Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration award in a real estate transaction. The plaintiffs, Miguel and Lizette Valencia, purchased a home from the defendants, Armando Mendoza, Coastal Holdings, LLC, and Class A Realty, Inc. After discovering undisclosed defects in the home, the Valencias initiated an arbitration proceeding against the defendants. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Valencias, awarding them damages for repairs, loss of use, statutory penalties, and inspection fees, as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees.The defendants appealed the arbitration award to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the court erred in denying their petition to vacate the arbitration award and in confirming the Valencias' petition to confirm the award. The defendants also contended that the arbitrator committed legal error by excluding key evidence from the arbitration hearing. The trial court affirmed the arbitration award, finding that the defendants' petition to vacate the award was untimely and that they failed to show that the arbitrator erred in its rulings excluding evidence.On appeal to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in not considering the evidence they submitted with their late-filed petition to vacate the arbitration award. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of error in the arbitration award. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the award without considering the defendants' untimely evidence. View "Valencia v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Martin Tait, Jane Tait, and Bry-Mart, LLC (collectively, the Taits) who sued Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth) for breach of a title insurance policy. The Taits alleged that Commonwealth failed to pay the full amount by which their property’s value was diminished due to an undisclosed easement. The Taits had purchased a residential property in Danville for $1.25 million and had plans to subdivide the property into two lots. However, they discovered a separate 1988 maintenance easement that they believed would impact the marketability and value of the property and interfere with its potential development.The trial court granted Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required Commonwealth to compensate the Taits only for the value of their actual use of the property as a vacant residential lot suitable for only one home rather than its highest and best use as a subdividable lot. The court reasoned that the legal standard for title insurance losses did not permit consideration of a property’s highest and best use, only its actual use as vacant residential land.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four disagreed with the trial court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the Taits’ policy entitles them to reimbursement for the diminution in value of their property based on its highest and best use. The court found that the Taits’ evidence of the likelihood of subdivision and the value of a subdividable lot created a triable issue of fact regarding the amount of the Taits’ loss under the policy, thereby precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Tait v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied to the City of Oakland's Planning Department for a zoning clearance to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The proposed facility was described as a compartmentalized commercial kitchen for take-out services only, measuring roughly 14,000 square feet. The facility is located in a Housing and Business Mix-1 Commercial Zone (HBX-1 zone), which permits certain industrial activities classified as "Light Manufacturing." The Planning Department issued CloudKitchens a zoning clearance and later a building permit allowing renovations.In April 2021, the San Pablo Avenue Golden Gate Improvement Association, Inc., and Oakland Neighborhoods For Equity (Neighbors) learned of CloudKitchens's plans. They sent a letter to the City Administrator requesting that the City reconsider its approval of CloudKitchens as qualifying for HBX-1 classification. The City's Zoning Manager responded, maintaining that the decision was proper. In July, Neighbors filed a formal complaint requesting the Planning Department initiate a revocation review process. They alleged that CloudKitchens will become a nuisance due to increased traffic, air pollution, and noise, and that the commercialized kitchen is essentially a Fast-Food Restaurant not permitted in an HBX-1 zone. The Planning Department denied the request.Neighbors then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed, holding that chapter 17.152 “does not create a legal basis to challenge a prior zoning determination made by the City.” Neighbors appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 does not provide a legal basis to challenge the Planning Department’s interpretations and determinations of the zoning regulations, including use classifications and zoning clearances. The court also noted that the Enforcement Regulations still permit Neighbors to seek a revocation hearing for any nonconforming uses (or nuisances) if they arise. However, the Enforcement Regulations do not allow members of the public to challenge use classifications or zoning determinations outside the procedures prescribed in chapter 17.132. View "San Pablo Ave. Golden Gate Improvement Assn. v. City Council of Oakland" on Justia Law

The case involves a worker, Jake Johnson, who was injured while working as an electrician on a construction project managed by CBRE and owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI). Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against CBRE, PRI, Crew, and PCF for damages. CBRE and PRI moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when CBRE and PRI hired Crew for the project.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract was not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that CBRE and PRI delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that because no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, CBRE and PRI were entitled to relief. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its previous order and enter a new one granting summary judgment to CBRE and PRI. View "CBRE v. Superior Court of San Diego County" on Justia Law

A group of residents and a church, collectively referred to as the "Neighbors," sued Ghassan Korban, the Executive Director of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (SWB), for damages caused to their properties during a drainage project. The Neighbors won a judgment for inverse condemnation, but the SWB did not pay. The Neighbors then filed a federal lawsuit, which was dismissed. They subsequently filed a state lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment. The district court dismissed the case, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the payment of a judgment for inverse condemnation is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court found that the federal lawsuit did not bar the state lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata because the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state mandamus claim. The court also found that the Neighbors had stated a valid cause of action for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the payment of a judgment based on inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus. The court remanded the case to the district court to devise a plan for satisfying the judgment within a reasonable period of time. View "WATSON MEMORIAL SPIRITUAL TEMPLE OF CHRIST V. KORBAN" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott and Natalie Pinkham, who contracted with Three Peaks Homes, LLC, for the construction of a custom home. The construction did not go as planned and the contract was terminated before the home was completed. Three Peaks subsequently filed two $600,000 mechanics’ liens against the Pinkhams’ home. The Pinkhams then filed a complaint against David Plate, Rebeccah Jensen, Three Peaks, Rebel Crew Construction, LLC, and Legacy Management Enterprises, LLC, asserting several causes of action.The district court denied the Pinkhams’ motion for summary judgment. Later, the Pinkhams’ attorney, Lance Schuster, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plate, Jensen, Three Peaks, and Legacy, which the court granted. The court ordered Appellants to appoint another attorney or appear in person within twenty-one days of service of the order, failing which, the court may enter default judgment against them. The court clerk served a copy of the withdrawal order on Appellants via first class mail.The Pinkhams moved for the entry of default and default judgment against Appellants and for dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaims with prejudice. The district court granted the Pinkhams’ motion without a hearing. Appellants later secured new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied Appellants’ motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry of default. The court also held that Appellants have failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b). The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Pinkham v. Plate" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a tax sale of a property in Jackson County, Mississippi. The property was owned by Deborah Hallford, who failed to pay property taxes in 2014, leading to the property being sold at a tax sale in 2015. Pierre Thoden, a resident of New York, purchased the property at the sale. Hallford failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, and Thoden later received title after he paid the delinquent taxes for 2015-18. After learning of the tax sale, Hallford filed a complaint to set aside the tax sale, claiming that due to a lack of proper notice, the sale was void. The chancery court found in Hallford’s favor and voided the tax sale based on insufficient notice.Thoden appealed the chancery court's decision, arguing that he was entitled to a statutory lien and reimbursement for appliances, costs, and expenses on the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s finding that the tax sale was void but held that Thoden was entitled to a hearing to present proof of his damages. The case was remanded for a hearing to determine the amount Thoden was owed as damages.On remand, the chancery court found that Thoden was unjustly enriched by the rent he collected from tenants and that he could not keep money he collected on property where he was in the nature of a trespasser. The court also found that Thoden was entitled to the amount he paid in taxes, plus interest. However, the court denied Thoden’s claim to reimbursement for his repairs on, improvements to, and maintenance of the property. Thoden appealed these findings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. The court held that Thoden was entitled to a refund of his purchase price and interest on that price, and that he was not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of repairs, improvements, and maintenance. The court also held that Hallford was entitled to a $4,500 set-off. However, the court reversed the chancery court's determination that Thoden was not entitled to the taxes he paid on the property for 2015-18, and awarded Thoden $2,231.06. View "Thoden v. Hallford" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Estate of Ke Zhengguang and Stephany Yu, concerning the enforcement of an arbitral award issued in Hong Kong. The award was the result of a business dispute involving real estate in China. The arbitration panel ordered Yu and her two sisters to pay the Estate and Xu Hongbiao a sum of money for the losses they sustained. After Yu paid Xu his share, the Estate sought to collect the remaining half from Yu, a U.S. citizen residing in Maryland.Yu challenged the enforcement of the award in the District Court of Maryland, arguing that the court was an inconvenient forum, that necessary parties were not included in the proceedings, and that enforcing the award would violate Chinese currency control laws, thereby violating U.S. policy favoring international comity. She also argued that the judgment should be in Renminbi (RMB), as provided in the arbitral award, not in U.S. dollars. The district court rejected all of Yu's arguments and confirmed the award under the New York Convention, entering judgment in favor of the Estate against Yu in a total amount of $3.6 million.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found none of Yu's arguments persuasive and held that the district court was correct in confirming and enforcing the arbitral award. The court also held that the district court did not err in entering the judgment in U.S. dollars, as it was within its discretion to do so. View "In re Estate of Ke Zhengguang v. Yu" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee Rali 2006QA5 (Deutsche Bank), the holder of the first deed of trust, and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC (SFR), the purchaser of a property at a homeowners’ association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale. The dispute centers around whether the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the superpriority lien, which would mean that the HOA foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank, finding that the homeowner's pre-foreclosure payments satisfied the superpriority lien. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated and remanded the case, instructing the district court to consider the analysis in the then recently decided case 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of SFR, concluding that a portion of the superpriority lien remained unsatisfied, so the HOA foreclosure extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The court held that, unless expressly authorized by the homeowner, the HOA may not allocate a payment in a way that results in a forfeiture of the first deed of trust holder’s interest and deprives the homeowner of the security on the homeowner’s mortgage. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the court found that the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the HOA’s superpriority lien, so the foreclosure did not extinguish Deutsche Bank’s first deed of trust. Therefore, SFR took possession of the property subject to the deed of trust. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of judgment for Deutsche Bank consistent with this opinion. View "Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a transaction between the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks (RDA) and a developer. The RDA transferred property to the developer for the construction of an apartment project. In exchange, the developer agreed to maintain free public parking on the property for the next 50 years. The Labor Commissioner considered this transaction as the RDA providing a "financial incentive" worth more than $100,000 to the developer, thus requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages on the project. The Labor Commissioner assessed a penalty against the RDA for not requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages.The Labor Commissioner's decision was upheld by the district court, which led to the RDA's appeal. The RDA argued that the Labor Commissioner had neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to address a dispute arising under Nevada’s Community Redevelopment Law over the valuation of interests in real property. The RDA also contended that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect and expanded its reach. The court held that the statute does not reference "future compensation," nor does it equate its receipt with a redevelopment agency giving a developer "financial incentives [worth] more than $100,000." The court concluded that the Labor Commissioner's decision that the RDA provided a financial incentive exceeding $100,000 to the developer lacked substantial evidence and must be reversed. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the RDA’s petition for judicial review. View "The Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks v. Nevada Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law