Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
Summit Construction v. Koontz
Summit Construction filed a lawsuit against Jay Koontz and Jennie L. Kennette for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, alleging nonpayment for work performed on Mr. Koontz’s home based on an oral agreement. The work included an addition to the home and extensive renovations to the existing structure. The District Court rejected both claims, determining that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties and that Summit did not sufficiently prove its damages for the unjust enrichment claim.The District Court found that the parties had not mutually agreed to sufficiently definite terms for an oral contract. The court noted that the project progressed without a clear understanding of the scope of work, how it would be paid for, and who would be responsible for payment. The court also found that Summit's invoices did not clearly define the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that Summit had failed to prove the amount by which Mr. Koontz was unjustly enriched, i.e., its damages.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that Summit had failed to show the existence of an enforceable oral contract with either Mr. Koontz or Ms. Kennette. The court also agreed with the lower court's finding that Summit had failed to establish its damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, which is necessary for an unjust enrichment claim. View "Summit Construction v. Koontz" on Justia Law
Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor
A dispute arose between Sojenhomer LLC and the Village of Egg Harbor over the Village's decision to condemn a small portion of Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The Village aimed to improve safety at a dangerous intersection by constructing a sidewalk along County Highway G. Sojenhomer, however, contested the condemnation, arguing that Wisconsin statutes prohibit property acquisition by condemnation to establish or extend a "pedestrian way," which it claimed included sidewalks.The Door County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Village, holding that sidewalks are not pedestrian ways and thus the Village had the authority to condemn the property for sidewalk construction. Sojenhomer appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that sidewalks are indeed pedestrian ways as defined by Wisconsin statutes. The court reasoned that sidewalks fall within the broad definition of a pedestrian way as "a walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel."The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The court held that when read in context, the definition of pedestrian way does not include sidewalks. The court noted that the statutory language, history, and broader context indicate that sidewalks and pedestrian ways are distinct, non-overlapping categories. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutes did not prohibit the Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor" on Justia Law
Ministry of Defence of the State of Kuwait v. Naffa
The Ministry of Defence of the State of Kuwait entered into three contracts with Joseph M. Naffa and his fictitious law firm, Naffa & Associates, LLP, for legal advice and representation in real estate transactions. The Ministry later discovered that Naffa was not authorized to practice law in the United States and that he had kept a credit meant for the Ministry from one of the real estate transactions. The Ministry sued Naffa and his firm for breach of contract and conversion of funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Ministry's claims under Rule 12(b)(1), ruling that the Ministry had not pleaded damages sufficient to meet the amount in controversy requirement for federal court jurisdiction. The court also held that the agreements did not require Naffa to be a licensed attorney and that the Ministry could not show that it did not receive legal advice or that its outcome would have been different if it was represented by a licensed attorney.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing the Ministry's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint contained sufficient allegations to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Ministry had pleaded damages of at least $635,000, an amount that substantially exceeds the statutory minimum for federal court jurisdiction. The court vacated all other determinations made by the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ministry of Defence of the State of Kuwait v. Naffa" on Justia Law
Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC
The case revolves around Delanna Garey, who was employed as the director of operations of an apartment building managed by Stanford Management until her termination in January 2023. In February 2023, Stanford and its current director of operations, Eve Dunham, requested the Rumford Police to serve Garey with a criminal trespass notice, barring her from entering the building for a year. In March 2023, Stanford and Dunham posted copies of the criminal trespass notice on the building and sent a letter to the residents stating that former employees were not permitted on the premises. Garey filed a complaint against Stanford alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.The Superior Court granted Stanford’s motion to dismiss Garey’s complaint in its entirety, concluding that Garey failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Stanford’s statements were not provably false; they were statements of opinion, not of fact; the statements were subject to multiple interpretations and should not be attributed their worst possible meaning; and in the alternative, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Garey met her burden and vacated the Superior Court judgment with respect to her claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. The court affirmed the dismissal of her claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as moot. The court found that Garey’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Stanford published statements that falsely imply that Garey engaged in dangerous conduct such that the community needs protection. The court also concluded that Garey has sufficiently alleged a claim for false light invasion of privacy. However, Garey’s declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims were moot because she is no longer precluded from entering the building property. View "Garey v. Stanford Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc.
A general contractor, Graycor Construction Company Inc., was involved in a dispute with a subcontractor, Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust, over unpaid invoices for flooring work performed on a movie theater project. Business Interiors submitted three separate applications for periodic payments, which Graycor neither approved nor rejected within the time limit set by the Prompt Pay Act. As a result, the applications were deemed approved under the Act. Business Interiors sued Graycor for breach of contract and other claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted Business Interiors's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and entered separate and final judgment. Graycor appealed.Graycor argued that the original contract was not a "contract for construction" within the meaning of the Act, and that it had a valid impossibility defense due to its failure to pay. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Act defines its scope broadly, and the subcontract at issue was a "contract for construction" under the Act. The Court also held that common-law defenses are not precluded by the Act, but a contractor that does not approve or reject an application for payment in compliance with the Act must pay the amount due prior to, or contemporaneous with, the invocation of any common-law defenses in any subsequent proceeding regarding enforcement of the invoices. As Graycor sought to exercise its defenses without ever paying the invoices, it could not pursue the defenses. The Court also vacated and remanded the rule 54 (b) certification to the motion judge for reconsideration. View "Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc." on Justia Law
MORRIS V. WEST HAYDEN ESTATES FIRST ADDITION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
The case involves Jeremy and Kristy Morris, who sued the West Hayden Estates First Addition Homeowners Association (HOA) under the Fair Housing Act. The Morrises alleged that the HOA discriminated against them based on religion by attempting to prevent them from conducting a Christmas program. The jury ruled in favor of the Morrises, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. However, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA, alternatively granted a new trial, and issued a permanent injunction against future productions of the Christmas program that violate the HOA’s covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the HOA as to the Morrises’ disparate treatment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) because they did not show that they were adversely affected by the HOA’s actions. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law on the Morrises’ claim that the HOA interfered with their right to purchase and enjoy their home free from discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial to the HOA as to the § 3617 claim and vacated the district court’s grant of an injunction to the HOA. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MORRIS V. WEST HAYDEN ESTATES FIRST ADDITION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC." on Justia Law
City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II" on Justia Law
City of Golden v. City of Aurora
The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law
People v. Howell
The case revolves around a dispute over the definition of a "dwelling" in the context of Colorado's "force-against-intruders" statute. The defendant, Joseph Howell, was involved in a physical altercation with J.M. outside his mother's apartment. At some point, Howell went inside the apartment, leaving J.M. outside on the doorstep. Howell fired a shot from inside the apartment, hitting J.M. in the face. Howell was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder, among other crimes. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the "force-against-intruders" statute immunized him from prosecution.The district court denied Howell's motion to dismiss, finding that because J.M. never entered inside the threshold of the doorway, there was never an "unlawful entry into a dwelling," and thus, the statute does not apply. Howell appealed this decision, leading to the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that an uncovered, unenclosed, and unsecured doorstep is not part of a “dwelling” for the purposes of the "force-against-intruders" statute. The court reasoned that a “dwelling” must be a “building,” and a “building” is “a structure which has the capacity to contain.” Since the doorstep has no roof, walls, or gate, it does not have the capacity to contain, and therefore, it is not a “building.” The court concluded that Howell's use of force against J.M., who was standing on the doorstep and was a “non-entrant,” was not shielded by immunity under the "force-against-intruders" statute. Therefore, the court discharged the rule to show cause. View "People v. Howell" on Justia Law
Bailey v. Bailey
This case involves a divorce dispute between Randall Thomas Bailey and Sara Elizabeth Bailey, now known as Ms. Larson. The couple married in 2005 and have three minor children. Ms. Larson filed for divorce in December 2022. The main issues in the case revolve around the district court's decisions on child custody, child support, and property division.The district court granted joint legal custody of the children, with the children's primary residence set with Ms. Larson. The court also calculated child support, imputing income to Mr. Bailey, and divided the couple's property, which was valued at approximately $2.2 million. The division required an equalization payment of $475,000 from Mr. Bailey to Ms. Larson.Mr. Bailey appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that the court abused its discretion in determining custody, calculating child support, and dividing the parties' property. He also contested the valuation of his gun collection, the valuation of accounts at the date of separation, and whether two properties in South Carolina should have been included in the marital estate.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues of custody, child support, and property division. The court also found that the evidence presented supported the district court's findings and conclusions, and that the property division was not so unfair or unreasonable as to shock the conscience. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law