Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. On December 8, 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip-resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne crossed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located, "holding the handrail and being careful." However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne filed suit against Fisk and fictitiously named parties, alleging there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Fisk answered Byrne's complaint, moved for and received a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the City of Orange Beach ("the City") appealed a judgment entered in favor of Ian Boles in regard to a dispute over the City's inspection of Boles' property. Between 2013 and 2015 Boles constructed two eight-bedroom duplexes on property he owned located within the City limits ("the beachfront property"). In September 2015, Boles filed a building-permit application seeking a permit to construct two additional multiple-level duplexes on the beachfront property. Additionally, in October 2015, Boles filed a separate building-permit application for the construction of a single-family dwelling on another parcel of property that Boles owned within the City limits ("the Burkhart Drive property"). At the time of each permit request, Boles completed a "Home Builders Affidavit" attesting that he was the owner of the property; that he would be acting as his own contractor on the proposed project, which would not be offered for sale; and that he was, thus, exempt from the requirement that he be licensed under Alabama's Home Builders Licensure Law. The building-permit packages provided to Boles explained that a certificate of occupancy for the proposed structure would not be issued until, among other things, "a subcontractor list has been submitted to the [City's] Finance Department." Boles also received with each package a blank subcontractor form for identifying all subcontractors for the proposed project, which specified that it was due within 10 days of the issuance of the building permits. Boles proceeded with construction on the two properties without completing or returning the subcontractor form for either property. Boles's electrical subcontractor apparently contacted the City to request an electrical meter-release inspection upon completion of the electrical portion of that project; the City refused. Boles contended the City either lacked the authority to and/or were exceeding their authority in refusing to inspect the beachfront property until the City received information to which, according to Boles, it was not entitled. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred both in submitting Boles's damages claims to a jury and in denying the City's motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court's judgment was reversed, and these matters were remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles." on Justia Law

John and Amy Penrose bought a house in Montgomery. After moving in, they discovered multiple problems with the house and sued several parties that had been involved in the transaction, alleging that those parties' negligent or intentional acts had prevented the Penroses from discovering the house's problems before the purchase closed. During discovery, the Penroses failed to provide timely and complete responses to the defendants' discovery requests or to appear at two hearings on the resulting motions to compel. Following the second missed hearing, the circuit court dismissed the Penroses' lawsuit with prejudice. Invoking Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Penroses moved the trial court to reinstate their lawsuit, arguing among other things that the dismissal violated their due-process rights because no defendant had moved for dismissal and because the trial court had given them no indication that it was considering that sanction. The trial court denied their motion. The Penroses appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Penrose v. Garcia, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Alex and Jane Galea fell behind on the mortgage payments for their house in Tuscaloosa; as a result, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The property was eventually conveyed to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ("SVA"), which sent formal notice to the Galeas demanding they vacate the property. After the Galeas refused to do so, SVA initiated an ejectment action. The Galeas stated in their answer that they had evidence to prove that the foreclosure sale here was illegal, but they apparently never submitted that evidence to the trial court. Indeed, as the trial court noted in its judgment, the Galeas "did not offer any valid testimony or evidence" that would refute the evidence submitted by SVA. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of SVA. The Galeas appealed. But finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Galea v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Cody Durham filed suit against Jacob Cooper, alleging breach of a purchase agreement between them involving the sale of Cooper's residence. In August 2020, Durham saw a listing on the Facebook Marketplace social-media website advertising for sale Cooper's house and the two acres of real property on which the house was situated. Over text messages between Durham and Cooper, they agreed to a purchase price and closing date, with Cooper paying the closing costs. Durham testified that he did not engage any realtor or lawyer to help him with drafting the purchase agreement. Instead, he just Google-searched for "residential purchase agreement" and used the first fillable form generated by that search. One of the conditions of Durham's FHA loan was that the loan would not be approved unless the subject property's appraised value was confirmed by a certified appraiser. A certified appraiser appraised the property's value, but that value was subject to the condition that a storage shed in Cooper's backyard needed to be fixed or torn down. Cooper told Durham he "don't have the money" to fix or tear down the storage shed, so it would be up to Durham to take care of it. Cooper then sent Durham a text stating he was backing out of the deal because the closing date had passed, and the issue of the shed had not been resolved. Durham sought specific performance of the purchase agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Durham $79,000 in damages. Cooper appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court misapplied the law to the facts by measuring Durham's damages based on the difference between the contract price and the subject property's assessed market value in a new appraisal because the proper legal standard for measuring damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real property was the difference between the contract price and the subject property's market value at the time of the breach. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a recalculation of damages. View "Cooper v. Durham" on Justia Law

In appeal no. SC-2023-0198, Louie Smith, Emily Smith, and Joshua Smith appealed a circuit court judgment declaring that Katherine Stowe had a prescriptive easement over the Smiths' property to allow her to access her property for agricultural and recreational purposes. In appeal no. SC-2023-0200, the Smiths appealed a judgment granting Stowe a right-of-way over both their property and a railroad crossing owned by Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk"). Finding no reversible error in either case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgments. View "Smith v. Stowe" on Justia Law

These consolidated appellate proceedings consisted of an appeal filed by Regina Daily ("Regina") and The Daily Catch, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Shores Seafood ("The Daily Catch") (case number SC-2022-0672); a cross-appeal by Greg Esser ("Greg") (case number SC-2022-0673); and a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Patrick Daily ("Patrick"), Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, Inc., d/b/a Remax of Orange Beach ("White Sands"), and Blue Palms, LLC (case number SC-2022-0992). The appeal, the cross-appeal, and the mandamus petition all involved the same underlying action filed by Greg -- in his individual capacity, in his capacity as the trustee of the Wallene R. Esser Living Trust ("the trust"), and in his capacity as an administrator ad litem of the estate of Wallene R. Esser ("the estate") -- against Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms. Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment awarding damages in favor of Greg and against Regina and The Daily Catch; the circuit court denied Greg's claims as to all the other defendants. Regina and The Daily Catch filed their appeal, and Greg filed his cross-appeal. Later, Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms petitioned for mandamus relief. Greg and Regina were Wallene's children and were beneficiaries to Wallene's estate. Generally, Greg alleged that "[t]he trust has been harmed and depleted by the acts and omissions of the defendants." Greg asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, requesting money damages and declaratory relief. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in case numbers SC-2022-0672 and SC-2022-0673, and granted the mandamus petition filed in case number SC-2022-0992. View "Daily, et al. v. Esser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Janice Morrison appealed a circuit court's judgment entered in favor of defendants-counterclaim plaintiffs Torry May, Sr., and Angela May. This case involved two parcels of property in Mobile, Lots 24 and 25. In 2008, the Morrison's parents, the Reddicks, executed a mortgage on Lot 25 in favor of GMAC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a GMAC Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"). Yolanda Reddick died in 2009. Shortly after Yolanda's death, Joseph Reddick moved out of state and died shortly later. Lot 24 was sold at a tax sale; GMAC foreclosed on Lot 25, and Fannie Mae purchased Lot 25 at the foreclosure sale in 2012. In early 2013, the Mays purchased Lot 25 from Fannie Mae, and Morrison purchased Lot 24 from the State. The Mays testified they waited until the redemption period ended before they started making improvements to the house. Torry testified he had not expanded the part of the house that sat on Lot 24. Morrison testified that, at the time she purchased Lot 24, she did not know that parts of the house, the driveway, and the storage shed were located on Lot 24 and that she did not discover that information until sometime later. At some point in 2018, Morrison walked up the driveway on Lot 24, and Torry told her to get off his property. She told Torry that it was not his property, the police were called, ultimately leading to this litigation. In its judgment, the trial court found that the Mays were entitled to redeem Lot 24 pursuant to § 40-10-82 because they were in possession of that property Morrison had not adversely possessed Lot 24 for a period of three years. The Alabama Supreme Court found the undisputed evidence established the Mays had never been owners of Lot 24 and never ever held title that property. Thus, the exception in § 40-10-82 did not apply. Because the Mays filed their counterclaim to redeem Lot 24 after the expiration of the time to redeem, the trial court erred when entered its August 11, 2022 judgment determining that the Mays had properly exercised the right to redeem Lot 24, and when it subsequently entered its November 3, 2022, order quieting title to Lot 24 in favor of the Mays. View "Morrison v. May" on Justia Law