Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

In this case, a construction financer, Mortgages Ltd. (ML), collapsed, leading to numerous mechanics' liens on unfinished projects. ML had loaned $165 million to Tempe Land Company (TLC) for a condominium project, securing the loan with a deed of trust and purchasing a title insurance policy from Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. Contractors began recording mechanics' liens against the property, and ML entered involuntary bankruptcy. The Loan LLCs, created to hold ML's assets, foreclosed on the property but did not extinguish the liens. Universal and VRCP provided loans to ML Manager and the Loan LLCs, securing their loans with deeds of trust and obtaining title insurance policies from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.The trial court granted summary judgment to Commonwealth on CMLC's breach of contract claim, finding that the loans were fully repaid, thus precluding coverage under the policy. The case proceeded to trial on CMLC's bad faith claim, where the jury awarded $5 million in damages. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for CMLC, and affirmed the denial of Commonwealth's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that Commonwealth could contest coverage based on policy provisions limiting liability to the unpaid indebtedness. The court found that the loans were fully repaid, thus no covered loss occurred. The court also held that the diminution in lien value did not constitute actual pecuniary damage to support a bad faith claim. Additionally, the court ruled that the collateral source rule did not preclude evidence of loan repayments. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Commonwealth on the breach of contract claim, and remanded to enter summary judgment for Commonwealth on the bad faith claim. View "CENTERPOINT v COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

The case involves an ancillary proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Jesse Dunn filed a third-party petition claiming ownership of a parcel of land in West Jordan, Utah, which the government sought to forfeit in Justin Peck’s criminal case. Peck was convicted of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. The government alleged Peck held an ownership interest in the land. The district court agreed with Dunn and blocked the forfeiture, leading to the government's appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially found the land forfeitable based on Peck’s plea agreement. However, during the ancillary proceeding, the district court determined that Dunn had a superior interest in the property. Dunn had purchased the land with untainted funds and later paid off a loan using funds authorized by Peck. The court found that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s at all relevant times under Utah law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Dunn’s interest in the property was superior to Peck’s and the government’s under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). The court noted that the government had only sought to forfeit the land and had not pursued other potentially forfeitable property or substitute property. The court also emphasized that the government did not challenge the district court’s findings under Utah law, which governed the determination of property interests in federal forfeiture proceedings. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly vacated the preliminary forfeiture order and granted Dunn’s third-party petition. View "United States v. Peck" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by Albert Pickett, Jr., Keyonna Johnson, Jarome Montgomery, Odessa Parks, and Tiniya Shepherd against the City of Cleveland. The plaintiffs, all African American residents of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, allege that Cleveland Water's policy of placing water liens on properties for unpaid water bills disproportionately affects Black homeowners. The water liens, which accumulate penalties and interest, can lead to foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiffs claim that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating the "Water Lien Class" under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class includes all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County who have had a water lien placed on their property by Cleveland Water within the last two years. The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory. The court found that the common question of whether Cleveland's water lien policy disproportionately affects Black homeowners predominated over individual issues, satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory relief. The appellate court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' FHA claim, focusing solely on the class certification issues. View "Pickett v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC (JHHR) sought to partition real property it claimed to own as a tenant in common with Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC (Leeks). Leeks counterclaimed, asserting sole ownership based on judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and adverse possession. The district court granted partial summary judgment to JHHR, dismissing Leeks’s judicial and equitable estoppel claims. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Leeks on the adverse possession claim. Leeks appealed both the summary judgment and the trial findings.The District Court of Teton County granted summary judgment to JHHR on Leeks’s judicial and equitable estoppel claims. The court found that Mr. Gill, representing JHHR, had forgotten about his 25% interest in the property during arbitration, negating the application of judicial estoppel. The court also found no evidence of willful misconduct or serious negligence by Mr. Gill, which is necessary for equitable estoppel. The court held that Mr. Gill’s statements during arbitration were not sufficient to establish estoppel.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court agreed that judicial estoppel did not apply because Mr. Gill’s prior position was based on a mistake. The court also upheld the summary judgment on equitable estoppel, finding no evidence of willful misconduct or serious negligence by Mr. Gill. Regarding adverse possession, the Supreme Court found that Leeks failed to prove that its possession of the property was hostile to JHHR’s interest. The court noted that Leeks did not provide clear notice to JHHR that its ownership was in jeopardy, a requirement for adverse possession among cotenants. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings in favor of JHHR. View "Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

Siblings Martin, Paula, and Tom Robinson, along with Tom’s wife Laura, own adjoining farm properties and claim a drainage easement across properties owned by Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO) and Kenneth and Deanice Ludolph, which the Ludolphs leased to Coggon Solar, LLC. The Robinsons allege that CIPCO violated their drainage easement by rerouting a drainage tile line and that Coggon Solar’s solar farm development would further violate their easement. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and claimed a right to access and repair the drainage tile on the servient properties.The Iowa District Court for Linn County dismissed the Robinsons’ lawsuit, quieted title in favor of the defendants, and awarded attorney fees to the defendants. The court held that the Robinsons had the right to drain surface water onto the servient estates but not along a fixed route, and they did not have a right to access or repair the drainage tile on the servient estates. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of CIPCO and Coggon Solar on the quiet-title action and dismissed the Robinsons’ nuisance claim.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Robinsons have a legal and natural easement to drain surface water onto the servient estates but do not have a drainage easement along a fixed route or a right to access and repair the drainage tile on the servient properties. The court found no evidence that CIPCO’s rerouting of the tile line caused any detriment or injury to the Robinsons. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. View "Robinson v. Central Iowa Power Cooperative" on Justia Law

EBSCO Industries, Inc. owned a 5.5-acre parcel of land in Tuscaloosa County, which it leased to Michael R. Ballard for hunting purposes starting in 1990. The lease was renewed annually until February 2022. Ballard purchased adjacent property in 1992 and believed a partial fence marked the boundary between his property and EBSCO's. In 2016, a survey confirmed the boundary, and in 2021, Ballard began constructing a hog farm on the disputed parcel. EBSCO sent cease-and-desist letters, but Ballard claimed ownership through adverse possession.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court found that EBSCO held legal title to the disputed parcel but ruled that Ballard and his entities had acquired ownership through adverse possession by 2012. The court based its decision on Ballard's actions, such as contracting with Alabama Power Company, harvesting trees, and replacing a gate without providing EBSCO a key. EBSCO's post-judgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its finding. The court noted that Ballard's use of the land was permissive under the lease, which could not ripen into adverse possession until the lease ended in February 2022. Since Ballard performed no acts on the disputed parcel after the lease ended, the trial court's finding of adverse possession as early as 2012 was incorrect. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "EBSCO Industries, Inc. v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Coyote Aviation Corporation (Coyote) entered into a 20-year lease with the City of Redlands (City) on April 4, 2000, for property at the Redlands Municipal Airport. The lease included two 15-year options to extend. An amended lease was signed on September 5, 2000, with the same termination date of April 4, 2020. Coyote believed the lease should terminate on September 5, 2020, but no written amendment was made. In June 2020, Coyote attempted to exercise the extension option, but the City rejected it, stating the lease had already terminated. The City issued a 30-day notice to quit, and Coyote filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and other claims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County sustained the City’s demurrer to Coyote’s first amended complaint (FAC) and entered judgment against Coyote. The court found that Coyote failed to provide timely written notice to exercise the extension option as required by the lease. The court also rejected Coyote’s claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, declaratory relief, and promissory estoppel, finding no clear promise by the City to amend the lease termination date.The City filed an unlawful detainer action when Coyote did not vacate the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ordering Coyote to vacate. The court found no triable issues of fact regarding the timeliness of Coyote’s notice to exercise the extension option and rejected Coyote’s arguments of estoppel and waiver.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that the lease’s terms were clear and unambiguous, requiring written notice to exercise the extension option. The court also found that City officials did not have the authority to amend the lease orally or accept late notice. The court upheld the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer and summary judgment, denying Coyote’s claims and requests for leave to amend. View "Coyote Aviation Corp. v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

The case involves several taxicab companies in Hillsborough County, Florida, which held certificates and permits issued by the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission (PTC). The PTC was a special district created by the Legislature to regulate taxicabs. In 2012, a law declared these certificates and permits to be the private property of their holders, allowing them to be transferred or devised. However, in 2017, the Legislature repealed the 2012 law, dissolved the PTC, and returned regulatory authority to Hillsborough County, which chose not to recognize the PTC-issued certificates and permits.The taxicab companies filed a lawsuit claiming that the repeal of the 2012 law and the dissolution of the PTC constituted a taking of their property without compensation, violating the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hillsborough County, concluding that the certificates and permits had effectively vanished when the PTC was dissolved. However, the court denied the State's motion to dismiss, allowing the possibility of claims for damages against the State.The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Hillsborough County and reversed the denial of the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the taxicab companies did not have a property interest in the PTC-issued certificates and permits for purposes of the Takings Clause. The taxicab companies then sought review by the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida held that the 2017 repeal did not implicate the Florida Constitution’s Takings Clause. The Court concluded that the Legislature retained the discretion to revoke any property rights conveyed in the 2012 law, as the certificates and permits were revocable privileges rather than irrevocable property rights. Consequently, the repeal of the 2012 law did not constitute a taking requiring compensation. The Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Bojorquez v. State" on Justia Law