Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas Rhone, a property owner in Texas City, Texas, had his apartments declared a nuisance by a Municipal Court of Record. Rhone disputed this decision in state court, but the City moved the case to federal district court. There, Rhone's claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Rhone appealed the district court's decision, challenging the standard of review and its conclusions regarding his constitutional claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement.Rhone's property, three apartment buildings, passed a city inspection in 2013 without any issues regarding a lack of a certificate of occupancy being raised. However, following an inspection in 2020, Texas City informed Rhone that his buildings were substandard and that he would need a certificate of occupancy to operate them. Rhone argued that city officials interfered with his efforts to remedy the violations claimed by the City and imposed conditions that made it impossible for him to preserve the value of his property by repairing the apartment buildings to bring them into compliance with the Texas City Code instead of demolishing the structures.After the city filed an administrative action in its Municipal Court of Record, the court ordered the demolition of the apartment buildings, finding them to be "dilapidated, substandard, unfit for human habitation, a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare," and a nuisance. Rhone appealed this order in the 122nd Judicial District Court of Galveston County, but the City removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Galveston under federal-question jurisdiction. The federal district court ultimately granted partial summary judgment in favor of Texas City.The Court of Appeals held that any of Rhone's claims that would only interfere with the demolition of the buildings on his property were moot due to the demolition of the buildings. However, the court also held that the demolition did not eliminate a potential takings claim. The court ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement. The court also held that Rhone has not shown that an initial inspection by a city fire marshal and an issuance of a citation that has consequences on his use of the property violate federal law. View "Rhone v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the St. Louis County Assessor ("Assessor") and a group of St. Louis County commercial property owners, referred to as "Taxpayers." The Taxpayers alleged that their properties were assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value (FMV) than other commercial properties in the county. This claim is known as a "ratio discrimination" claim. The Taxpayers appealed their assessments to the local board of equalization ("BOE") and the Missouri State Tax Commission ("STC"). In some of the appeals, the BOE and STC did not change the Assessor's original FMV and assessed value, while in others, they ordered reductions in the estimated FMV of the property, resulting in a lower assessed value and decreased tax liability.The STC found that the Taxpayers did not provide substantial and persuasive evidence of discrimination. The Taxpayers then filed a petition for judicial review, and the circuit court reversed the STC's decision and order and remanded the case for retrial. The Assessor appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found that the STC's decision was authorized by law and supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed with the STC that the Taxpayers did not provide persuasive evidence of discriminatory assessment. The Court held that the actual assessment level used to analyze a claim of discriminatory assessment and taxation is based on the assessed value that actually determines the tax liability. The Court also found that the STC did not abuse its discretion by denying certain discovery requests and quashing subpoenas for the deposition of the Assessor and several staff appraisers. The circuit court's judgment was vacated, and the STC's decision and order was reinstated. View "Crown Diversified Industries Corp. v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC (Lazy S) filed a lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company and related entities (collectively, Valero), alleging that Valero's pipeline leaked and caused contamination on Lazy S's property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Valero.Lazy S runs cattle operations on a large property in Oklahoma, beneath which several pipelines transport hydrocarbons. In 2018, a representative of the ranch noticed a diesel fuel odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property. Samples were taken and tested, and these tests revealed trace amounts of refined petroleum products in soil, surface water, groundwater, spring water, and air on the ranch.Lazy S brought several claims against Valero, including private nuisance, public nuisance, negligence per se, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valero, holding that Lazy S did not present sufficient evidence to establish a legal injury or causation.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to legal injury on its claims of private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence per se. The court noted that Lazy S had presented evidence of a strong odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property, headaches suffered by individuals due to the odor, and changes in behavior due to the odor. As such, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the odor injured the ranch.The Tenth Circuit also found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The court noted that the pipeline was a major source of potential contamination beneath the ranch, that it had leaked in the past, and that a pathway existed for hydrocarbons to travel from the pipeline to the water source.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lazy S's claims of constructive fraud and trespass, finding that Lazy S had not presented sufficient evidence to support these claims.The court remanded the case to the district court for trial on the issues of negligence per se, private nuisance, and public nuisance, including Lazy S's claims for damages. View "Lazy S Ranch Properties v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution" on Justia Law

In the case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Peace Ranch LLC challenged the constitutionality of California AB 978, a mobilehome-rent-control statute. Peace Ranch alleged that if it increases mobilehome rents more than AB 978 permits, the California Attorney General would enforce AB 978 against it. However, Peace Ranch also alleged that AB 978 does not apply to its mobilehome park. The Court of Appeals concluded that Peace Ranch had adequately established standing based on a pre-enforcement injury. The court reasoned that Peace Ranch was trapped between complying with a law that it believes does not apply to it or risking enforcement proceedings by raising rents. This dilemma, the court ruled, is the precise predicament that supports pre-enforcement standing. As such, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. View "PEACE RANCH, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, Joni Fraser, who was attacked by two pit bulls owned by a tenant, Hebe Crocker, who rented a single-family residence from landlords Ali Farvid and Lilyana Amezcua. Fraser sued both Crocker and the landlords. After settling with Crocker, the case proceeded against the landlords. A jury found that the landlords had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the dogs and could have prevented foreseeable harm to Fraser, awarding her damages exceeding $600,000. However, the trial court granted the landlords' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding no substantial evidence to demonstrate the landlords' knowledge of the dogs' dangerous propensities.Under California law, a landlord who lacks actual knowledge of a tenant's dog's vicious nature cannot be held liable when the dog attacks a third person. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Court held that the email from a neighbor mentioning "guard dogs" did not constitute substantial evidence that the landlords knew or must have known the dogs were dangerous. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the landlords' alleged false statements denying knowledge of the dogs constituted evidence of their knowledge of the dogs' dangerous nature. The Court concluded that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that the landlords knew or should have known the dogs were dangerous. View "Fraser v. Farvid" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the Indiana Supreme Court, plaintiff Dux North LLC, the owner of a landlocked property in rural Hamilton County, Indiana, sought an implied easement over adjacent property owned by defendants Jason and Sarah Morehouse. Dux North claimed either an implied easement by prior use or an implied easement of necessity over the Morehouse property. The court clarified that these two types of implied easements are conceptually different. For an implied easement by prior use, the claimed servitude must predate the severance creating the separate parcels. For an implied easement of necessity, the claimed necessity need to arise only at severance and not before. Thus, Dux North could seek relief under either implied easement, and the failure of one such easement does not necessarily defeat the other. Furthermore, the court held that an implied easement of necessity requires a showing that access to the property by another means is not just impractical but impossible. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment granting Dux North's motion for summary judgment on the easement-by-prior-use claim and denying the Morehouses' motion for partial summary judgment on the easement-of-necessity claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings to decide whether Dux North has an easement by prior use over the Morehouse property. View "Morehouse v. Dux North LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerns the dissolution of a marriage between Diana and Andreas Lietz. The primary point of contention was the valuation of the family home. Diana presented an appraisal report valuing the home at $1.1 million, while Andreas's appraisal report valued it at $1,020,000. Both appraisal reports stated the home was on a 9,000 square feet lot. However, Diana attempted to argue that the lot size was more than 9,000 square feet. The trial court found Andreas's appraiser more credible and accepted his valuation. On appeal, Diana argued that the court erred by preventing her from presenting evidence and testimony suggesting that the lot size was larger than 9,000 square feet. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the trial court followed the correct procedure when it sustained objections to Diana's attempts to present evidence about the larger lot size due to the lack of competent evidence supporting her claim. The court emphasized that an expert witness could not assert case-specific facts in hearsay statements unless they were independently proven by competent evidence or covered by a hearsay exception. View "In re Marriage of Lietz" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, Emily Bialota sought to gain title to a property previously owned by Lakota Lakes, LLC, which was sold at a tax sale due to unpaid property taxes. Bialota argued that she had properly served Lakota Lakes with a notice of intent to take tax deed, while Lakota Lakes claimed it had not been validly served, rendering the tax deed void. The circuit court granted Lakota Lakes' motion for summary judgment, determining that Bialota had not properly served the notice. Bialota appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It held that under Minnesota law, which Lakota Lakes operated under, the Minnesota Secretary of State was the valid agent for service of process as Lakota Lakes had been administratively terminated and failed to maintain a registered agent for service of process. The court further held that Bialota had personally served the notice on the Minnesota Secretary of State, which was deemed proper under South Dakota law. Therefore, the court concluded that Bialota had correctly served Lakota Lakes and was entitled to the tax deed to the property. View "Bialota V. Lakota Lakes" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, realtor Joshua Uhre, who owns Uhre Realty Corporation (URC) and Uhre Property Management Corporation (UPM), had a dispute with Benjamin and Leslie Tronnes over the sale of their property. The Tronneses had contracted with Uhre to sell their property and entered into a property management agreement that authorized Uhre to lease and manage the property if it did not sell. After the property was leased to a tenant, the Tronneses sold the property directly to the tenant after the listing agreement expired. Uhre claimed that his realty company was entitled to a sales commission and that his property management company was entitled to a management fee for the entire lease agreement, despite its early termination. Uhre sued the Tronneses for breach of the listing agreement, breach of the management agreement, and civil conspiracy. The Tronneses counterclaimed, alleging that Uhre and his companies had interfered with their business expectation with the tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that Uhre was not entitled to a sales commission because he did not procure a ready, willing, and able buyer during the term of the listing agreement. The court also rejected Uhre's argument that the lease agreement gave him an option to buy the property, finding that it did not contain the necessary terms for a valid option contract. Additionally, the court found that the Tronneses did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Regarding the management agreement, the court ruled in favor of the Tronneses, stating that Uhre was only entitled to 10% of the monthly rent that had accrued through June 3, 2021, which he had already received. Finally, the court reversed the lower court's determination that the Tronneses were entitled to attorney fees, finding that the listing agreement only authorized fees in the event of a breach of contract. View "Uhre Realty V. Tronnes" on Justia Law