Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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A general contractor, Graycor Construction Company Inc., was involved in a dispute with a subcontractor, Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust, over unpaid invoices for flooring work performed on a movie theater project. Business Interiors submitted three separate applications for periodic payments, which Graycor neither approved nor rejected within the time limit set by the Prompt Pay Act. As a result, the applications were deemed approved under the Act. Business Interiors sued Graycor for breach of contract and other claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted Business Interiors's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and entered separate and final judgment. Graycor appealed.Graycor argued that the original contract was not a "contract for construction" within the meaning of the Act, and that it had a valid impossibility defense due to its failure to pay. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Act defines its scope broadly, and the subcontract at issue was a "contract for construction" under the Act. The Court also held that common-law defenses are not precluded by the Act, but a contractor that does not approve or reject an application for payment in compliance with the Act must pay the amount due prior to, or contemporaneous with, the invocation of any common-law defenses in any subsequent proceeding regarding enforcement of the invoices. As Graycor sought to exercise its defenses without ever paying the invoices, it could not pursue the defenses. The Court also vacated and remanded the rule 54 (b) certification to the motion judge for reconsideration. View "Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc." on Justia Law

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The case involves Jeremy and Kristy Morris, who sued the West Hayden Estates First Addition Homeowners Association (HOA) under the Fair Housing Act. The Morrises alleged that the HOA discriminated against them based on religion by attempting to prevent them from conducting a Christmas program. The jury ruled in favor of the Morrises, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. However, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA, alternatively granted a new trial, and issued a permanent injunction against future productions of the Christmas program that violate the HOA’s covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA as to the Morrises’ disparate treatment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) because they did not show that they were adversely affected by the HOA’s actions. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law on the Morrises’ claim that the HOA interfered with their right to purchase and enjoy their home free from discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial to the HOA as to the § 3617 claim and vacated the district court’s grant of an injunction to the HOA. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MORRIS V. WEST HAYDEN ESTATES FIRST ADDITION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over the definition of a "dwelling" in the context of Colorado's "force-against-intruders" statute. The defendant, Joseph Howell, was involved in a physical altercation with J.M. outside his mother's apartment. At some point, Howell went inside the apartment, leaving J.M. outside on the doorstep. Howell fired a shot from inside the apartment, hitting J.M. in the face. Howell was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder, among other crimes. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the "force-against-intruders" statute immunized him from prosecution.The district court denied Howell's motion to dismiss, finding that because J.M. never entered inside the threshold of the doorway, there was never an "unlawful entry into a dwelling," and thus, the statute does not apply. Howell appealed this decision, leading to the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that an uncovered, unenclosed, and unsecured doorstep is not part of a “dwelling” for the purposes of the "force-against-intruders" statute. The court reasoned that a “dwelling” must be a “building,” and a “building” is “a structure which has the capacity to contain.” Since the doorstep has no roof, walls, or gate, it does not have the capacity to contain, and therefore, it is not a “building.” The court concluded that Howell's use of force against J.M., who was standing on the doorstep and was a “non-entrant,” was not shielded by immunity under the "force-against-intruders" statute. Therefore, the court discharged the rule to show cause. View "People v. Howell" on Justia Law

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This case involves a divorce dispute between Randall Thomas Bailey and Sara Elizabeth Bailey, now known as Ms. Larson. The couple married in 2005 and have three minor children. Ms. Larson filed for divorce in December 2022. The main issues in the case revolve around the district court's decisions on child custody, child support, and property division.The district court granted joint legal custody of the children, with the children's primary residence set with Ms. Larson. The court also calculated child support, imputing income to Mr. Bailey, and divided the couple's property, which was valued at approximately $2.2 million. The division required an equalization payment of $475,000 from Mr. Bailey to Ms. Larson.Mr. Bailey appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that the court abused its discretion in determining custody, calculating child support, and dividing the parties' property. He also contested the valuation of his gun collection, the valuation of accounts at the date of separation, and whether two properties in South Carolina should have been included in the marital estate.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues of custody, child support, and property division. The court also found that the evidence presented supported the district court's findings and conclusions, and that the property division was not so unfair or unreasonable as to shock the conscience. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over the use of a property in the River Plantation subdivision, which has been operated as a golf course since the subdivision's establishment. The River Plantation Community Improvement Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment that the golf course property is encumbered by an implied reciprocal negative easement restricting it to use solely as a golf course. The owners of the golf course property, River Plantation Properties, LLC and Preisler Golf Properties, LLC, counterclaimed for a declaration that the property is not so encumbered.The trial court granted summary judgment for the golf course property’s owners, holding it is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, noting that when the subdivision was developed, the developers retained the Reserves without placing any restrictions on their use, and the recitals in the property records put prospective lot owners on notice that the Reserves were excluded from the subdivision’s uniform plan.The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. The court held that the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements does not apply in this case. The Association's complaint was not that a substantial number of lots in the River Plantation subdivision were burdened by express restrictions when originally conveyed by the developer while others were not. Instead, the Association argued that the property should be burdened by an entirely different restriction: golf course use only. The court concluded that there are no substantially uniform express restrictions on the River Plantation lots that the Association claims give rise to similar restrictions on the golf course property. Therefore, the golf course property is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement. View "River Plantation Community Improvement Assn. v. River Plantation Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the boundary between two parcels of land in Wapello County, Iowa. The northern parcel was owned by the Handlings and the southern parcel by the Sims. Both parties treated a fence line as the boundary between their properties for many years. In the mid-1990s, Scott Hubbell began leasing both properties for farming. In 2004, he built a machine shed south of the fence line, assuming it was on the southern property. In 2014, Hubbell and his wife purchased both properties, becoming the sole owners. In 2017, they sold the southern property to the Remmarks and in 2018, they sold the northern property to Sundance Land Company. A survey commissioned by Sundance revealed that the legal boundary between the properties ran south of the fence line, meaning the machine shed was encroaching onto the northern property. Sundance filed a petition to quiet title according to the survey boundary lines, alleging that the Remmarks were trespassing on the northern property.The district court found that a boundary line by acquiescence had been established at the old fence line during the Handlings’ and Sims’ respective ownership of the properties. The court rejected Sundance’s argument that the Hubbells’ common ownership of both parcels from 2014 to 2017 erased the boundary by acquiescence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that when two adjoining parcels come under common ownership, any potential boundary by acquiescence between them is eradicated, and the ten-year clock for calculating boundary by acquiescence restarts when separate ownership resumes. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for entry of judgment for Sundance in accordance with this opinion. View "Sundance Land Company, LLC v. Remmark" on Justia Law

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The case involves Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats (the plaintiffs) who filed a private right-of-way condemnation case against Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers (the defendants). The plaintiffs sought a right-of-way across the defendants' property to access their own landlocked properties. The properties in question include several parcels of land, some of which are low-lying wetlands often flooded and used for hunting and fishing. A private dirt road, referred to as the "farm road," crosses the defendants' property and has been historically used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors to access their properties.The Tuscaloosa Probate Court initially granted the plaintiffs a right-of-way across the defendants' property, concluding that the plaintiffs' property was landlocked. The defendants appealed this decision to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked due to inheritance of additional land that touched a public road. The Circuit Court agreed with the defendants, granting a summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked and they had reasonable access to their property from a public road.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the decision of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs have an existing, reasonable means to access their landlocked property. The court noted that the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence indicating that they could not travel from the public road across their property to access their landlocked property. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had permission to cross an intervening property, and thus there was no requirement for them to seek a right-of-way over it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Coats v. Ayers" on Justia Law

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The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The proposed hospital was alleged to exceed local building height and bulk restrictions. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of property owners residing near the proposed hospital, sued to halt the construction, claiming it was a “threatened nuisance per se.” The Regents argued that as a state entity, they were immune from complying with local building and zoning regulations when engaging in a governmental activity such as constructing university buildings.The trial court disagreed with the Regents, concluding that their immunity depended on whether the proposed construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court concluded that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. The court held that the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue, and the demurrer should have been sustained. The court issued the writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the Regents’ demurrer and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer. View "The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law