Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land between two neighboring property owners in Park County, Wyoming. The appellants, Michael and Michelle Sellers, purchased a 12-acre property that was adjacent to a 4-acre parcel owned by the appellees, Phyllis Claudson, William Pond, Pamela Pond, and Peggy Lou Pond Paul. During the purchase, the Sellers discovered that a portion of their property was located on the Ponds' side of a boundary fence. The Ponds filed a lawsuit to claim ownership of this portion of land based on adverse possession.The District Court of Park County initially heard the case. The Ponds and the Sellers filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of the Ponds, finding that they had adversely possessed the disputed property. The Sellers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Ponds had established a prima facie case for adverse possession. They had shown actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed property, which was hostile and under claim of right or color of title. The Sellers failed to rebut this claim by showing permissive use of the property through neighborly accommodation. The court also rejected the Sellers' argument that the Ponds could only have adversely possessed the areas of the property containing buildings, as the Sellers had not raised this issue in the lower court. View "Sellers v. Claudson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tax appraisal dispute involving Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and Travis Central Appraisal District (the District). The Landfill owns 344 acres of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, the District appraised the market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform taxation but did not claim that the District’s appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. The appraisal review board reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety percent. The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject property’s true market value.The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge it made before the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider market value. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that a trial court’s review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court concluded that the Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC. v. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a property deed. Earnest Coprich and Bessie Elizabeth Jones, who have known each other for about 50 years, disagreed over the terms of a property sale. Coprich claimed that he sold his residence to Jones for $15,000, while Jones contended that the sale price was $10,000. After Jones moved into the property and made several improvements, Coprich filed a complaint seeking to set aside the deed. He alleged that he was mentally incompetent at the time of signing the deed and that he was coerced and defrauded by Jones. Jones denied these allegations and asserted that she had purchased the property and occupied it since the transaction.The Montgomery Circuit Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Jones. The court found that Coprich failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his incompetence or that Jones had committed fraud or misrepresentation. Coprich's postjudgment motion to vacate the order was summarily denied by the court. Coprich then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, determined that the Court of Civil Appeals should have jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that the case is a "civil case" as defined by § 12-3-10 and that the "amount involved" does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000. Therefore, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Coprich v. Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves eight landowners who sued Midland and Gladwin Counties in Michigan, alleging a taking under the federal and state constitutions following the failure of the Edenville Dam, which resulted in flooding of several cities downstream. The dam, built in 1924, had a history of flood control issues. In 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission revoked the existing owner's license and transferred regulatory authority over the dam to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy. In compliance with Michigan law, the counties assembled a task force to manage the lake above the dam and filed a petition in 2019 to maintain the lake levels. In May 2020, several days of historic rainfall raised the water level three feet above its previous maximum, triggering the dam's failure and causing extensive damage to properties downstream.The district court granted summary judgment to the counties, concluding that their efforts to maintain the water levels did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties and "take" their land. The landowners appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the counties' petition to maintain the lake depth at the same level that had existed for roughly a century did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties. The court also noted that the counties played no part in regulating or controlling the dam's infrastructure. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the dam's failure was caused by soil vulnerabilities, not inadequate spillways, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's independent forensic team. Therefore, the court concluded that no taking occurred as a matter of federal or state law. View "Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, maintained landscaping and hedges on their property in violation of certain provisions of the LAMC. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations based on section 36900, subdivision (a) of the California Government Code, which states that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action. The Schwartzes relied on a prior court decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which interpreted this provision as allowing any private citizen to sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances.The trial court overruled the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on the alleged LAMC violations. The court applied the Riley decision and concluded that the Schwartzes could assert private causes of action for violations of the LAMC. The Cohens petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Riley decision was wrongly decided and that section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four agreed with the Cohens. The court found that the language of section 36900, subdivision (a) is ambiguous and that its legislative history shows that the Legislature did not intend to afford members of the public the right to bring suit to redress violations of local ordinances. The court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the portion of its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to these causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend. The court also overruled the Riley decision to the extent that it recognized a private right of action under section 36900, subdivision (a). View "Cohen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law

Brandon Hahn was convicted by a jury for intentional damage to property, with the damage amount totaling more than $1,000 but less than $2,500. The property in question was the front door of 88-year-old Delores Moen's home, which Hahn was accused of damaging. Hahn was also charged with obstructing a public officer and disorderly conduct, the latter of which was later dismissed. The State presented multiple witnesses, including Delores' neighbors and the responding police officers, who testified about Hahn's aggressive conduct and their interactions with him. Hahn himself denied any responsibility for damaging the door.In the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, Hahn moved for judgment of acquittal on the intentional damage to property charge, arguing that the State had not established the fair market value of the door, which he claimed included depreciation. The court denied his motion, concluding that the State could prove the damage amount element through evidence of the cost of reasonable repairs. Hahn was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to an enhanced 15-year prison sentence on Count 1 with ten years suspended and a 30-day jail sentence on Count 2.In the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Hahn appealed, claiming that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the intentional damage to property charge. He argued that the jury could not properly apply the damage element without first establishing the fair market value of the property. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the current version of the intentional damage to property statute focuses on the "damage to property" and not the value of the property. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the damage Hahn caused to Delores’ door was at least $1,000 but less than $2,500, and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "State v. Hahn" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, K.E. Liggett, is a tenant in a Manhattan apartment building owned by the defendant, Lew Realty LLC. Liggett filed a lawsuit when Lew Realty attempted to increase her rent in 2021, arguing that her apartment is rent-stabilized and she is entitled to a rent-stabilized lease, overcharges, and attorney's fees. Liggett's claim is based on a stipulation from 2000 between Lew Realty and a previous tenant, Edward McKinney, which required McKinney to waive his right to file a Fair Market Rent Appeal (FMRA). Liggett argues that this stipulation is void as it goes against public policy, and because it led to the deregulation of the apartment, the deregulation is invalid and the apartment remains rent-stabilized.The Supreme Court initially denied Lew Realty's motion to dismiss, agreeing with Liggett that the stipulation is unenforceable as it waives the protections of the rent laws. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that the protection against waiving the benefits of rent control law did not apply to McKinney as he was not an established tenant when he signed the stipulation. The Appellate Division also concluded that Liggett's claim was akin to an FMRA and therefore barred by the statute of limitations.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court held that the stipulation is void as it waives a benefit of the rent laws, regardless of McKinney's status as a tenant. The court also held that the statute of limitations does not bar Liggett's claim that the apartment is subject to rent stabilization. The court remanded the case, allowing Lew Realty to establish other reasons for why the apartment was not rent-stabilized when Liggett took tenancy. The court did not address any issues related to Liggett's rent overcharge claims. View "Liggett v Lew Realty LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law