Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In a case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Ursinus College utilized financing from the Montgomery County Health and Higher Education Authority (Authority) to undertake a construction project. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 98 (IBEW) asserted that this project was a public work under the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), which would require workers on the project to receive prevailing minimum wages. The court was tasked with determining whether this project constituted a public work under the PWA. The court found that the project was not a public work as defined in the PWA, as the funds for the project did not come from a public body. Rather, the Authority served as a conduit for financing, with private funds generated from the Authority's ability to issue bonds being used to pay for the project. The Authority did not hold or disburse these funds, nor did it bear any risk or liability with respect to the repayment of the bonds. Therefore, the court held that the project was not subject to the PWA's prevailing wage requirements. View "Ursinus College v. Prevailing Wage Appeals Board" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, petitioner Claire E. Miller and respondent Jesse A. Amos were involved in a dispute related to eviction proceedings. Miller was a tenant who lived in a home owned and occupied by Amos. Their arrangement was an oral tenancy agreement where Miller agreed to provide pet care and light housekeeping services instead of paying rent. After six months, Amos served Miller with a notice to quit, alleging breach of their oral agreement. Miller refused to move out, and Amos filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) complaint seeking eviction. Miller contended that her eviction was due to her refusal to engage in sexual acts with Amos, which she stated was a form of sex discrimination and retaliation under the Colorado Fair Housing Act (CFHA).The county court ruled in favor of Amos, stating that a landlord can serve a notice to quit for “no reason or any reason,” dismissing the CFHA violation claim as an affirmative defense for eviction. The district court affirmed this decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower court's ruling. The court held that a tenant can assert a landlord’s alleged violation of the CFHA as an affirmative defense to an FED eviction. The court noted that the purpose of the CFHA is to prevent discriminatory practices, and therefore, a tenant must be able to use it as a shield against a discriminatory eviction. The court also emphasized that a tenant's right to due process must be preserved even in eviction proceedings, which are intended to be expedited. This decision allows tenants in Colorado to assert discrimination or retaliation under the CFHA as a defense in eviction cases. View "Miller v. Amos" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed an appeal from Hilltop Group, Inc., and ADJ Holdings, LLC (Hilltop Group), regarding a dispute with the County of San Diego (County), over the proposed North County Environmental Resources Project (NCER Project), a recycling facility. The Hilltop Group applied to develop the NCER Project on a parcel of land that was designated for industrial use by the County as part of its General Plan Update (GPU) in 2011. However, the project faced significant opposition from community members, homeowners associations, and the nearby City of Escondido due to concerns over potential environmental impacts.The County staff initially required Hilltop Group to conduct environmental studies. Based on these studies, the County concluded that the NCER Project qualified for a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exemption under section 21083.3, meaning that no further environmental review would be needed. However, this decision was appealed to the Board of Supervisors, who voted to grant the appeals and require further environmental review. The Hilltop Group challenged this decision in court, arguing that the NCER Project did not have any significant and peculiar environmental effects that were not already evaluated by the program Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the GPU.The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hilltop Group, finding that the Board of Supervisors did not proceed in a manner required by law when they denied the exemption and failed to limit further environmental review to those effects enumerated in Guidelines section 15183, subdivision (b)(1) through (4). The court concluded that the Board of Supervisors' findings of peculiar environmental effects in the areas of aesthetics, noise, traffic, air quality, and GHG emissions were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, the court held that the Board of Supervisors' decision denying the CEQA exemption and requiring the preparation of an EIR constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and directed it to enter a new judgment granting the petition and issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision granting the administrative appeals and requiring the preparation of an EIR. View "Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

In this case, Lee Baker and Kenneth Duffus were partners in a real estate development company, Harvest Properties, LLC. Baker was accused of defrauding the company, leading to a lawsuit from the company's members for defaulting on a loan. Duffus cross-claimed against Baker, alleging Baker had violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). Baker argued that the UTPA did not apply since his conduct was part of a real estate transaction and was within the company's internal operations. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska rejected Baker's arguments and affirmed the superior court's ruling. The court held that Baker's fraudulent actions were not part of a real estate transaction because they did not involve the actual transfer of an interest in real property. Instead, they interfered with the company's ability to realize larger, future real estate transactions. The court also held that the UTPA applies even when a party has a fiduciary relationship with a business entity if the parties also engage in arms-length commercial transactions. Baker's provision of services through his separate corporation was considered such an arms-length transaction. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Warren G. Treme, a member of AJSJS Development, LLC, leased minerals on a tract of land in St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, from Dr. Christy Montegut and his siblings. AJSJS intended to join a joint venture formed in 2010 between Treme, AIMS Group, Inc., and Fred Kinsley. The joint venture aimed to extract and process clay material from the tract for a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project. However, to conduct mining and excavation activities, the plaintiffs needed to change the zoning classification of the tract. Despite multiple applications for rezoning, the Parish Council denied the applications after hearing complaints from affected residents. The plaintiffs then sued the Parish and the Council, alleging that the denial of the rezoning application constituted a regulatory taking without compensation in violation of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a takings claim because their mineral lease was not yet in effect, meaning they had no vested property interest in the tract. The court interpreted the lease to have a suspensive condition that required the plaintiffs to obtain governmental approvals for the lease to become effective. As the plaintiffs had not obtained these approvals, the lease had not yet come into effect. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision but modified the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Treme v. St. John the Baptist" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the right to use a gravel crossing over a railroad track in Johnson County, Texas. The landowners, Nathan Albert and Chisholm Trail Redi-Mix, LLC, were granted an easement by necessity, an easement by estoppel, and a prescriptive easement by a jury, allowing them to cross the railroad tracks owned by the Fort Worth & Western Railroad Company (Western). The jury also found that the landowners did not trespass on the railroad’s property. The Court of Appeals reversed these findings, stating that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s easement findings and factually insufficient to support the trespass finding. The Supreme Court of Texas partially reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that while the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's findings of an easement by necessity and an easement by estoppel, it was legally sufficient to support the prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to consider unresolved issues involving the boundaries and permitted uses of the easement. The dispute started when the railroad company began sending notices to the landowners that they were trespassing on the railroad’s property by using the gravel crossing. Despite this, the gravel crossing had been used without issue for many years and had been referenced as a "private road" on local maps since the 1940s. View "ALBERT v. FORT WORTH & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by BMG Monroe I, LLC. BMG, a developer, had sued the Village of Monroe, New York, alleging that the Village's denial of its applications for building permits on five lots violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause due to a discriminatory animus towards the Hasidic Jewish community. The Village denied the applications due to non-compliance with the architectural criteria established in the Smith Farm Project's approval conditions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the claims were unripe because BMG had not exhausted its administrative remedies. In order to satisfy the finality requirement under ripeness doctrine, BMG needed to appeal the adverse planning-board decision to a zoning board of appeals and submit at least one meaningful application for a variance. BMG could not claim that further actions were futile based on the Village's indication that it would likely not be receptive to a variance request that had yet to be made. View "BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe" on Justia Law

This case involves two consolidated appeals related to Sanitary and Improvement District No. 596 of Douglas County, Nebraska (SID 596) and THG Development, L.L.C. (THG), a real estate owner whose property adjoins but is outside of SID 596's boundaries. The first appeal is from a condemnation action in which SID 596 sought to condemn part of THG's property for public use and the second appeal is from a separate action in which SID 596 sought to levy a special assessment on THG's property, which is outside of SID 596's boundaries, alleging that the property received special benefits from improvements made by SID 596.On the first appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no merit in THG's claims that the lower court erred in allowing the mention of "special benefits" and in permitting certain expert testimony. The Supreme Court also found no merit in the claim that the trial court erred in denying THG's motion for a new trial based on alleged improper conduct by SID 596's counsel during closing argument.In the second appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment granting THG's motion for summary judgment and dismissing SID 596's complaint. The court interpreted the relevant statute, § 31-752, as not authorizing an SID to levy a special assessment on property located outside of the SID's boundaries. As such, the court concluded that SID 596's complaint seeking to levy a special assessment on THG's property was without merit. The court also found no merit in THG's cross-appeal arguing that the lower court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees. View "SID No. 596 v. THG Development" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Robert Trebelhorn, suffered a serious knee injury at his apartment complex when a section of an elevated walkway collapsed due to deterioration. The defendants, Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, and Prime Administration, LLC, who owned and managed the apartment complex, were aware of the deteriorated condition of the walkway but chose not to repair it. Trebelhorn sued the defendants for negligence and violation of Oregon's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and won. The jury awarded him just under $300,000 in damages and also imposed punitive damages of $10 million against each defendant. On post-verdict review, the trial court concluded that although the evidence supported some amount of punitive damages, the amount of $10 million would violate the defendants' due process rights. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to just under $2.7 million against each defendant. On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon also agreed with the trial court that $10 million in punitive damages would violate the defendants' due process rights and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, One Love Housing, LLC, a company that operates a residential sober living home in Anoka, Minnesota, sued the City of Anoka for refusing to grant a waiver from the city's zoning regulations. The regulations permit only a single family or a group of not more than four unrelated persons to reside together in the area where the sober home is located. One Love wanted to accommodate seven unrelated recovering addicts in the home. One Love and two residents of the home alleged that the city violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act by refusing to grant this waiver.The district court granted One Love summary judgment on its claim that the city failed to reasonably accommodate the sober home's request. The court ordered the city to grant the waiver for One Love to house seven unrelated individuals recovering from substance abuse. The city appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred by considering evidence that was not presented to the city council when it denied One Love's request for a waiver. The appellate court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to One Love because there was a genuine dispute over whether the requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary. The court stated that the financial viability of One Love's sober home is relevant only if One Love can prove that the service it offers provides a therapeutic benefit that is necessary for people recovering from alcohol or drug abuse to successfully live in a residential neighborhood without relapsing. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of disputed fact on these issues. The court also declined to rule on One Love's disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, leaving those for the district court to address on remand. View "One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, MN" on Justia Law