraska. Dzingle owns the northwest quarter, and Krcilek owns the northeast quarter of Section 17. The dispute arose when Krcilek discovered a government survey marker indicating that the true boundary line was approximately 20 feet west of an existing fence that had been in place since at least 1946. Dzingle believed the fence was the true boundary and filed a complaint to establish it as such.The district court for Valley County dismissed Dzingle’s claims based on mutual recognition and acquiescence and the common grantor rule, finding that the parties had not owned their properties for the requisite 10-year period and that the common grantor rule did not apply to quarter sections. The court also rejected Dzingle’s request to reform the deeds based on mutual or unilateral mistake, as there was no evidence of inequitable or fraudulent conduct by Krcilek. The court accepted the survey marker as the true boundary and granted Krcilek’s counterclaims to eject Dzingle from his property and order her to construct a new fence along the survey’s boundary line.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the common grantor rule applies only to conveyances described by lot numbers, not by quarter sections. The court also agreed that the doctrine of mutual recognition and acquiescence was inapplicable because the parties had not owned their properties for 10 years and their mother, the previous owner, could not have acquiesced to the boundary. The court found no error in the district court’s acceptance of the survey marker as the true boundary and rejected Dzingle’s claim for reformation of the deeds. View "Dzingle v. Krcilek" on Justia Law

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Daoud M. Janini and Feryal Janini filed a complaint against London Townhouses Condominium Association, alleging that the association failed to maintain the sidewalk by not removing snow and ice, leading to Daoud Janini's fall and subsequent brain injury. The plaintiffs owned a condominium unit in the complex, and the association was responsible for maintaining common areas, including the sidewalk where the incident occurred.The Wayne Circuit Court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition in part, dismissing all claims except for the premises-liability claim. The defendant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that because the plaintiffs were co-owners of the land, they could not bring a premises-liability claim. The plaintiffs then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a co-owner of a condominium unit is considered an invitee when entering the common elements of the condominium project. The court determined that the condominium association owes a duty of reasonable care to protect co-owners from dangerous conditions in these common areas. The court overruled the previous decision in Francescutti v. Fox Chase Condo Ass’n, which had precluded such claims. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association" on Justia Law

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Donald and Mary Fuger own forty acres of land in Wyoming. Larry Wagoner began using a five-acre section of this land for his oilfield business around 2008. The Fugers and Wagoner agreed to construct two buildings on the site, with Wagoner handling construction and the Fugers securing financing. They did not formalize this agreement in writing. A lease agreement was signed, giving Wagoner exclusive use of the buildings for five years. Wagoner claimed there was an oral agreement to transfer ownership of one building and the land to him in exchange for his construction work and loan payments, which the Fugers denied.The District Court of Sweetwater County initially found in favor of Wagoner, awarding him damages for breach of the oral contract. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed this decision in Fuger v. Wagoner, 2020 WY 154, ruling the oral contract void because Mrs. Fuger did not join the agreement. The case was remanded to consider Wagoner’s equitable claims. On remand, the district court found the Fugers were unjustly enriched by Wagoner’s construction work and awarded him damages, offsetting some of these due to his use of the buildings. The court also awarded prejudgment interest on a portion of the damages.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the district court did not err in offsetting Wagoner’s damages by the actual rent he received rather than the fair rental value of the second building. The court also upheld the award of prejudgment interest, finding that a portion of Wagoner’s damages were liquidated and thus subject to such interest. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in its equitable determinations regarding offset and prejudgment interest. View "Fuger v. Wagoner" on Justia Law

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In October 2014, while guiding a hunting party on their property, the Olsens' son observed a crop duster spraying herbicide, which allegedly damaged the Olsens' ponderosa pine trees. The Olsens claimed the herbicide caused significant damage and death to the trees. They filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who argued that expert testimony was required to prove causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, leading to the Olsens' appeal.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Spink County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that without expert testimony, a jury would be left to speculate about the cause of the damage to the trees. The court noted that the fields of chemistry, botany, and agronomy were beyond the understanding of a typical layperson. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the Olsens' complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the need for expert testimony to establish causation for the damage to the trees. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the claims of trespass, statutory nuisance, and common law nuisance, noting that these claims do not require proof of damages to survive summary judgment. The court remanded these claims for further proceedings, allowing the Olsens to potentially recover nominal damages. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel and civil conspiracy due to the lack of evidence on causation for damages. View "Estate of Olsen v. Agtegra Cooperative" on Justia Law

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Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

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The case involves Pure Oasis LLC, which applied for a conditional use permit to operate a recreational cannabis dispensary in Boston. The building commissioner denied the permit, and Pure Oasis appealed to the Board of Appeal of Boston. After multiple hearings, the board approved the permit. William Shoucair, an abutter to the property, opposed the permit, arguing it would negatively impact the neighborhood and filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Suffolk County, appealing the board's decision.The Superior Court judge ordered each plaintiff to post a $3,500 bond, despite not finding the appeal to be in bad faith. The judge applied the standard from Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, which allows for a bond to discourage frivolous appeals while not obstructing meritorious ones. The plaintiffs sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Appeals Court stayed the bond order and allowed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that under Section 11 of the Boston zoning enabling act, a preliminary finding of bad faith or malice is not required before imposing a bond for damages. The court reaffirmed the standard from Damaskos, which balances discouraging frivolous appeals with not obstructing meritorious ones. The court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court judge in setting the bond amount and affirmed the order. View "Shoucair v. Board of Appeal of Boston" on Justia Law