Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A Colorado-based company applied to the Utah state engineer for permission to divert 55,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Green River in Utah, intending to pipe it across Wyoming for use in Colorado. The company proposed to use the water along Colorado’s Front Range but had not finalized a delivery location or obtained any approvals from Colorado authorities. The application was subject to both the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, which governs interstate water allocations, and Utah’s statutes regulating water appropriation and export.After receiving the application, the Utah state engineer published notice, received protests, and held an administrative hearing. The engineer ultimately denied the application, finding that the company had not demonstrated compliance with Utah’s Export Statute, particularly the requirement to show that the water could be beneficially used in Colorado. The engineer also noted the absence of any guarantee from Colorado that the water would be counted against its compact allocation. The company’s request for reconsideration was denied by default. The company then sought de novo review in the Eighth District Court, Daggett County.The district court granted summary judgment for the state engineer, ruling that the Upper Compact did not preempt Utah’s water laws and that the applicant failed to show beneficial use as required by Utah’s Export Statute. The court also found, in the alternative, that Colorado was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Utah’s Export Statute is not preempted by the Upper Compact and that the applicant failed to establish a reason to believe the exported water could be beneficially used in Colorado. View "Water Horse v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

A developer entered into an agreement with a city to develop a downtown district, which included provisions for three large signs identifying the area as "Reno's Neon Line District." The city council approved the agreement and adopted it by ordinance. A nonprofit organization dedicated to scenic preservation objected, arguing that the signs were actually billboards prohibited by city code and that the developers lacked the necessary interest to enter into the agreement.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County partially granted the nonprofit’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the nonprofit had standing to challenge the agreement. It ruled that one sign (the archway sign) was a permissible area identification sign, but determined that the other two signs (the gas station sign and the cemetery sign) were, respectively, an on-premises advertising display and a billboard, both in violation of city code. The court severed the provisions for these two signs from the agreement and issued a writ preventing their construction.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether the nonprofit had standing and whether the district court properly reclassified the signs. The Supreme Court held that the city’s classification of the signs as area identification signs was entitled to a presumption of validity and that substantial evidence supported this classification. The court further held that the nonprofit lacked standing to seek writ relief because it did not have a direct and substantial beneficial interest in the agreement, as the signs were not billboards and thus not covered by a prior settlement agreement with the city. The court also found that the nonprofit had waived any argument for representational standing. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RENO REAL ESTATE DEVEL., LLC VS. SCENIC NEVADA, INC." on Justia Law

A tenant rented a space on a landlord’s farm to park and live in her recreational vehicle (RV). The site lacked a sewage disposal system, and the tenant connected her RV’s wastewater port to a pipe that discharged raw sewage onto the ground. After the county health department cited the landlord for this violation, the landlord notified the tenant of lease termination for cause and initiated a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict her. The tenant argued that her obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary depended on the landlord’s duty to provide a sewage system. She also counterclaimed for damages, alleging the landlord failed to provide both a sewage system and safe drinking water.The Umatilla County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the landlord on both the eviction and the tenant’s counterclaims, awarding possession to the landlord. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage system did not excuse the tenant’s duty to keep the premises sanitary, and that the tenant failed to prove her counterclaims, particularly because she did not notify the landlord of the problems.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system violated his statutory obligation to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. However, this did not excuse the tenant from her independent obligation to refrain from dumping sewage onto the ground. The tenant’s continued discharge of sewage constituted a violation that justified termination of the tenancy and eviction. Regarding the counterclaims, the court found the tenant could recover damages for the lack of a sewage system because the landlord already knew of the deficiency, but not for unsafe drinking water, as there was no evidence the landlord knew or should have known of that issue. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jared v. Harmon" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

Owners of developed commercial and residential properties in Athens-Clarke County challenged the county’s stormwater utility charge, arguing that it was an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The charge, established by county ordinances in 2004, funds stormwater management services required by federal law, with the amount assessed based on impervious surface area and land-use classification. The ordinance exempts certain properties, such as public roads and sidewalks, and offers credits for on-site stormwater management. The funds collected are used for flood prevention, pollution minimization, and compliance with federal regulations.Previously, the Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County granted summary judgment to the county, finding that the stormwater utility charge was a fee, not a tax, and thus not subject to the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. This decision relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, which had addressed the same ordinance and held it imposed a fee rather than a tax. The appellants also pursued related claims in federal court, but those were dismissed on abstention grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County controlled, reaffirming that the stormwater utility charge is a fee and not a tax, and therefore the uniformity provision does not apply. The court also rejected the appellants’ arguments that the charge constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Georgia and United States Constitutions, finding no basis for such a claim. Finally, the court found that the trial court had properly applied the summary judgment standard and had not improperly resolved factual disputes. The judgment in favor of the county was affirmed. View "HOMEWOOD ASSOCIATES INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY" on Justia Law

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor, was injured when he fell from an exposed, unguarded ledge while installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom at a residential construction site owned by SMG Construction Services. Cook had previously observed the absence of a guardrail on the ledge and acknowledged this hazard in his deposition. At the time of the accident, he was moving backward toward the ledge while working. Cook sued SMG, alleging that the company failed to maintain a safe premises, which led to his injuries.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The court concluded that Cook’s knowledge of the exposed ledge was equal to SMG’s, and therefore, SMG owed him no duty to warn or protect against the risk. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, there was evidence that conditions at the site affected his ability to perceive the exact location and risk posed by the ledge. The appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook’s knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG’s.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had conflated actual and constructive knowledge, erroneously applying standards relevant to constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—that caused his injury. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses in light of Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard. View "SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC v. COOK" on Justia Law

A property owner and developer challenged a city’s adopted housing element, which is a required component of a local general plan in California that must identify how the city will accommodate its share of regional housing needs, including for lower-income households. The city, a charter city, used a “residential overlay” zoning approach, superimposing new residential development rights over existing commercial and industrial zones, to identify sites for affordable housing. Some of these sites were nonvacant, including parking lots serving shopping centers and a site leased to a grocery store with contractual restrictions. The developer argued that the city’s approach did not comply with state law because it did not ensure that the identified sites would realistically be developed for lower-income housing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the developer’s petition for writ of mandate and entered judgment for the city. The trial court found that the city’s housing element constituted a “major change in allowable land use” under the city charter, but held that state housing law preempted the charter’s voter approval requirement. The court also found the city’s use of overlay zoning and its identification of nonvacant sites to be permissible under the Housing Element Law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. The appellate court held that the city’s use of a residential overlay did not comply with Government Code section 65583.2(h)(2) because the overlay allowed development of identified sites without requiring any residential component, thus failing to meet the mandatory minimum density and residential use requirements. The court also found that the city failed to provide substantial evidence that one of the nonvacant sites, occupied by a grocery store with restrictive lease terms, was realistically available for redevelopment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the city to revise its housing element in compliance with state law. View "New Commune DTLA LLC v. City Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A lessor and two lessees entered into a lease with an option to purchase a residential property in Calhoun County, Alabama. The agreement required the lessees to make monthly rent payments, annual payments, and an initial deposit, with certain payments to be credited toward the purchase price if the option was exercised. Disputes arose near the end of the lease term regarding the timeliness of the lessees’ payments and whether the lessees had complied with all contractual requirements, including providing written notice of their intent to purchase.The Calhoun Circuit Court conducted a bench trial and found that a valid lease-to-purchase contract existed, that the lessees had complied with its terms, and that the lessor still owed a mortgage on the property. The court ordered that all funds held by the parties be paid to the lessor to reduce the mortgage principal, required the lessor to satisfy the mortgage and convey clear title to the lessees by a specified date, and assigned responsibility for property taxes to the lessees. The lessor’s postjudgment motion, which challenged the findings regarding compliance and payment timeliness, was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the trial court’s factual findings under the ore tenus standard, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the lessees had not breached the lease, concluding that the lessor’s actions had contributed to any payment delays. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment to the extent it credited monthly rent payments toward the purchase price, holding that only the initial deposit and annual payments should be applied, as the contract unambiguously required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "McCain v. Sneed" on Justia Law

After a property owner defaulted on a note secured by a deed of trust, he filed for bankruptcy in 2008, and his debt was discharged in 2009. He made no further payments on the 20-year obligation. In 2018, the interest in the deed of trust was transferred to a new entity, which initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The property owner responded by filing a quiet title action and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations to enforce the note and foreclose on the deed of trust began running upon the bankruptcy discharge. The trial court agreed, granted summary judgment, and quieted title in favor of the property owner.The new beneficiary appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unpublished opinion. The beneficiary’s motions for reconsideration and petitions for review to the Washington Supreme Court were denied. Shortly after, Division One issued a published opinion in Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Association v. Kurtz, which expressly disagreed with the earlier decision in this case, creating a split within the division. The beneficiary then sought relief from the quiet title judgment in the trial court under CR 60(b)(11), arguing that the divisional split and subsequent legal developments justified reopening the case. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard under CR 60(b)(11). The Supreme Court determined that the combination of legal errors, the prompt actions of the beneficiary, and the divisional split constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the quiet title judgment and for further proceedings. View "Luv v. W. Coast Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Indian tribe purchased a parcel of nonreservation land in Washington State using state and federal conservation grant funds, with the purpose of protecting salmon habitat and preserving tribal treaty fishing rights. The land was designated for conservation and was not part of any reservation. A neighboring landowner, a Washington corporation, claimed that it and its predecessors had acquired title to a strip of this land through adverse possession, based on decades of exclusive use and maintenance of a boundary fence. The corporation filed a quiet title action in Snohomish County Superior Court against both the tribe and the county, seeking to establish its ownership of the disputed strip.The Snohomish County Superior Court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the tribe was protected by sovereign immunity and could not be sued without its consent or an act of Congress. The corporation sought direct review by the Washington Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Washington Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that tribal sovereign immunity is not subject to a common law immovable property exception unless Congress or the tribe itself clearly waives immunity. The court also noted that prior Washington cases allowing in rem jurisdiction over tribally owned nonreservation land were no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 584 U.S. 554 (2018).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over adverse possession claims involving nonreservation land owned by tribes, unless there is a clear waiver of immunity by the tribe or Congress. The court further held that the common law immovable property exception does not apply to tribal sovereign immunity. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Flying T Ranch, Inc. v. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians" on Justia Law