Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a boundary-line dispute between neighbors: Kathleen LaFlore sued her neighbors, Robert and Katherine Huggins, seeking to have the court establish the true boundary line between her property and the Hugginses' property. LaFlore alleged she had acquired legal title to the disputed property -- which consisted of a ravine ("the gully") and an adjoining strip of land -- through adverse possession. The trial court rejected LaFlore's claim and declared the true boundary to be the western survey line that existed when her family originally purchased their home in 1962. LaFlore filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied. LaFlore appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "LaFlore v. Huggins" on Justia Law

Dolgencorp, LLC, appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Deborah Gilliam. In March 2016, Daisy Pearl White Freeman was operating her vehicle in the parking lot of the Northwood Shopping Center. Freeman lost control of the vehicle, ran over a six-inch curb, crossed a sidewalk, and crashed through the storefront of a Dollar General store, striking Gilliam -- a customer of the store. Gilliam sustained serious and permanent injuries. According to an Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash Report, Freeman reported that, immediately before the accident, she had been traveling across the shopping center parking lot when the vehicle's steering wheel began to shake, the vehicle jerked to the left, and the vehicle's brakes failed. The traffic report also indicated that witnesses had observed Freeman's vehicle traveling across the parking lot at a "high rate of speed." The traffic report listed the speed limit in the parking lot at 15 miles per hour; it was estimated that Freeman's vehicle had been traveling approximately 33-34 miles per hour when it collided with the storefront. Gilliam filed suit against, among others, Dolgencorp, which owned the Dollar General store, alleging that Dolgencorp had been negligent and wanton in failing to erect barriers such as bollards outside the store's entrance, which, she claimed, could have prevented Freeman's vehicle from crashing into the storefront and injuring her. Dolgencorp moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Gilliam's claims were precluded as a matter of law. The Alabama Supreme Court concurred with the company, finding Gilliam's negligence claim failed as a matter of law. It therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Dolgencorp. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants the City of Auburn ("the City"); Ron Anders, in his official capacity as the mayor of the City; and Beth Witten, in her official capacity as an Auburn City Council member who served as mayor pro tempore of the City. The underlying action arose from a dispute between Dixon and defendants over Ordinance No. 3288, which amended the City's zoning ordinance to expressly regulate short-term rentals of residential property within the City's geographical limits. Dixon claimed that the adoption and enforcement of the short-term-rental ordinance violated his right to due process and also violated his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. Finding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dixon v. City of Auburn, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed judgments issued by the district court in these consolidated appeals concerning the interpretation of the Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act as it related to mobile home owners who had been evicted from their lots, holding that the Act does not allow for a no-cause termination of a periodic tenancy.David and Doreen Lockhart appealed the order issued by the district court upholding the order for possession issued by the justice court and ordering them to vacate and remove all personal property from a mobile home lot owned by Westview Mobile Home Park, LLC. Hydi Cunningham appealed the district court orders following the justice court's judgment and order for possession of property and writ of issuance ordering Cunningham to vacate the mobile home lot she had been renting from Greener Montana Property Management, LLC. The Supreme Court reversed in both causes, holding (1) the Act does not allow a lot-only landlord to terminate a homeowner tenant's month-to-month lease without cause; and (2) therefore, the no-cause terminations of both leases in this case were illegal and invalid. View "Greener Montana Property Management LLC v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original action, holding that the trial court in this case lost jurisdiction to proceed on a request for attorney fees after entering final judgment.After a limited remand in this case stemming from a real estate dispute the trial court entered final judgment, and the judgment was subsequently paid. Thereafter, the prevailing parties filed a motion seeking more than $167,000 in additional attorney fees. Petitioner filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition alleging that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the court of appeals' mandate did not give the trial court jurisdiction to entertain an attorney fees request that accrued after the final judgment. View "State ex rel. Mather v. Oda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring Respondent as the owner in fee of all of the property and appurtenances of the property in dispute in this case, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting title of the disputed property to Respondent.Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners, who were the guardians and conservators for their father, alleging that the father had conveyed title to the disputed property to him by a deed that was never recorded, that Respondent had title under a claim of adverse possession, and that Petitioners were unjustly enriched by the improvements Respondent built upon the land. After a bench trial, the circuit court declared that Respondent was the owner in fee of the disputed property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its factual findings or conclusions of law in regard to Respondent's right to title in the disputed property based on the deed between the father and Respondent that was later lost or stolen. View "Sandy M. v. Donald M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the final approval of the settlement in the underlying class action against the State, holding that Petitioner had no right to compensation.In 1920, the federal government pledged land to native Hawaiian beneficiaries, and while Hawai'i held the homestead land in trust it breached its fiduciary duties. In the underlying class action, trust beneficiaries successfully sued the State for breach of its trustee responsibilities, and the State settled. The Supreme Court accepted a petition for a writ of mandamus, an appeal challenging final approval of the case's settlement, and held (1) because Petitioner was born beyond the statutory period to receive a payout from the settlement he had no right to compensation; and (2) because this decision ended Petitioner's appeal, the appeal before the intermediate court of appeals was moot. View "Rivera v. Honorable Cataldo" on Justia Law

Snowball West Investments, LP applied to build a housing project consisting of 215 homes in the Sunland/Tujunga area of the City of Los Angeles. The current zoning for the site is RA and A1; the project must be rezoned to RD5 and R1 for the project to move forward. The City denied Snowball’s zone change request, stating that more information was needed before building homes in a high wildfire hazard area. Snowball petitioned for a writ of mandate, which was denied. Snowball appealed. Snowball argues that under the rezoning exemption in the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (j)(4)1 (section 65589.5(j)(4)), its project is exempt from the need for a zone change.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the superior court’s denial of Snowball’s writ petition. The court explained that the current RA and A1 zoning is consistent with the community plan through the language of that plan. Because the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) only applies when “the zoning for the project site is inconsistent” with the applicable plan, the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not apply here, and Snowball’s project was not exempt from zone change requirements.  Further, the court wrote that the HAA does not apply, and the City’s findings were sufficient under the LAMC and supported by substantial evidence. View "Snowball West Investments v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second time before the Idaho Supreme Court. It involved the existence of a prescriptive easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook owned a parcel of land which was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr. The property stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.” Tower Road connected the Cooks’ property to a county road and had been used by the Cooks and their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, finding it was necessary for the district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for establishing a prescriptive easement. On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. The Van Ordens appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed into an adverse use, and the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Lakota Lakes and denying Emily Bialota's cross-motion for summary judgment in this quiet title action, holding that Bialota accomplished valid service on the Minnesota Secretary of State.Bialota brought an action to quiet title in Pennington County, alleging that she had fee simple ownership in real property previously owned by Lakota Lakes but later sold at a tax sale. In its summary judgment motion, Lakota Lakes claimed that it had not been validly served with the notice of intent to take tax deed, rendering the tax deed void. In her cross-motion for summary judgment, Bialota argued that service upon Lakota Lakes was proper and that Pennington County had correctly issued a tax deed based upon her affidavit of completed service. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) South Dakota law controlled this Court's determination whether Bialota personally served the Secretary as Lakota Lakes' registered agent; (2) Bialota accomplished valid service on the Secretary; and (3) Bialota was entitled to the tax deed to the property. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law