Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

AUUE, Inc. applied for a zoning permit to develop a medical center, including a hospital, medical clinic, and professional offices, on five parcels of land in Jefferson Hills Borough. The Borough's Zoning Officer issued a use permit, recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the Office Park District (O-P District), but conditioned the permit on AUUE obtaining further approvals before any development could commence. Residents of Jefferson Hills appealed, arguing that the application violated several provisions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision, concluding that the proposed medical center was not permitted by right in the O-P District and that the Zoning Officer exceeded his authority by issuing a permit without ensuring full compliance with the Ordinance. The ZHB identified several violations in the application, including improper use of accessory parking lots and lack of direct access to a collector or arterial road.The Commonwealth Court reversed the ZHB’s decision, holding that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit recognizing the proposed use as allowed by right in the O-P District. The court found that the ZHB should have limited its review to whether the proposed use was permitted by right, rather than considering overall compliance with the Ordinance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit for the limited purpose of recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the O-P District. The ZHB was required to limit its review to this issue and was not permitted to overturn the Zoning Officer’s decision based on other potential violations of the Ordinance. View "AUUE, Inc. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills" on Justia Law

David and Amy LeFevre own a residential property in Deering, New Hampshire, adjacent to a property owned by Tiffany and James Hogan. In 2002, a deed (the Spragg-McEwan deed) conveyed the LeFevre property and included a reservation for a 30-foot-wide easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. This easement was intended to provide access and utility purposes. The Hogans began using this easement, leading the LeFevres to file a lawsuit seeking to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the easement was invalid.The Superior Court initially granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the LeFevres. However, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Hogans, finding that the 2002 Spragg-McEwan deed validly created an easement over the LeFevre property. The court denied the LeFevres' motion for reconsideration and clarification, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Spragg-McEwan deed clearly intended to create an easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. The court rejected the "stranger to the deed" doctrine, which would have invalidated the easement because it was reserved for a third party not named in the deed. The court emphasized that modern principles of deed interpretation prioritize the intent of the parties over archaic formalistic requirements. The court also found that the deed was properly delivered and accepted, as evidenced by its recording and the clear intent expressed in a confirmatory deed. Thus, the easement was validly created, and the Hogans were entitled to use it. View "LeFevre v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Samuel Boytor, an engineer and businessman, and his wife Carol, defaulted on loans they had personally guaranteed. They entered into a settlement agreement with EFS Bank’s successor, restructuring their debt into three new promissory notes secured by mortgages on their properties. PNC Bank, which eventually held these notes, filed a complaint in 2018 against the Boytors for defaulting on two of the notes. PNC sought foreclosure on the Boytors’ residential property and a money judgment for the nonpayment of a separate note.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a bench trial and found in favor of PNC on both counts. The court ordered foreclosure on the Boytors’ residential property and issued a deficiency judgment after the property was sold. The Boytors appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that PNC had established a prima facie case for foreclosure by presenting the mortgage and underlying note. The Boytors’ affirmative defenses, including lack of consideration and payment of the notes, were rejected. The court found that the $203,000 note was supported by consideration and that the Boytors had not paid the note. Additionally, the court determined that the $200,000 note was not paid, and the release of the mortgage did not extinguish the underlying debt. The court also rejected the Boytors’ argument of accord and satisfaction, finding no evidence of a new arrangement to pay less than the outstanding debt. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Boytor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Coziahr filed a class action against Otay Water District, alleging that Otay's tiered water rates for single-family residential customers violated Section 6(b)(3) of Proposition 218, which mandates that property-related fees not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. The trial court certified the class and found that Otay failed to meet its burden of demonstrating compliance with Section 6(b)(3). In the remedy phase, the court awarded an estimated refund of approximately $18 million, with monthly increases until Otay imposed compliant rates. Otay appealed the liability decision and damages, while Coziahr appealed only as to damages.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that Otay's tiered rates were based on non-cost objectives like conservation and did not correlate with the actual cost of providing water service. The court determined that Otay's reliance on peaking factors and adherence to industry standards were insufficient to justify the tiered rates. The court also found that Otay discriminated against single-family residential customers by charging them more for water than other customer classes without a cogent reason. The court rejected Otay's peaking factor analysis and Mumm's independent analysis as flawed and unsupported by the record.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's liability determination, holding that Otay did not establish its tiered rates complied with Section 6(b)(3). The court found that Otay's evidence did not withstand independent review and that the trial court properly applied the principles from Capistrano and Palmdale. However, the appellate court reversed the refund amount, finding the trial court's calculations unreasonable due to reliance on projected data and a proxy from another case. The matter was remanded for a new trial on the refund amount, including monthly increases and prejudgment interest. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Coziahr v. Otay Wat. Dist." on Justia Law

A commercial tenant and landlord entered into a contract for the construction and lease of a warehouse, with the landlord also acting as the general contractor. The contract included a waiver of subrogation, where both parties waived subrogation against each other for certain losses, including those caused by their subcontractors. After the warehouse sustained weather damage, the tenant’s insurer sought to recoup insurance payments by suing the subcontractors.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of the subcontractors, concluding that they were intended beneficiaries of the waiver of subrogation in the contract between the tenant and landlord. The court did not consider any extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed this decision, finding that the waiver of subrogation in the contract did not unambiguously benefit the subcontractors and that the subcontractors were not intended third-party beneficiaries.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the waiver of subrogation in the contract between the tenant and landlord did not extend to the subcontractors. The court found that the language of the waiver was unambiguous and did not show an intent to benefit the subcontractors. However, the court found that the waiver of subrogation included in the subcontracts was ambiguous regarding whether it applied to the tenant’s insurer’s claims against the subcontractors. Therefore, the court held that extrinsic evidence was needed to determine the parties' intent regarding the scope of the subrogation waiver in the subcontracts.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, reversing the Circuit Court's summary judgment in favor of the subcontractors, and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider extrinsic evidence. View "Lithko Contracting v. XL Insurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

Citizens of a town submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, seeking a referendum on a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures and requested the reversal of the zoning changes. However, it did not reference the specific ordinance or request a referendum vote. The Commissioners determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum.The Circuit Court for Harford County reviewed the case and ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid. The court found that the Commissioners should have submitted the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making any determination on its validity. The court also ruled that the Commissioners' action by verbal motion was insufficient and that they should have acted by ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the charter's requirements for a valid petition for referendum. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to submit the document to the Board of Election Judges for signature verification before making a threshold determination of its validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by verbal motion, as memorialized in the meeting minutes.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) acquired the high bid at a foreclosure sale of Anthony Michael Branch's property. Fannie Mae then initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court to gain possession. The court ruled in favor of Fannie Mae, and Branch appealed. During the appeal, Fannie Mae sold the property to Roberto Pina Cardoso. Cardoso intervened in the case and was awarded use and occupancy payments from Branch. The Appeals Court later vacated the Housing Court's judgment for possession, declaring it moot since Fannie Mae no longer had a possessory interest, and required Cardoso to establish his right to possession in a new case.The Housing Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and dismissed Branch's counterclaims. Branch appealed, and during the appeal, Cardoso was allowed to intervene and was joined as a party with Fannie Mae. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment for possession as moot but affirmed the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appeals Court's mootness determination. The court held that Cardoso, having acquired Fannie Mae's interest, maintained a live stake in the adjudication of the judgment for possession. The court affirmed the Housing Court's order allowing Cardoso to intervene and be joined as a party. It also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims. The court concluded that the foreclosure was valid and that Pentagon Federal Credit Union, as the authorized agent of the note holder, had the authority to foreclose. View "Fannie Mae v. Branch" on Justia Law

The case involves a landlord-tenant eviction action where the defendant, Jo-Ann Albanese, was ordered to vacate her apartment by August 1, 2021, by the plaintiff, Red Gate Motel, Inc. Ms. Albanese did not vacate the property and sent a rent payment for August, which was returned uncashed by Red Gate. Red Gate then filed an eviction complaint in District Court, which ruled in favor of Red Gate, awarding possession and damages. Ms. Albanese appealed to the Superior Court.In the Superior Court, Ms. Albanese filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss the eviction action, arguing that Red Gate accepted her rent payment without proper notice. The trial justice deferred ruling on this motion until all evidence was presented. The trial spanned five days, during which Ms. Albanese attempted to introduce a recording to support her retaliatory defense. On the final day of trial, Ms. Albanese was absent due to a medical emergency, and the trial justice rendered a bench decision in her absence, awarding possession and $6,000 in damages to Red Gate. Ms. Albanese's subsequent motions to vacate the judgment and to reconsider were denied by the trial justice.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice. The court noted that Ms. Albanese failed to provide a complete transcript of the lower court proceedings, which limited the review. The trial justice's findings, including the decision to deny the motion to vacate based on Ms. Albanese's purposeful delay, were upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders of the Superior Court, concluding that Ms. Albanese was given a fair opportunity to present her case and that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. View "Red Gate Motel, Inc. v. Albanese" on Justia Law

Demona Freeman secured a loan to purchase her home, which was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon) and serviced by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. After falling behind on her mortgage payments, BNY Mellon initiated a foreclosure action. Freeman filed for bankruptcy and eventually cured her mortgage default through bankruptcy payments. Despite this, Ocwen inaccurately reported her loan as delinquent and began rejecting her monthly payments, leading BNY Mellon to file a second foreclosure action, which was later dismissed. Freeman sued Ocwen and BNY Mellon, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed Freeman’s FCRA claim and granted summary judgment on her FDCPA claim, citing lack of standing. Freeman appealed both rulings. She argued that Ocwen failed to conduct a reasonable investigation after being notified by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) of her dispute over the delinquent loan reporting. She also claimed that Ocwen’s erroneous reporting and collection practices caused her various injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCRA claim, finding that Freeman failed to specify which CRA she notified, thus not providing Ocwen fair notice of the claim. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the FDCPA claim, concluding that Freeman lacked standing. The court determined that Freeman did not provide sufficient evidence of concrete injuries, such as monetary harm or intangible injuries closely related to common law analogues like defamation or invasion of privacy. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a boundary dispute between two siblings, Susan Dzingle and Thomas Krcilek, over their adjoining tracts of real property in Valley County, Nebraska. Dzingle owns the northwest quarter, and Krcilek owns the northeast quarter of Section 17. The dispute arose when Krcilek discovered a government survey marker indicating that the true boundary line was approximately 20 feet west of an existing fence that had been in place since at least 1946. Dzingle believed the fence was the true boundary and filed a complaint to establish it as such.The district court for Valley County dismissed Dzingle’s claims based on mutual recognition and acquiescence and the common grantor rule, finding that the parties had not owned their properties for the requisite 10-year period and that the common grantor rule did not apply to quarter sections. The court also rejected Dzingle’s request to reform the deeds based on mutual or unilateral mistake, as there was no evidence of inequitable or fraudulent conduct by Krcilek. The court accepted the survey marker as the true boundary and granted Krcilek’s counterclaims to eject Dzingle from his property and order her to construct a new fence along the survey’s boundary line.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the common grantor rule applies only to conveyances described by lot numbers, not by quarter sections. The court also agreed that the doctrine of mutual recognition and acquiescence was inapplicable because the parties had not owned their properties for 10 years and their mother, the previous owner, could not have acquiesced to the boundary. The court found no error in the district court’s acceptance of the survey marker as the true boundary and rejected Dzingle’s claim for reformation of the deeds. View "Dzingle v. Krcilek" on Justia Law