Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Dirt Road Development LLC (DRD) and Robert and Kathryn Hirschman over the construction and operation of a new feedlot in Howard County, Nebraska. The Hirschmans own several properties in the county where they operate feedlot facilities. They planned to construct and operate a new feedlot on a property that is separated from their existing feedlots by a quarter section of land owned by a third party. DRD, which owns a property near the proposed new feedlot, filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the Hirschmans from constructing and operating the new feedlot without obtaining a conditional use permit from the Howard County Board of Commissioners.The District Court for Howard County heard the case initially. The court had to determine whether, under Howard County’s zoning regulations, the Hirschmans' new feedlot was “adjacent” to their existing livestock operations. If so, the regulations required the Hirschmans to obtain a conditional use permit before constructing and operating the new feedlot. The district court concluded that the new feedlot was adjacent to the Hirschmans’ other feedlots and that therefore, the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit to build and operate the new feedlot. The court granted DRD’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hirschmans’ motion.The Hirschmans appealed the decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court. They argued that the district court erred in holding that under the Howard County zoning regulations, their new feedlot was adjacent to their other feedlots and constituted a single commercial livestock operation rather than a separate feedlot. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the term "adjacent" as used within the zoning regulations is unambiguous and that the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit for their new feedlot. View "Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a residential eviction dispute between a landlord, MIMG LXXIV Colonial, LLC (Colonial), and a tenant, TajReAna Ellis. Colonial initiated eviction proceedings against Ellis for failing to pay rent, providing a seven-day notice as required by Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Ellis, however, argued that the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) imposed a 30-day notice requirement, superseding the state law. The county court rejected Ellis' argument and ruled in favor of Colonial. Ellis appealed to the district court, which reversed the county court's decision, agreeing with Ellis that the CARES Act required a 30-day notice.The case was then brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, by this time, Ellis' lease had expired, and she had vacated the property. The court found that the case was moot as the relief sought by Colonial, a judgment for restitution of the premises, would have no practical effect since Ellis no longer resided in the property. Colonial argued that the case was not moot due to its interest in knowing whether it violated the law and the financial interest related to the district court's taxing of costs. The court rejected these arguments, stating that claims for costs are generally insufficient to avoid mootness.The court also considered whether to reach the merits of the case under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. However, it declined to do so, noting that the primary question in the case was a matter of federal statutory interpretation, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has final authority. The court also declined to apply the collateral consequences exception, which is typically used in criminal cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the Mauna Kea Access Road (MKAR) in Hawaii, which partially lies on Hawaiian home lands. The plaintiffs, who are Native Hawaiian beneficiaries of the Hawaiian home lands trust, sued the State of Hawaii and several of its departments, alleging that they breached their trust duties by allowing the State to use MKAR lands without payment since the 1970s. They also argued that the State's attempt to designate MKAR as a state highway in 2018 was ineffective as a matter of law.The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, based on Act 14 of 1995, which was intended to resolve all controversies relating to the Hawaiian home lands trust that arose between 1959 and 1988. The defendants argued that Act 14 remedied the uncompensated use of the Hawaiian home lands underlying the MKAR and made enforcement of a land exchange the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The Supreme Court held that Act 14 of 1995 does not preclude the plaintiffs' claims, that the portion of the MKAR going through Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) lands is not a state highway because legal requirements for such a designation were not satisfied, and that the State breached its constitutional and fiduciary obligation to faithfully carry out the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kanahele v. State" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over whether a transfer of property from a family corporation to a trust constituted a "change in ownership" under California's Proposition 13, which would trigger a reassessment of the property's value for tax purposes. The Los Angeles County Assessor determined that the transfer did constitute a change in ownership because the transfer eliminated the interests of individual shareholders who held nonvoting stock in the corporation. The Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board reversed this decision, asserting that the beneficial interest in the corporation's real property was held by the persons who controlled the corporation through its voting stock. The Superior Court granted a petition by the assessor to vacate the Appeals Board's decision, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision. The court held that the term "ownership interests" in the relevant statute, Revenue and Taxation Code section 62, subdivision (a)(2), refers to beneficial ownership interests in real property, not interests in a legal entity. For a corporation, these beneficial ownership interests are measured by all corporate stock, not just voting stock. The court rejected the argument that the term "stock" in section 62, subdivision (a)(2) must be interpreted to mean voting stock. The court concluded that the transfer of the properties from the corporation to the trust resulted in a change in ownership because the proportional beneficial ownership interests in the properties did not remain the same before and after the transfer. View "Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board" on Justia Law

In July 2018, Heather Lee Hawking rented a room at a Super 8 hotel in Boise, Idaho, where she housed approximately fifty cats. Over five days, the cats caused extensive damage to the room. Hawking was subsequently charged with and convicted of misdemeanor malicious injury to property. After the incident, the hotel was sold to a new owner. Following Hawking's conviction, the magistrate court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine restitution owed to the victim. Hawking appealed the Order for Restitution and Judgment.The magistrate court awarded the new owner of the Super 8 hotel $3,708.40 in restitution, reasoning that the new owner took the property in a damaged condition due to the real estate contract and "stepped into the shoes of the previous owners" through that contract. Hawking appealed this decision to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court's order. Hawking then appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the district court's decision. Hawking subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court's order affirming the magistrate court's restitution award. The court found that the State failed to establish that Super 8 was an entity or an assumed business name of a person or entity, and that Super 8 suffered economic loss or injury as a result of Hawking's criminal conduct. The court concluded that the State's failure to establish these elements was fatal to its restitution claim. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the Order for Restitution and Judgment and remand the matter to the magistrate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Hawking" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the funding of Delaware's public schools. The plaintiffs, non-profit organizations with an interest in Delaware's schools, filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging that the state's public schools were not providing an adequate education for students from low-income households, students with disabilities, and students whose first language is not English. They argued that one of the problems was a broken system for funding the schools, which relied on property taxes. The plaintiffs contended that the three counties in Delaware were using decades-old property valuations, which violated state law and the state constitution.The case was initially heard in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. During discovery, the plaintiffs served requests for admission to the counties, asking them to admit that their decades-old assessments resulted in a lack of uniformity in property taxes and violated state law. The counties denied these requests. At trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the counties' assessments violated state law and the state constitution. The court also found that the plaintiffs had proved the facts that were the subject of the requests for admission that the counties had denied.The plaintiffs then requested an award of expenses under Court of Chancery Rule 37(c), which allows the court to order a party to pay the expenses that another party incurred in proving a fact that should have been admitted. The court granted the plaintiffs' request, awarding them expenses of $337,224, which included attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs. Each county was ordered to pay a prorated share of $112,408. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Patrick Boyle, a trustee and unit owner of the Ocean Club Condominium (OC Condominium), and the Ocean Club Condominium Association (Association). After a disagreement over the Association's financial management, the Board of Trustees (Board) expelled Boyle. Boyle filed a complaint challenging his removal and sought indemnification for his legal fees and costs based on a provision in the Association's bylaws. The trial court reinstated Boyle as a trustee and held that the bylaws entitled Boyle to counsel fees and costs. Boyle later filed an amended complaint, adding additional claims including for indemnification, and a third amended complaint, bringing a derivative claim on behalf of the Association and alleging that the trustee defendants breached their fiduciary duties.The trial court ruled in Boyle's favor, holding that the bylaws entitled him to counsel fees and costs. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision but limited the indemnification to the fees and costs Boyle incurred in his action to be reinstated as trustee, not in his derivative action claim.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's judgment. The court found the indemnification provision in the Association's bylaws to be ambiguous and, therefore, strictly construed it against Boyle, the indemnitee. The court held that the provision did not cover Boyle's first-party claim for attorneys' fees and costs against the Association. The court clarified that while indemnification may apply to first-party claims if that is the clear intent of the parties, any ambiguity will be construed against the indemnitee. The court encouraged parties seeking to permit indemnification of first-party claims to include express language to do so. View "Boyle v. Huff" on Justia Law

A group of Arkansas landowners sued Lawrence County, alleging that a bridge constructed by the county had caused their farms to flood, constituting an unlawful taking of their properties without just compensation, in violation of the U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions. The landowners claimed that the bridge acted as a dam, forcing excessive water into the Cache River, which then spilled onto their farms. They presented expert testimony to support their claims and sought damages based on the fair rental value of their properties during the period of the alleged taking.The district court upheld a jury award of nearly $350,000 to the landowners but rejected their request for an order to tear down the bridge. The county appealed the damages award, arguing that the landowners had failed to offer sufficient evidence of damages since they did not calculate the value of crops actually lost. The landowners cross-appealed the denial of their request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the damages award, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation of damages. The court found that the landowners were not obliged to prove damages by providing evidence of the amount of crops they expected to grow versus the amount of crops they actually grew due to increased flooding. Instead, they were entitled to recover the fair rental value of the property during the period of the taking.However, the court vacated the district court's order denying injunctive relief and remanded for the court to give the landowners' request a more focused consideration. The court found that the district court had relied heavily on the law of standing, which was not at issue, and had ventured into areas that had little bearing on a proper evaluation of the request for injunctive relief. View "Watkins v. Lawrence County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a deed reservation related to a shale pit on a property owned by the Hansen-Gier Family Trust. The deed, originally between the Haywoods and the Paughs, reserved the use of the shale pit for ingress and egress roads of "the development property." The Trust, the current property owner, sought a declaratory judgment that the reservation had fulfilled its purpose and is now void, or alternatively, that the reservation was limited to use on the ingress and egress roads of its property and two neighboring parcels. The Haywoods, however, argued that "the development property" meant any property they had developed or were going to develop.The Circuit Court of Mineral County ruled in favor of the Haywoods, interpreting "the development property" as any property the Haywoods develop. The court granted the Haywoods ownership rights to the shale and the right to remove the shale for property that they develop.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's interpretation broadened the scope of the reservation beyond the language of the deed. The court also found that the lower court failed to consider the use-and-purpose limitation in the reservation, which specified that the shale could only be used for ingress and egress roads. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to make additional findings consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the reservation. View "The Hansen-Gier Family Trust v. Haywood" on Justia Law

The case involves Continental Resources, Inc., an Oklahoma oil and gas company, and Rick and Rosella Fisher, who own a farm in North Dakota. Continental drilled a horizontal disposal well on the Fishers' property to inject saltwater waste into the pore space of a rock formation known as the Lodgepole. The Fishers sued Continental, claiming that the company had no right to drill the well. The district court ruled that Continental had the right to proceed with drilling and using the well as long as the use was reasonable, but the Fishers were entitled to compensation for any proven damage to their pore space.The district court denied Continental's motion for judgment as a matter of law and the jury awarded the Fishers $22,440.25. Continental then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, moved for a new trial. The Fishers moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court denied Continental’s motion and awarded the Fishers $249,243.60 in attorneys’ fees and $87,639.89 in costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the third-party contracts and Rick Fisher’s testimony. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the Fishers. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fisher" on Justia Law