Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Jake Johnson, an electrician, was injured while working on a construction project in a building owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI) and managed by CBRE. Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against PRI, CBRE, Crew, and PCF for damages. PRI and CBRE moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project.The trial court's decision was based on the execution date of the written contract between PRI, CBRE, and Crew. The court found that there was a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project. The court also granted Crew’s and PCF’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the Privette doctrine barred Johnson’s claims against them.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract is not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that PRI and CBRE delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and granted PRI and CBRE’s requested relief. View "CBRE v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, a Delaware statutory trust, NB Taylor Bend, DST (Taylor Bend), borrowed $13 million from Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, LLC (Prudential) to acquire property in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Patrick and Brian Nelson, who were guarantors of the loan, signed an Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement (the Guaranty) in December 2014, personally guaranteeing the loan. After the loan documents were executed, Prudential assigned the loan to Liberty Island Group I, LLC (Liberty), which in turn assigned the loan to North American Savings Bank, FSB (NASB). By May 2020, Taylor Bend struggled to find tenants for the property due to the COVID-19 pandemic and informed NASB of their financial problems. In May 2021, NASB declared Taylor Bend to be in default after the borrower continually failed to make timely loan payments. NASB then filed an action against the Nelsons in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, asserting claims for breach of the Guaranty, for recovery of the loan balance, and for declaratory judgment.The district court entered partial summary judgment for NASB, holding the Nelsons “breached the [G]uaranty and thus owe[d] to [NASB] the amount remaining due on the subject loan.” The court determined that the Guaranty was “freely assignable” and that Prudential adequately assigned all of its rights and interests to Liberty, which in turn assigned all of its rights and interests to NASB, including those conferred by the Guaranty. The court also concluded that the defenses raised by the Nelsons were “unavailable given the borrower’s absence from this litigation.” The court also granted Brian’s motion for summary judgment against Patrick, ruling that the indemnity agreement between the brothers was valid and binding and that Patrick was contractually required to indemnify Brian for “any and all obligations arising out of or relating to this litigation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Guaranty was properly assigned from Prudential to Liberty and from Liberty to NASB. NASB could therefore properly bring its claims for breach of guaranty and declaratory judgment against the Nelsons to recover the loan deficiency. Moreover, under Mississippi law, Patrick may not interpose equitable defenses that were available only to Taylor Bend to defeat his liability under the Guaranty. The court also held that the deficiency judgment awarded to NASB pursuant to the Guaranty need not be reduced by the third-party sale of the Apartments to Kirkland. NASB had no duty to mitigate its damages under either Mississippi law or the terms of the Guaranty. View "North American Savings Bank v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John Alexander Cucchi, owns a parcel of land south of Skatutakee Lake in Harrisville, New Hampshire. His property abuts the southern edge of Skatutakee Lake Road, which runs along the southern shore of the lake. A narrow strip of land, the disputed parcel, lies between the northern edge of the roadway and the lake. Both Cucchi and Pamela Worden, who owns adjacent land, claim ownership of this disputed parcel. Cucchi's claim traces back to a 1999 deed, while Worden's claim is based on a 2002 deed from the same original owner. In 2021, the Town of Harrisville conveyed most of its rights in the disputed parcel to Worden.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Worden and the Town of Harrisville, determining that Worden owned the disputed parcel and that Cucchi therefore lacked standing to challenge the Town’s release of its interest in the right-of-way to Worden. The court applied the presumption that landowners abutting public highways have fee ownership to the center of the road and concluded that the 1999 deed conveyed a fee interest only to the center of the traveled roadway.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The Supreme Court applied the whole-road presumption, which states that if a deed conveys to the side of a road, the effect is to convey the entire road if the grantor owns the land under the road and does not own the land on the other side. The court concluded that the 1999 deed did not reserve the fee underneath the right-of-way, and therefore, the whole-road presumption controls. The court determined that the 1999 deed conveyed the disputed parcel, and Cucchi now owns the underlying fee. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cucchi v. Town of Harrisville" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Roy Padilla and Ray Torres, where Padilla, the landlord, filed a petition in the metropolitan court under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), alleging that Torres, his tenant, had not paid rent. The metropolitan court ruled in favor of Padilla, ordering Torres to pay past-due rent and costs amounting to $927. Torres appealed this judgment to the Second Judicial District Court, but the appeal was dismissed because Torres had failed to request a recording of the metropolitan court’s trial.The district court held that without a record of the trial, it could not effectively review Torres’s appeal. The court also rejected Torres’s assertion that he had a right to a recording, explaining that Torres, as appellant, was required to provide an adequate record on appeal. Torres then appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the metropolitan court’s practice of not recording civil proceedings except on a party’s request was inconsistent with Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) and violated his state and federal constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the failure to record the trial in this matter is contrary to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993). The court concluded that the statute imposes a duty on the metropolitan court to create a record of its proceedings that will be sufficient to permit appellate review in this case. The court further held that Rule 3708(A) and other similar rules impermissibly conflict with Section 34-8A-6(B) to the extent that the rules condition the creation of this record on a party’s request. The court directed its committee for the Rules of Civil Procedure for the State Courts to correct the rules in conformance with its opinion. Finally, the court reversed and remanded this matter to the metropolitan court for a new trial. View "Padilla v. Torres" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land, which was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. However, a different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted the homeowner’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

The case involves Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC and five Michigan residents who sued Howell Township, Michigan, alleging that the township's zoning restrictions, which prevented Oakland Tactical from constructing and operating a commercial shooting range, violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the township's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The district court's decision was made before the Supreme Court announced a new framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen, and the district court again granted judgment for the township.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that while the Second Amendment protects the right to engage in commercial firearms training as necessary to protect the right to effectively bear arms in case of confrontation, it does not extend to training in a particular location or at the extremely long distances Oakland Tactical seeks to provide. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed conduct—commercial training in a particular location and long-distance commercial training—was not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Therefore, the township's zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. View "Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC v. Howell Township" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, Donavon Meuchel approached MR Properties LLC, a company with two members, Jessy Meyer and Nick Renner, to purchase the Golden West Shopping Center. Meuchel offered the asking price of $600,000. A real estate broker prepared a purchase agreement, but MR Properties did not sign any version of it. During negotiations, it was discovered that part of the shopping center encroached on a neighboring parcel of land owned by MKB LLP. Meuchel requested MR Properties to acquire additional land from MKB and include it in the purchase. However, negotiations broke down when MR Properties discovered that Meuchel had instructed a surveying company to modify the location of a previously agreed upon boundary line. MR Properties returned Meuchel’s earnest money, stating that an agreement could not be reached.The District Court of Morton County treated MR Properties' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The court disregarded statements in Meuchel’s affidavit and struck a late-filed supplemental affidavit. The court concluded that Meuchel failed to meet his burden to show specific performance was necessary and granted summary judgment to MR Properties, dismissing Meuchel’s claim for specific performance.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding statements in an affidavit and in striking a late-filed supplemental affidavit. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to MR Properties. The court held that the record did not provide any "clear and unequivocal" evidence showing a meeting of the minds or mutual consent between the parties to establish an oral contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing Meuchel’s claim for specific performance. View "Meuchel v. MR Properties" on Justia Law

In 2010, Crystal Kaye Coan purchased a property in Lauderdale County, which was subject to a mortgage. Coan defaulted on the mortgage, leading to a foreclosure by Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the mortgage assignee. Carrington sold the property to Championship Property, LLC in an online auction in May 2018. Championship then filed an ejectment action against Coan, claiming it was the title owner and seeking possession of the property. Coan countered that the foreclosure sale was void, and therefore, Championship had not acquired the title. In January 2023, Championship requested the trial court to require Coan to deposit $2,000 per month with the court clerk pending a final ruling in the ejectment action. The trial court, over Coan's objection, ordered her to deposit $800 per month.Coan failed to deposit the court-ordered payments for March, April, and May 2023, leading Championship to move the trial court to hold her in contempt. The trial court found Coan in contempt and, as a sanction, ruled in favor of Championship on its ejectment claim, awarding it possession of the property. Coan appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision to require Coan to deposit $800 per month with the court clerk, stating that the trial court had the authority to enter the escrow order. The court also affirmed the trial court's finding of contempt against Coan for failing to comply with the escrow order. However, the court reversed the trial court's sanction awarding Championship possession of the property, stating that the sanction was not appropriate given the current posture of the litigation. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Coan v. Championship Property, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between limited partners and general partners of MBC Properties, LP and MBC Development, LP, two entities engaged in real estate development, investment, acquisition, and management. The general partners appointed a special litigation committee (SLC) to investigate claims made by one of the limited partners, James W. Miller. The SLC recommended that the partnerships should not pursue any action against the general partner or any other third parties. Miller then filed a demand for arbitration, asserting derivative claims and requesting the arbitrator to determine whether the SLC complied with the Pennsylvania Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2016 (PULPA).The Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County granted a petition to permanently stay the arbitration, concluding that Miller's challenge to the SLC report arose statutorily and not under the partnership agreements. The Superior Court vacated the trial court's order, finding that the underlying derivative claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreements and that the determination required by PULPA is a prerequisite and defense to those claims, rather than a cause of action.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the parties' agreements incorporated the plain language of Section 8694 of PULPA, which mandates court review of a special litigation committee's determination. The court concluded that the dispute over an SLC's determination pursuant to the PULPA is not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MBC Development, LP v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case involves SCS Carbon Transport LLC ("Summit") and a group of landowners. Summit plans to construct an interstate pipeline to transport carbon dioxide to sequestration sites in North Dakota and four other states. To determine the appropriate pipeline route, Summit needs to access the landowners' properties. However, the landowners denied Summit permission to enter their lands. Consequently, Summit filed lawsuits against the landowners, seeking a court order confirming its right under North Dakota law to enter the lands to conduct pre-condemnation surveys and examinations. The landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the statute authorizing entry is unconstitutional.The district courts granted summary judgment to Summit, concluding that the statute does not constitute an unconstitutional per se taking, Summit is a common carrier authorized to exercise eminent domain, and the proposed surveys and examinations are the type of minimally invasive surveys and examinations allowed under the statute. The courts confirmed Summit's right to enter the lands to complete civil, environmental, and archaeological/cultural surveys and examinations, including any necessary geotechnical/soil borings, archaeological/cultural resource surveys and examinations, and including any necessary core or water sampling activities subject to any conditions.The landowners appealed the judgments and order granting summary judgment, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and article I, § 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the landowners have not established a constitutional violation on the face of the entry statute or as applied to them, and the judgments and order do not exceed the scope of the entry statute. The court also found that the district court's judgment does not grant Summit an indefinite or perpetual right of access. The court held that a constitutionally permissible entry may not be longer or more invasive than necessary to complete the examination or survey needed to confirm and minimize the scope of the anticipated taking of private property. View "SCS Carbon Transport v. Malloy" on Justia Law