Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud related to property rights. The defendants, through their business, REO Holdings, LLC, bought properties at tax sales and used redemption rights to obtain titles, some of which were later found to be fraudulent. The case involved four specific properties where the defendants allegedly used misrepresentation and forged documents to redeem and sell the properties at a profit.The Chancery Court for Davidson County initially dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of redemption rights, finding that unjust enrichment required a voluntary conferral of a benefit and that Tennessee law did not recognize conversion of intangible property rights. The court also denied class certification. After a jury trial, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence preponderated against the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. The court also held that a claim for unjust enrichment does not require a voluntary conferral of a benefit, overruling previous case law to the extent it held otherwise. Finally, the court affirmed that Tennessee law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Family Trust Services LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a property owned by Indiana Land Trust #3082, located in Hammond, Indiana, which houses a lucrative fireworks and tobacco business operated by Omar and Haitham Abuzir. The City of Hammond seeks to use its eminent domain power to take this property to build a road connecting Indianapolis Boulevard and the Water Gardens neighborhood. The Abuzirs allege that the City’s actions are part of a conspiracy involving political motives and favoritism towards competitors who support the mayor.The Hammond Redevelopment Commission initially offered to purchase the property in 2018, but the Abuzirs declined. Consequently, the Commission initiated a condemnation action in Indiana state court under the state’s eminent domain statute. The Abuzirs objected, arguing that the taking was for a private purpose and motivated by ill will. Unable to assert counterclaims in state court, they filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional and federal law violations, including claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Abuzirs' third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the City had a legitimate government interest in building a road and that the Abuzirs failed to state a claim for equal protection, substantive due process, or civil conspiracy. The court noted that the Abuzirs' complaint itself provided a rational basis for the City’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the Abuzirs failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim because the City’s actions had a rational basis. The court also found that the proposed substantive due process claim was futile as the Abuzirs did not allege a deprivation of a protected interest. Lastly, the court upheld the denial of leave to add a § 1983 conspiracy claim, as the Abuzirs failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. (the Resort) and the State of Maine. In 1986, the State sold a ski area, along with easements and a portion of the abutting parcel, to the Big Squaw Mountain Corporation (BSMC). The deed included restrictive covenants prohibiting timber harvesting and requiring the continued public use of the ski area. In 1995, the Resort acquired the property, including the restrictive covenants. The Resort later closed half of the ski area and harvested timber from the area, actions which the State argued violated the covenants.The Superior Court of Kennebec County granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Resort had breached both covenants. The court ordered the Resort to pay damages for the timber harvested and to place funds into an escrow account for the repair and reopening of the ski area.The Resort appealed, arguing that the State could not enforce the covenants as it did not own a parcel that benefited from them, that the court erred in its interpretation of the public use covenant, and that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the public use covenant was unreasonable, the State failed to notify the Resort of its alleged breach, and the State was barred from enforcing the covenant by the doctrine of laches.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State could enforce the covenants without owning a benefiting parcel, that the public use covenant required the Resort to make reasonable efforts to keep the whole ski area open for public use, and that the doctrine of laches did not apply as the Resort had not shown that the State's delay in enforcement was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the Resort. View "State v. Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

This case revolves around a dispute over an insurance claim following a house fire. The plaintiff, William Werner, owned a home in Springfield, Illinois, which was in foreclosure when it burned down in 2017. Werner's home insurance policy was with Auto-Owners Insurance Company. After the fire, Werner filed a claim seeking to recover his policy limit on the home itself and two smaller coverages, totaling just over $190,000. Auto-Owners denied Werner’s claim for the full replacement value of the home, arguing that Werner had lost any insurable interest in the full value of the property after the judicial sale occurred and all of Werner’s rights of redemption had expired.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The district court ruled in favor of Auto-Owners, holding that at the time of the fire, Werner’s only remaining insurable interest in the property was based on his narrow right under Illinois law to occupy the home until 30 days after the judicial sale was confirmed. The court awarded Werner the rental value of that temporary right, which amounted to just under $4,000.Werner appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation of Illinois insurance law, stating that Werner's insurable interest at the time of the fire was limited to the value of his temporary right of possession. The court noted that Werner still held legal title to the property when the fire occurred, but he had no legal right to redeem it from foreclosure or otherwise retain it. The court concluded that Werner's insurable interest did not extend to the full value of the property. View "Werner v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a relationship and cohabitated from 2002 to 2022. They shared a bank account and ran an intermingled cattle herd. The dispute arose over the ownership of a property and cattle, and the enforcement of oral loan agreements. The property in question was initially owned by Anthony and Jean Ehrmantrout, who transferred it to each other in 1994. After their deaths in 2001, the property was distributed to their grandchildren, Chet, Carlos, and Marty Meyer, as co-trustees of the Jean Ehrmantrout Residuary Trust. In 2004, Marty Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Gary Meyer. In 2010, Gary Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Mary Roth.The District Court found that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession and had valid title when he transferred it to Mary Roth in 2010. The court also found that Gary Meyer had converted 13 of Mary Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, awarding her damages. Both parties appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had erred in finding that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession. The Supreme Court also found that the District Court had erred in admitting certain evidence, in failing to determine when the alleged conversion of cattle began, in valuing the converted cattle, and in finding that Gary Meyer owed on loan contracts that were unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation claim brought by Bill Charles, a real estate professional and president of the homeowners' association of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, against Donna McQueen, a resident of the same community. McQueen had posted a critical review of Charles on Google, accusing him of using misleading tactics to deceive home buyers. Charles filed a defamation and false light claim against McQueen, who sought dismissal of the claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice.The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, agreeing that Charles had to prove actual malice for his false light claim but holding that Charles was not a public figure and therefore did not need to prove actual malice for his defamation claim.The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given his voluntary and prominent role in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. The court further held that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. The court also rejected Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. The court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Charles v. McQueen" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between SR Construction (SRC), a construction company, and RE Palm Springs II, L.L.C. (RPS), a company formed to take title to a hotel property. SRC was hired to build a hotel in California but was terminated before completion, leaving it with a demand for $14 million in unpaid work. After several failed attempts to recover its dues, SRC held onto certain personal property left over from the hotel project. The bankruptcy court ordered SRC to turn over the personal property, which SRC appealed.The lower courts had a series of interactions with this case. The bankruptcy court initially ordered SRC to turn over the personal property. SRC appealed this decision, challenging the bankruptcy court's power to order the turnover and the validity of the most recent hotel owner's claim to the personal property. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the Sale Order. It also affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Hall had obtained title to the Personal Property and had not waived its right to the Personal Property by taking it "as is."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court's order was part of its undisputed power to order the sale of a bankruptcy debtor's assets. It also rejected SRC's arguments about ownership of the assets in this case. The court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Turnover Order because that order interpreted and enforced the Sale Order. It also concluded that because the Turnover Order is integral to and inseparable from RPS's bankruptcy, it is a core matter. Therefore, issuing the Turnover Order was entirely within the bankruptcy court's authority. The court also affirmed the conclusion that title to the Personal Property passed from SRC to Palm Springs, then to RPS, and finally to Hall. View "SR Construction v. RE Palm Springs II" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by homeowners in the Falcon Ridge subdivision in Billings, Montana, against Buscher Construction and Development, Inc., and other related entities and individuals (collectively referred to as the "Buschers"). The homeowners alleged that the Buschers negligently designed and developed the subdivisions, failed to construct homes to mitigate against the possibility of differential settlement on hydro-collapsible soils, and failed to disclose material adverse facts known to them as the original owners of all the lots within the subdivision.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, certified the class action. The Buschers appealed this decision, arguing that the proposed class did not satisfy the prerequisites for class certification under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and that the court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The court also found that the class action was superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the homeowners' claims were not dependent upon individual conduct but on the Buschers' alleged uniform negligence. The court also noted that the lower court has the discretion to revisit certification if class claims no longer predominate as the case proceeds. View "Busher v. Cook" on Justia Law

The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of local property owners, sued to halt the construction, arguing it would violate local building height and bulk restrictions. The Regents countered that as a state entity, they were immune from local building and zoning regulations when engaging in governmental activities, such as constructing university buildings. The trial court disagreed, ruling that the question of whether the construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity could not be resolved at this stage.The trial court concluded that the Regents' immunity depended on whether the proposed construction was a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The court further concluded that the exemption only applies when a project is solely for educational purposes. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court held that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. Therefore, the project falls within the Regents’ broad public purpose, and the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue. The court concluded that the demurrer should have been sustained and issued the writ of mandate. The court also ordered modifications to the published opinion filed on June 13, 2024, but there was no change in the judgment. View "Regents of the University of Calif. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law