Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Joe Tubwell had been living in a house in DeSoto County, Mississippi, since 2005. In 2016, the mortgage loan on the house went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were initiated. Tubwell filed a complaint against the mortgage companies in an attempt to stop the foreclosure. The case was moved to a federal court where the mortgage companies were granted summary judgment. Tubwell, Morgan Stanley, and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) entered settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. Tubwell agreed to vacate the property by April 30, 2020, in exchange for a confidential sum of money. The property was sold to FV-1, Inc., in trust for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC. However, Tubwell refused to vacate the property by the agreed deadline and did not return the settlement funds.The mortgage companies filed a complaint against Tubwell in the DeSoto County Circuit Court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment ordering Tubwell to relinquish possession to the plaintiffs and dismissed Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. Tubwell appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Tubwell’s petition for certiorari to address the issue of whether it was error to dismiss his counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain Tubwell’s counterclaims and erred when it declined to do so based on a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals with regard to the dismissal of Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals on the remainder of the issues raised. View "Tubwell v. FV-1, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ward family, who own extensive acreage in Bismarck, North Dakota, initiated a quiet title action against 152 adjacent landowners, including Dan and Lindsey Herbel, to determine adverse claims to their property. The Wards did not make any claims against the defendants personally but sought a decree that the defendants had no estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance upon their property. The Herbels moved to dismiss the action, arguing they were not proper defendants under chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., as neither the Wards nor the Herbels claimed an adverse interest against the other’s property. The Herbels also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. The district court denied the motion despite finding the Wards were not aware if any of the named defendants were claiming title to any of the property. Following a bench trial, the court granted the judicial remedy of quiet title and a judgment dismissing the Herbels’ action was entered.The Herbels appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that because neither party made an adverse claim against the other’s property, the Wards lacked standing to sue under section 32-17-01, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 requires the existence of an adverse claim. The court found that the parties’ properties did not share a fence line or a common boundary without any intervening land, and a well-traveled roadway separated the properties. The Herbels never claimed an interest in the Wards’ real property, and the Wards never asserted there was an adverse interest between the parties. The court concluded that a direct suit against the Herbels was not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01.The Herbels also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the district court has discretion to determine whether a claim is frivolous and to determine the reasonable amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The court remanded the case to determine if the claim was frivolous and, if it was, to determine attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims against the Herbels. View "Ward v. Herbel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a long-term relationship but never married. They cohabitated and ran a cattle operation together on a property that had a complex ownership history involving various members of Meyer's family. The couple's relationship ended, and Roth sued Meyer, alleging that he had converted some of her cattle and failed to repay loans she had given him.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, found in favor of Roth. It ruled that Meyer had gained title to the disputed property through adverse possession and had transferred it to Roth in 2010. The court also found that Meyer had converted 13 of Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, ordering him to pay her $52,500.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. It found that the lower court had erred in its findings on adverse possession, the admissibility of certain evidence, the timing of the alleged conversion of cattle, the valuation of the converted cattle, and the enforceability of the loan contracts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, instructing it to make new findings based on the existing record. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves Little Scholars of Arkansas, AP Consolidated Theatres II L.P., CSRC Charter LISA, LLC, and KLS Leasing LLC (collectively, appellants) who appealed against Pulaski County, Arkansas, and its officials (collectively, appellees). The appellants operate charter schools and lease properties for their schools. The appellees assessed real-property taxes against the schools, which the appellants contested, arguing that the properties used for school purposes are exempt from taxes under the Arkansas Constitution. The appellants also sought a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118, which they claimed the appellees relied on for the tax assessment, is void under the constitution.The case was initially brought before the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The appellees moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over county tax matters. The circuit court agreed with the appellees, dismissing the case on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellants argued that the circuit court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their illegal-exaction claims. They also argued that their request for a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118 is void does not fall within the county court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants, affirming the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim was not an illegal-exaction claim but an assessment dispute, which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' request for declaratory judgment. View "LITTLE SCHOLARS OF ARKANSAS FOUNDATION v. PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, violated certain provisions of the LAMC by maintaining landscaping and hedges on their property that exceeded height limits and were non-compliant with the Residential Parkway Landscaping Guidelines. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations under Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a), which provides that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action.The trial court sustained the Cohens' demurrer to the Schwartzes' first and fourth causes of action, but overruled the demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on alleged violations of the LAMC. The trial court relied on a previous decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which held that anyone can sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances under section 36900. The Cohens petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order overruling their demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, granted the Cohens' petition. The court disagreed with the interpretation of section 36900 in Riley, finding that the statute only grants city authorities, not private parties, the right to redress violations of municipal ordinances via either criminal prosecution or civil action. The court overruled Riley and held that section 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. The court clarified that its holding does not disturb caselaw recognizing that a defendant's violation of a local ordinance may be relevant to, or provide an element of, some other cause of action by a private party, such as nuisance or public nuisance. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend. View "Cohen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a permit application to repair and maintain Imperial Gulch Road (IGR), which provides access to the property of the appellant, Jeffrey "Jae" Hill. The respondent, Blaine County, denied the permit application, concluding that it did not have the authority to issue the permit because it had previously declined to validate IGR. Hill filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision.The district court affirmed the Board’s denial in part and vacated its decision in part. The court concluded that the Board did not validate IGR and therefore the Board lacked authority to issue the requested permit. However, the court remanded the matter back to the Board to determine if the Board had authority to issue the permit under a public easement theory. Hill appealed, arguing that the district court erred by determining that the Board had not validated IGR.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not err when it affirmed the Board’s decision that it lacked authority to grant Hill’s permit because it had not validated IGR. The court found that Hill failed to establish that the Board’s decision denying his permit was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The court did not disturb the district court’s order vacating the Board’s decision in part and remanding the matter to the Board for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Lori Lundeen, a property developer, and Lake County, Montana. Lundeen planned to develop a 60-lot subdivision, Wild Horse RV Resort, on her property in Lake County. She intended to use roads through the Big Arm townsite for access to her development. The Board of Lake County Commissioners granted conditional approval for the development. However, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes contested the County’s ownership, regulatory authority, and right to use the access routes. Lundeen alleges that she relied on Lake County and the Lake County Attorney to research her access issue. After an eight-month moratorium on Lundeen’s development application, the Board conditionally approved an amended road layout for the development. Lundeen claims the Lake County Attorney represented to her that the Tribes’ claim was baseless and that she could proceed with the development.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granted Lake County’s motion to dismiss Lundeen's lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Lundeen was on inquiry notice of the negligent misrepresentation when she became aware the Tribes had blocked off her property. The court also determined the discovery and accrual rules for the statute of limitations were satisfied no later than when the Tribes blocked Lundeen’s access. Based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the court found Lundeen’s claims filed were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Lundeen had sufficiently asserted facts that, if accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to her, establish a basis for the claims asserted in her complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court erred by granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Lundeen v. Lake County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Gardiner-Park County Water and Sewer District (District) and the Knight family (Knights). The Knights own a property in Gardiner, Montana, under which the District has a prescriptive easement for a sewer line. In 2016, a survey revealed that part of the Knights' house and porch was built within the easement and over the sewer line. The District requested the Knights to remedy the easement violation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Consequently, the District filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Knights violated the District’s easements and caused damage to a retaining wall. The Knights counterclaimed, alleging that the District's Board Members had not taken and filed an oath of office, thus rendering any action they took invalid.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granted a declaratory judgment in favor of the District and summary judgment in favor of the individual Board Members. The court held that the District’s Board Members were not legally required to file oaths of office and were immune from personal liability for any actions taken related to the Knights. The court also held a joint hearing on the District’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and the individual Board Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that there was no requirement for board members of a local water and sewer district to take and file an oath of office as they were not public officers of the state, nor members of the legislature or executive. The court also held that the Board Members were immune from suit in an action against the governmental entity for the same subject matter, even when oppression, fraud, or malice had been alleged. The court found no violation of the Knights' due process rights when the District Court entertained oral argument on a summary judgment motion and a declaratory judgment action at the same hearing. The case was remanded for the District Court to consider an award of attorney fees, if any, under the Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Gardiner-Park v. Knight" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a Major Land Use Permit issued to Susan Dietz, individually and as Trustee of G&M Trust (G&M), by Flathead County, Montana. G&M had purchased two adjacent 11.5-acre tracts on the shore of Lake Five and began several remodeling, demolition, and construction projects on both tracts. G&M received notices of multiple violations from both the Department of Environmental Quality and Flathead County, advising that these new structures violated local zoning regulations. G&M then submitted an application proposing new structures for short-term/vacation nightly rentals. The application was initially accepted by the County, who issued a Major Land Use Permit, later voided by the District Court.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, voided the Major Land Use Permit issued to G&M, permanently enjoined all future construction or expansion of use or conversion of G&M’s property to any commercial use without first obtaining legal access and complying with all State and local statutes and regulations, ordered restoration of G&M’s property to its previously unaltered condition, and awarded attorney fees and costs to Friends of Lake Five, Inc. (FLF).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to void the Major Land Use Permit and its award of attorney fees and grant of permanent injunction. However, it reversed the District Court's requirement that G&M restore the property to its previous unaltered condition outside of the lakeshore zone. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Friends of Lake 5 v. County Commission" on Justia Law

Jake Johnson, an electrician, was injured while working on a construction project in a building owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI) and managed by CBRE. Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against PRI, CBRE, Crew, and PCF for damages. PRI and CBRE moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project.The trial court's decision was based on the execution date of the written contract between PRI, CBRE, and Crew. The court found that there was a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project. The court also granted Crew’s and PCF’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the Privette doctrine barred Johnson’s claims against them.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract is not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that PRI and CBRE delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and granted PRI and CBRE’s requested relief. View "CBRE v. Superior Court" on Justia Law