Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Alebia, Inc. (Alebia) is a Rhode Island corporation that owned a property at 284-286 Atwells Avenue, Providence. In September 2005, Carmela Natale and Walter Potenza, purported owners and shareholders of Alebia, executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Equity One Mortgage Company. The mortgage lacked a legal description of the property, but the loan proceeds were used to pay off prior mortgages and taxes on the property. The note was intended to be secured by the property, but Natale and Potenza signed the mortgage in their individual capacities instead of as corporate representatives of Alebia.In 2011, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), the current holder of the note, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court against Natale and Potenza for breach of contract and against Alebia seeking reformation of the mortgage. Deutsche Bank obtained a judgment against Natale and Potenza in 2017 but could not proceed against the property. In 2021, Deutsche Bank filed a motion to equitably reform the mortgage against Alebia. The Superior Court held remote evidentiary hearings and granted the motion, reforming the mortgage to reflect that Natale and Potenza signed as corporate representatives of Alebia.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony and evidence, including the promissory note. The court found sufficient evidence to support the reformation of the mortgage due to mutual mistake. The court also held that the mortgage could be reformed without reforming the note and that the remote hearings did not violate due process, despite the error in holding them remotely without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Alebia, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the possession of Touro Synagogue, the oldest active synagogue in the United States, located in Newport, Rhode Island. Congregation Shearith Israel (Shearith Israel) sought to evict Congregation Jeshuat Israel (Jeshuat Israel) from the synagogue. Shearith Israel sent a notice of termination to Jeshuat Israel, demanding they vacate the premises by February 1, 2023. Jeshuat Israel did not vacate, leading Shearith Israel to file an action for trespass and repossession by ejectment.The Rhode Island Superior Court ruled in favor of Shearith Israel, granting them the right to immediate possession of the property. Jeshuat Israel appealed, raising four arguments: the validity of the termination notice, the existence of a condition precedent in a 1945 agreement, the modification of a 1908 lease by the 1945 agreement, and the waiver of a defense by Shearith Israel.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the termination notice was valid and that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also determined that the 1945 agreement did not modify the lease to include a condition precedent requiring consultation before eviction. The agreement's requirement for consultation pertained only to matters of historical preservation and not to eviction actions. The court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, granting Shearith Israel the right to take immediate possession of Touro Synagogue. View "Congregation Shearith Israel v. Congregation Jeshuat Israel" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Sara Roman, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court alleging she sustained injuries from slipping on untreated snow and ice at Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School in Providence. She claimed negligence against the City of Providence and K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc., which had a contract with the city for snow removal.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. The first hearing justice ruled in favor of the city, applying the Connecticut Rule, which states that a landlord or business invitor's duty to remove snow and ice arises only after the storm has ceased and a reasonable time has passed. The second hearing justice ruled in favor of K. Scott, determining that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because it was not authorized to begin snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It vacated the judgment in favor of the city, finding that a question of material fact remained as to whether the plaintiff slipped on preexisting ice or freshly accumulated snow, which would affect the city's duty under the Connecticut Rule. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of K. Scott, holding that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff at the time of the incident because it was not authorized to perform snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall. View "Roman v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Michael R. and Christine O. McElroy, claimed an express or implied easement to access Seaweed Beach in Narragansett, Rhode Island, and to traverse certain private properties to reach the beach. The private properties in question are owned by Marilyn O. Stephens, Paul G. and Nancy L. Anthony, and Vivian H. Lacroix. The dispute arose when the Stephenses blocked access to their driveway, which the McElroys used to reach Seaweed Beach.In the Superior Court, the McElroys sought to quiet title to the easement, a declaration of their rights, and injunctive relief. The court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the McElroys, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated this judgment, citing unresolved factual issues. Upon remand, a bench trial was conducted, and the trial justice found that the McElroys had an express easement upon Seaweed Beach and an implied easement over the Stephens property. However, the court ruled that the McElroys did not have easements over the Anthony or Lacroix properties.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial justice's findings. The court held that the 1986 warranty deed clearly incorporated the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach. The court also upheld the trial justice's determination that the McElroys had an implied easement over the Stephens property, as it was necessary for the enjoyment of their express easement on Seaweed Beach. The court found no error in the trial justice's admission of the 1986 purchase and sales agreement as extrinsic evidence to establish the implied easement. Finally, the court concluded that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to amend the judgment, as the alleged inconsistencies did not constitute a manifest error of law. View "McElroy v. Stephens" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Paula M. Montaquila, appealed a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Flagstar Bank, FSB, regarding the foreclosure sale of property located at 33 Zella Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Ms. Montaquila and her son had obtained a mortgage with Flagstar in 2008, using the property as collateral, and later executed a partial claim mortgage in 2016. Flagstar sent a notice of intent to foreclose to the property via certified mail and conducted a foreclosure sale, which Ms. Montaquila challenged, alleging that Flagstar failed to comply with statutory notice requirements by not sending the notice to her last known address at 25 Enfield Avenue.The Superior Court granted Flagstar's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was affirmed in part and vacated in part by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Flagstar had satisfied the statutory notice requirements as to Ms. Montaquila. On remand, Flagstar filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had complied with the notice requirements by sending the notice to the property address, where Ms. Montaquila was listed as an assessed owner.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Flagstar's compliance with the statutory notice requirements. The court held that the last generally recognized address for Ms. Montaquila, relating to the real estate subject to the mortgage, was 33 Zella Street. Flagstar had complied with the statutory requirements by sending the notice to that address. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, granting summary judgment in favor of Flagstar. View "Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

The case involves a partition action concerning two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The properties were inherited from their mother’s estate in 2017. After failed negotiations to sell the properties to Puchalski, Karasuk and Ingley filed a partition action on May 3, 2021. Numerous continuances were granted due to Puchalski's complaints of hearing impairment. Despite accommodations, Puchalski expressed dissatisfaction and failed to appear at several hearings.The Superior Court dismissed Puchalski’s appeals, approved the commissioner’s petition for instructions, and quashed a statement she filed in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. Puchalski appealed these decisions. The Superior Court had granted plaintiffs' motion to sell the properties, appointed a commissioner, and issued a temporary restraining order against Puchalski. Puchalski failed to appear at critical hearings, leading to the dismissal of her appeals.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Puchalski received adequate notice of the motions and hearings. The court determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory and not subject to review under the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions, including the dismissal of Puchalski’s appeals and the orders related to the partition and sale of the properties. The court emphasized that Puchalski’s continued attempts to delay the proceedings were unavailing and that the matter should proceed to finality. View "Karasuk v. Puchalski" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a real estate transaction between Francesco Scotti and Matthew Mimiaga concerning a property at 300 Benefit Street in Providence, Rhode Island. In 2015, Scotti sold the property to Mimiaga, who financed the purchase through a promissory note. As part of the transaction, Scotti was granted an option to repurchase the property within five years for $900,000. Scotti claimed he exercised this option by mailing a handwritten letter to Mimiaga on June 1, 2020, but Mimiaga denied receiving it. Scotti also alleged that Mimiaga requested extensions to stay on the property due to COVID-19 and other issues, which he granted.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mimiaga, ruling that the option agreement lacked separate consideration, Scotti did not properly exercise the option, and there was no express or implied waiver of the option's terms. The court found no evidence that Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter and concluded that Scotti did not act timely to repurchase the property.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the option agreement was supported by consideration as stated in the written document. It also found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter, invoking the presumption that mailed notices are received. Additionally, the court determined that whether time was of the essence and whether there was an implied waiver of the option's terms were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Scotti v. Mimiaga" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Louis Paolino and Marie E. Issa, own property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to a site operated as an automobile recycling business. The neighboring property, owned by J.F. Realty, LLC and operated by LKQ Route 16 Used Auto Parts, Inc., was found to be contaminated. The Department of Environmental Management (DEM) required remediation, leading the defendants, Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., to design a stormwater remediation system. Plaintiffs alleged that this system discharged contaminated water onto their property and encroached on it.In prior litigation, the plaintiffs sued the Ferreira defendants in state court for trespass due to contamination. The case was removed to federal court, where federal claims were dismissed, and state claims were remanded. A jury found encroachment but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, which was partially granted. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the encroachment, deeming it de minimis, but ordered a new trial on other issues. In a subsequent trial, the jury found no continuing trespass. Plaintiffs also pursued a Clean Water Act claim in federal court, which was dismissed after a bench trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the issues in the current case were precluded by collateral estoppel. The court found that the issue of contamination had been litigated and decided in prior state and federal actions, and the encroachment was previously determined to be de minimis. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating these issues. View "Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a landlord-tenant eviction action where the defendant, Jo-Ann Albanese, was ordered to vacate her apartment by August 1, 2021, by the plaintiff, Red Gate Motel, Inc. Ms. Albanese did not vacate the property and sent a rent payment for August, which was returned uncashed by Red Gate. Red Gate then filed an eviction complaint in District Court, which ruled in favor of Red Gate, awarding possession and damages. Ms. Albanese appealed to the Superior Court.In the Superior Court, Ms. Albanese filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss the eviction action, arguing that Red Gate accepted her rent payment without proper notice. The trial justice deferred ruling on this motion until all evidence was presented. The trial spanned five days, during which Ms. Albanese attempted to introduce a recording to support her retaliatory defense. On the final day of trial, Ms. Albanese was absent due to a medical emergency, and the trial justice rendered a bench decision in her absence, awarding possession and $6,000 in damages to Red Gate. Ms. Albanese's subsequent motions to vacate the judgment and to reconsider were denied by the trial justice.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice. The court noted that Ms. Albanese failed to provide a complete transcript of the lower court proceedings, which limited the review. The trial justice's findings, including the decision to deny the motion to vacate based on Ms. Albanese's purposeful delay, were upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders of the Superior Court, concluding that Ms. Albanese was given a fair opportunity to present her case and that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. View "Red Gate Motel, Inc. v. Albanese" on Justia Law